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Foreword
I believe that this book will be regarded as a classic in describing the emerging global 
energy crises and alternate approaches for addressing them. It will not only serve sev-
eral purposes in the technology and policy worlds but will also appeal to a broader 
audience. As the authors intended, it is an excellent technical source book for engineers 
and technologists. It provides a comprehensive review of the history of energy conver-
sion and use; current and emerging technologies to achieve energy sustainability in a 
highly stressed planet; and contemporary international efforts to find solutions to the 
complex issues involved. Accordingly, it is also a must read for all young individuals of 
social consciousness, who see themselves as inheritors of grand challenge world issues 
and have a keen desire to contribute to their solution. 
The book is organized such that each chapter begins with an abstract of the sub-
ject matter and ends with a summary of key points. The language is aimed at a Pop-
ular Science level of technical exposition and is relatively jargon-free considering the 
wide spectrum of technologies presented. Each chapter includes an extensive list of 
references to assist the reader in finding sources and additional details of the refer-
enced content.
However, the most important aspect of the book, which is relatively unique, is the 
way the subject matter is organized. Energy sustainability is presented as a complex 
issue (or a wicked problem) that is interrelated with other complex issues, such as envi-
ronmental sustainability, economic sustainability, and in the case of biomass-derived 
fuels, water and soil sustainability. For such problems there exists not a single solution 
but a multiplicity of solutions, which must then be judged by equally complex interrela-
tionships among technical, social, and economic factors. These in turn vary regionally 
throughout the world based on different histories, cultures, social norms, etc. The book 
carefully addresses these complexities for each energy policy topic presented. 
The editors have carefully selected expert authors to explain the technical, social, 
and economic factors for each topic and present alternative approaches to a solution. 
The book intentionally avoids advocacy and attempts to be an honest broker to the 
readers so that they can draw their own conclusions based on the relative advantages 
and disadvantages presented. 
forewordxii
I am exceedingly proud that this book originated in Professor Coyle’s Fulbright 
Fellowship at Purdue University’s Global Policy Research Institute. I also applaud the 
members of the faculty at Purdue and at the Dublin Institute of Technology who con-
tributed to it, exemplifying a successful trans-Atlantic partnership. This product is a 
glowing example of the vision of the GPRI to engage more faculty and students at Pur-
due and elsewhere to conduct research and careful analysis of grand challenge global 
issues to inform the nation’s policy and decision makers. 
Arden L. Bement, Jr.
Biographical Sketch
Arden Bement, Jr. retired from his position as the founding Director of the Global Policy 
Research Institute at Purdue University in 2013. Prior to that position, he was the Di-
rector of the National Science Foundation from 2004 to 2010. He served as a member of 
the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO and as the vice-chair of the Commission’s 
Natural Sciences and Engineering Committee. He is a member of the U.S. National 
Academy of Engineering, a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and 
a fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Science.
[preface]
xiii
Preface
This book brings together experts in energy policy, social science, power systems, so-
lar energy, agronomy, renewable energy technologies, nuclear engineering, transpor-
tation, and the built environment from both sides of the Atlantic to explore the future 
of energy production and consumption from technological, political, and sociological 
perspectives. The volume is not intended to serve as complete in-depth coverage of all 
energy sector technologies, nor to cover energy policy comprehensively for all world re-
gions. It is, however, hoped that the topics selected and questions addressed will encour-
age further engagement and debate among not only students, but anyone with interest 
in energy sustainability, climate change, and related challenges.
These issues are multi-dimensional and complex in nature; “wicked problems” with 
no easy answers. The book explores issues such as financial outlay and tariff support, 
the readiness of emerging technologies such as wave and tidal energy converters, the 
degree of wind energy that may be accommodated on national networks, the extent to 
which solar energy may be deployed, challenges and uncertainties in the production 
of advanced biofuels, concerns about natural gas extraction via hydraulic fracture (hy-
drofracking), and whether nuclear energy should become more widely used or taken 
out of the generation mix.
In many quarters there is a sense of a race against time in trying to undo the cur-
rent and introduce the new technologies that will help reduce carbon emissions back to 
within acceptable levels and, in so doing, offset further increases in global average tem-
perature. It is also important to remain focused and seek agreement on practical steps 
that may be taken in both the short term, through research and innovation for renew-
able technologies and efficiency in energy use, and longer term through replacement 
of coal, oil, and gas by commercially viable renewable technologies in much greater 
proportions than are achievable today.
We the editors are strong proponents of a growing dialogue between the technology 
and policy communities, and attest to the value of a broader exchange among stake-
holders. Through our respective participation in programs such as the Fulbright Schol-
arship and the AAAS Science and Technology Policy Fellowship, we have witnessed 
ways in which this dialogue can both inspire and be transformed into action.
Prefacexiv
We wish to extend our thanks to the Dublin Institute of Technology, Purdue Uni-
versity, and both the Irish and US Fulbright Commissions for facilitating the faculty ex-
changes between DIT and Purdue that were the origin of this book. We would also like 
to thank Dr. Arden Bement, Emeritus Director of the Global Policy Research Institute 
and his team at Purdue University; Yvonne Desmond and Amy Van Epps, librarians at 
DIT and Purdue respectively; and the staff at Purdue University Press, especially editor 
Jennifer Lynch and director Charles Watkinson. Last but not least, we wish to thank Dr. 
Marek Rebow for his energy and dedication to research at DIT and to Dr. Melissa Dark 
for her role in research collaboration between Purdue University and DIT.
Eugene D. Coyle, Military Technological College, Sultanate of Oman
Richard A. Simmons, Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana
1Then I say the Earth belongs to each generation during its course, fully and in 
its own right . . . [but] no generation can contract debts greater than may be 
paid during the course of its own existence.
Thomas Jefferson (1743–1826)
Introduction
Energy is everywhere and drives everything. Our modern lives, both individual and so-
cietal, have come to depend on its abundance, convenience, and potential. It is the motive 
force within our bodies, propelling our vehicles, lighting our world. Consider a power 
outage, or a dead cell phone battery; living without energy, for even ten minutes, demon-
strates how indelible its imprint is on daily activities. At the same time, we inhabit an 
amazing ecosystem, as resilient as it is fragile. Our energy comes from and returns to a 
global environment. The world is in a predicament, yet this is no book of gloom and doom, 
but rather of technology and policy. These tools help us not only understand the energy 
and climate context of our world, but allow us to begin solving its challenges. History has 
shown that when technology and policy are not aligned or well-proportioned, they fail on 
their collective promises. But taken together, in an intentional, practical, and coordinated 
manner, they can be the stimulus behind a new and far superior energy future. And the 
world has never needed that more than it does today.
Planet Earth is facing an energy crisis owing to an escalation in global energy de-
mand, continued dependence on fossil-based fuels for energy generation and transpor-
tation, and an increase in world population, exceeding seven billion people and rising 
steadily. Excessive burning of fossil fuels is not only depleting natural resources, but is 
resulting in a steady increase of carbon dioxide emissions, which experts believe is re-
sponsible for increasing average global temperatures. While natural cyclical variations do 
occur in regional and global climates, there is now widespread agreement among scien-
tific communities and governments that recent climate change is accelerating as a result 
of human intervention and that rapid and profound measures will be required to reduce 
harmful impacts. Concentration levels of greenhouse gases are rising steadily and are 
now greater than at any time in the past eight hundred thousand years. If concentration 
levels are not reversed, major changes to the world climate may result, bringing significant 
effects on people, industry, and the world economy. The International Energy Agency 
(IEA) has outlined critical steps that, if implemented quickly, can help reduce the upward 
trend in atmospheric emissions. To reduce traditional fuel use and CO2 emissions, major 
countermeasures include increased energy efficiency and conservation, efforts to advance 
alternative energy technologies, and efforts to control future energy demand.
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Prior to modern industrialization, concentration levels of carbon dioxide in the 
atmosphere remained relatively stable at 280 ppm. Over recent decades there has been 
a steady rise in emissions, with levels now approaching 400 ppm (a forty percent in-
crease) and rising an average of 2.3 percent per annum. The Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC) has coined the now widely accepted “hockey stick graph” 
characteristic to describe atmospheric pollutant increase. The graph has been used for 
numerous reconstructions of Northern Hemisphere temperatures for the last 600 to 
1,000 years. Reconstructions have consistently shown that late 20th century and early 
21st century temperatures are rising sharply in tandem with concentrations of green-
house gases, in particular carbon dioxide (Figure 1).
It is now believed that a doubling of atmospheric carbon dioxide to 560 ppm, pro-
jected by IPCC to occur by mid-century, will yield a global average temperature in-
crease of at least 4°F (2.2°C). To gain an appreciation of world average temperature 
statistics it is noted that the twentieth century average global temperature for the month 
of June was 60°F (15.5°C).
Even an increase of 2°C over pre-industrial levels may result in significant world 
climatic change with detrimental social, human and economic impact. Therefore, to 
the extent such temperature increases can be avoided, it behooves governments and 
concerned members of civil society to implement appropriate, yet practical policies and 
actions in response.
To that end, IEA in 2009 proposed a plan entitled the 450 Scenario with an aggres-
sive timetable of actions that would be required to limit the long-term concentration 
of greenhouse gases in Earth’s atmosphere to 450 parts per million of carbon-dioxide 
Figure 1. Keeling Curve of Atmospheric CO2 Concentrations, Measured at Mauna Loa 
Observatory1
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equivalent, setting a limit on global temperature rise to around 2°C above pre-industrial 
levels. The plan outlines a timeline to 2030 with actions that include the introduction of 
energy efficient technologies, low-carbon energy technologies, enhanced generation in-
tegration through renewable energy resources, increase in nuclear energy as a base load 
provider, and incorporation of energy plants fitted with carbon capture and storage 
capabilities. In road transportation, the plan advocates a shift from the current balance 
of greater than 99 percent combustion-powered vehicles to at least 60 percent hybrid 
and electric vehicles.
In addition to the 450 Scenario, IEA proposed a range of policy scenarios in the 
2012 World Energy Outlook, which if followed could result in very different outcomes in 
global climate.2 In researching projections and likely outcomes it is clear that the grand 
challenges presenting in energy and climate are global in nature and require concerted 
action and coordination across state, country and continental borders. Commendable 
inroads have been achieved through work of the United Nations Framework Conven-
tion on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 
the Environmental Protection Agency and related organizations. By the end of 2011, 
191 countries had become signatories to the Kyoto Protocol, and in so doing committed 
to reaching designated national targets for reduction in greenhouse gas emissions.
A study on global climate change, commissioned by the National Research Council 
in the United States and conducted by a wide ranging team of experts, resulted in a 
comprehensive report etitled America’s Climate Choices in 2011. The world currently 
emits upwards to thirty billion tons of CO2 per year from the combustion of fossil fu-
els. Twenty percent of these emissions are created by the United States. In America’s 
Climate Choices it is acknowledged that limiting climate change will necessitate global 
participation and contribution, noting that greenhouse gases do not observe national 
boundaries:
A molecule of CO2 emitted in India or China has the same effect on the 
climate system as a molecule emitted in the United States. There is wide 
agreement that limiting the magnitude of climate change will require sub-
stantial action on behalf of all major GHG-emitting nations, including 
both the industrialized nations and the rapidly developing countries whose 
relative share of global emissions is rapidly increasing.3
The report proffers that development of strong credible policies by the US for reducing 
emissions will ultimately help advance similar response by individual nations and help 
facilitate greater international cooperative engagement.
Western industrialized countries carry a much greater responsibility for past emis-
sions and continue to emit large quantities of carbon dioxide; however many develop-
ing countries through rapid expansion and growth are now significant greenhouse gas 
polluters. In recent years China has surpassed the US as the world’s largest emitter of 
greenhouse gases. China, US, the European Union, Brazil, Indonesia, Russia, and India 
account collectively for approximately 60 percent of emissions. This group of countries 
also accounts for approximately 55 percent of world population. More than 75 percent 
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of carbon dioxide emissions derive from burning of fossil fuels, principally coal, oil and 
natural gas.
Aside from concerns about fossil fuel emissions, there is increasing concern re-
garding global supply to meet market demand for crude-oil. In “Oil’s tipping point has 
passed,” Murray and King argue that since 2005 conventional crude oil production has 
not risen to match increasing demand. Prior to 2005, production increased in line with 
growing demand, however supply has been relatively constant over the ensuing eight 
years to the present day:
In 2005, global production of regular crude oil reached about 72 million 
barrels per day. From then on, production capacity seems to have hit a ceil-
ing at 75 million barrels per day. Analysis of prices against production from 
1998 to today . . . shows this dramatic transition, from a time when supply 
could respond elastically to rising prices caused by increased demand, to 
when it could not. As a result, prices swing wildly in response to small 
changes in demand.4
In a special report entitled “Golden Rules for a Golden Age of Gas,” IEA explores the 
case for exploitation of unconventional gas (in particular shale gas, tight gas, and coal-
bed methane) and questions whether natural gas is poised to enter a golden age. Some 
view wider deployment of natural gas as a way to provide increased energy security, 
while others remain concerned about potential environmental damage which may re-
sult from hydraulic fracturing (fracking). Additional complexities surrounding avail-
ability and supply of crude oil, coal and natural gas will be further addressed in ensuing 
chapters.
The authors of this book are primarily engineers, social scientists, and policy spe-
cialists and do not claim in-depth expertise in the related sciences of climatology and 
greenhouse gas emissions. The book will therefore not attempt to explain the complex 
relationship between energy, emissions and climate nor further argue in favor or against 
the case for accepting a particular projection. As concerned citizens and educators of 
student engineers, scientists, and technologists, this book rather seeks to question how 
greenhouse gas emissions can be reduced, address challenges in bringing advanced 
technologies to market, and identify steps to be taken that will facilitate more diversi-
fied and sustainable global energy systems.
Engineers will need to be engaged in solving these issues to the same extent as 
they have, however unwittingly, contributed to their creation. Major steps forward in 
the adaptation, development, and use of technology will be required. Greater invest-
ment in energy efficient technologies, low carbon technologies, renewable technologies, 
nuclear energy, and carbon capture and storage technologies is now needed. In trans-
portation, increased vehicle efficiency along with a gradual shift from conventional pe-
troleum-fueled technology to hybrids and other advanced vehicles promises to extend 
fuel and diversify to new sources of energy. Applying biofuels to both air and ground 
based transportation, which have notably different fuel specifications, is also of crucial 
importance. Greater momentum is now evident in applied research with a focus on 
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product-to-market renewable energy technologies including solar photovoltaic, wind, 
marine, and geothermal. The future of nuclear energy and the development of smart 
grids and super grids are seminal research questions facing today’s engineers and policy 
makers. Adaptations to existing residential and commercial buildings to more passive, 
energy efficient, less fossil-fuel dependent dwellings is an area of growing concern in 
many western countries today. Research on energy distribution and future intercon-
nected grid networks is of growing interest to national energy utilities, with emerging 
opportunities for greater cooperation between nations in both energy trading and in 
ensuring energy availability and security of supply.
In a modern book discussing the interactions of energy and climate, technology 
and policy, an attempt to integrate all aspects of these issues would be daunting at best. 
Therefore we have organized the narrative by selecting target technologies, represen-
tative policy concepts, and instructive case studies. Specific technologies, policies, and 
countries have necessarily been chosen in order to expand the reader’s breadth and 
depth of understanding and stimulate additional discussion and investigation. No at-
tempt has been made to introduce every conceivable energy solution, or even to suggest 
a priority for those most promising today. Rather, it is believed that technology and pol-
icy remain flexible, and that a truly robust energy and climate strategy should be adapt-
able to achieve multiple objectives in the face of changing variables, evolving economies 
and electorates, and new scientific data and discoveries.
In order to achieve solutions of the required scale and magnitude within a limited 
timeline, it is essential that engineers, scientists, and technologists be not only techno-
logically adept, but also aware of the wider social and political issues that governmental 
policy-makers face. Likewise, it is imperative that policy makers work closely with the 
academic community to interpret data and chart the way to achieve bold, timely, and 
lasting change. This book is designed to bridge the gap between these two communities. 
Central issues in global energy will be discussed through interdisciplinary dialogue and 
contribution by a host of experts in their respective fields.
Book Layout
The book is organized in three parts.
Part 1: Global Energy Crisis in Context. Chapter 1 considers man’s dependence on 
carbonaceous fuels for survival through time. The technological and economic devel-
opments of the industrial revolution are recalled, with a focus on the detrimental effects 
resulting from excessive burning of coal to meet energy requirements. This coincides 
with emerging scientific awareness in the eighteenth century of the nature of Earth’s 
atmosphere and the delicate balance of its constituent elements. The history of society’s 
growing dependence on coal, oil, and natural gas, the emergence of new methods of 
extraction such as hydraulic fracking, and the introduction of clean technologies and 
the proposed capture and storage of carbon are reviewed in context.
Chapter 2 explores current global energy demand and expected demand growth 
in the coming decades. Demand has more than doubled in the last four decades; with 
introduction6
reliance still heavily weighted on the traditional fossil fuels: coal, oil, and natural gas. A 
review and comparison of energy policy in the US and the EU is made, including the im-
portant 1997 Kyoto Protocol and subsequent UN energy and climate conventions. This 
is followed by an exploration of energy policy directives and trends in China, Russia, 
Brazil, and India. These nations all have large populations as well as significant energy 
demands and resources, and will be critical players in global efforts to align energy and 
climate trade and policies.
As educators, our primary objective is to equip graduates with the necessary skill 
sets to understand social context and to help them contribute to the solutions of en-
ergy’s challenges. Chapter 3 explores social engagement by the engineer, through un-
derstanding the social environment and awareness of common authentic values and 
principles. Themed case studies are included to address how social environment influ-
ences engineering practice.
Part 2: Energy Conversion Technology. In harnessing the forces of nature Chapter 
4 reviews a range of renewable energy technologies including wind, hydro, marine wave 
and tidal, and geothermal energy. A discussion of recent developments and growth in 
both onshore and offshore wind energy is followed by an appraisal of historical de-
velopments in hydropower. The case for wave and tidal energy is made with a review 
of emerging technologies and the challenges engineers continue to face. The chapter 
concludes with an investigation of geothermal energy and its place in the energy mix.
Solar energy is emerging as an important source of renewable energy with po-
tential for increased grid penetration. Developments in nanotechnology have enabled 
the study of materials at an atomic level, opening up an exciting frontier in materi-
als science. Applications of nanotechnology to solar energy devices are resulting in 
improvements in solar energy conversion efficiency. Emerging technologies are also 
enabling improved robustness to thermal variation and environmental degradation of 
solar devices. Chapter 5 addresses the current status of research in nanotechnology in 
association with solar photovoltaic, solar concentration, and thermoelectric devices. 
The chapter also explores future opportunities for nanotechnology in energy conver-
sion and storage.
Bioenergy is a forefront research frontier. Chapter 6 provides a history of first and 
second-generation biofuel production, and explores policy which has enabled develop-
ments in biofuels in the US, Brazil, and the EU. Feedstocks, conversion processes, and 
end products in advanced biofuel technologies are explored. An examination is made 
of five uncertainties associated with the industrial development of biofuels and other 
challenges and opportunities facing the industry are explored. The chapter includes 
with a technology update of advanced biofuel conversion projects.
In chapter 7 we shift focus from renewable energy technologies, to consider the 
role of nuclear engineering. We examine the social, environmental, technological, and 
power capacity capability of nuclear fission reactors. An exploration of the historical 
development of nuclear engineering, the nuclear fuel cycle and nuclear energy as a pro-
vider of baseload generation is followed by a review of nuclear energy safety. Nuclear 
accidents and their effect on public perception are explored through scenario discus-
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sions of Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and Fukushima. Challenges in handling waste 
with current policy, including disposal or storage of nuclear fuel stockpile, are explored 
and quantified. The chapters closes with a brief discussion on nuclear fusion and where 
it might lead.
Part 3: Energy Distribution and Use. Chapter 8 explores policy perspectives and 
challenges presenting in taking emerging renewable energies to market. The chapter 
first explores a range of influential factors including economic, political, social, envi-
ronmental, and maintainability. A brief appraisal is then made of the economics of 
energy together with a study of levelized costs of new generation energy resources, both 
dispatchable (including coal, gas, nuclear, and biomass) and non-dispatchable (such as 
wind, solar, and hydro). An exemplar study of challenges for emerging wave energy 
technologies concludes the chapter.
In chapter 9, attention turns to consideration of energy used for transportation, not-
ing the sector’s disproportionate reliance on oil. The resulting geopolitical, economic, 
and environmental consequences present difficult near and long-term challenges. The 
chapter is divided into three parts; part 1 is an introduction and overview of current 
transportation energy issues. Part 2 explores the specific challenges facing the auto-
motive transportation sector. A brief history of automotive technology is followed by a 
classification of modern vehicle configurations, including internal combustion engine 
and hybrid electric driveline configuration developments. In Part 3, we turn our atten-
tion to the aviation transportation sector by exploring aviation fuels and regulations, 
followed by a discussion of challenges to the development and production of alternative 
aviation fuels and fuel emissions.
Noting that energy use in the built environment accounts for approximately 
40% of the energy consumed in developed countries, chapter 10 is devoted to this 
highly important sector. In 2004, the emissions resulting from direct energy use in 
the built environment were estimated at close on 9 Gt of CO2 per year. There is gen-
eral agreement that through the use of mature technologies, building energy usage 
can be reduced substantially. The chapter begins with a thorough introduction to the 
magnitude of energy consumed by existing buildings in the developed world. Practi-
cal and currently available retrofit technologies with long-term potential for building 
energy reduction are described along with variables that influence the choice and 
effectiveness of these technologies. A discussion ensues of the challenges and barriers 
to implementing these technologies. This is followed by an exploration of policy chal-
lenges that confront energy efficient retrofits. A review of building energy reduction 
programs employed in the US and EU is followed with recommendations and oppor-
tunities for future solutions.
Epilogue
The epilogue provides a pivotal synthesis of questions posed, lessons learned, and in-
sights gained, and of the continued challenges in both meeting future energy demands 
and helping reduce manmade carbon emissions.
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Chapter 1
Reflections on Energy, Greenhouse Gases,  
and Carbonaceous Fuels
EugEnE d. CoylE, William gRimSon,  
biSWajit baSu, and mikE muRPhy
abstract
In this chapter, we review the history of man’s dependence on carbonaceous fuels for 
survival, beginning with pre-industrial civilizations, during which charcoal was pro-
cessed for thousands of years to smelt iron and copper. In the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, however, coke and coal became prime energy resources which powered the 
engine rooms of the industrial revolution. Accompanying the economic and societal 
benefits of this period was the recognition of the damage resulting from smog owing 
to excessive burning of coal, which affected both human health and the natural envi-
ronment. These pivotal centuries laid the foundation for the advancement of scientific 
knowledge and discovery which underpinned both engineering developments and the 
sciences of the natural world, including earth science, atmospheric science, and meteo-
rology. These developments in turn led to our modern understanding of climate change 
and the effect of greenhouse gases.
Today coal, petroleum, and natural gas still play a vital role in our global energy mix. 
While scientists and engineers have developed clean coal technologies such as carbon 
capture and storage, it is important to question whether such technologies can offset 
the growing carbon footprint caused by the use of carbonaceous fuels. This challenge 
is complicated by the growth in scale of total global world energy demand, the scale of 
economic investment required to implement such technologies, and the race against 
time to minimize the damage resulting from continued use of fossil fuel energy.
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1.1. Introduction: Man’s Quest for Energy
Humankind has always needed energy, and while the source and usage of energy have 
changed over time some patterns have remained constant. In earlier times food was the 
key source of energy for people and their livestock. This form of energy not only allowed 
our race to survive but dictated in part how civilization developed. Societies worldwide 
focused on developing new and sustainable food sources. The storage of food and its 
distribution was a factor in how groups learned to organize themselves communally, 
best survive periods of shortage, and also benefit from occasional abundances. The dis-
covery of methods of processing and preserving food meant that new sources of food 
could be used with increased efficiency and increasingly less waste. People migrated 
across continents, seas, and oceans in response to sometimes complex social pressures, 
but certainly the search for food and reliable sources of food was a common factor in 
their movements. There may be a greater urgency today than heretofore to identifying 
sustainable sources of energy, increasing the efficiency of energy usage, and finding new 
sources of energy due to expanding world population, depletion of energy resources, 
and growing environmental concerns; but there is no question that similar patterns 
have been in evidence for thousands of years. And there is something timeless and cir-
cular about modern society growing crops that once would have been considered food, 
but now are solely intended to produce energy as biofuels.
The history of how energy is and was used illustrates how competing usages dictate 
the exploitation of resources, often to the detriment of the original but less powerful first 
adopters. Charcoal as fuel for cooking has a long history and is still in demand today for 
use in barbecues. Yet more than five thousand years ago, people found that it was useful 
in smelting of iron and in the Bronze Age applied it to the production of copper and 
more valuably, bronze. These and subsequent developments caused the clearing of wood-
lands and competed with land once intended only for agricultural purposes. The use of 
banks to divide land facilitated the retention of some trees which were then coppiced to 
provide a source of charcoal. By the thirteenth century Europeans had learned of the 
Chinese explosive gunpowder, which created a new demand for charcoal yet again. The 
military use of gunpowder necessitated the casting of cannons, requiring a considerable 
amount of charcoal. These factors put pressure on supplies of wood suitable for charcoal 
production, leading to the introduction of restrictions in certain countries. By the eigh-
teenth century the demand for charcoal to support the iron industry was so high that an 
alternative was desirable, and this was found in the form of coke. Not only could coke 
replace charcoal for many industrial purposes, but a byproduct of coke production was 
a combustible gas that could be used in households. Not surprisingly coal and coke pro-
ducers encouraged the use of their products, further reducing the demand for charcoal. 
The historical relationship between coke and charcoal demonstrate how a single energy 
source can have many interacting uses and drivers for its exploitation, and that the resul-
tant interrelationships between users and suppliers are complex.
During World Wars I and II and their aftermath, the world witnessed both the horror 
of the destructive power of nuclear energy and the potential promise of an efficient, reliable 
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and clean source of electrical energy. The debate on the future mix of nuclear power in 
global energy provision, which had to address such issues as nuclear waste disposal, nuclear 
power plant accidents and their environmental and social consequence, and the continued 
development and dependence on nuclear energy from an armaments perspective, continues 
today (these issues are explored further in chapter 7). Furthermore, the general argument 
that environmental factors are not the only ones that influence decisions on energy produc-
tion also applies to what might be called green or clean technologies. Lobby groups pushing 
their own agendas have not always supported their stances with high quality economic and 
environmental data. As a result, the informed public has rightly become more robust in 
questioning  the latest projects to harness power through renewable and sustainable sources, 
whether those involve estuary barrages, wave power, offshore wind, solar power, or bioen-
ergy. Apart from searching for new solutions and developing new methods of production, 
energy engineers have a clear responsibility to help inform policy makers and the general 
public of the pros and cons of each means of energy production.
The world has truly become a global village. The challenges to achieving global 
economic security and sustainable living—in a world of increasing population and mul-
tivariable levels of wealth and social inequality—are complex and vast. The relation-
ship between man and machine, productivity and industrial development, marches on. 
Whether in cities of the so-called developed nations or in the rapidly expanding urban 
population centers of the developing world, concern for the atmosphere that sustains 
Earth’s ecosystem is of growing importance. Air pollution affects the overall balance 
and ultimate health of the ecosystem. It is instructive to briefly review the nature and 
composition of Earth’s atmosphere and to explore the important role played by carbo-
naceous fuels throughout human history. 
1.2. Earth’s atmosphere and Greenhouse Gases
1.2.1. Climate Variability
Climate variability is one of the great discussion points and climate change one of the 
great concerns of humankind today. Research in climate science and meteorology is long 
established and it is therefore fitting to briefly review the writings of a selected band of 
pioneering thought leaders of the nineteenth century in their contemplations of Earth’s 
atmosphere and its makeup.
In the 1820s, Jean Baptiste Joseph Fourier calculated that, based on its size and 
distance from the sun, planet Earth should be considerably cooler than it actually is, 
assuming it is warmed only by the effects of incoming solar radiation. He examined 
various possible sources of the additional observed heat, and ultimately concluded that 
the Earth’s atmosphere acts in some way as an insulator, thus retaining quantities of 
incoming solar heat. This observation may be considered the earliest scientific contri-
bution to what today is commonly known as the greenhouse effect.1
Forty years later John Tyndall identified the radiative properties of water vapor 
and CO2 in controlling surface temperatures. In 1861, after two years of painstaking 
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experiments, Tyndall published a lengthy paper packed with results. Among the find-
ings, he reported that moist air absorbs thirteen times more heat than dry, purified 
air.2 Tyndall observed that:
The waves of heat speed from our earth through our atmosphere towards 
space. These waves dash in their passage against the atoms of oxygen and 
nitrogen, and against the molecules of aqueous vapor. Thinly scattered as 
these latter are, we might naturally think meanly of them as barriers to the 
waves of heat.3
In the early twentieth century, Swedish scientist Svante Arrhenius asked whether the mean 
temperature of the ground was in any way influenced by the presence of the heat-absorb-
ing gases in the atmosphere. This question was debated throughout the early part of the 
twentieth century and is still a main concern of earth scientists today. Arrhenius went on 
to become the first person to investigate the effect that doubling atmospheric carbon di-
oxide would have on global climate and was awarded the 1903 Nobel Prize for Chemistry.4
It is well understood that Earth’s atmosphere comprises a layer of gases surrounding the 
planet and retained by gravity.5 Extending from Earth’s surface, the atmosphere protects 
life on Earth by absorbing ultraviolet solar radiation, warming the surface through heat 
retention (the greenhouse effect), and reducing temperature extremes between day and night 
through a process called diurnal variation. The air we breathe contains approximately 78.1% 
nitrogen, 20.9% oxygen, 0.9% argon, 0.04% carbon and small amounts of other gases. These 
other gases, often referred to as trace gases, also comprise the greenhouse gases. 
An atmospheric greenhouse gas (GHG) can absorb and emit radiation within the 
thermal infrared (IR) range of the electromagnetic spectrum of light.6 The primary 
greenhouse gases of Earth’s atmosphere are water vapor, carbon dioxide, methane, ni-
trous oxide, and tropospheric ozone.7 Solar radiation passing through the atmosphere 
heats the surface of the Earth. Some of the energy returns to the atmosphere as long-
wave heat energy radiation, some energy is captured by the layer of gases that surrounds 
the Earth, and the remainder passes into space. The concentration and proportional mix 
of these gases in the atmosphere influence climate stability and changes in composition 
can result in climate change. Since the commencement of the industrial revolution, hu-
man activity such as the burning of fossil fuels, the release of industrial chemicals, the 
removal of forests that would otherwise absorb carbon dioxide, and their replacement 
with intensive livestock ranching, has changed the types and quantities of gases in the 
atmosphere. This in turn has substantially increased the capacity of the atmosphere 
to absorb heat energy and emit it back to Earth. Some greenhouse gases stay in the 
atmosphere for only a few hours or days, while others remain for decades, centuries, or 
even millennia. Greenhouse gases emitted today will drive climate change long into the 
future, and the process cannot be quickly reversed.8
1.2.2. Carbonaceous Fuels
Carbon dioxide emissions come from combustion of carbonaceous fuels such as coal, 
oil and natural gas. Carbon dioxide has an atmospheric lifetime of about one hundred 
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years; methane, twelve years; and nitrous oxide, one hundred fourteen years. Methane 
is up to twenty-five times more effective than carbon dioxide in the capture of heat in 
the atmosphere and its radiative effect is approximately seventy times larger, however it 
exists in much smaller concentrations and therefore its overall environmental impact 
is significantly less. In addition to its production through farming livestock, rice culti-
vation, and coal mining, there are large quantities of methane in arctic permafrost ice9 
and below ocean sediments. Release of such gas could result in major environmental 
damage; large-scale release has not occurred in recent history, but remains a point of 
genuine concern.
Isn’t it ironic that the natural elements of coal, gas, and oil, having sustained human 
life over thousands of years, are now viewed to a certain degree as offenders, responsible 
for the pollution that has upset the balance of nature? It is, of course, mankind that has 
created the current instability through insatiable exploitation of Earth’s resources. It is 
therefore mankind’s responsibility to ensure every effort be made to redress the damage 
done and to work toward a more sustainable eco-environment.
1.2.3. Fossil Fuels Through history
Fossil fuels are formed by natural processes such as the anaerobic decomposition of 
buried dead organisms, through exposure to heat and pressure in the Earth’s crust over 
time periods of typically millions of years. Containing high percentages of carbon, fos-
sil fuels include coal, petroleum, and gas. They range from volatile materials with low 
carbon to hydrogen ratios, such as methane (CH4), to liquid petroleum, to nonvolatile 
materials composed of almost pure carbon, such as anthracite coal.10 George Agricola 
is credited as the first scientist to have articulated the biogenic of fossil fuel creation. 
His most famous work, the De re metallica libri xii, a treatise on mining and extractive 
metallurgy, was published in 1556. Agricola described and illustrated how ore veins 
occur in and on the ground, making the work an early contribution to the developing 
science of geology.11
In 2011, fossil fuel consumption in the United States totaled eighty quadrillion Brit-
ish thermal units (Btu). The US Energy Information Administration (EIA) estimated 
that 80% of that energy was derived from fossil fuels, specifically 35.3% from petroleum, 
19.6% from coal, and 26.8% from natural gas. Nuclear energy and renewable energy 
accounted for 8.3% and 9.1%, respectively.12
Fossil fuels are non-renewable resources because they take millions of years to 
form, and reserves are being depleted much faster than new ones are being made. The 
burning of fossil fuels produces over twenty-two billion tonnes of carbon dioxide (CO2) 
per year, but it is estimated that natural processes can only absorb about half of that 
amount. This causes a net increase of eleven billion tonnes of atmospheric carbon di-
oxide per year.
1.2.3.1. Coal
One of Earth’s most valued natural resources, coal has been a provider of warmth and 
energy to humankind for hundreds, if not thousands of years. Resulting from decaying 
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woodland vegetation, compressed by rain water and repeatedly added to through fur-
ther additional mineral vegetation deposit over hundreds of thousands of years, peat 
was formed which over time hardened to lignite (brown coal) and then to coal, a dark 
colored sedimentary rock made of both inorganic and organic matter. With many dif-
ferent classifications of grade and composition, also referred to as coal rank, coal is 
primarily composed of carbon, while also containing elements of hydrogen, oxygen, 
nitrogen, aluminum, silicon, iron, sulfur and calcium. Coal can in fact contain as many 
as one hundred twenty inorganic compound trace elements with over seventy of the 
naturally occurring elements of the periodic table. Designated coal types range from 
lignite to flame coal, sub-bituminous, bituminous through to nonbaking coal and an-
thracite, classified in accordance with percentage element composition. The particles of 
organic matter in coal are referred to as macerals, indicative of plants or parts of plants 
including bark, roots, spores and seeds, which originally contributed to a particular 
coal formation. Coal rank is determined by the percentage of fixed carbon, moisture, 
volatile matter, and calorific value in British thermal units after the sulfur and miner-
al-matter content have been subtracted.13
Coal is the world’s most abundant and widely distributed fossil fuel, accounting for 
more than one quarter of global primary energy demand. With global proven reserves 
totaling nearly one trillion tonnes it remains one of the most important sources of en-
ergy for the world, particularly for power generation.16 Coal fuels high percentages of 
electricity to the United States (49%), India (69%), China (79%), Poland (92%), and South 
Africa (97%), and supplies in excess of forty percent of the global electricity generation 
requirements, including Germany and much of central Europe. More than twenty-three 
percent of total world energy and thirty-six percent of world electricity is produced by 
coal, with a projected growth of 2.4% annually in the consumption of electricity between 
2005 and 2030. Over the last decade demand for coal has outpaced that for gas, oil, nu-
clear power, and renewable energy sources. North America, the former Soviet Union, 
and Pacific Asia combined account for more than eighty percent of proven coal reserves. 
Global coal production in 2009 topped 6.9 billion tonnes, with China producing approx-
imately 46 percent, the United States 16 percent, and Australia and India equal producers 
at roughly 6 percent. Bituminous coal dominates world production, followed by lignite 
and coking coal. Sixty percent of coal is produced through underground mining. Aus-
tralia and Indonesia are the two main coal exporting countries. Most coal-producing 
nations produce for their home markets exclusively, and import the balance required to 
meet national demand. In spite of environmental concerns, coal is expected to continue 
to be the second greatest global source of energy through 2030.17
Coal-fired power plants, however, are facing new challenges owing to  increased 
competition from natural gas and  new air pollutant regulations advanced by the EPA 
in 2011, requiring in particular reduced emissions of mercury, acid gases, and soot.18 
Average CO2 emissions from coal-fired power plants are roughly double those from nat-
ural gas plants, approximately 2,250 and 1,135 pounds per megawatt hour, respectively. 
Coal-fired plant retirements are projected to rise to nine thousand megawatts by 2014, 
with a reduction in generating capacity from coal of well in excess of ten percent.19
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Carbon and the Industrial Revolution
Socio-techno-economic factors all played their part in how industrial revolutions 
originated, developed, transformed and then eventually evolved to a post-revolution 
industrial society. One of the key factors undoubtedly was the availability of energy 
and invariably that source of energy was coal. In Great Britain Matt Ridley noted that 
it was not just the availability of coal but that for other and existing sources “there 
was never going to be enough wind, water or wood in England to power the factories, 
let alone in the right place.”14 Of course this comment has to be qualified in that we 
now know that there was and is sufficient energy available from wind and water, but 
the technology and know-how did not exist to harness the levels of energy required 
by industries such as iron and transport. Ridley refers exclusively to windmills, wa-
ter mills, and charcoal. Another point Ridley makes is that the widespread use of 
horses required a huge amount of food (itself an energy source) that required up to 
one-third of the available arable land—land required to feed a growing population. 
It was therefore necessary to abandon renewable sources of energy if the Industrial 
Revolution was to take off. But the picture was complex, as technological innovation 
was required in order to exploit coal at an economic advantage. Effective water pumps 
were required for mining, and new transport solutions were needed to deliver coal 
to where it was to be used. Steam engines for both pumps and early trains, as well as 
the rapidly expanding rail network, required machines to manufacture and shape the 
necessary parts, and it was coal that ultimately provided the power. 
Coal as it was used during the Industrial Revolution came at an additional cost 
in terms of a set of disadvantages. First, it was dirty, resulting in huge amounts of 
ash. Second, it produced a range of toxic flue gases as well as carbon dioxide. Third, 
the production of coal left its mark on the landscape and more importantly on the 
men and their families who carried out the mining. And because coal was abundant, 
there were few incentives to investigate alternatives or even to be much concerned 
with efficiency. A plentiful supply of coal replaced a number of largely clean energy 
sources, but this was not considered an issue as long as profits were increasing. Of 
course today clean—or more correctly cleaner—coal technology (such as flue gas 
scrubbing) has been developed, but the long-term damage cannot be undone.
Some of the problems that accompany coal mining include:
•	 Acid mine drainage results when coal beds and surrounding strata contain-
ing medium to high amounts of sulfur (sulphide compounds) are disrupted 
by mining, thereby exposing sulphides to air and water.
•	 Atmospheric sulfur oxides (SOx) and subsequent acid decomposition, such 
as acid rain, result from the burning of medium to high-sulfur coal.
•	 The quality of surface and ground water may be adversely affected by the dis-
posal of the ash and sludge that result from the burning of coal and flue gases.
•	 Environmental greenhouse gas emissions result from the release of carbon 
dioxide (CO2) and nitrogen oxides (NOx) through the burning of coal.
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1.2.3.2. Petroleum 20
Petroleum, also termed crude oil, contains hydrocarbons and other organic com-
pounds. It is found in natural formations beneath the Earth’s surface. It is derived from 
ancient organic materials such as zooplankton and algae. Petroleum is recovered mostly 
through oil drilling. Colonel Edwin Laurentine Drake is credited as the first person to 
have successfully drilled for oil in the United States. Employed by the Seneca Oil Com-
pany in 1858 to investigate oil deposits in Pennsylvania, Drake devised a 10-foot long 
cast-iron drive pipe which struck bedrock at 32 feet. The following morning crude oil 
was seen to be rising up and oil was brought to the surface using a hand-pitcher pump.21
The discovery of oil triggered an oil rush in America, fueled by an American law 
which conferred ownership of underground resources to the landowner. During this 
period, crude oil was refined into kerosene and was used to light homes and businesses. 
In 1863 John D. Rockefeller entered the fray and concentrated his business on the re-
fining, transportation, and distribution of petroleum. After founding the Standard Oil 
Company in 1870, Rockefeller became the dominant figure in the late nineteenth cen-
tury petroleum industry. Exploration in other parts of the United States, in particu-
lar Texas, and in countries including Russia, Dutch East Indies, Indonesia, Venezuela, 
Trinidad, and Mexico opened up the market with competition from companies includ-
ing the Royal Dutch Company and Shell. It wasn’t until around 1910 that oil began to 
overtake coal as the primary global energy driver. This was largely due to the rapid 
growth of the automobile industry and the necessity for widespread availability and 
supply of gasoline.22
Today, petroleum is refined and separated into a range of consumer products, in-
cluding gasoline (petrol), kerosene (paraffin), asphalt (bitumen), and chemical reagents 
used to make plastics and pharmaceuticals. Petroleum is used in manufacturing a wide 
variety of materials, and it is estimated that the world consumes up to eighty-eight 
million barrels per day. The term petroleum strictly refers to crude oil, however in com-
mon usage it includes all liquid, gaseous, and solid hydrocarbons. Under certain surface 
pressure and temperature conditions, lighter hydrocarbons including methane, ethane, 
propane, and butane exist as gases, while pentane (C5H12) and heavier organic com-
pounds exist in the form of liquids or solids.23
An oil well produces predominantly crude oil, with some natural gas dissolved in 
it. Because the pressure is lower at the surface than underground, some of the gas will 
come out of solution and be recovered (or burned) as associated gas or solution gas. 
A gas well produces predominantly natural gas, however because the underground 
temperature and pressure are higher than at the surface, the gas may contain heavier 
•	 Additional trace elements are released through burning of coal.
Developments both during and subsequent to the Industrial Revolution also 
resulted in great benefits to society. The Enlightenment provided the stimulus for 
creative development and innovation, an increased interchange of knowledge cou-
pled with a new entrepreneurial vigour.15
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hydrocarbons such as pentane, hexane, and heptane in the gaseous state. At surface 
conditions these will condense out of the gas to form natural gas condensate. The pro-
portion of light hydrocarbons in the petroleum mixture varies greatly among different 
oil fields, ranging from as much as 97 percent by weight in the lighter oils to as little as 
50 percent in the heavier oils and bitumens.
Within the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), the five 
Middle Eastern countries Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, and United Arab Emirates 
accounted for seventy percent of oil reserves in 2009, with Saudi Arabia alone account-
ing for twenty-six percent of total OPEC reserves.24 Non-OPEC production accounts 
for about sixty percent of current global oil supply. China has emerged as the largest oil 
consuming country in the world with annual growth rate of about seven percent.
Global crude oil consumption grew by 0.6 million barrels per day (b/d) in 2012, 
reaching 88 million b/d. OECD consumption actually declined by 1.2% in line with 
trends over recent years. Non-OECD consumption grew by 2.8%. China had the largest 
consumption growth at 5.5% (505,000 b/d).
1.2.3.3. Natural Gas
Natural gas is found in deep underground natural rock formations or associated with 
other hydrocarbon reservoirs in coal beds and as methane clathrates. As discussed 
above, petroleum is also found in proximity to and with natural gas. Most natural gas 
was created over time by either a biogenic or thermogenic mechanism. Biogenic gas is 
created by methanogenic organisms (microorganisms that produce methane as a met-
abolic byproduct in anoxic conditions) in marshes, bogs, landfills, and shallow sed-
iments. Deeper in the earth, at greater temperature and pressure, thermogenic gas is 
created from buried organic material.25
Natural gas is often informally referred to simply as gas, especially when compared 
to other energy sources such as oil or coal. In the nineteenth century, natural gas was ob-
tained as a byproduct of producing oil, since the small, light gas carbon chains came out 
of solution as the extracted fluids underwent pressure reduction from the reservoir to the 
surface. If unwanted, natural gas was burned off at source in the oil field. Today, unwanted 
gas may be returned to the reservoir through injection wells. Where economical, gas may 
be transported using a network of pipelines. By converting gas into a form of liquid gaso-
line or diesel, it may also be exported as a liquid, commonly referred as gas to liquid (GTL), 
or to a jet fuel by applying the Fischer-Tropsch process (a collection of chemical reactions 
that converts a mixture of carbon monoxide and hydrogen into liquid hydrocarbons).
Before natural gas can be used as a fuel, it must undergo processing to remove 
impurities, including water, to meet the specifications of marketable natural gas. The 
byproducts of processing include ethane, propane, butanes, pentanes, and higher mo-
lecular weight hydrocarbons, hydrogen sulfide (which may be converted into pure sul-
fur), carbon dioxide, water vapor, and sometimes helium and nitrogen.
Natural gas extracted from oil wells is called casinghead gas or associated gas. The 
natural gas industry is extracting an increasing quantity of gas from challenging re-
source types, including sour gas, tight gas, shale gas, and coalbed methane.
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The world’s largest proven gas reserves are located in Russia, at approximately 48 
terra (1012) cubic meters. Russia is frequently the world’s largest natural gas extractor. 
Other major proven resources (in billion cubic meters) exist in Iran (26,370 in 2006), 
Qatar (25,790 in 2007), Saudi Arabia (6,568 in 2006) and the United Arab Emirates 
(5,823 in 2006).
The world’s largest gas field is Qatar’s offshore North Field, estimated to have twen-
ty-five trillion cubic meters of gas in place.26 The second largest natural gas field is the 
South Pars Gas Field in Iranian waters in the Persian Gulf. Located next to Qatar’s 
North Field, it has an estimated reserve of eight to fourteen trillion cubic meters of gas.
1.2.3.4. Shale Gas
Shale is a fine-grained, clastic sedimentary rock composed of mud that is a mix of flakes 
of clay minerals and tiny fragments of other minerals, notably quartz, calcite, feldspar, 
and dolomite. The ratio of clay to other minerals is variable. Shale is characterized by 
breaks along thin laminae or parallel layering or bedding less than one centimeter in 
thickness, called fissility.27 Shale is easy to break or split, slate-like, into smaller planar 
sheets. Oil shale occurs where organic material is present in the process of producing 
the sedimentary rock. Extraction of gas and oil is carried out by heating the shale to 
temperatures in the region of 475°C. It is estimated that there are about nine hundred 
trillion cubic meters of unconventional gas such as shale gas, of which one hundred 
eighty trillion may be recoverable.28
Shale gas was first extracted as a resource in Fredonia, New York in 1821, in shallow, 
low-pressure fractures.29 In the mid-1800s James Young, a Scottish chemist, devised a 
method of extracting from shale an oil product which he then distilled to yield kero-
sene, naphtha, heavier lubricating oils, and paraffin wax. Fuel (kerosene) to provide 
lighting was an important use of the shale oil at the end of the industrial revolution. The 
shale residue gave rise to shale bings (small hills or tips) which are still a feature of the 
landscape today in West Lothian, Scotland.
Horizontal drilling began in the 1930s, and in 1947 a well was first fracked30 in the 
United States. Work on industrial-scale shale gas production did not begin until the 1970s, 
when declining production potential from conventional gas deposits in the United States 
spurred the federal government to invest in research, development, and demonstration 
projects that ultimately led to directional and horizontal drilling, microseismic imaging, 
and massive hydraulic fracturing. Up until the public and private demonstration projects 
of the 1970s and 1980s, drilling in shale was not considered to be commercially viable.
Approximately thirty countries have oil shale in quantities that are economically 
extractable and they include Brazil, China, Germany, Russia, Sweden, and the United 
States. Worldwide peak production occurred in the 1980s (forty-six million metric 
tons).31 Allix et al. note that “current estimates of the volumes recoverable from shale 
oil deposits are in the trillions of barrels, but recovery methods are complicated and 
expensive . . . but may soon become economically viable.”32
As with many sources of energy, the use of shale gives rise to environmental 
issues. Two major disadvantages of oil recovery from shale is the huge amounts of 
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waste rock (spent shale) and the requirement for large quantities of water in the post- 
extraction treatment. To mitigate the waste problem, one company, Shell, has inves-
tigated in situ extraction of oil based on a method first developed in Sweden using 
electric heaters. Trials have also investigated the use of high temperature injected 
steam. As the United States has the largest oil shale deposits in the world and bearing 
in mind its policy of being as independent as possible of other oil suppliers, it is likely 
that the exploitation of these deposits and the development of extraction methods 
will intensify.
There are growing fears among concerned citizens about the social and environ-
mental impacts of hydrofracking, not least in the United States. The New York Marcel-
lus Shale formation extends from West Virginia to southern New York. Lobby groups 
such as the Nature Conservancy33 point out that high volume horizontal fracturing 
(hydrofracking) would necessitate use of millions of gallons of water per fracking treat-
ment. The water used also contains oil, grease, and small amounts of other chemicals 
and it is estimated that up to forty percent of this water will return to the surface, result-
ing in various degrees of environmental pollution.
1.2.4 Clean Fossil Fuels: Future Challenges and Prospects
1.2.4.1. Overview
While there has been a substantial growth in generation of power from renewable and 
green sources, coal will remain a significant source of fuel for power generation due to 
the requirements of availability, security and diversity of supply. It is therefore import-
ant to review the state of the art in the field of Clean Coal Technologies (CCTs) and how 
such technologies may help reduce carbon emissions going forward.
The primary drawback associated with the use of traditional coal is that modern 
coal-fired power plants operate at low efficiencies and emit large amounts of pollutants. 
This drawback can be circumvented by instead using clean coal. CCT is a product of 
several generations of technological advances. Since the process of combustion is the 
key for energy generation, CCT has led to more efficient combustion of coal with re-
duced emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs), including carbon dioxide, sulfur dioxide, 
and nitrogen oxide. The market for CCT is steadily growing owing to the imminent 
need to reduce GHGs and improve upon power plant efficiency.
One of the biggest challenges in the implementation of CCT is that the quality of 
coal is extremely variable and that coal combustion structurally produces more pollut-
ants than other fossil fuels. Coal is also a major ingredient in the production of steel. A 
further concern is China; the world’s largest and fastest growing economy ranks num-
ber one in coal production, accounting for more than forty percent of global produc-
tion. The extensive use of coal worldwide, coupled with a large number of old, inefficient 
power plants lacking proper emission control equipment, adds to the pollution gener-
ated through burning coal.
Given the likelihood that coal will continue to feature prominently in the energy 
mix for decades to come, adaptation and deployment of CCT in both new and existing 
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plants, where possible, is essential. Power plants being built today are more efficient and 
emit ninety percent less pollutants (SO2, NOx, particulates and mercury) than plants 
built in the 1970s. There are three stages to achieving clean coal:
1. Controlling and reducing pollutants  (excluding CO2),
2. Deploying advanced technologies, and
3. Installing CO2 capture and storage.
1.2.4.2. Advanced Technologies
To control and reduce pollutants it is necessary to remove the source of pollution be-
fore burning, avoid production of pollutions during combustion, and remove pollutants 
prior to stack emission.
Plant efficiency and pollutant emission reduction can be improved upon by deploy-
ing advanced technologies and improving the thermodynamic cycle of power genera-
tion. For example, there is a modern shift from steam-cycle plants to gas-cycle plants. 
Advanced ultra-supercritical (USC) parameters for steam are used in some plants. Fur-
ther to the use of these parameters for steam conditions, other advanced technologies 
incorporated include several clean air technologies; innovative design of burners, new 
schemes for combustion in the boiler furnace, new design of steam superheaters and 
systems for gas cleaning.
In fluidized bed combustion technology, limestone and dolomite are added during 
the coal combustion process to mitigate sulfur dioxide formation.
An integrated gasifier combined cycle uses heat and pressure in the thermodynamic 
cycle to convert coal into a gas/liquid phase. The coal in this transformed phase can be 
further refined, resulting in reduced environmental impact. The heat energy from the 
gas turbine is also used to power a steam turbine. This technology has the potential to 
improve the thermodynamic system efficiency of a coal plant to fifty percent.
Flue gas desulfurization, or scrubber technology, removes large quantities of sul-
fur, particulate matter, and other impurities from the emissions. Low Nitrogen Oxide 
(NOx) burners help reduce the generation of NOx, a set of gases which contribute 
to ground-level ozone. This is achieved by restricting oxygen and manipulating the 
combustion process. Selective Catalytic Reduction (SCR) achieves NOx reductions of 
between eighty and ninety percent. Electrostatic Precipitators remove particulates 
from emissions by electrically charging particles and then capturing them on collec-
tion plates.
1.2.4.3. Carbon Capture and Storage
There is a long term view toward achieving effective capture and storage of carbon dioxide. 
CO2 emissions from burning of coal are calculated based on the emission factor, EFC, where
EFC = (CR × CC × CE × 44)/(HV × 12)
HV is the heating value of the fuel (12–32 MJ/kg), CC is the carbon content of the coal 
(60–90%), CE is the combustion efficiency (0.9–0.95), and CR is an opportune conver-
sion rate (0.2778 in the case of kWh).34 
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Carbon capture and storage requires capturing CO2 emissions and then storing 
them either in geologic formations or deep in the ocean bed where the gas is then dis-
solved under pressure. CCS technologies under development include:
•	 Post-combustion capture: This involves capture from the flue gases and neces-
sitates use of an amine as solvent and chilled ammonia.
•	 Pre-combustion capture: Here, integrated gasifier combined cycling is used to 
isolate and capture CO2 before it is released to the atmosphere.
•	 Oxy-Coal combustion process: This is an improved combustion process using 
pure oxygen in the boiler, resulting in significant reduction in the dilution of 
CO2 in the exhaust gas stream.
Improved efficiency of power plants will reduce the levels of CO2 emissions, how-
ever, carbon capture and storage would be a more effective solution. Unfortunately, 
CCS technologies require energy to implement and operate, reducing overall plant per-
formance. Other pollutant emissions are also created in the CCS process, including 
limestone and ammonia. This technology is still at an early stage of development and 
can be considered as a future technology. 
The development of CCT is growing worldwide with active research and develop-
ment in both the US and Europe. If successful, CCT will play a vital role in allowing the 
continued worldwide use of abundant coal resources, in an affordable and sustainable 
manner. Such advanced technologies can contribute significantly to the areas of mer-
cury control and carbon capture and storage, while also assisting in the reduction of 
SO2 and NOx emissions. Zero emissions through carbon sequestration, is a long-term 
objective.
While developments in clean coal technologies mark a welcome phase in the his-
tory of coal as a power fuel, there are considerable challenges relating to economic cost, 
plant refurbishment, effective utilization, and wide scale global deployment of such 
technologies. There is a sense of a race against time in the proposition that clean coal 
technologies may significantly offset the damaging effects of carbon emissions or that 
deployment will justify the further and continued exploitation of coal as a principal 
source of energy going forward. Even if CCT doesn’t allow current levels of coal uti-
lization to be sustainable, effective development of clean technologies could result in 
justification for the use of coal in reduced quantities in the energy mix until such time 
that carbon free renewable technologies reach mature status and can be shown to be 
effective for deployment. The future for nuclear energy, debated in chapter 7, will also 
influence the viability for significant investment in clean coal and related technologies.
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Chapter 2
Global Energy Policy Perspectives
RiChaRd a. SimmonS, EugEnE d. CoylE,  
and bERt ChaPman
abstract
The global demand for energy and the enhanced quality of life it affords is strong 
and growing.  In this chapter a review is made of developments and interactions of 
energy, environment and climate policy in the United States, Europe and globally. 
Contemporary demand for energy as well as initiatives promoting diversity of energy 
supplies, efficiency, and policies aimed at curbing emissions are reviewed.  Legislation 
for energy and the environment is explored along with a discussion of challenges 
facing the world’s most developed nations and regions.  Viable technology and policy 
solutions adapted for introduction throughout the world are investigated.  Through 
this dialogue the authors sense that cross-discipline partnerships of a global nature, 
social conscience, and compelling market factors will be critical in driving tomor-
row’s energy and climate trends.
Through exploration of in-depth perspectives for national energy and environment 
policy mechanisms a review and comparison of energy policy in the US and the EU is 
made, with inclusion of major historical milestones, the seminal 1997 Kyoto Protocol, 
and subsequent UN energy and climate conventions. The chapter concludes with anal-
ysis of energy and climate policy directives and trends in several of the world’s largest 
economies including China, Russia, Brazil and India.  All have large populations, sig-
nificant energy demands and resources, and will be critical players in global efforts to 
align energy and climate trade and policies. 
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2.1. Introduction: Energy Demand and Expected Growth
Richard A. Simmons
Energy has been an enabling driver of unprecedented levels of economic growth, pros-
perity, and globalization, particularly during the past century. Throughout this period, 
a variety of primary energy sources have enjoyed eras of popularity, including tradi-
tional biomass, coal, oil, and natural gas. Due to a complex combination of factors, 
including the prospects of resource constraint, security of supply, and heightened envi-
ronmental concern, a host of alternatives to traditional fossil fuels including renewable 
and unconventional sources of energy have been introduced to the global energy matrix 
in recent decades. However, the demand for energy and the enhanced quality of life it 
affords is strong and growing. Appropriately managing this global reality is the primary 
motivation of numerous energy and climate policy measures that are being analyzed, 
developed, and implemented across the globe.
In this chapter we review the interaction of energy, environment, and climate policy 
in the United States, Europe, and other major energy markets. We consider the current 
demand for energy and review initiatives developed to promote diversity of energy sup-
plies, efficiency, and policies and regulations aimed at curbing emissions. We explore 
reasons why comprehensive energy and environment legislation has presented major 
challenges in the world’s most developed regions, review global perspectives on energy 
and environment policies, and discuss mechanisms being used to promote broader di-
alogue on energy policy issues.
A brief glance at history provides insight into the link between energy and eco-
nomic growth. Critical eras such as the Industrial Revolution, the post-WWII boom, 
and the oil crisis of the mid 1970s come quickly to mind. More recently, the economic 
crisis that began in 2007 has has resulted in intense volatility and price fluctuations for 
oil and natural gas, renewed concerns over the use of nuclear energy for power gen-
eration, as well as polarization over the near-term promise of many renewable energy 
technologies. Since the dawn of the industrial revolution some 250 years ago, histori-
cal evidence indicates that major energy transitions take longer, are more complicated, 
and often cost more than initially expected.1 Power, heat, and electricity produced from 
traditional biomass gave way to coal, which has given way to oil, natural gas, and even 
nuclear fuels, albeit over intervals closer to fifty years, not ten or twenty. Like a mas-
sive mechanical flywheel, once major energy infrastructure has been adopted and in-
tegrated, it has great inertia owing to its cost and complexity. This makes it difficult to 
adapt quickly to new fuels and technologies. Now we are equipped with more advanced 
data, tools, and resources than at any previous point in history, and we aspire to under-
stand how new transitions will be implemented over the coming decades. The future 
will likely bring periods of uncertainty, including growth and recession, but continued 
economic progress will hinge upon sustainable supplies of energy. It is vital to both 
understand these challenges and develop a plan to address them.
The wealth and economic status that has been amassed by much of the developed 
world is now available in varying degrees to developing countries and emerging econ-
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omies. Some of the opportunities arising from globalization can be a double-edged 
sword. Individuals have benefited tremendously from increased quality of life, medi-
cal services, and opportunities for social mobility as developing economies boom; yet 
many countries are confounded in their attempts to keep pace with growing resource 
demands by rapid population expansion. Frequently, the infrastructure for energy and 
other critical resource services associated with clean air and water, waste management, 
and the transportation of people and goods is taxed beyond intended design limits; ini-
tial assumptions and conventional approaches can be ill-equipped to address projected 
population growth trends. Undesirable side effects include congestion, harmful air 
quality, price gouging, and electrical blackouts. Methodical approaches will be required 
to optimize resources, improve efficiency, encourage conservation, and reduce waste. 
Given appropriate implementation, such actions may enable the delivery of critical ser-
vices, alleviate the risks of scarcity, and sustain trends toward a greater quality of life.
Energy is at the nexus of people, environment, and economic development, and 
energy supply and management requires careful implementation in order to navigate 
many of these challenges. This is not an issue to be delegated to or solved exclusively by 
policy makers or by any single group of stakeholders. Globally, more than eighty per-
cent of the world’s energy requirement is derived from fossil fuels, with oil (thirty-three 
percent), coal (twenty-eight percent), and natural gas (twenty-one percent) the principal 
constituents.2 Combustion of these fossil fuels releases greenhouse gases directly into 
Earth’s atmosphere. Scientific and economic experts are in increasing agreement that 
our current energy paradigm is no longer tenable, not least due to reserve and supply 
uncertainties, price volatility, and fiscal and environmental strains on the world’s ma-
jor markets and ecosystems. Numerous studies on this topic highlight aspects of the 
present challenges and discuss a range of viable technology and policy solutions, often 
concurring there is no one-size-fits-all model. Furthermore, it is unlikely a single tech-
nology or a single country will swing the needle entirely by itself. More likely, combined 
efforts such as global public and private partnerships, increased social conscience, and 
compelling market factors will continue to drive tomorrow’s energy and climate trends. 
Prior to delving into potential solutions to this problem, it is important to assess the 
current reality, including energy demand and scenarios of expected growth, in addition 
to the social, economic, and environmental impacts such growth may have.
In addition to monitoring major energy supply disruptions and advising member 
countries regarding appropriate and timely responses, a primary mission of the Inter-
national Energy Agency (IEA) is to compile and analyze historical energy data. This 
data is used to estimate future supply and demand scenarios and to develop policy ad-
vice based in part upon these projected trends. The IEA provides a series of outlook 
scenarios based on assumptions including the availability and reliability of the energy 
supply, energy consumption, growth, and the uptake of alternative energy sources. 
While an exhaustive review of this data is not the intent of this text, an overview of key 
global demands and trends is certainly revealing and instructive. Comparing energy 
data between countries is not a trivial task, given the obvious differences in energy in-
frastructure, modernization, and regulatory policies, let alone variances in the quality 
SimmonS, Coyle, AnD ChApmAn30
and reliability of the data itself. Despite this, the IEA’s publically available assessment of 
energy supply and consumption is a robust database that conveys a sense of gravity and 
context for the energy challenge. Consider the following snap-shot in Table 2.1 of major 
energy indices, indicating gross domestic product, total primary energy supply, and es-
timated carbon dioxide emissions for countries and regions inclusive of US, EU, China, 
Russia, Brazil, India. Summed totals for world figures are also provided, indicating the 
aforementioned countries are responsible for approximately sixty-six percent of global 
energy-related CO2 emissions.
In many ways, this type of data speaks for itself and is useful to help frame the 
global energy situation at a particular instant in time. That said, such summaries do not 
adequately capture either the strategic agendas of individual countries or the trends in 
these key indicators. Important questions are therefore raised: where is energy demand 
growing, at what rates, with what resources and technologies, and why? This text will 
explore the technical and geopolitical aspects of some of these urgent questions.
Data for both energy and climate has been collected since before utilities began elec-
trifying the world. In terms of tracking energy metrics, analysis has progressed with 
greater rigor since the 1970s and the Arab oil embargo. From a climate perspective, at-
tempts to understand and quantify the links and potential impacts between emissions and 
the combustion of fossil fuels are more recent, with research commencing in the 1980s 
and evolving quickly over the past two decades. It would appear that trends have moti-
vated growing research interest: annual greenhouse gas emissions from the combustion 
of fuel between 1971 and 2012 have more than doubled from about fourteen to thirty-one 
Gt CO2e (billion metric tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent).4 Recent transitions of fuel 
source from coal to natural gas and more stringent regulations on aging coal power plants 
have helped mitigate emissions to some degree; however, these have been largely outpaced 
by increased overall energy growth rates. In 2010, total global primary energy supply was 
estimated to be in excess of 12,700 Mtoe (million tonnes of oil equivalent), with an ex-
pected increase of at least one hundred percent by the year 2035. These figures are largely 
based on anticipated population growth in the developing world. Even in an optimistic 
Country 
or Region
Population Gross  
Domestic  
Product (GDP)
Total Primary 
Energy Sup-
ply (TPES)
TPES  
per capita
CO2  
Emissions
CO2 per 
capita
(million) (2005 USD) (Mtoe) (toe/capita) (Mt) (t/capita)
USA 312 13,226 2,191 7.02 5,287 16.94
EU* 503 12,626 1,654 3.29 3,543 7.04
China 1,344 4,195 2,728 2.03 7,955 5.92
Russia 142 947 731 5.15 1,653 11.65
Brazil 197 1,127 270 1.37 408 2.07
India 1,241 1,317 749 0.60 1,745 1.41
World 6,958 52,486 13,113 1.88 31,342 4.50
Table 2.1. Key World Energy Statistics for 2011.3 
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scenario in which leading world economies implement aggressive new policies aimed at 
limiting carbon dioxide emissions to 450 parts per million (PPM) (believed to correlate to 
a temperature rise of two degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels) by 2035, energy con-
sumption is still projected to increase by at least twenty percent with respect to 2010 levels. 
A less aggressive scenario, allowing an approximate temperature rise of 3.5°C, projects en-
ergy consumption to increase thirty-six percent over this same period.5 The global share of 
renewable-based energy consumption is projected to increase from about eighteen percent 
of total energy use in 2010 to between twenty and thirty-five percent by 2035. While this 
transition from fossil to non-fossil fuel energy resources will constitute a step in the right 
direction for Earth’s climate, fossil fuel energy sources may still constitute a sizable major-
ity of world energy supply by mid-century unless significant shifts in policy, increases in 
alternative technology uptake, and large scale capital investments are implemented.
Public awareness of the negative impacts of greenhouse gas emissions has grown 
significantly in recent years and this concern is beginning to translate into effective pol-
icy action. While the potential positive impact of large scale countermeasures and low 
carbon energy deployment may still be decades away, there is cause for hope. Through 
climate science research and dissemination, the links between energy consumption 
and associated environmental impacts are becoming more widely accepted and un-
derstood. In the twenty-five years from the inception of the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC) in 1988 to the present, researchers have acquired new evi-
dence complemented by powerful new modeling capabilities. This obviously provides 
decision makers a greater database of reliable information. Unfortunately, during this 
same twenty-five year period, the global community has consumed more exajoules (EJ) 
of fossil fuels than in the previous forty years (1948–1988).6 These accelerating trends 
combined with the sobering message depicted in recent energy and climate data has 
given stakeholders ample reason for pause. It has also served to sound an alarm. Public 
opinion, far from unanimous on either energy or environmental policy, is beginning 
to reflect a growing sensitivity to select issues. Whether this has been driven home by 
higher oil or gasoline prices, volatile heating bills, or a more nuanced reading of energy 
and climate trends, it is occurring. This may usher in an era no less complicated but 
characterized by critical focus on meaningful long term strategic action and enabled 
by the clear interpretation of science-based climate and energy data. Such action may 
include a range of steps, including individual consumer behavioral shifts, industrial re-
sponses to economic and market factors, commercialization of innovative technologies, 
and broad policy measures taken by state and federal governments.
Understanding these issues for developing countries becomes exponentially more 
complex, as are efforts to expand real time learning of energy and climate in a perpet-
ually evolving, increasingly globalized world. The age of two-way trade between major 
superpowers has given way to a global matrix of producers and consumers, the models 
for which, be they economic, environmental, societal or geopolitical, are in constant 
flux. In a January 2013 speech, then-US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton explained the 
energy and climate change balance succinctly: “Managing the world’s energy supplies 
in a way that minimizes conflict and supports economic growth while protecting the 
SimmonS, Coyle, AnD ChApmAn32
future of our planet is one of the greatest challenges of our time.”7 Consider the im-
plications of energy and climate policy for a few of the world’s most rapidly growing 
economies: China, Russia, Brazil, and India. The significance and complexity of energy 
and climate issues in these regions are markedly different than they are in the more 
developed and established domains of the United States and the European Union.
Two differences, in particular, stand out. First, increased global trade and ur-
banization throughout the world (fueled primarily by fossil fuels) are now hitting 
full stride in several of the world’s most populous countries. By contrast, energy 
consumption in the developed world has more or less plateaued, been augmented by 
larger shares of cleaner energy (including nuclear, natural gas, and hydropower), and 
stabilized on a per capita basis. 
Figure 2.1. (a) Total Energy Emissions for Selected Countries, 2011;  (b) Energy Emis-
sions Per Capita for Selected Countries, 2011.8
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Second, from the standpoint of industry and emissions, the light regulation and in-
expensive supply typical of the past have set precedents that weigh heavily in economic 
and business modeling. Not surprisingly, developing countries commonly rely upon 
these precedents in strategic planning and public policy. It is argued that the rates of 
growth for energy and emissions should not be subject to sudden change or regulation, 
as the developed world fueled much of its own growth relatively unchecked by envi-
ronmental constraints or international opinions. For example, China has argued that 
developing states should be afforded some leniency in emissions as they are currently in 
critical stages of economic development.8 
Consider, for example, the two energy emissions charts shown as Figure 2.1. Is it 
more appropriate to measure CO2 emissions by country or per capita? The answer ob-
viously depends on your perspective. China and India can leverage their large popula-
tions in this debate to argue that their CO2 intensity per capita is much lower than the 
developed world, yet China as a nation leads in overall emissions. India has formally 
announced during climate negotiations that their per capita CO2 emissions will not ex-
ceed that of developed countries, falling far short of negotiators’ aspirations but sending 
a salient and sobering message to the West.
In terms of recent trends, total energy-related CO2 emissions have actually contin-
ued to fall slightly for the US and EU, for example between 2010 and 2011, but continued 
to increase between 4% and 8% for Brazil, Russia, Indian and China over the same one 
year period.9 These emission trajectories are qualitatively consistent with a recent six-
year period between 2005 and 2011 as illustrated in Figure 2.2.
Leading economies of the world recognize their future will be in part defined by how 
they create a sustainable balance between the supply of energy, its environmental im-
pact, and the prevailing pursuit of economic prosperity and growth. Like other monu-
mental challenges of our times, this is much more easily stated than solved. To achieve 
the greatest global impact in a world of increasing globalization and population, national 
Figure 2.2. Energy Emissions Trends, 2005–2011.10 
SimmonS, Coyle, AnD ChApmAn34
efforts should not occur in a vacuum but rather, to the extent possible, in a coordinated, 
informed manner. Major consumer nations are reminded frequently and acutely that the 
world has finite resources, and there will be increasing competition for them.
It is upon this energy and climate backdrop that members of productive society will 
strive to confront epic challenges and sustain recent positive trends in health, economic 
development, and quality of life. Lasting solutions will require not just revolutionary 
technology, but also an understanding of some very disparate perspectives, productive 
global discourses about the nature of the problem, and effective and pragmatic policy 
implementation on an unprecedented scale. 
2.2. United States Energy and Climate Policy
Bert Chapman
2.2.1. United States Energy Policy
Although the United States’ federal government has been engaged in energy and cli-
matic policymaking for many decades, the emergence of modern US energy policy 
commenced with the 1973 Arab oil embargo. The embargo was a reaction by many pe-
troleum producing countries against US military support for Israel during the October 
1973 Yom Kippur war. It was a vivid illustration of the dangers of increasing US de-
pendence on oil imports. This embargo included reductions in oil output by five to ten 
percent per month, and a total ban on oil exports to the United States which resulted in 
significant energy supply shortages. It also increased retail gasoline prices in the United 
States by approximately fifty percent from $0.37 per gallon in 1973 to nearly $0.57 per 
gallon in 1975. Crude oil prices rose from $3.18 per barrel in 1970 to $7.67 in 1975.11
The embargo caught the United States and other governments unprepared, leading 
to a variety of policy responses as western countries became more fully aware of their 
vulnerability to abrupt energy supply disruptions.12
The eventual creation of a centralized Department of Energy (DOE) in 1977 from 
existing energy policymaking entities, including the Federal Power Commission, was a 
direct result of these developments. The DOE would have multiple policymaking arms 
with responsibility for overseeing the domestic US energy agenda, including fossil and 
renewable resources; conducting energy policy research through its national laborato-
ries; managing the US nuclear weapons arsenal; and analyzing energy sector trends and 
developments both domestically and internationally.13
Another federal response was the establishment of the Strategic Petroleum Re-
serve (SPR) in 1975 to create a store of up to one billion barrels of petroleum to meet 
domestic economic needs in the event of another supply disruption. The SPR is located 
in salt caverns on the Louisiana and Texas coasts and had an inventory of about 695 
million barrels at the end of 2012. This equates to approximately sixty days of import 
protection, and more than one hundred days’ supply if private stocks are included. 
Presidential administrations of both parties have generally resisted calls to tap into 
the SPR as a response to rising domestic energy prices, though releases occurred in 
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1991, 2005, and 2011, usually to mitigate short term supply disruptions from global 
conflicts or natural disasters.14
Through a cooperative effort between the United States and other member coun-
tries of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the In-
ternational Energy Agency (IEA) was also formed in response to the 1973 oil crisis. 
The IEA’s initial role was to help countries coordinate a collective response to major 
disruptions in oil supply through the release of emergency oil stocks to the markets. The 
IEA has since broadened its charter to encompass energy analyses, technology surveys, 
projections, and policy recommendations, but remains a primary international mecha-
nism for monitoring national petroleum reserves against global oil supply and demand 
and coordinating multi-lateral policy responses to international supply disruptions.15
Inflation in the late 1970s combined with geopolitical tension arising from the Ira-
nian revolution and the Iranian seizure of US diplomats as hostages resulted in subse-
quent energy price increases. US retail gasoline prices nearly doubled to $1.19 per gallon 
between 1978 and 1980, while crude oil prices more than tripled from $9.00 to $31.77 
per barrel between 1978 and 1981. 16
Another seminal event affecting US energy policy was the partial meltdown of a 
reactor at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania in 
March 1979. This incident was contained and various regulatory reforms were instigated 
by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) including enhanced safety and training 
protocols and reactor design modifications at US nuclear power plants. However, the 
accident damaged the then-burgeoning nuclear industry’s reputation and resulted in an 
effective moratorium on US nuclear power plant construction that persisted for more 
than three decades. Although the number of operating nuclear units has increased from 
70 in 1979 to 103 in 2013, the NRC issued its first new construction permits in thir-
ty-three years in 2012 for new generation reactors slated to be constructed in Georgia 
and South Carolina.17 These two separate projects, administered by regional utilities, 
are underway with the construction of Westinghouse AP1000 pressurized water reac-
tors. Two such reactors at each site, of 1100 MW nameplate capacity, are expected to 
come online by 2018.18 When the construction permit was issued, the NRC Commis-
sioner stated, “If they are built as proposed and in accordance with NRC requirements, 
[the reactors] will represent a new era of enhanced nuclear safety.”19 Prior to the recent 
construction permit issuances, less than forty percent of nuclear power plant operating 
licenses had been issued since 1979, with the last of these licenses issued in 1996.20
Key similarities in US energy policy response can be observed by comparing the 
1970s with a multi-year period beginning in about 2007. Not surprisingly, both eras were 
characterized by dramatic spikes in oil price, global economic stress, and geopolitical in-
stability. During both periods, efforts were made to improve energy security, increase 
US domestic energy production, and institutionalize efficiency and conservation mea-
sures. For example, the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) program, inaugurated 
in 1975, set standards for increasing car and light truck fuel efficiency. Actual regulatory 
standards experienced no change between 1992 and 2011, but CAFE has returned as a sig-
nificant piece of recent energy policy, and new rules strive to double fuel economy in new 
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vehicles (between 2011 and 2025) while exploiting efficiency benefits such as reduced oil 
consumption and emissions (Please see chapter 9 for more on CAFE). Similarly, measures 
have been enacted to increase the use of alternative fuels, for example via the Energy In-
dependence and Security Act (EISA 2007) and the Renewable Fuels Standard (RFS 2005 
and annual updates), which mandate the use of increasing quantities of alternative fuels 
such as cellulosic ethanol and other advanced biofuels through 2022.
Natural gas prices were decontrolled by the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 and this 
process was completed in 1985. Oil prices were decontrolled upon issuance of an Exec-
utive Order by President Reagan (Order 12287) on January 28, 1981. These events would 
produce significant increases in natural gas and oil supplies and associated reductions 
in energy commodity prices. Retail gasoline would fall from $1.35 per gallon in 1981 to 
$0.96 in 1988 and industrial natural gas would fall from $6.98 per thousand cubic feet 
in 1982 to $3.32 by 1995.21
More recently, natural gas has re-emerged as a central issue in US energy policy. 
The so-called shale gas revolution has been made possible by hydraulic fracturing tech-
niques, which allow access to and retrieval of gas trapped in source rock via horizontal 
drilling. Just as conventional on- and offshore gas wells began a slow decline in the 
United States, these new technologies reached commercial scale around 2005. The po-
tential is astounding. The US Department of Energy’s Energy Information Administra-
tion (DOE-EIA) predicts that the share of shale gas as a percentage of all natural gas will 
grow from five percent to about forty-five percent between 2005 and 2020. This turns 
an otherwise declining natural resource into one projected to grow approximately fifty 
percent to an annualized twenty-seven trillion cubic feet of gas by 2020.22
The flood of shale gas is on; and the abundant supplies caused commodity prices 
to drop two to threefold in US markets between 2008 and 2012, creating a host of op-
portunities, challenges and unexpected consequences. On the positive side, natural gas, 
with about half the carbon content of coal, can truly be a bridge fuel as high carbon 
alternatives are phased out and carbon neutral options get deployed, reducing the envi-
ronmental impact of energy generation. In addition to adding jobs in the energy sector, 
cheap natural gas has rekindled the competitiveness of US manufacturing, enabling 
key industries to regain global market share. Unfortunately, many fear a reliance on 
another, albeit cleaner, fossil fuel, may significantly impair the commercial viability and 
deployment of renewable energy technologies. Others fear loose state-controlled regu-
lation and weak oversight may result in unintended environmental risks such as water 
contamination or un-combusted emissions of methane during extraction and trans-
port. The debate will continue, as the economic benefits appear compelling and the en-
vironmental benefits and risks, thus far at least, relatively manageable. A new decision 
impacting foreign policy may be on the near horizon as well, as the United States grap-
ples with whether to leverage newfound energy abundance strictly for domestic gain, 
or to begin exporting lower carbon energy resources to a willing global marketplace.
By way of advising policymakers about technical implications relevant to future 
energy trends in the United States, EIA summarizes key analysis in its Annual Energy 
Outlook. In its 2013 projection to 2040, EIA predicts:
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•	 Growth in energy production will outstrip consumption growth;
•	 Crude oil production will rise sharply over the next decade;
•	 Motor gasoline consumption will reflect more stringent fuel economy standards;
•	 Renewable fuel use will grow at a much faster rate than fossil fuel use;
•	 The United States will become a net exporter of natural gas by the early 2020s; and
•	 US energy-related carbon dioxide emissions will remain below their 2005 level 
through 2040.23
2.2.2. United States Policy and Climate Change
An important emerging strand affecting US energy policy is that of global warming and 
climate change. The idea that human-created emissions are responsible for warming 
temperatures remains controversial in the United States. The phrase global warming 
first appeared in a January 1986 Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) stratospheric 
ozone protection plan, when it was proposed that chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) are in-
frared-absorbing gases acting like carbon dioxide which can result in raised global sur-
face temperatures.24 The remainder of the 1980s and early 1990s would see analysis, 
controversy, policy proposals, and scrutiny of this polarizing issue play out in literature 
produced by many federal agencies and the Congress.25 
Climate change has become a critical aspect of US foreign policy as other nations have 
sought to coordinate plans and perspectives as well as to propose multi-lateral action to 
address it. These efforts culminated in a 1992 United Nations sponsored Conference on 
Environment and Development (UNCED), informally titled Earth Summit, that was held 
in Rio de Janeiro and drew one hundred twenty heads of state, accompanied by numerous 
government officials. Topics addressed included personal energy consumption, energy 
resource availability, forest production and deforestation, population impact on energy, 
and various commitments to addressing climate change. The Summit’s message—“that 
nothing less than a transformation of our attitudes and behaviour would bring about 
the necessary changes”—was transmitted by almost ten thousand on-site journalists and 
heard by millions around the world. The message reflected the complexity of the problems 
facing us: that poverty as well as excessive consumption by affluent populations place 
damaging stress on the environment. Governments recognized the need to redirect inter-
national and national efforts to ensure that economic decisions account for environmen-
tal impacts.26 President George H. W. Bush, however, refused to sign the Convention on 
Biodiversity due to compensation requirements for countries providing animal and plant 
sources for biotechnology inventions. Summit efforts also faltered due to wide differences 
of opinion between developed and developing countries over emission reduction targets 
and financial liability for enforcing climate change countermeasures.27 
During the Clinton administration, the United States participated in the 1997 Kyoto 
Protocol Conference in Japan as a member of the United Nations Framework Conven-
tion on Climate Change. In the Kyoto agreement, signatory countries agreed to emis-
sion reductions of greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, 
and sulfur hexafluoride. Although most countries have signed Kyoto, the US Senate did 
not ratify this agreement due to concerns that it would negatively impact US economic 
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growth and weaken national sovereignty. The United States has also expressed concern 
that the Protocol’s loose emission restrictions on China and India would not achieve 
significant global emissions reductions, and that it would increase US dependence on 
foreign oil and adversely impact US fuel and energy prices.
On March 28, 2001, President George W. Bush announced that the US would not 
implement Kyoto, and on December 12, 2011 Canada, an initial Kyoto signatory, with-
drew from the Kyoto Protocol to avoid monetary penalties for failure to comply with 
its emission targets and its promotion of domestic energy industries such as Alberta’s 
oil sands.28
The 2005 Energy Policy Act was a significant piece of energy legislation that mir-
rored widespread sentiment in the United States, European Union, and globally, in 
response to climate and energy related issues. It coincided with the introduction in 
the European Union by the European Council of a Mandatory Energy Policy which is 
expounded upon in the next section. General statute provisions of the 2005 US Energy 
Policy Act encompassed a broad remit including energy efficiency, renewable energy 
such as hydro and geothermal power, alternative fuels such as ethanol and hydrogen, oil 
and gas, coal, nuclear power, energy tax incentives, and climate change technology. Spe-
cific provisions include sustainable design principles in new federal buildings, tax cred-
its for improved energy efficiency in homes and to help meet Energy Star requirements, 
provisions to increase domestic energy production and reduce dependence on foreign 
energy, expansion of unconventional fuel resources such as oil sands; implementation 
of new regulatory tools, and the development initiatives to promote alternative fuels 
and new vehicle technologies.29  
The American Reinvestment and Recovery Act (ARRA) was signed into law in Feb-
ruary 2009 in response to the global financial crisis, and included significant federal 
investments in energy efficiency and renewable energy. Under ARRA, the Obama ad-
ministration allocated more than ninety billion dollars (of nearly eight hundred billion 
dollars total) in grants and tax incentives for a host of clean energy programs. It is of 
particular note that nearly half of the award grants went to energy efficiency initiatives, 
such as programs to assist in the weatherization of homes and buildings. Efficiency im-
provements under ARRA would utilize available technologies, be deployed rapidly, and 
could therefore result in the greatest economic and environmental benefits in the near 
term. The balance of energy investments and provisions were spread across a wide suite 
of programs including renewable energy pilot projects, alternative fuels, smart grid, en-
vironmental clean-up, and carbon capture and storage. Some ventures failed on either 
technical or financial grounds, for example Beacon Power, Solar Trust, and Solyndra, 
which resulted in hundreds of millions of federally funded losses. Critics cite such fail-
ures as evidence of political cronyism and add that poor business performance by these 
companies can cast doubts on the financial viability of certain clean tech ventures and 
worthiness of government support.30 Amidst failures, other successful projects con-
tinue to achieve stated objectives. Most energy projects by nature are longer-term, and 
by dispatching funds quickly, the administration may have created an unreasonable 
expectation that all funded programs would succeed and/or generate immediate and 
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measurable impacts. This situation led to controversy over whether the federal govern-
ment should pick economic winners and losers, with complaints that investment had 
not yielded sufficient returns.31 Though the intent to stimulate the energy economy was 
genuine, even the most successful projects may progress at a deliberate pace and achiev-
ing “positive” outcomes may be challenging in the short term.
Political controversy has also ensued over the Environmental Protection Agency’s 
(EPA) intent to regulate carbon dioxide emissions as a public health threat contributing 
to global warning. In 2009, the outgoing Bush administration resisted this on economic 
grounds, but the April 2007 US Supreme Court decision Massachusetts v. EPA ruled 
by a 5–4 margin that the EPA could promote the development of auto tailpipe green-
house gas emissions standards under Section 202 of the Clean Air Act (CAA). This de-
cision was reinforced by the Supreme Court’s 2011 ruling in American Electric Power v. 
Connecticut and the EPA has since worked to promote various standards for reducing 
CO2 emissions such as capture and sequestration.
In March 27, 2012 the EPA issued proposed carbon pollution standards for new 
power plants which would limit the amount of carbon pollution these plants can emit 
and ensure that these facilities adopt new cleaning technologies. The fate of the pro-
posed regulations is uncertain.32 Among the objections are that possible geographic 
costs and benefits from climate change do not align with Congressional intent under 
the CAA, that the Court was forcing the EPA to regulate these emissions under a law 
never intended to cover climate change, and that unilateral US emission limits will be 
ineffective and may become a disincentive for China and other countries to reduce their 
emissions. Another critique of EPA’s policy in this area maintains that the proposed 
rule has not monetized costs or benefits to the electric power sector nor by extension to 
electric power consumers.33
The Obama administration sought to use the December 2009 Copenhagen Summit 
to recognize the acute global environmental challenge resulting from climate change 
by limiting temperature increases to two degrees Celsius. The administration also com-
mitted the United States to reducing its emissions seventeen percent by 2020. The 2009 
draft document was not legally binding and contained no enforcement mechanisms for 
reducing CO2 emissions. However, UN climate negotiation efforts are ongoing, with 
a 2015 goal to formalize a climate agreement that would take effect in 2020 (for more, 
please see the section on EU climate policy). Despite this, consensus has been elusive 
within the US government and among the international community over exactly how 
to proceed in reducing emissions and combating climate change. As one of the more 
complicated issues of our times, the future of US participation in international climate 
change initiatives remains uncertain.34
Energy and climate change factors heavily into US national security policymaking. 
The outgoing Bush administration issued a policymaking document stressing the Arctic’s 
importance on a range of grounds including US national and homeland security, as 
well as natural resource management, environmental protection and economic devel-
opment with other Arctic nations.35 The Obama administration’s May 2010 National 
Security Strategy stressed the importance of developing new energy sources to reduce 
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dependence on foreign oil as critical to national security as are efforts to transition to 
low carbon energy sources and combat climate change.36 Recent trends would indi-
cate selected policies are taking hold, as the share of US oil imports in 2013 fell below 
fifty percent for the first time since 1995. Furthermore, Canada has become the largest 
oil importer to the United States, and along with Mexico and Venezuela, the western 
hemisphere presently accounts for a majority of US imports.37 In 2009, the Central In-
telligence Agency established a Center on Climate Change and National Security whose 
missions include examining the national security impact of desertification, natural re-
sources competition, population shifts, and rising sea levels to policymakers and the 
scientific community through imagery and other means.38 Resources describing na-
tional security implications resulting from climate change are produced by multiple 
military and civilian agencies.39
In 2011, the Obama administration issued the Blueprint for a Secure Energy Future 
with proposed solutions to major US energy problems. It outlined means of developing 
and securing America’s energy supplies; providing consumers with choices to reduce 
costs and save energy; and innovating the nation’s way to a clean energy future. In 2013 
the President’s Climate Action Plan was released. These objectives included specific poli-
cies supporting the responsible and safe expansion of domestic oil and gas development 
and production; more fuel and energy efficient cars, trucks, homes, and buildings; and 
the promotion of clean energy research and development.40
A 2012 supplement to the Blueprint contended that 2011 saw US domestic oil and 
natural gas production reach their highest levels since 2003. Meanwhile, the Interior 
Department announced a proposed expansion of the Outer Continental Shelf Oil and 
Gas Leasing Program, and light duty vehicle fuel economy standards increased to 
54.5 miles per gallon by 2025 through advanced and clean energy vehicles.41 Some 
energy policy critics assert, however, that the administration has been slow to issue 
drilling leases and permits and to promote drilling expansion in areas of potential 
promise. Following an extensive review of economic and environmental impacts, 
the administration deferred a permit for the Keystone XL Pipeline that would bring 
crude oil from Alberta, Canada, to Nebraska and, eventually, to refineries in Texas. 
In 2013, the State Department issued a supplemental environmental impact statement 
for a new permit with an alternate, lower impact route, but final authorization of na-
tional interest is still pending. 
The need for low carbon solutions combined with increasing fuel prices and con-
troversy over the Obama administration’s green energy programs have renewed inter-
est in nuclear power as an important element of a diverse US energy strategy. Nuclear 
energy accounts for about nineteen percent of US electricity generation, and the indus-
try has been boosted by 2005 Energy Policy Act incentives such as construction loan 
guarantees, which are helping underwrite the aforementioned new generation projects. 
The EIA expects nuclear power output to increase at approximately half the rate of to-
tal electricity generation.42 Despite its aging nuclear facility infrastructure, the United 
States remains the world’s leading nuclear power producer in total capacity with 101 
GW, though France leads in nuclear as a share of total electrical generation at seventy- 
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five percent.43 However, there is still significant public skepticism about nuclear energy, 
which has been exacerbated by the 2011 tsunami which caused the nuclear accident at 
Japan’s Fukushima Dai-ichi plant. Polarization on the issue was  reflected in a March 
2012 Gallup opinion poll, in which fifty-seven percent of respondents said they strongly 
or somewhat favored using nuclear energy to provide electricity, with forty percent 
strongly or somewhat opposed to using nuclear energy for this purpose.44
The Obama administration has also sought to promote expanded international 
energy cooperation through multilateral initiatives such as the UN’s Sustainable En-
ergy for All campaign, which was delineated at the “Rio+20” Summit in June 2012. 
This initiative calls on the international community to reach three aspirational goals 
by 2030: providing universal access to modern energy services, doubling the global 
rate of improvement in energy efficiency, and doubling the share of renewable energy 
in the global energy mix.45 If implemented, the US would provide nearly two billion 
dollars worth of grants, loans, and loan guarantee resources to help developing coun-
tries create sustainable energy development, participate in clean energy technology 
partnerships, promote US energy technology exports, and finance and mobilize pri-
vate capital to help developing world investors through debt financing, risk insurance, 
and new coverage for power purchases. Critics of the Rio+20 Summit contend that its 
policymaking objectives create expanded and unaccountable global international en-
ergy bureaucracies, as well as enhance international control over energy development 
and other economic activities.46
US energy policymaking involves the complex and continually evolving interaction 
of federal, state, and local government authorities with civil society, the private sector, 
non-governmental organizations, and independent agencies. A diverse array of con-
gressional and state legislative committees are also involved in this process, adding to 
its merit, but also its complexity, inefficiency, and cost. Regulatory authority may fall 
under federal or state jurisdiction, and certain differences between states have been 
known to complicate regional alignment. With such a diverse array of authorities and 
affected stakeholders from both the public and private sectors, the open and democratic 
US energy policy process is charged with the daunting task of equitably weighing and 
integrating all manner of input, optimizing effectiveness, while controlling costs. Poli-
cymaking efforts can be understandably more complex in the international domain, as 
US energy policy objectives intersect those of foreign governments and stakeholders.
2.2.3. Conclusion
Ideological differences on energy between the two largest political parties in the United 
States have been a source of uncertainty and tension, not least for the American voter. 
While some cite scientific evidence for human-caused global warming, skeptics cite 
leaked emails from East Anglia University’s climate unit as justifying their charges of 
fraudulent scientific behavior by global warming proponents. These critics express con-
cern that some proposed climate change solutions could injure the US economy and 
limit US national sovereignty. As mentioned, other critics take issue with direct govern-
ment financial support of clean energy companies.47 
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The questions and responses surrounding the extraction of oil, natural gas and 
unconventional fossil fuels have sharply divided US national interests. Environmental 
implications, energy demand growth, economic development, climate change and strat-
egies to reduce the carbon footprint of the domestic energy matrix demand appropri-
ate consideration and integration into the national energy dialogue. Common-ground 
outcomes must be agreed upon and pursued, despite traditional polarization of certain 
issues. While some contend that government energy policies are intrusive and counter-
productive for both individuals and the private sector, others feel that government pol-
icies are excessively solicitous of individual and private sector interests. Nevertheless, 
the proper roles of fossil energy and renewable energy, protracted federal budget defi-
cits, and public resistance to higher energy prices or reductions in energy consumption 
are hallmark issues of recent US energy policy and will remain part of the US energy 
policymaking landscape for the foreseeable future.48
It is clear that the process of optimizing energy resources and developing effective pol-
icies can be complicated, costly and time consuming. Throughout its history, the United 
States has pioneered significant technical, commercial, and even political energy innova-
tions. Along the way, it has had to navigate major uncertainties, disasters, and challenges. 
As we look forward, accompanying unprecedented levels of globalization and economic 
growth looms the unknown risk of climate change. And while no system yet devised is 
perfect, the United States has both the responsibility and the privilege as the world’s larg-
est economy to contribute productively to global progress in the new energy era. 
2.3. Energy and Climate Policy in the European Union
Eugene D. Coyle
2.3.1. Underpinnings of Modern European Energy Policy
The seeds of the European Union share a rich and interwoven history with energy, 
and the multi-national stage upon which energy related events have unfolded. Twen-
tieth century energy policy legislation among European nations formally commenced 
during a post World War II period that coincided with the establishment of the Council 
of Europe in 194949 alongside efforts to reconstruct the economy and establish a last-
ing period of peace. In May 1950, French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman made his 
Schuman Declaration at the Quai d’Orsay, where he proposed that “Franco-German 
production of coal and steel as a whole be placed under a common High Authority, 
within the framework of an organization open to participation of other countries of 
Europe.”50 This led to the pooling of Franco-German coal and steel production and the 
formation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). The treaty was entered 
into force in July 1952, bringing France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands together in a community with the aim of organizing free movement of 
coal and steel and free access to sources of production. This set a significant precedent: 
a common high authority supervised the market, with the aim of respecting and ensur-
ing rules for competition and price transparency. 
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In similar fashion, the Messina Conference, held at Messina, Sicily in May 1955, was 
charged with preparation of a report on the creation of a common European market. 
The resulting Spaak Report was presented at the Intergovernmental Conference on the 
Common Market and EURATOM, at Val Duchesse, Brussels. It was agreed that two 
new communities would be established, the European Economic Community (EEC) 
and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM). The two new high au-
thorities (Commissions) would be separate to the ECSC’s Council of High Authority. 
In March 1957, the Treaties of Rome were signed, with the new authorities coming into 
force on January 1, 1958. EURATOM was founded with the purpose of creating a spe-
cific market for nuclear power in Europe. Although legally distinct from the European 
Union (EU), EURATOM has nevertheless the same membership and is governed by the 
EU’s institutions.51
Long before these developments, the strategic hundred-mile-long Suez Canal 
opened in 1869. Financed jointly by the French and Egyptian governments, it created 
a much needed shipping route and land bridge between Africa and Asia, the Medi-
terranean and the Indian Ocean, and enabled trade between Asia, the Middle East, 
Europe and the United States.52 Owing to financial difficulties, Egypt was forced to sell 
its shares in ownership of the Suez Canal to the United Kingdom in 1875. However, an 
international convention in 1888 opened the Canal to all shipping from any nation. In 
1956 tensions arose when the newly inaugurated Head of Government in Egypt, Gamal 
Abdel Nasser, declared his intent to place the Suez Canal under Egyptian control. The 
United States and United Kingdom withdrew previously committed financial support 
for the construction of the Aswan High Dam in the Nile, and in retaliation, Egypt 
nationalized the Canal. This became the Suez Crisis, also referred to as the Tripartite 
Aggression, Suez War, or Second Arab-Israeli War. The crisis became a diplomatic and 
military confrontation pitting Egypt against the combined interests of Britain, France 
and Israel. Intervention by the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Nations 
brought the occupation to an end by late December 1956.53 The fight over the canal also 
sowed the seeds for the eventual outbreak of the Six Day War in 1967 due to an inade-
quate peace settlement following the 1956 war.
The conflict is significant in that it lead to a severe oil shortage and financial crisis in 
the United Kingdom and Western Europe. Prior to the conflict approximately 1.5 mil-
lion barrels of oil per day transited the canal, of which 1.2 million barrels were destined 
for Western Europe, equating to two thirds of total oil supplies. A third of the ships 
that passed through the Canal at the time were British, and three-quarters belonged to 
NATO countries.
In the aftermath of the turbulence surrounding the Suez Crisis, the Organization of 
the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), a permanent intergovernmental organiza-
tion, was created at the Baghdad Conference on September 10–14, 1960, representing oil 
producing nations Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela. The five founding 
members were later joined by nine other members: Qatar (1961–present); Indonesia (1962–
2009); Libya (1962–present); United Arab Emirates (1967–present); Algeria (1969–present); 
Nigeria (1971–present); Ecuador (1973–1992, 2007–present); Angola (2007–present); 
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and Gabon (1975–1994). Originally headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland, OPEC has 
been based in Vienna, Austria, since 1965.54 OPEC’s stated principal objective is to “co- 
ordinate and unify petroleum policies among Member Countries, in order to secure fair 
and stable prices for petroleum producers; an efficient, economic and regular supply of 
petroleum to consuming nations; and a fair return on capital to those investing in the 
industry.”55
The October 1973 Yom Kippur War and subsequent oil embargo had a profound 
impact on Europe as well as the United States. The Organization of Arab Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OAPEC), comprising the Arab members of OPEC in addition 
to Egypt, Syria, and Tunisia, were the dominant supplier of crude oil to the European 
Union member states. When OAPEC proclaimed an oil embargo in October 1973, eco-
nomic turmoil in the European Union ensued. The first effect of the crisis was a short-
age of oil, which led to a number of measures to restrict consumption. As shortage fears 
diminished, increasing oil prices and their resulting financial consequences became 
the paramount concern. Prices for crude oil rose for many years, reaching twelve times 
their pre-crisis level (thirty-six dollars per barrel compared to three) after a second 
oil shock provoked by the Iran-Iraq war of 1980. This exorbitant increase in crude oil 
prices over the span of six years dealt a serious blow to the economies in several regions 
of the world, including Europe. The community member states, accustomed to trade 
surpluses, were now in a weakened position. Recession began to bite in nearly all the 
European countries.56 In addition to the economic consequences, the 1973 crisis cre-
ated a sense of insecurity among European countries, exposing the vulnerability of EU 
economies to their dependence on abundant supplies of cost-competitive oil. As noted 
earlier, such insecurity led to the formation of the Paris-based International Energy 
Agency (IEA) to help coordinate member country responses, track markets, and even-
tually advise on energy technologies and global policies.
The automotive industry was one of western Europe’s most affected industries in 
the wake of the 1973 oil crisis. After the second World War most west European coun-
tries applied heavy taxes to imported automobiles and related accessories, and as a re-
sult most cars made in Europe were small and hence more economical to both purchase 
and operate. However, by the late 1960s, as individual wealth increased, vehicles and 
engines began to increase in size. The oil crisis reversed this trend in Europe, and con-
vinced many people to revert to smaller and more efficient hatchback vehicles. This trend 
continued until the late 1980s, by which time hatchbacks dominated most European 
small and medium car markets and gained a substantial share of the larger family car 
market as well.
2.3.2. Energy Policy in Twenty-First-Century Europe
In meeting its current energy demands, the European Union is heavily dependent on 
imports of fossil fuels, with up to eighty percent imports of oil and sixty percent nat-
ural gas. Almost ninety-seven percent of uranium used in European nuclear reactors 
is imported from countries including Russia, Canada, Australia, Niger, and Kazakh-
stan, with only three percent mined in Europe.57 The basic principles of European en-
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ergy policy were laid down in 2006 with the release of the Commission’s green paper A 
European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy.58 In launching the 
strategy it was noted that Europe requires the importation of fifty percent of its energy 
for fuel and that global hydrocarbon reserves are being depleted. Investment of one tril-
lion euros is required by 2020 in order to meet the expected energy demand and replace 
aging infrastructure. It was also accepted that global warming has already made the 
world 0.6°C hotter.
Intent on limiting global average temperature increase to less than two degrees Cel-
sius above pre-industrial levels, key proposals of the European strategy include:
1. A cut of at least twenty percent in greenhouse gas emissions from all primary 
energy sources by 2020 (compared to 1990 levels), while pushing for an inter-
national agreement to succeed the Kyoto Protocol aimed at achieving a thirty 
percent cut by all developed nations by 2020.
2. A cut of up to ninety-five percent in carbon emissions from primary energy 
sources by 2050, compared to 1990 levels.
3. A minimum target of ten percent for the use of biofuels by 2020.
4. Unbundling of the energy supply and generation activities of energy companies 
from their distribution networks to further increase market competition.
5. Improving energy relations with the European Union’s neighbors, includ-
ing Russia.
6. The development of a European Strategic Energy Technology Plan to develop 
technologies in areas including renewable energy, energy conservation, low-en-
ergy buildings, fourth generation nuclear power, clean coal, and carbon capture.
7. Developing an Africa-Europe Energy partnership, to help Africa leap-frog to 
low-carbon technologies and to help develop the continent as a sustainable en-
ergy supplier.
While these goals were considered ambitious, subsequent developments have set 
the scene for change and have imparted responsibility to individual EU member states 
to advance, implement and achieve targets. Mechanisms for doing so include regular 
strategic energy reviews, introduction of a European Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-
ETS, endeavoring to achieve cost-effective carbon dioxide emissions reductions), and 
the pursuit of targets to be achieved initially by year 2020. Among these are efforts to: 
1) reduce greenhouse gas emissions by twenty percent, 2) increase energy efficiency to 
achieve a twenty percent savings in energy consumption, 3) achieve integration of re-
newable energy sources for twenty percent of total energy consumption, and 4) achieve 
ten percent integration of biofuels into the total consumption of vehicle fuels by 2020.
2.3.3. EU Policy and Climate Change
European policy strategies with respect to energy are arguably more closely linked to cli-
mate policy and international dialogue than perhaps the energy policy approaches that 
have traditionally been taken in the United States. As evidenced by the implementation 
of market-based emissions trading in the European Union, the motivation and nature 
of policy action can be quite different among developed countries. Here, we will explore 
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SET-Plan: The European Strategic Energy Technology Plan
The European Commission presented a strategic energy technology plan (SET Plan) 
on 22 November 2008, to accelerate the development and deployment of cost-effective 
low carbon technologies. The plan comprises measures relating to planning, imple-
mentation, resources and international cooperation in the field of energy technol-
ogy. Set-Plan was introduced through communication from the Commission to the 
Council of the European Parliament on 22 November 2007, entitled: “A European 
strategic energy technology plan (SET-Plan)—Towards a low carbon future.”59
Adopted in 2008, the aim through SET-Plan was to establish an energy technology 
policy for Europe. It is the principal decision-making support tool for European energy 
policy, with a goal of accelerating knowledge development, technology transfer and up-
take, providing industrial leadership on low-carbon energy technologies, fostering science 
for transforming energy technologies to achieve the 2020 Energy and Climate Change 
goals, and contributing to the worldwide transition to a low carbon economy by 2050.
Implementation of the SET-Plan commenced with the establishment of the 
European Industrial Initiatives (EIIs) which bring together industry, the research 
community, the member states, and the Commission in risk-sharing, public- 
private partnerships aimed at the rapid development of key energy technologies at the  
European level. In parallel, the European Energy Research Alliance (EERA) has 
been working since 2008 to align the research and development activities of indi-
vidual research organizations to the needs of the SET-Plan priorities, and to estab-
lish a joint programming framework in the European Union. A projected budget 
for the SET-Plan was estimated in excess of seventy billion euros.60
Six EIIs in total were established with a focus on data exchange on low-carbon en-
ergy technologies, including the European Industrial Bioenergy Initiative, European 
CO2 Capture, Transport and Storage Initiative, European Electricity Grid Initiative, 
Sustainable Nuclear Initiative, Solar Europe Initiative, and European Wind Initiative.
European Technology Platforms (ETPs) were also established to liaise with SETIS  
and to examine how to reach Europe’s energy targets through major technological 
advances. The ETPs, led by industry, help define research and development objec-
tives and lay down concrete goals for achieving them. The ETPs in fields covered by 
the SET-Plan are aligned with the EIIs.
In some sectors of strategic importance to Europe, public-private funded  
European Joint Technology Initiatives (JTIs) were also established under the Sev-
enth Framework Program (FP7) for large-scale initiatives. One such JTI, Fuel Cells 
and Hydrogen (FCH) was created to deliver hydrogen energy and fuel cell technol-
ogies developed to the point of commercial take-off.
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more fully the role and involvement of the European Union following the adoption of the 
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1994.61 As mentioned, the 
Kyoto Protocol was adopted at the third conference of the parties to the UNFCCC in Kyoto, 
Japan in December 1997 and entered into force on 16 February 2005.62 The detailed rules 
for the implementation of the Protocol were adopted at COP 7 (Conference of Parties) in 
Marrakesh in 2001, and are also called the Marrakesh Accords.63 A major distinction be-
tween the convention and the protocol is that the convention encouraged developed coun-
tries to stabilize greenhouse gas emissions, while the protocol committed them to do so.
The major feature of the Protocol is that it sets binding targets for signatory coun-
tries and the European Community for reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. To 
be considered compliant, signatory countries had to reduce national greenhouse gas 
emissions an average of five percent compared to a 1990 baseline over the five year 
period from 2008 to 2012. Calculated estimates of GHG emissions in Mt CO2e (mil-
lion tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent) would establish the baselines for participating 
countries. As of September 2011, 191 states had signed and ratified the Protocol. Indi-
vidual countries in the European Union are responsible for developing annual national 
emission projections for greenhouse gases for all key sectors of their economy and for 
complying with EU reporting obligations and projections. Official submissions to the 
European Commission are required under Council Decision 280/2004.64
Under the Treaty, countries were encouraged to meet their targets primarily through 
national measures. This, incidentally, has interesting implications for the European Union, 
which is obviously comprised of member states that exhibit significant national diversity 
with respect to energy and emissions. The Protocol also offered additional means of meeting 
national targets by way of three market-based mechanisms. The Kyoto mechanisms are: 1) 
emissions trading, known as the carbon market, 2) clean development mechanism (CDM), 
and 3) joint implementation (JI). These mechanisms were proposed to help stimulate green 
investment and help Parties meet their emission targets in a cost-effective way.65
Participating countries were obliged to monitor and maintain precise records of 
emissions. Emission targets for industrialized Parties to the Protocol were expressed as 
levels of allowed emissions, or assigned amounts, over the 2008–2012 commitment time 
period. Such assigned amounts, denominated in tonnes (of CO2 equivalent emissions), 
are known informally as Kyoto units. Parties may add to their holdings of Kyoto units 
through credits for clean development mechanisms (CDM) such as land use, land-use 
change and forestry (LULUCF) or by moving units from one country to another, for 
example through emissions trading.
The Kyoto Protocol was generally seen as an important first step toward a truly 
global emission reduction regime with intent on stabilizing GHG emissions, and 
providing the essential architecture for ensuing international agreements on climate 
change. The Protocol’s stringent emission reductions were devised to align with find-
ings and recommendations of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
The December 2009 United Nations Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen did 
not result in a new global climate protocol, however, a decision was taken to “take note” of 
an accord drawn up by a core group of heads of state (including the United States, China, 
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India, South Africa, Brazil, and the European Union). The accord (which is not legally 
binding) included a recognition to limit temperature rises to less than two degrees Celsius 
and to aid developing nations through financial support in achieving reduction in green-
house gas emissions.66 Discussions took place in tandem with the International Energy 
Agency whose proposed plan, entitled the 450 Scenario, includes an aggressive timetable 
of actions that would be required to limit the long-term concentration of greenhouse gases 
in Earth’s atmosphere to 450 parts per million of carbon-dioxide equivalent; the concen-
tration level commonly associated with a global temperature rise of around two degrees 
Celsius above pre-industrial levels. The plan outlined a timeline to 2030 with actions to 
achieve this objective including a fifty percent reduction in greenhouse gas emissions 
through implementation of energy efficient technologies  and the use of low-carbon en-
ergy technologies to produce sixty percent of global electricity, comprised of thirty-seven 
percent renewables energy, eighteen percent nuclear energy, and five percent using power 
plants capable of CCS. The plan also calls for substantial deployment of advanced vehicle 
technology and a resultant shift from current combustion technology, with sixty percent 
of new sales attributable to hybrid, plug-in hybrid, and electric vehicles.67 In 2013, these 
vehicles comprised about three percent of new car sales.
A further 2010 UN Climate Change Conference, held in Cancún, Mexico, adopted 
a number of proposals termed the Cancún Agreements. The Agreements acknowledged 
the goal of reducing emissions from industrialized countries by twenty-five to forty per-
cent (relative to 1990) by 2020, and also supported enhanced action on climate change 
in the developing world.68 At a UN climate meeting held in Durban, South Africa in 
November 2011, agreement was reached to begin work on a new climate deal that would 
have legal force and require both developed and developing countries to cut their car-
bon emissions. Attendees set targets to reach agreement on terms by 2015 and bring the 
agreement into effect in 2020.69
The Doha COP 18 UN Climate Change Conference served as the eighth meeting 
of the parties to the Kyoto Protocol in late November and early December, 2012, in 
Doha, Qatar.70 Countries launched a new commitment period under the Kyoto Proto-
col, agreeing to a firm timetable to adopt a universal climate agreement by 2015 and a 
path to raise necessary ambition to respond to climate change. They also endorsed the 
completion of new institutions and agreed on ways and means to deliver scaled-up cli-
mate finance and technology to developing countries. The following Amendment to the 
Kyoto Protocol was agreed:
2.3.3.1. Amendment of the Kyoto Protocol
The Kyoto Protocol, as the only existing and binding agreement under which developed 
countries commit to cutting greenhouse gases, has been amended so that it would con-
tinue as of 1 January 2013.
•	 Governments have decided that the length of the second commitment period 
will be eight years.
•	 The legal requirements that will allow a smooth continuation of the Protocol 
have been agreed.
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•	 The valuable accounting rules of the protocol have been preserved.
•	 Countries that are taking on further commitments under the Kyoto Protocol 
have agreed to review their emission reduction commitments at the latest by 
2014, with a view to increasing their respective levels of ambition.
•	 The Kyoto Protocol’s Market Mechanisms—the Clean Development Mecha-
nism (CDM), Joint Implementation (JI) and International Emissions Trading 
(IET)—can continue as of 2013.
•	 Access to the mechanisms will be uninterrupted for all developed countries 
that have accepted targets for the second commitment period.
•	 JI will continue to operate, with the agreed technical rules allowing the issuance 
of credits, once a host country’s emissions target has been formally established.
•	 Australia, the EU, Japan, Lichtenstein, Monaco, and Switzerland have declared 
that they will not carry over any surplus emissions trading credits (Assigned 
Amounts) into the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol.
2.3.4. EU Emissions Trading System (ETS)
The first and biggest international scheme for market-based trading of greenhouse gas 
emission allowances, the EU ETS works on the cap and trade principle. It covers approx-
imately eleven thousand power stations and industrial plants in thirty-one countries, in-
cluding the twenty-eight member states as well as Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway. It 
covers CO2 emissions from power stations, combustion plants, oil refineries and iron and 
steel works, as well as factories making cement, glass, lime, bricks, ceramics, pulp, paper 
and board. Nitrous oxide emissions are also covered by the scheme. In 2020, emissions 
from sectors covered by the ETS will be twenty-one percent lower than in 2005. The avia-
tion sector was brought into the system at the start of 2012; however, in November 2012 the 
European Commission deferred application of the scheme to flights operated to and from 
countries outside the European Union to allow more time to reach a global agreement 
addressing aviation emissions (please see Chapter 9 for more on EU-ETS in aviation). 71
2.3.5. Conclusion
A sense of urgency has defined EU energy and climate policy in recent years. Key efforts 
are motivated by analyses of required technological and financial actions through 2050 
that will help achieve required greenhouse gas reduction targets. Increased energy fund-
ing has resulted, for example through the 2007–2013 EU Framework 7 (FP7) research 
funding platform and is extended to Horizon 2020, with roll-out from January 2014. The 
Strategic Energy Technology (SET) Plan was introduced, providing a blueprint for rebal-
ancing of supply-side energy, including a range of low carbon energy initiatives. Orga-
nizations contributing to energy policy include the European Energy Research Alliance 
(EERA), the International Partnership for Energy Efficiency Cooperation (IPEEC), and 
Electricity Liberalization consortia focused on regulation to support competition in en-
ergy generation and distribution. Energy and climate in the European Union, like many 
other cross-cutting policy issues, rely heavily on the cooperation of individual member 
states and on the close coordination of stakeholders from across public and private sectors. 
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A variety of tangible strides have been made across the European Union, as evidenced by 
creative German and Spanish policies to commercialize solar technologies, French global 
leadership in nuclear power generation and safety, and pioneering efforts by the Dutch in 
wind energy, to name just a few examples. To an even greater extent in the coming de-
cades, Europe will be required to leverage practical technologies and effective policies in 
order to realize its aggressive national and international energy and climate aspirations.
2.4. China Energy and Climate Change Policy
China is an increasingly important player in twenty-first century global energy pol-
icy. China ranks second in the world in energy consumption and first in fuel-related 
emissions. It also has significant domestic energy resources and infrastructure and, as a 
permanent UN Security Council member and major world power, has elevated the role 
of energy and climate in its foreign and national security policies.
China’s gross domestic product (GDP) grew by an estimated 9.2% in 2011 and by 
7.8% in 2012. This ongoing high growth rate has, whether by cause or by effect, drasti-
cally increased Chinese energy consumption and, according to IEA, Beijing now ranks 
as the world’s second largest oil consumer. Oil consumption growth in China accounted 
for a whopping fifty percent of global growth in 2011.
Chinese proven oil reserves were estimated at 20.4 billion barrels in January 2012, 
concentrated in China’s northeast. Beijing started importing oil in 1993, and by 2009 
had become the world’s second largest oil importer. By 2011 its total net imports reached 
5.5 million barrels per day, delivered from regions as diverse as the Persian Gulf, Sudan, 
Angola, and Venezuela. China is active in developing domestic oil resources in north-
western regions of the mainland as well as potential offshore energy resources in the 
East and South China Seas. Development and claim to resources in these regions may 
prove contentious, as neighboring energy-hungry powers—including Japan, Malaysia, 
the Philippines, and Vietnam—share similar interests. Estimates of these resources 
range from 28 billion barrels of oil according to the US Geological Survey (USGS) to 
over 105 billion barrels from Chinese sources. Natural gas resources are abundant as 
well, but like oil, estimates by USGS and Chinese sources vary.72
Chinese government energy policy is administered by the National Development 
and Reform Commission, which serves as the energy sector’s primary policymaking and 
regulatory entity. A National Energy Commission established in January 2010 seeks to 
consolidate Chinese government energy policy, as well as formalize a more comprehen-
sive energy agenda which incorporates new and lower carbon technologies as an element 
of national energy planning. Numerous national oil companies, such as the China Na-
tional Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), the China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation 
(Sinopec), and the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), are major players 
in Chinese domestic and international production and policymaking.73
In 2009, coal accounted for approximately seventy percent of Chinese energy con-
sumption.74 That same year, China was responsible for nearly half of global coal, thus 
having tremendous influence on the future of the coal market. In its ambitious Twelfth 
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Five-Year Plan, 2011–2015, China intends to reduce energy and carbon intensity via en-
hanced energy efficiency and diversification of the energy mix.75 In addition to coal, nat-
ural gas and its accompanying pipeline infrastructure is of increasing interest within 
China. The Chinese electricity sector is dominated by five state-owned holding companies 
including China Huaneng Group and China Datang Group. The Three Gorges Dam is the 
world’s largest hydroelectric power station in terms of installed capacity (22,500 MW). 
Furthermore, China is the world’s largest hydropower producer, and is seeking to increase 
its nuclear power generation from its 2010 level of two percent of net generation. Modest 
but growing steps are being taken to increase the use of renewable energy resources, no-
tably with wind power. Furthermore, Beijing hopes to increase its solar production from 
two gigawatts in 2011 to twenty-five gigawatts by 2020.76 Other policies are being intro-
duced at the national and sub-national level to encourage the purchase of new energy 
vehicles, a term China uses to describe alternatives to the internal combustion engine.77 
Despite aggressive targets, such technologies are expensive and demand within China is 
relatively weak. In the near term, it is therefore possible that China may be more interested 
in innovating and manufacturing such renewable technologies for a world marketplace, 
as they are demonstrating in the export of solar PV panels, wind energy components, and 
advanced electronics comprising rare-earth metals.
Environmental pollution and climate change are significant problems confronting 
China. China emitted an estimated 6,666 million tons of CO2 in 2008, an annual figure 
that ballooned twenty percent in just three years to an estimated 8,000 million tons in 
2011, according to IEA and US DOE analysis. At such a pace, it is not difficult to un-
derstand that China became the world’s largest CO2 emitter in 2007. A 2009 conference 
report prepared for the US National Intelligence Council (NIC) noted that two-thirds 
of 338 Chinese cities for which air-quality data is available are considered polluted, that 
industrial pollution has occurred in more than seventy percent of Chinese rivers and 
lakes, and that underground water in ninety percent of Chinese cities is also polluted.78
Other findings from this report include the following:
1. China’s average temperature has risen by 1.1°C between 1908 and 2007.
2. Sea level and sea surface temperature have increased by 90 mm and 0.9°C re-
spectively, over the past thirty years.
3. Extreme weather events such as floods, drought, and storms have caused an-
nual direct economic losses of between $25 and $37.5 billion per year.
4. Water resource scarcity, fast-growing urbanization and industrialization, and 
severe pollution may lead to a water crisis that could result in social unrest.
5. China’s coastal regions are vulnerable to storms, floods, and sea-level rise due 
to their low and flat landscape.79
China is taking some steps on the domestic front to reduce its emissions and ad-
dress climate change. It conducts bilateral dialogues with Australia, the European Union, 
Japan, and the United States while also participating in international climate change fo-
rums such as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.80 China’s participation in 
international forums is of critical import. It is a large developing country, with pockets of 
considerable wealth that have achieved a high level of development as measured by any 
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global metrics. A primary challenge for China and the international community is to ap-
propriately reconcile and balance the energy and climate goals associated with a manufac-
turing powerhouse of tremendous global influence against the urgent necessity associated 
with improving basic needs and quality of life for the world’s most populous nation.
2.4.1. Conclusion
China’s role as a major player in international energy and climate change policy must 
not be understated. Its growing dependence on foreign oil imports has even resulted in 
Beijing’s use of warships to address international antipiracy patrols off the Gulf of Aden 
in 2008. China has also developed a chain of bases called strings of pearls in locales such 
as Chittagong, Bangladesh; Sittwe, Myanmar; Gwadar, Pakistan; Colombo, Sri Lanka; 
and other areas in the South China Sea and Indian Ocean to maintain sea lines of 
communication with its oil imports from the Middle East and to increase its geopolit-
ical influence in these areas.81 China’s increasing reliance on imported, largely fossil, 
energy resources and maritime security to protect its international trade may make it 
an increasingly assertive power throughout the world. Sustaining recent growth rates in 
China will require massive new energy supplies from both sides of its borders, and have 
significant impacts on the global climate.
2.5. Russia Energy and Climate Change Policy
Russia possesses the world’s largest conventional natural gas reserves, second largest 
coal reserves, and the ninth largest crude oil reserves; and not surprisingly, its economy 
depends heavily on energy exports. It was the world’s second largest oil producer (after 
Saudi Arabia), and the second largest natural gas producer (after the United States) in 
2011. In 2012, Russian oil production, averaging slightly over ten million barrels per 
day, actually surpassed Saudi oil production.82
Russia exports a significant portion of its energy resources to European countries, 
which affords it coercive leverage over these nations, such as Ukraine which receives 
51.6% of its domestic natural gas supplies from Russia. Moscow has used this leverage 
in both January 2006 and January 2009 when it raised natural gas prices and threatened 
to cut off delivery to Ukraine. This led to the eventual toppling of the Kiev government 
and replacement by a more pro-Moscow government. Empirical evidence of Russian 
export leverage over European countries can be witnessed in the following statistics 
that show the distribution of Moscow’s natural gas exports in 2010:
•	 Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS, made of selected former Soviet 
Republics): 37%
•	 Eastern Europe: 31%
•	 Germany: 27%
•	 Turkey: 14%
•	 Italy: 10%
•	 Other Western European Countries: 10%
•	 France: 8%
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While Moscow allows some foreign energy companies to invest and operate in 
Russia, preferential treatment is given to Russian energy companies such as Gazprom 
(natural gas) and Transneft (oil pipeline).83 Its oil production is heaviest in Western 
Siberia and occurs in areas as diverse as Sakhalin Island and the Urals-Volga. There 
are significant untapped oil and natural gas resources in Eastern Siberia, the Arctic, 
and the Northern Caspian Sea, all of which interest not only Russia but other regional 
neighbors, and carry the potential for increased conflict. A quick glance at the numbers 
make it evident why: Arctic Ocean reserves are estimated at 90 billion barrels of oil, 
1,669 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, and 44 billion barrels of natural gas liquids. Esti-
mated North Sakhalin Island oil reserves are 5.3 billion barrels, 43.8 trillion cubic feet 
of natural gas, and 0.8 billion barrels of natural gas liquids.84
Oversight for Russian energy policy is charged to the Ministry of Energy, yet multiple 
agencies participate in the implementation of the national energy policy. The Ministry of 
Natural Resources is responsible for issuing field licenses, monitoring compliance with li-
cense agreements, and levying fines for violating environmental regulations. The Finance 
Ministry administers energy sector tax policy, and the Ministry of Economic Develop-
ment influences tariff regulation and energy sector reforms. Within these ministries the 
Federal Energy Commission administers oil transportation tariffs, the Commission for 
State Policy on the Oil Market regulates oil and oil product markets, the Commission on 
Protective Measures in Foreign Trade and Customs and Tariff Policy sets crude oil export 
tariffs, the Regional Energy Commission regulates retail gas prices, and the State Atomic 
Energy Corporation (Rosatom) administers Russian nuclear energy.85
Like China, Russia is also confronting significant climatic and environmental chal-
lenges which will impact not only its own energy and climate policies, but those of neigh-
boring countries as well. Russia ranked fourth in the world in energy-related emissions 
with about 1.65 billion metric tons in 2011. A 2009 NIC report noted that a warming 
climate may lead to mixed impacts, including reduced energy and increased hydro-
electricity production. At the same time, potential permafrost thaw could negatively 
affect energy infrastructure and increase river crossing hazards. While water supply 
may increase in Siberia, North, and Northwest Russia, water shortages are possible in 
southern European Russia increasing economic and social strains. Russian agricultural 
production may experience mixed impacts, with northern localities potentially benefit-
ting from increased CO2 levels and shifted rainfall, while southern Russia may grapple 
with reduced productivity and become more vulnerable to drought. Russia will also 
experience increased migration pressure from Central Asia, the Caucasus, Mongolia, 
and northeastern China due to water shortages in these areas. Climate change may 
even impact international maritime trade in the Arctic Ocean potentially resulting in 
positive economic and negative environmental impacts.86
Additional NIC report findings include the following:
1. Prediction of significant winter temperature increases in regions of the Arctic, 
averaging 4–5°C by 2050.
2. Projected summer temperature increases in the northern Caucasus, Volga, and 
southern Western Siberia projected at 2–3°C.
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3. Projected snow mass decrease in European Russia of 10–15% by 2015.
4. Increased risk of fire and flooding; and outbreaks of disease carrying insects in 
northern Russia.
5. Concerns about government management of potential climate change induced 
infrastructure collapse.87
2.5.1. Conclusion
Russia is a critical nation in global energy and climate change policy. Its substantial 
energy resources generate significant export earnings, which in turn, enhance domestic 
economic growth and prosperity. Through these same energy resources, Russia has op-
portunity to gain economic and geopolitical leverage in the Arctic Ocean, Europe, the 
Caspian Sea region, and other former Soviet states. In one particularly acute example, 
Russia has protested western attempts to build a Trans-Caspian pipeline that would 
bypass Russia in delivering oil and natural gas to Europe. An emerging area of concern 
to players in the international energy arena is Russia’s sparsely populated but energy 
rich east Asian region, and countries such as China, Japan, South Korea, and the United 
States would be interested in seeing its resources developed.
Of particular interest from a geopolitical perspective is the China-Russia energy re-
lationship. Between 2000 and 2010, Russian crude oil exports to China increased nearly 
tenfold from 1.3 million to 12.8 million tons.88 Moscow is particularly concerned about 
Chinese attempts to increase economic and energy investment in northeast Russia and 
about regional demographic trends.89
As Russia confronts the opportunities and challenges associated with energy and 
climate, recent history has shown that it may be tempted to leverage extensive energy 
resources at the expense of regional neighbors. Given the reliance and increasing in-
ter-dependence of energy consuming states in the region, Russian leadership has a 
timely opportunity to balance its objectives with strategies that help optimize not only 
domestic but international economic, environmental, and security outcomes.
2.6. Brazil Energy and Climate Change Policy
Brazil’s energy matrix is one of the cleanest in the world, owing primarily to abundant 
hydroelectric power, electricity generated from biomass, and ethanol derived from sug-
arcane. Whereas the global average for renewable energy is about 12.6%, Brazil’s 45% 
domestic share ranks it first among the world’s ten most populous nations in carbon 
neutral energy supply.90 At the same time, Brazil has expertise in conventional oil de-
velopment and is poised to emerge as a significant fossil energy player over the coming 
decades, due largely to discoveries of significant offshore oil and natural gas reserves 
in 2007. Meanwhile, the Amazon rainforest, sixty percent of it in Brazil, is well known 
for its ecological value to earth’s biosphere, acting as a carbon sink with far reaching 
benefits for the global climate. Depletion through deforestation and loss of biodiver-
sity since the 1960s carries significant implications for Brazil, South America, and the 
world. Upon the backdrop of these disparate realities, the Brazilian economy has surged 
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in recent years, creating new challenges for a state that seeks to balance the rate of eco-
nomic growth with appropriate social, industrial, and environmental policy. Brazil has 
been a strong voice on the global stage concerning sustainability and climate change, 
playing host in 2012 to the UN Rio+20 Conference on Sustainable Development, and 
has been a prominent figure in many of the Conferences of Parties (COP).
Authority over the issues surrounding energy and climate policy is shared by several 
executive branch agencies, the Casa Civil and relevant legislative committees. Brazil has 
developed a long range planning framework for both the public and private sectors that 
includes the National Energy Plan 2030 (PNE 2030) and the National Energy Matrix 
2030. The stated objective of these documents is to devise strategies and develop pol-
icies that ensure the security and quality of energy supply for decades to come.91 Key 
areas of focus for Brazilian energy policy include: security of energy supply, a policy of 
reasonable tariffs, and aspirations to expand energy services to a greater share of the 
population.
The lead for implementation of energy coordination and policy making is the Min-
istry of Mines and Energy (MME), which has oversight for energy planning and devel-
opment, electricity, oil and natural gas, renewable fuels, geology, mining and materials 
processing. MME leads a multi-stakeholder mechanism known as the National Energy 
Policy Council (CNPE) which includes participation by key ministries including: Plan-
ning, Treasury, Environment, Development/Industry/Foreign Trade, and Agriculture, 
as well as representatives from the states, civil society, and Brazilian universities. CNPE 
advises the presidency of the republic for the electricity sector and is the principal fo-
rum for long term energy policy issues. The National Agency for Petroleum, Natural 
Gas, and Biofuels (ANP) was created in 1998 to provide regulatory authority and su-
pervision for the production and distribution of fuels in Brazil. While an independent 
agency, it maintains links to MME, and has a diverse charter including the execution of 
geological and resource assessments, management of the tender process for exploration, 
development and production of oil and gas, calculation of revenues for various govern-
ment entities, monitoring of prices, regulation and oversight of activities related to the 
supply chains for all types of fuels (including ethanol).92 
Propelled by broad economic expansion, electricity consumption is expected to 
grow by five percent per year over the next ten years. Whereas hydropower currently 
provides about seventy-five percent of Brazil’s electricity, a combination of concerns 
about over-reliance on a single source, risk of drought and environmental and cultural 
opposition to new projects will likely reduce this share as total electricity demand in-
creases. Nuclear generation capacity is planned to grow in order to keep pace at a two 
percent share of a larger total base, natural gas will increasingly displace coal for ther-
mal generation  (a net one percent increase to fifteen percent overall), and a suite of 
alternative energy sources are planned including small hydro, wind, and biomass, dou-
bling their composite share from eight to sixteen percent.93 
Two significant Brazilian companies heavily influence the country’s energy sec-
tor: Eletrobras and Petrobras. Eletrobras is Latin America’s largest power utility with 
a generating capacity of forty-three gigawatts. The Brazilian federal government owns 
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a fifty-two percent stake in the company, with the remaining shares publically traded 
on various international markets.94 Petrobras is the largest company in Latin America 
by revenue, and again, the Brazilian federal government is the largest shareholder and 
maintains voting control.95 
In oil and natural gas, a headline story not only for Brazil, but the energy world, 
is the 2007 discovery of extensive pre-salt layer continental shelf reserves estimated 
to contain over fifty billion barrels of oil equivalent (boe). Following initial resource 
assessment and exploration, a pilot project in the Tupi Lula fields began production 
in October 2010 at an output of approximately one hundred thousand barrels per day 
(bpd). Brazil is already a net oil exporter, and the pre-salt assets have the potential to 
increase domestic production from about 2.7 million bpd nearly twofold over the com-
ing decades. Formidable technical challenges surround the extraction of these reserves, 
given the depth and pressures involved, associated freezing temperatures, and distance 
offshore. In addition, the fields have the potential to include large volumes of associated 
natural gas for which major infrastructure would be required to either transport it to 
markets via pipeline or liquefy it at sea, both of which introduce additional technical, 
logistical, economic, and safety considerations. Pre-salt resources have raised legislative 
questions at the federal level to ensure the distribution of royalty income is equitable 
and undergirds socio-economic development for all Brazilian states, including many 
not endowed with fossil fuels.96
Brazil is renowned for its ethanol industry, ranking second to the United States 
in total production. Sugarcane juice is fermented to produce the ethanol, while the re-
sidual biomass, or bagasse, is burned to produce process steam for distillation and the 
generation of surplus green energy for the local electrical grid. In all, the process is 
extremely efficient with an energy ratio that yields between five and nine parts energy 
output for every one part of energy input (please see chapter 6). When combusted in 
motor vehicle engines, sugarcane ethanol has lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions that 
are approximately sixty percent lower than standard gasoline, according to US EPA 
estimates. This qualifies it as a so-called advanced biofuel. Sugarcane ethanol is a very 
sustainable form of bioenergy, and has provided opportunities to de-carbonize the 
Brazilian vehicle fleet, in which more than ninety percent of vehicles can operate as flex-
fuel. Brazilian statute mandates a minimum ethanol blend level on a quarterly basis, 
which typically varies between eighteen and twenty-five percent. Though the commod-
ity is freely traded, the sugarcane industry has received indirect government support in 
the past, and recent policies are aimed at providing favorable loan terms for upgrading 
infrastructure, optimizing agricultural practices, and incentivizing research and de-
velopment for advanced biofuels. Gasoline as a commodity has been kept artificially 
low in recent years in efforts to stem inflation. Though prices are adjusted periodically, 
this policy has been known to make ethanol less competitive and has unintentionally 
created supply shortages for gasoline and inventory imbalances for ethanol. Ethanol as 
a share of Brazilian transport fuel declined from fifty-five to thirty-five percent between 
2008 and 2012.97 Ironically, during part of 2011, Brazil increased imports of US corn 
ethanol to help meet statutory blend levels, while exporting sugarcane ethanol to sev-
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eral US states, including California, where local policies favor advanced biofuels. In the 
long term, Brazil is coordinating its energy, agricultural, and environmental policies to 
optimize the value that sugarcane delivers across the sectors of food, fiber, and energy.
Connecting energy policy with sustainable development and environmental pol-
icy has been a priority for Brazil, both domestically and internationally. While Brazil 
ranks fourth in the world in total greenhouse gas emissions, a small percentage of these 
emissions are attributable to the conversion of energy (please refer to Table 2.1). This is 
principally because fifty-five percent of total Brazilian emissions derive from land use, 
land-use change, and forestry , twenty-five percent from agriculture and livestock; and 
the industrial and energy sectors account for only twenty percent. Brazil’s clean energy 
matrix and modest per capita energy intensity result in very low energy-specific emis-
sions for the nation as a whole.
Brazil’s position in the context of international climate change negotiations has 
generally focused on three issues, namely:
1. Insistence upon each country’s individual sovereign right to national devel-
opment;
2. Strong opposition to any suggestion that the Amazon rainforest be put under 
international control for its protection;
3. Insistence of acceptance of obligations by industrialized countries for their 
emissions to date.98
Since 2008, Brazil has made some policy adjustments with regard to international 
agreements about forests, and importantly, introduced policies aimed at identifying 
CO2 reduction targets by sector. For example, under a 2009 law, Brazil would target a 
thirty-six to thirty-nine percent reduction in CO2 by 2020; which, if implemented, will 
keep total emissions at the 2005 level of 2.0 Gt CO2e in lieu of the business as usual pro-
jection level of 3.2 Gt CO2e. Though energy would be a minor component of these strat-
egies, given the dominant share of non-energy emissions, the Brazilian energy sector 
has suggested ways to assess and monitor energy performance and emissions, fiscal in-
centives, and energy efficiency projects. Brazil established, in 2009, a National Climate 
Change Fund, in order to assist in formalizing emission reductions across all sectors.99 
2.6.1. Conclusion
Brazil has been blessed with considerable natural resources with respect to both energy 
and the environment. The country has postured itself well by responsibly leveraging 
both renewable and fossil energy sources to promote social development and economic 
growth in a global market. In the coming decade, Brazil will confront new challenges 
associated with rapid growth in electricity demand and delicate decisions about ben-
efits and risks associated with the development of large-scale hydropower and, sig-
nificantly, deepwater oil and natural gas. Land use change and market optimization 
questions surrounding sugarcane will continue to require careful policy vision. With 
respect to the environment and climate change, the international community can ben-
efit from the contributions of Brazil, recognizing that large segments of developing 
countries will increasingly enjoy the benefits of industrialization and energy access 
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in the coming decades. As that occurs, it will remain imperative that Brazil balance 
the complicated forces between increased economic growth, supply of services, social 
reform, increased output of fossil and renewable energy, and environmental impacts. 
It is clear that whether the context is demand growth, renewables, oil, environmental 
impacts, or global collaboration, Brazilian energy and climate policy will be of critical 
global importance.
2.7. India Energy and Climate Change Policy
Though India is the world’s fourth largest energy consumer, it has the lowest per capita 
energy consumption of the countries discussed in this section. Yet India’s energy and 
climate footprint is bifurcated—large urban centers are responsible for high levels of 
coal-based emissions; and rural areas have little or no energy access. Economic growth 
in India has been steady over the past decade and more than half of India’s economic 
output is attributable to the service industry.100 Annual GDP growth based upon pur-
chasing power parity (PPP) for the period 2015–2030 is estimated to be 5.9% in India. 
This rate is notably greater than other major economies, including China. Should these 
projections prove accurate, Indian economic growth would likely be less energy inten-
sive than in neighboring China, where manufacturing and construction constitute a 
larger share.
First and foremost, Indian energy policy is focused on securing energy sources to 
sustain economic development. Much of this has come from coal which accounts for 
about fifty-five percent of the country’s commercial energy supply. Though India ranks 
fourth in coal reserves with about seven percent of proven global totals, demand growth 
has outstripped domestic supply for coal, forcing India to increase coal imports by more 
than thirteen percent per year since 2001.101
Similar to China, India’s energy planning is coordinated within the central govern-
ment’s revolving five year plans. The current Twelfth Five Year Plan (2012–2016) empha-
sizes energy and climate initiatives, yet conveys a candid outlook of the critical realities:
A GDP growth rate of about 8 per cent requires growth rate of about 6 per 
cent in total energy use from all sources. Unfortunately, the capacity of 
the economy to expand domestic energy supplies to meet this demand is 
severely limited. The country is not well-endowed with energy resources, 
except coal, and the existence of policy distortions makes management of 
demand and supply more difficult.102
India has recently made significant strides to re-align energy prices notably for coal 
and liquid petroleum products. Despite near term price increases, these policy adjust-
ments are nevertheless expected to have positive long term impacts on conservation and 
efficient use.103
A serious issue confronting India in the midst of its emergence as a major global 
economy is poverty. Though many have entered a rising middle class, the rural poor 
have been largely bypassed. A 2012 IEA report estimated that nearly twenty-five percent 
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of the Indian population lacks basic access to electricity, while electrified areas suffer 
from intermittent service.104 The government of India launched a rural electrification 
initiative in 2005 known as the Rajiv Gandhi Grameen Vidyutikaran Yojana (RGGVY) 
aimed at increasing rural household access by creating additional electricity infrastruc-
ture. Capital subsidies and preferential policies specifically target below poverty line 
households in un-electrified villages and rural communities.105 
Oil reserves in India are extremely limited, and reliance on foreign petroleum is 
perhaps the country’s weakest energy link. In its twelfth and provisional thirteenth Five 
Year Plans, India anticipates meeting approximately seventy percent of its expected 
energy consumption with domestic resources,106 however growing imported oil de-
mands will preclude greater levels of near term energy self-sufficiency. In 2013, India’s 
petroleum minister announced that the ministry would work toward energy indepen-
dence by 2030 through a series of steps aimed at increasing supply or reducing demand. 
Among them are the following: Increased hydrocarbon production; unconventional re-
sources such as coalbed methane and shale gas; foreign acquisitions by domestic Indian 
companies; and reduced subsidies on motor fuels.107
India has increased its development offshore, where about half its oil and three-
fourths of its natural gas is known to reside. India’s New Exploration Licensing Policy 
(1999) was successful in attracting largely domestic private investment and in identify-
ing new oil and natural gas finds. Despite this, India is a net importer of all fossil fuels. 
Over the last four decades, energy supply from imported sources has increased from 
ten to more than thirty percent, a sobering statistic for a country poised for sustained 
economic expansion.
Traditional biomass and waste are thermally converted to provide nearly a quarter 
of India’s energy supply. Much of this is used to provide for the energy requirements 
of buildings, heating and cooling, and other industrial needs. In rural areas, firewood, 
animal dung and agricultural residue are used as fuel for cooking, heating and lighting 
due to a lack of grid connectivity or access to alternate energy services. According to the 
Ministry of New and Renewable Energy (MNRE), India has 288 biomass power and co-
generation plants that generate 2.7 GW of installed capacity with the potential to reach 
18 GW in total generating capacity.108
India generates about three percent of the world’s hydropower with 113 billion kilo-
watt-hours (kWh) generated in 2010 (ranked seventh in the world).109 Due to the trop-
ical climate, India has identified opportunities to increase its hydroelectric generating 
capacity from 39.3 GW to more than 100 GW if all projects currently under survey and 
investigation are approved and constructed.110 India currently has six nuclear power 
plants in total with a combined 4.4 GW of generating capacity. As part of its energy 
growth strategy, the government has indicated that it plans to increase the share of 
nuclear power from four percent in 2011 to twenty-five percent over the long term.111
The country’s energy sector is administered and managed via a multi-ministerial 
structure that includes the Ministries of Power, Coal, Petroleum and Natural Gas, New 
and Renewable Energy, Environments and Forests, the Department of Atomic Energy, 
and the Planning Commission, among others.
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Several national policies have been implemented to ensure a smooth functioning 
framework for the power sector, open access to transmission and distribution networks, 
regulation of tariffs, and to improve rural electrification. The government established 
the Power Grid Corporation of India (POWERGRID) to operate five regional electricity 
grids, while states and private companies operate transmission/distribution segments. 
Other policies have liberalized the hydrocarbon market and encouraged private sector 
investment throughout the energy supply chain. This advocacy applies both to invest-
ment within India, as well as to Indian investment in foreign energy projects that will 
accrue value in India, such as from imports of oil or natural gas.112 One such example 
is in liquefied natural gas (LNG), in which the government of India began an import 
arrangement with Qatar in 2004. Indian firms, such as Petronet, have established trad-
ing relationships with foreign and domestic partners to ensure a stable supply to Indian 
markets. Due to increasing demand, India is an attractive trading partner, and LNG is 
now being acquired on the spot market from the Middle East and Africa.
IEA has noted that strategic technologies may enable India to sustain social-eco-
nomic growth while developing increased energy resources including: clean coal tech-
nologies; nuclear power through a three stage nuclear program; energy efficiency in 
industry and buildings through such approaches as audits, trading schemes and la-
beling; increased use of biodiesel and ethanol in transportation fuels; and improved 
transmission and distribution networks.113 
India has taken some critical steps domestically to reduce the environmental foot-
print associated with energy production and use. For example, the Ministry of New 
and Renewable Energy aims to increase the share of renewable energy to six percent of 
India’s total energy matrix and to ten percent of the electricity mix by 2022.
India’s National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC) identified eight priority 
national missions to address climate change mitigation and adaptation. Among these, 
the National Mission on Enhanced Energy Efficiency (NMEEE) seeks to create a regu-
latory and policy framework that is conducive to sustainable business models and inno-
vation. Fuel savings, avoided capacity additions, and emissions reductions are among 
the benefits. Other campaigns are directed at increasing the contribution of solar en-
ergy and accelerating the adoption and use of sustainable biofuels, setting an indicative 
target of 20% blending of biodiesel or bioethanol by 2017.114
In December 2009, India voluntarily agreed to a twenty to twenty-five percent re-
duction in emission intensity by 2020 from 2005 levels, exclusive of agricultural emis-
sions. The government projects that its per capita emission in 2030 (< 4 t CO2e) will 
remain lower than the 2005 global average (4.22 t CO2e).115 As revealed in the details of 
its recent policy plans, India has made significant progress in outlining steps required 
to align and implement its energy and climate agendas to continue strong economic 
growth in a sustainable manner.
2.7.1. Conclusion
India’s economic growth is projected to outpace other developing countries as well as 
its capability to procure domestic energy resources. Going forward, it must grapple with 
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major increases in energy demand while balancing imports against the development 
of domestic supplies. Energy analysts warn than India must manage its energy growth 
“without locking in high emissions.”116 Thus, environmentally sound solutions will be 
imperative from more efficient use of coal to increasing shares of natural gas, nuclear 
and biomass. The Indian energy and climate agenda includes some familiar essentials: 
improving access and reliability, increasing exploration and capacity, implementing reg-
ulatory and pricing reform, reducing petroleum reliance, increasing energy diversity 
with lower carbon sources, and increasing efficiency. Effective implementation will raise 
countless millions more to a higher quality of life while controlling the modest per capita 
energy intensities that typify the country today. India has made significant investments 
in foreign partnerships, and encouraged private interests, both foreign and domestic, to 
participate in Indian projects. This inclusive and global vision may come by necessity, but 
it may bring creative new solutions to the global energy and climate dialogue.
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Chapter 3
Social Engagement by the Engineer
mEliSSa daRk, ida ngambEki,  
dEnniS dEPEW, and Rylan Chong
abstract
The American Engineers’ Council for Professional Development, the precursor insti-
tution of the Accreditation Board for Engineering and Technology (ABET), defined 
engineering as the “creative application of scientific principles to design or develop 
structures, machines, apparatus, or manufacturing processes, or works utilizing them 
singly or in combination; or to construct or operate the same with full cognizance of 
their design; or to forecast their behavior under specific operating conditions; all as 
respects an intended function, economics of operation or safety to life and property.”1 
In light of this definition, engineers must have a working familiarity beyond the scope 
of their technical work. They must be able to identify and understand the social envi-
ronments and its interactions in order to develop solutions to global engineering chal-
lenges. Chapter 3 endeavors to provide a necessary social and global framework for the 
more detailed examination of specific energy topics undertaken in later chapters. The 
chapter describes systems within the social environment; introduces theories, concepts, 
and ideas to help students understand the social context and engineering’s place within 
it; and addresses the necessity for social engagement among engineers. The chapter also 
provides two energy themed case studies as examples of how the social environment 
affects engineering practice. Case Study 1 is designed to complement chapters 4 and 7 
and Case Study 2 is designed to demonstrate how political, social, and economic forces 
may emerge in the energy sector.
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3.1. Introduction
Questions of energy use and distribution and the global energy crisis must be consid-
ered in the context of energy producers, users, and the social environment that shapes 
energy use. To do so it is necessary to understand the social environment. A social 
environment is a context; it is a set of circumstances in which an event occurs; a time 
or place in which people live or in which something happens or develops. In the largest 
sense, the social environment is the milieu developed by humans (as opposed to the 
natural environment): it is society as a whole. Social environments are dynamic and 
multidimensional with many different aims, qualities, and aspects. 
Social environments are comprised of economic, political, and social systems. 
Within each of these systems there are other systems; for example, the political sys-
tem contains executive, legislative, and judicial systems. The economic system contains 
systems of production, distribution, property rights, and labor, among others. We can 
think of these systems as “nested” (Figure 3.1); each of these systems is an integrated 
whole and at the same time is part of larger systems. Changes within a system can af-
fect the systems that are nested within it as well as the larger system or systems within 
Figure 3.1. The Social Environment.
Social EngagEmEnt by thE EnginEEr 75
which it exists. Energy production, distribution and consumption exists within this 
social environment and therefore is fully integrated within, affected by, and in fact com-
prises these systems. For example, energy production, distribution, and consumption is 
an economic system with considerations of property rights and labor.
As individuals, we all experience social environments. We are shaped by the culture 
that we are educated or live in, or the people and institutions with whom we interact. Per-
sons within the same social environment often develop a sense of social cohesion based 
on shared experiences. Solidarity produces trust, reciprocity, and a sense of belonging, 
which can be desirable characteristics in a society. Taken too far though, cohesion can 
become collectivism and unquestioning allegiance—undesirable characteristics in a so-
ciety. The opposite extreme, rational self-interest, can be equally undesirable.
The global scope and temporal magnitude of the energy challenge requires that 
those whose work and calling is energy-related understand social environments in ways 
that helps them see beyond their own lived experiences, customs, and self-interest. The 
social environment of today’s global energy crisis is a complex and dynamic environ-
ment where the political, economic, and social systems are both intra- and interacting; 
the same issue is different in different places not only because of geographic differences, 
but as a consequence of political, economic and social factors constituting the context. 
Consider for example nuclear power generation. As described in Case Study 1, nuclear 
power generation in Germany, which accounts for just over fifteen percent of that na-
tion’s power generation, is being phased out as a result of public fears over safety. On the 
other hand, in neighboring France, where nuclear power accounts for over seventy-five 
percent of power generation, nuclear power generation is increasing. The drivers for 
these different directions in energy policy differ in the two contexts and include social 
factors such as public opposition in Germany, economic considerations such as the rev-
enue from energy export in France, and political will. The safety of nuclear energy is 
discussed in greater detail in Chapter 7.
This chapter begins by briefly describing foundational concepts of social systems, 
then focuses more specifically on political systems as an important type of social system, 
including interactions and dynamics within and among these systems and variations in 
political systems across the globe, discussing the implications of these interactions and 
variations on the issue of energy. Then, the chapter addresses common authentic values, 
examining how values and belief systems result in behavior, how common values im-
pact the common good, and the relationship between the common good and individual 
rights. Finally, we review the effect of globalization on social systems and discuss the 
implications for energy policy.
3.2. Social Systems
Social systems are all around us; neighborhoods, workplaces, class systems, traffic sys-
tems, families, marriage traditions, cities, and political systems are all examples of so-
cial systems. Social systems are comprised of individuals and groups. The most essential 
characteristic of any social system is interaction. Social systems are enduring, patterned 
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interrelationships between individuals, groups, and institutions. These enduring be-
havior patterns become embedded and shape the choices, opportunities, and actions 
of agents within the social system. Social systems supervene on individuals, influenc-
ing us through a variety of mechanisms. Social systems organize the behavior of large 
numbers of actors, coerce individual and group behavior, assign roles and power to 
individual agents, and have distributive consequences for individuals and groups. They 
are embodied in the actions, thoughts, beliefs, attitudes, and durable dispositions of 
individual human beings. Social systems are autopoietic; they exist only by reproducing 
the events that serve as components of the system. The characteristic patterns of inter-
action within a social system define it and differentiate it from other social systems. The 
mechanisms for control and influence are context specific; the mechanisms that one 
particular social entity uses for influence may fail in another context.
3.2.1. Political Systems
One of the most influential social systems is a political system. A political system is a 
manmade structure that regulates the processes and activities of human co-existence; 
specifically it is the social structure and methods used to manage a community, gov-
ernment, or state. The outputs from the political system can be broadly categorized as 
policies: the rules, understandings, and institutions that organize and direct human 
action. A political system can refer to either a particular form/system of government, 
for example, democracy, totalitarianism, or authoritarianism, or to a singular state or 
one of its subordinate authorities, such as a district or province, county, or city. A state 
is generally understood to be a sovereign entity with a government, defined territory, 
permanent population, and the capacity to enter into relations with other sovereign 
states. A political system is comprised of various political entities and their functions. 
This includes the political and legal structures manifested in governmental, civil so-
ciety, and private sector domains. A democracy has different political entities than a 
totalitarian or authoritarian political system. Not only do the entities and functions of 
the different political systems vary, so do the interactions among the entities, and this 
has implications for how decisions are made regarding energy generation and distri-
bution. For example, the Three Gorges Dam built on the Yangtze River in China was 
completed in 2012 despite widespread opposition from the local population because of 
the environmental impact and the necessity of relocating over one million residents of 
the flood plain. The political system in China allowed these decisions to be made, while 
in a different political context the project may have been stalled.
A political system is nested in a larger social environment that includes other so-
cial systems, such as the economic systems, and the values system. A political system 
interacts with these other systems. The legal structures and laws of a political system 
are made by the individuals and groups in the society or state, and they are influenced 
by the values and relationships of those actors. In turn, the political system influences 
the economic and value systems and, therefore, the actors—both group and individ-
ual. The process by which this occurs is manifest and perceivable in specific contexts. 
Later chapters explore specific contexts looking at different energy technologies and 
Social EngagEmEnt by thE EnginEEr 77
policies in different geographical locations and in so doing, provide snapshots that cap-
ture, compare and contrast particular social environments and their effects on energy 
production, distribution and use. There is value in understanding a particular energy 
technology in a particular locale at a particular point in time. There is even more value 
in understanding various technologies in various locales across various times, as this 
helps us to better understand the global energy crisis. Any movement toward shared 
solutions requires more robust understanding of the complex and emergent nature of 
the systems responsible for and impacted by the global energy crisis. We present an 
overview of structuration theory as a tool for thinking beyond surface features to the 
more deeply embedded understanding of the roles of policy in problems of human ac-
tion, such as energy.
3.2.2. Structuration
Structuration is useful for thinking about “problems of human action,” such as the 
global energy crisis, and policy solutions to these problems. A basic tenet of structur-
ation is that public policy is a multi-layered system, which means that we cannot look 
simply at policy actions (laws, regulations), we need to look more deeply into the sys-
tems that produce the policy actions. According to structuration theory, systems are 
made up of both agents and structures.2 Agents are individuals and collectives who 
act with purpose, intention, and motive. Structures are social properties that make it 
possible for social practices to exist. Structures can be thought of as the “rules of social 
life” that are applied in the enactment and reproduction of social life. All social states 
need agents and social practices to help them survive in a recognizably similar form. 
Structuration looks at how humans exert agency within structural contexts. More spe-
cifically, structuration looks at how social practices are ordered across time and space; 
how agents continuously reproduce these practices in the process of expressing them-
selves as actors; how actors reproduce the conditions that make these activities possible; 
and patterns of social outcomes resulting from these enacted social practices. Figure 3.2 
presents these ideas more concretely.
Figure 3.2. Theory of Structuration.3
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Policy action can be, and often is, explained by choice and preference. The relation-
ship between choice and preference, and policy action is labeled as teleological, which 
means that there is perception of purposeful development toward an end; that is, the 
choice or preference set logically leads to the given policy action. Explanations solely 
from the intentional dimension are often used in instrumental and rational theories 
of policy making. However, the analyst can go deeper by chaining back to look at per-
ceptions and values making up the dispositional dimension, suggesting a causal deter-
mination for given choice or preference sets. The distinction between levels one and 
two can be described as an in order to rather than a because of relationshiip, with the 
former referring to the intentional sphere and the latter constituting the link between 
this intention and the basis for it (the disposition): how a particular actor’s intention 
has come to be.4 The two constructs, perception and values, which Carlsnaes suggests 
as belonging to the dispositional dimension, fit Giddens’ model of structuration as the 
motives or purposes for action. Lastly, Figure 3.2 depicts a third level, the structural 
dimension, which represents the interaction between the dispositional and intentional 
dimensions. Structural factors include the contextual structures and institutions and 
their functions, and the manner and extent to which they enable and constrain condi-
tions under which contingent actors (the only causal entities) necessarily have to oper-
ate. Differences at all three levels result in differences in policy action.
Take the case of the renewable energies discussed in Chapter 4. The European Union 
(EU) is an example of a nested system. It comprises twenty-seven member states, each 
with their own political, social, and economic systems. However, the EU as a whole also 
shares common economic and governing political systems. The European Union set a 
goal that twenty percent of energy consumption should come from renewable sources 
by 2020. However, member states have the discretion to decide how this goal will be 
attained. There are actors in each of these states—such as companies, politicians, and 
individuals—all acting to influence the choices made in the national political, social, 
and economic systems about what technologies are used to generate power. Therefore, 
these systems are influenced by the agents within them. However, the agents are also in-
fluenced by the systems; they choose their actions and responses based on recognitions 
of how the systems work and how they can be influenced. Case Study 1 gives an example 
of how political and social issues can have an impact on energy generation.
While understanding differences is important, it is not the entire story. As im-
portant as it is that students understand differences in social environments, we also 
believe it essential that students understand commonalities that all humans share. 
The next section discusses how common beliefs and values are formed and how goals 
are negotiated.
3.3. Common authentic Values and Principles
Societies regularly develop a set of commonly accepted values arising from a common 
belief system. These values arise from common needs and desires and include those 
things seen as being good for the society as a whole, or for the common good. In a trea-
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Case Study 1
Energy is a global necessity. However, societies struggle to find answers to address 
the wicked problems of energy sustainability, environmental/climate concerns, and 
health. A potential alternative would be the increased usage of nuclear power. It pro-
vides significant benefits, such as clean emissions, cost effectiveness (that is, there is 
not a high demand to develop newer technologies or purchase additional technol-
ogies to reduce the carbon footprint), and it is reliable and provides a predictable 
base-load. Moreover, nuclear power plants do not have to refuel often. Although 
nuclear power plants present benefits, Chancellor Merkel of Germany announced a 
plan to phase out their nuclear power plants by the year 2022.
To understand the reasoning for phasing out nuclear power plants, it is essential to 
understand the history that led up to the decision. Germany’s first nuclear plant went 
online in 1957, which represented the political and economic movements of the time.5 
In 1960, Germany introduced the Atomic Energy Act with the primary aim of encour-
aging nuclear energy. However, not every actor was on board with the nuclear pro-
gram. An anti-nuclear interest group made up of environmentalists and peace activists 
believed there should be policy changes regarding the military usage of nuclear power 
and nuclear waste disposal. The oil crisis in the 1970s promoted the idea that energy 
diversity and therefore nuclear energy was good for the state, but the 1986 Chernobyl  
incident revitalized the anti-nuclear movement and discouraged public support for 
nuclear power plants.6 However, it was not until 2002 that Chancellor Schroeder, with 
the support of the Social Democratic Party and the Green Party, passed the first nu-
clear phase out deal to end all nuclear energy production by 2021.7 The phase-out deal 
modified the Atomic Energy Act of 1959 by including a section that no new licens-
ing would be distributed, which prohibited the building and operation of new nuclear 
power plants and other nuclear facilities.8 Schroeder provided three reasons for the 
phase-out: a) there was growing concern about how to handle nuclear waste, b) nuclear 
power was a social problem, and c) nuclear power had no economic purpose.9 
In 2010 Chancellor Merkel, the Christian Democratic Union, Christian So-
cial Union, and the Free Democratic Party expressed their disagreement with  
Chancellor Schroeder and his supporting parties’ phase out deal, because of  
Germany’s commitment toward the European Union’s 2020 energy strategy re-
quiring twenty percent use of renewable energy, energy supply, and steady energy 
prices.10 Merkel developed a new strategy that gave all nuclear plants that were con-
structed before 1980 an eight year license extension and those plants constructed 
after 1980 a fourteen year license extension.11 In 2011, twenty-three percent of  
Germany’s electricity was generated through nuclear power.12 On March 11, 2011, 
an earthquake and tsunami struck Japan, resulting in a meltdown at the Fukushima 
Nuclear Plant. Days after the event, Merkel formed the Ethics Commission on Safe 
Energy Supply that evaluated Germany’s seventeen nuclear power plants. Months 
later, in light of Japan’s nuclear disaster and public opposition, the Ethics Commission  
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tise on the common good, V. Bradley Lewis brings up arguments first voiced by Aristotle 
and St. Thomas Aquinas. The common good has been described as a specific good that 
is shared and beneficial for all (or most) members of a given community;  a good that 
is both end and means; and any action or behavior that promotes the good of the state 
and, by doing so, promotes the good of all its citizens.14 The concept of Common goods 
is grounded in morality and ethics. Central to morality, ethics, and the concept of the 
common good is the notion that human beings are both rational and political beings. 
Unlike the rest of the animal kingdom, humans can trace their actions as resulting from 
a series of thoughts and reasons; it is this capacity to reason that allows us to behave 
individually and collectively in a manner supporting the common good. However, man 
acts not only for himself, but for the larger group; he recognizes that the success of the 
group benefits the individual. Man utilizes not only individual work for the benefit of 
the many, but also aspires to function in a manner that ensures that a society’s work is 
for the benefit of the many. While it is important for people to understand the aspects 
that differentiate social environments, it is equally, if not more, important that we ap-
preciate these unifying common authentic values and principles.
3.3.1. Values, Beliefs, and Behavior
Social systems are the result of groups of people acting with and on each other; individ-
uals are nested within and make up the social structure. In order to understand social 
structures we must first consider the human being as an individual. Individual behavior 
on Safe Energy Supply took a deontological position and recommended Merkel to 
shut down eight of the seventeen nuclear plants and return to Schroeder’s phase out 
deal, in order to protect the country from future threats of nuclear disasters.13
Guiding Questions
1. What are the social, economic, and political implications of phasing out 
Germany’s nuclear program? Who will be impacted by this decision and 
to what extent?
2. Using the theory of planned behavior model, analyze Germany’s Green 
Party’s conflicting views on nuclear energy and clean energy?
3. What are the social, political, and economic differences that made Germany 
consider the tragic events in Japan as a reason to phase out their nuclear pro-
gram while France did not? 
4. Germany is a leader in the renewable energy sector and plays a huge role in 
the European Union 2020 energy strategy. What are some alternatives that 
could replace and improve the energy lost by the phase out deal, without 
increasing the carbon footprint and cost?
5. Evaluate the environmental policies and regulations (that is, the cost and ben-
efits, liability, human health protection, and environmental security) regard-
ing nuclear energy in Germany. Compare the results to Japan’s and the United 
States’ environmental policies and regulations regarding nuclear energy. 
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can be seen as the result of an individual’s values, belief system, and attitudes. Values 
refer to individually held, socially constructed ideals of desire and preference based on 
what the individual holds to be true or false. Belief systems are the total collection of 
what one holds to be true about the world, both physical and social, and about oneself.15 
One model of the interaction of these attributes is the Theory of Planned Behavior (Fig-
ure 3.3) proposed by Ajzen.16 In this model the individual’s behavior is influenced by 
their attitude, which is their positive or negative feeling about the behavior. Attitude 
is a result of the individual’s belief about the consequences of the behavior and how 
desirable those consequences are judged to be. Behavior is also influenced by the indi-
vidual’s belief about other people’s evaluation of the behavior and whether it should be 
performed, called the subjective norm. Finally, behavior is influenced by the individu-
al’s perception of the difficulty inherent in performing the behavior, measured in terms 
of effort, resources, and ability and weighed against the perceived value of the behavior 
to the individual. This is called perceived behavioral control. In this way an individual’s 
desires, attitudes, and beliefs about the world around them and values together influ-
ence their behavior.
As demonstrated by this theory, since the individual is nested within the social 
structure, individual action is heavily influenced by social norms. Evaluations of both 
the desirability and the consequences of an action are weighed based on perceptions of 
social judgment. Therefore, while the society is made up of individuals, individuals are 
the product of society and are heavily influenced by relationships, history, and tradi-
tion. So a society’s values are the product of the values of the individuals within it, and 
an individual’s values are the product of the society in which they are embedded.
3.3.2. The Common Good and Individual Rights
This complex relationship between the individual and society finds expression in the 
notion of the common good. Though values differ across individuals, communities, 
societies and cultures, there are certain values shared across these groups. These com-
mon values, such as food, shelter, development, and happiness, can be thought of as a 
conception of the common good. However, individuals and indeed societies differ in 
the extent and the manner in which they value these goods. It is therefore difficult to 
define the concept of the common good and to agree on what those goods may be. The 
Figure 3.3. Theory of Planned Behavior.17
Dark, Ngambeki, Depew, aND ChoNg82
utilitarian definition of the common good is the greatest good for the greatest num-
ber. This is the simplest definition of the common good and therefore the most easily 
translated into action. However, this definition has two major failings. First, it falters 
in its conception of common because the greatest number is often only a section of the 
population (usually demographically or historically powerful groups). The utilitarian 
approach values the benefit or happiness of this sector at the expense of the remainder 
of the population. In practice this often results in some members of a society being 
used as a means to ensure the well-being of the rest. Second, this approach fails in its 
definition of good. The measures of good or happiness in this visualization are often 
narrowly defined and reduced to a particular set of measurable goods such as material 
wealth. These goods are often limited to a sector of the population and even within 
this sector may disregard other desirable goods such as education. In this definition 
the individual rights of certain members of the population are limited for the benefit 
of other members of the society. An example from the energy sector is the appropri-
ation of land for building dams. Dam construction is generally viewed as being for 
the common good by providing power to communities, providing employment, and 
reducing the carbon footprint by providing renewable energy. However, those people 
displaced—in some cases forcibly—are disproportionately negatively affected by the 
loss of their land.
Since common goods are grounded in ethics and morality, another way to con-
ceptualize them is through the prism of religion. In this context the common good 
is defined as a responsibility to care for others and support the general welfare, 
sacrificing some personal freedoms for that which is seen to benefit society. These 
principles of self-sacrifice and generosity can be a powerful way to support and 
protect struggling sectors of the populace. However, this approach to the common 
good also has certain pitfalls; for example often a narrow section of the population, 
usually religious leaders or the theologically inf luenced elite, is responsible for de-
ciding what benefits society and what can be reasonably sacrificed for these bene-
fits. In this case these espoused benefits are strongly inf luenced by the particular 
religious doctrine, making religious tradition the arbiter of individual freedoms 
and restricting other freedoms, especially for nonmembers of that particular reli-
gion. This is especially problematic in societies with diverse populations belonging 
to varying religious traditions. This approach can also be problematic in societies 
like the United States which value the separation of powers. In these societies, ar-
guments rooted in religious doctrine may be derided as not belonging in the public 
sphere and ignored regardless of their merit.
The common good can also be defined as that state which supports the individ-
ual in the fulfillment of their potential.18 In this conception, each individual pursues 
personal fulfillment to the greatest extent possible. However because individual ful-
fillment is limited by time, energy, and resources, individuals also value benefits aris-
ing from others’ pursuit of fulfillment. Because of this, individuals come together to 
create a society that uses fairness as the basis to support individual fulfillment. In this 
conception both the participation in the society to support others and the benefits of 
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the society to the individual are considered common goods. However, this conception 
is naively optimistic, assuming mutual supportiveness and individual’s activities will 
benefit the group.19
In all of these discussions of the common good, there are three primary difficulties. 
One is the conception of the common. The number and diversity of individuals within 
a society make it impossible to cater to everyone, so a choice has to be made as to what 
portion of the society will be considered as the common. Another is the conception of 
good. Societies are made up of individuals who may not have the same values, belief 
systems, or needs. Therefore, deciding whose needs and values will be considered is a 
constant challenge. A third is the tension between the common good and individual 
rights. Considerations and responsibility for the good of others would seem to require 
sacrificing some individual freedoms. However, Tocqueville argues that the common 
good and individual rights are not in conflict. In a society where one’s rights are rec-
ognized as paramount, individuals realize that the protection of their rights depends 
on the extent of the protection of others’ rights, and define these as the common good. 
Therefore active and engaged participation in support of good citizenship is the best 
way to support individual rights.20
Inherent in all three of these difficulties is another important question namely, 
who gets to decide. A decision has to be made by the individuals within a society as 
to what will be valued, who will benefit, how they will benefit, and who will bear the 
cost. By necessity, this decision is made by a section rather than the whole population. 
The determination of who will have the power to make these decisions and how they 
will act is the essence of a political system, one of the foundational elements of the 
social environment.
3.3.3. The Tragedy of the Commons
One example of the tension between individual rights and social responsibilities is the 
notion of the tragedy of the commons. The commons are shared resources in a com-
munity, such as a public park or a lake which can be used by all. If this shared resource 
is destroyed by the cumulative action of individuals acting exclusively for their own 
benefit, the situation can be referred to as a tragedy of the commons.21 Take for example 
a local lake used by fishermen. Since the resource belongs to no one, each fisherman has 
the right to remove as many fish as they desire from the lake. Each fisherman therefore 
removes as many fish as possible in order to maximize their individual profit, result-
ing in overfishing of the lake and the consequent destruction of the resource. In this 
case the common good, continued access to the fishery, was sacrificed for individual 
rights, pursuit of a livelihood. The converse of this would be the seizing of the lake by a 
local government which could, for example, mandate that it could only be used by cer-
tain fishermen or for occasional sport fishing, thus preserving it for the common good. 
However, this would deprive the local fishermen of the right to make a living through 
fishing. Other examples of the tragedy of the commons include greenhouse gas emis-
sions and pollution from car exhaust.
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Though the pursuit of the common good can seem impossible—given both the dif-
ficulties in defining both common and good and the tensions between individual and 
communal rights—the pursuit is not impossible. This is evidenced by other examples of 
the use of common resources. There are many examples all over the world where local 
communities have evolved systems that maximize both common access to resources 
and individual rights to pursue beneficial economic and entertainment objectives.
3.4. Globalization and the Common Good
Historically, interpersonal and inter-group interactions through migration, explora-
tion, trade, and war has stimulated human development and fostered the adoption and 
propagation of technologies, values, and beliefs. These interactions generally result in 
changes in social systems for both groups, with values and beliefs altered or adopted 
in response to changing contexts, information, and desires. Globalization has not only 
significantly increased knowledge of and interactions among societies, but has also 
created interconnected production and consumption systems linking the fortunes of 
various societies. More than ever before, events in one part of the world can be felt in 
geographically separate places. This interconnectedness has required the development 
of new social, political, and economic systems spanning the globe, as well as a new 
understanding of the common good and individual rights. Achieving this understand-
ing requires the identification of and agreement on common values across societies. 
Globalization has had the dual effect of both distributing or magnifying the negatives 
in the social environment (such as the manipulation of differing values to maximize 
benefits for certain sectors of the population) and empowering actors to positively in-
fluence social systems by leveraging global connections. For example, globalization and 
its contributions to the development of transnational social movements have affected 
hydroelectric power generation. Between 1900 and 1950 the number of dams globally 
increased from approximately six hundred to nearly five thousand, by 2000 the num-
ber of dams approached forty-five thousand. However, the rate of dam building has 
declined significantly from about one thousand dams built per year in the mid 1960s 
to about twenty-five per year in the 1990s. This decrease can be partly attributed to the 
growth of transnational non-governmental organizations and the development of com-
munication systems that allow local people to mobilize worldwide opposition to large 
dam projects which would displace hundreds or millions of people.
Decisions about energy production and use must be made in the context of the 
political, social, and economic systems in which they exist. In order to make these deci-
sions it is important to understand the interplay between these systems, how they affect 
and are affected by the agents within them and by individual and societal values, and 
the necessity of balancing individual and communal needs. Case Study 2 illustrates how 
these differing forces may manifest in the energy sector.
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Case Study 2
Eco-Energy Systems owns an ethanol plant in the heart of the  United States mid-
west. The plant has a production capability for producing twenty million gallons of 
ethanol per year and employs thirty production workers. By comparison, most of 
the ethanol plants in the United States can produce sixty million gallons or more 
each year. In 2012, ethanol production dropped for the first time in sixteen years. 
This was primarily due to the reduced demand for gasoline since 2008 (most gas-
oline in the United States is blended with ethanol). The current production ceiling 
requires approximately thirteen billion gallons of ethanol to be blended with gas-
oline at ten percent (E10), as determined by a government mandate. Also, future 
projections by the Department of Energy show an increase in demand to fifteen 
billion gallons by 2015, which is the target date established by the RFS (Renew-
able Fuel Standards). However, the cost of biomaterials has increased substantially, 
undercutting profits by thirty percent. You have been assigned to lead a team of 
managers, engineers and scientists from Eco-Energy Systems to conduct a review 
of the facility and make recommendations to the company president and CEO on 
the future of the operation. You are expected to be sensitive to environmental and 
societal concerns in developing your final report.
There are some environmental and economic issues to be considered in any 
decisions on the future of the ethanol plant. 
1. Ethanol production requires using large volumes of water. When in full 
production, the plant pumps approximately six million gallons of water a 
day from a wetland, which helps some local residents in low lying areas by 
keeping the water table low and basements dry. However, environmental 
groups are threatening legal action because they view tampering with the 
water levels as detrimental to local wildlife and the natural ecosystem. If 
these lawsuits are successful, the company would have to pay millions of 
dollars for remediation, leading to the closure of the plant.
2. If the plant is closed, approximately ninety jobs will be lost from the com-
munity with a population of 1200. The economic impact of closing the pro-
duction facility is quite significant to a small community.
3. Any decision to dismantle the operation will require an environmental im-
pact study which will be expensive and time consuming. There could also 
be issues associated with hazardous materials.
4. Based on projections of increased demand for ethanol, the President of 
Eco-Energy is willing to consider expanding the facility to increase pro-
duction capacity to one hundred fifty million gallons per year. The expan-
sion could also include focusing production on second-generation biofuels 
using cellulosic feedstocks such as corn stover or other energy crops such as 
miscanthus, switchgrass, and tree plantations. However, these projections 
of demand are uncertain.
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Some guiding questions for your team to consider are:
1. How do notions of the common good play out in this case study?
2. How do you reconcile the competing interests of being a profitable business 
serving the interests of shareholders with being socially responsible to the 
community and future generations?
3. What are some of the potential financial consequences of closing the facil-
ity? What recommendations would you offer to the president?
4. What are two alternatives you would recommend to upper management? 
What are the consequences? Which alternative would you recommend?
5. In chapter 6, the author suggests using a “reverse auction” as one possible 
policy mechanism to make the production of biofuels more economically 
viable. Would this be a good alternative? 
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abstract
The chapter commences with a short appraisal of current shares of generating capacity 
from a range of renewable energies, before proceeding to a review of selected renewable 
energy sources. We discuss wind, hydroelectric, wave, tidal, and geothermal energy 
sources, examining the history of each technology, current developments, and environ-
mental impact. The chapter concludes with a look to the future grid, considering the 
impact of large scale renewable technologies on grid development. 
4.1. Introduction
Given both the proven market position of fossil fuels in world energy supply and the 
difficulties associated with continued or increasing demand and use of coal, petro-
leum, and natural gas, we need to consider the current status and future potential for 
a range of renewable technologies: onshore and offshore wind, hydroelectric energy, 
wave and tidal energy, and geothermal energy. Chapters five and six will go further, 
exploring developments in solar energy underpinned by nanotechnology and biofu-
els, respectively.
Hydrogeneration remains the world’s largest carbon-neutral renewable electricity 
resource, with global installed capacity of approximately 3.4 GWh (gigawatt hours 
per year). Wind installation is on a rapid growth curve, with current installation in 
excess of 230 TWh (terawatt hours per year). Installed wind capacity in the United 
States exceeded 43 GW (gigawatt) by the third quarter of 2011, making it second only 
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to China. The majority of wind installations to date globally have been onshore and 
that technology, although still developing, has reached a relatively mature status. Off-
shore wind farms offer greater power (watts/square meter), but such installations are 
more technically challenging and costly to install and maintain. Globally, biomass 
accounts for in excess of 200 TWh, geothermal energy for 65 TWh, solar photovoltaic 
energy for 12 TWh, solar thermal energy for 1 TWh, and tidal energy for 0.5 TWh. 
Estimated renewable energy by type is shown as a percentage of global energy con-
sumption in Figure 4.1.
4.2. Wind Energy
Growth trends for installed wind energy capacity are on the rise around the world. 
Total global cumulative capacity in December 2012 stood at 282.6 GW; China tops the 
table at 75 GW, with USA second at 60 GW, Germany third at 31 GW; followed by Spain 
(23 MW), India (18.5 MW), UK (8.5 MW), Italy (8 MW), France (7.5 MW), Canada 
(6 MW), Portugal (4.5 MW), and the rest of the world (40 MW).
4.2.1. historical overview
Wind turbines, traditionally known as windmills, have been around for at least three 
thousand years. The main use of early machines was either for pumping water or grind-
ing grain. Wind has been the key source of power in sailing for even longer. In the early 
part of the last century, wind turbines were used for electricity generation, primarily to 
charge batteries and facilitate the supply of power to remote locations. However, the at-
tractiveness of these systems declined with the advent of an expanding electricity grid. 
An exceptional case worth noting was a fifty-three meter rotor-diameter steel wind 
turbine constructed in the USA in 1941.2 This 1.25 MW Smith-Putnam machine had a 
full-span pitch control—much like modern machines—and had flapping blades for load 
Figure 4.1. Estimated Renewable Energy Share of Global Energy Consumption, 2011.1
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control. This operated as the largest wind turbine ever constructed for a period of about 
four years until it suffered catastrophic failure in 1945.
A record of the historical development of wind turbines recalls a 100 kW 30 m di-
ameter Balaclava wind turbine and an Andrea Enfield 100 kW 24m diameter pneumatic 
design, built in the former USSR in 1931 and in the UK in the early 1950s, respectively.3 
The design of the latter turbine was based on the use of hollow blades with openings at the 
tip. The air was drawn up from the opening and through the tower to subsequently drive 
another turbine which was connected to the generator to produce electrical power. Other 
developments include the 200 kW 24 m diameter Gedser machine built in Denmark in 
1956; testing of a 1.1 MW 35 m diameter turbine in 1963 by Electricité de France; advances 
made by Golding at the Electrical Research Association in the UK; and the construction 
of a number of lightweight turbines in Germany in the 1950s and 1960s, by Hotter.4 
Despite this general enthusiasm and the achievement of several technical milestones, 
activity in the wind energy industry did not gather momentum until the dramatic surge 
in oil prices in 1973. This made wind energy competitive with traditional fossil fuels. 
It also created the necessary push for the further advancement of wind energy science 
and technology, helping to reduce the cost of energy (COE). This in turn stimulated 
a number of substantial Government-funded programmes of research, development, 
and demonstration both in the USA and in Europe (specifically, in the UK, Germany, 
Sweden and Denmark). Denmark became a pioneering nation in the development of 
wind turbines, a far sighted stance which placed them ahead of neighboring European 
countries in the ensuing decades. A series of prototype turbines were constructed in the 
USA. Power generation capacity of the turbines grew from 100 kW for Mod-O built in 
1975 (38 m diameter) to the 2.5 MW Mod-5B built in 1987 (97.5 m diameter). A 4 MW 
vertical axis Darrieus wind turbine was also constructed in Canada. A similar concept 
34 m diameter turbine was tested in the Sandia Vertical Axis Test Facility in the USA. 
Other initiatives with regard to vertical axis design involved the use of straight blades 
giving rise to an ‘H’ type rotor proposed by Peter Musgrove, resulting in a 500 kW pro-
totype. In 1981, a 3MW horizontal axis wind turbine was developed and tested in the 
USA with hydraulic transmission and gear system. The entire structure was orientated 
into the wind instead of using a yaw controller. The optimal choices of the number of 
blades to be considered remained an open issue at that time and turbines with varying 
number of blades (one, two, or three) were constructed.
4.2.2. Wind Characteristics
The amount of energy that can be extracted from wind was eloquently determined by 
German physicist Albert Betz. Published in 1919, Betz’s Law calculates the maximum 
power that can be extracted from the wind in open flow. The law reveals that energy 
created is proportional to the cube of wind speed:
P = 0.5cρAV3
where P is the power (watts), c is the coefficient of performance, ρ is the density of air 
(kg/m3), A is the area of the turbine (m3), and V is wind speed (m/s).
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According to Betz’s Law no turbine can capture more than 59.3% of the kinetic en-
ergy in wind. Modern wind turbines are designed to achieve as much as eighty percent 
of the Betz limit.5
Since the power generated from wind is highly sensitive to wind speed, an assess-
ment of the characteristics of the wind resource is vitally important. Information on the 
characteristics of wind forms the basis of investigations on wind energy exploitation, 
including decisions on site selection, design optimization, and the best choice of tur-
bine for a particular setting. Wind characteristics are also critical to the understanding 
of the effect of wind energy penetration to the electricity grid network. This is very 
important in the emerging context of smart grids and the ease of connectivity to local 
distribution or transmission networks.
Wind speed is highly variable in nature, both spatially (geographically) and tempo-
rally. Scale dependency of this variability over a wide range (both spatial and tempo-
ral) adds to the complexity. Variability or fluctuations in available energy from wind is 
amplified due to the consequence of the cubic relationship to speed. On a global scale, 
spatial variability refers to varying climatic conditions in different regions of the world, 
with some locations more windy than others; such fluctuations are caused by the dif-
ference in solar insolation at different latitude. Within any particular climatic region, 
wind speed variation will also occur due to variability in physical geography. Wind 
speeds are affected by the proportion of landmass and sea, the size of the land mass, the 
presence of mountains or plains, and the type of vegetation in the area, which governs 
the amount of solar reflection and radiation and, in turn, the surface temperature and 
humidity. On a local scale, wind speed fluctuations are affected by local topography: 
for example, wind speed is higher on the top of hills than on the leeward side or in a 
sheltered valley. Finally, at any given location wind speed is dictated by the presence of 
buildings, trees, or open, unobstructed land.
At any particular site, the wind speed also varies temporally. On a long term tem-
poral scale, there may be an underlying trend in the variation of the wind speed over 
years or decades, but such variation is not well understood and is rather difficult to 
predict. On time scales shorter than one year, fluctuations can often be attributed to 
seasonal variations. These are better understood, however large variability can occur 
over short time scales and accurate prediction may not be possible beyond a few days 
forward. There are considerable local specific variations possible during the day (diur-
nal) and these can be predicted more accurately. The understanding and forecasting 
of these fluctuations plays a major role in the context of energy management for the 
grid, as they give an indication of how much can be produced from the renewable 
wind and hence enable decisions regarding production from other types of power 
plant feeding the grid. Even further refined temporal scales (on the order of minutes 
or seconds) indicate several aerodynamic phenomena which can contribute to fluc-
tuations in wind speed. One such phenomenon, turbulence, can have a significant 
impact on the design, performance, and fatigue life of individual turbines and their 
components, and can also impact on the quality of the power produced and its effect 
on customers.
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The total velocity of wind flow passing through the turbine rotor may be decom-
posed into a height dependent mean component and a stochastic (turbulent) fluctuat-
ing component. Attention to understanding turbulence in wind flow is an important 
field of research. One approach to tackling stochastic problems in wind turbulence is 
through application of power spectral density functions (PSDF).6 A rotating blade is 
subject to an atypical fluctuating wind velocity spectrum, known as a rotationally sam-
pled spectrum. Rotationally sampled spectra are used to quantify the kinetic energy as a 
function of frequency for rotor blades. Due to the rotation of the blades, the spectral en-
ergy distribution is altered, with variance shifting from the lower frequencies to peaks 
located at integer multiples of the rotational frequency.
4.2.3. Modern Wind Turbines and the Power Grid
Wind turbines can be mainly classified into two types based on the alignment of 
the rotor shaft: the vertical axis wind turbine (VAWT) and the horizontal axis wind 
turbine (HAWT), which is most widely observed today. Typical wind turbine compo-
nents include turbine blades, nacelle housing, a low speed shaft, gearbox, generator, 
brake assembly, support tower, a cable drop to a converter and switchgear, and a local 
transformer for connection to the power grid.  Either alternating or direct current 
generators, with related accompanying power electronic circuitry, may be found in 
turbines in operation today. 
Direct drive grid connected generators are considered candidates for future 
wind generation, as they would eliminate the need for gear boxes and power con-
version. Generator designs for wind turbines include the permanent magnet syn-
chronous generator (PMSG), field excited synchronous generator (FESG), and the 
induction generator (IG). IGs may be of fixed speed (FSIG) or double fed (DFIG) 
design. The DFIG has a wound rotor, enabling the transfer of power from both the 
rotor and stator windings. The stator winding is connected directly to the three-
phase electrical grid and the three-phase rotor winding is fed from the grid through 
a frequency converter.
With the significant penetration of wind energy into the grid, wind turbines are 
now integrated into the mainstream source of generating power. Commercially in-
stalled wind turbine machines of megawatt capacity have been successfully operat-
ing for a number of years. On-shore and offshore wind farms in operation in many 
countries around the world typically comprise ten to one hundred turbines, with 
some large on-shore farms containing several hundred units. On-shore wind farms 
are suitable for open landmass areas which have average wind speeds greater than six 
meters per second at a height of ten meters. An example of a wind speed power curve 
is shown in Figure 4.2, with an indicative cut-in speed of 3.5 m/s and a rated speed of 
12.5 m/s.
Aside from the increased incremental power output, there are several beneficial 
effects to grouping turbines in a farm, including savings in construction costs, grid 
connection costs, and lower operation and maintenance (O&M) costs due to integrated 
management and maintenance.
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4.2.4. Future offshore Wind Energy Potential
Figure 4.3 provides an indication of the growth in the size of wind turbines from 1985 
to the present day. Referring again to Betz’s Law (P = 0.5cρAV2), we see that the power 
generated by a wind turbine is linearly proportional to the swept area, and we know 
that area is proportional to the square of the radius (r2 or d2/4). Thus, holding other 
conditions constant, a doubling of the radius will increase power output fourfold. A 
significant increase in turbine rotor diameters is possible by locating farms offshore. 
In this way rotor diameters as large as 160 meters can be installed, since restriction 
due to aesthetic pollution or noise is not an issue. Stronger offshore wind speeds com-
bined with less turbulence away from the shore result in increased efficiency and greater 
power production, especially since the size of onshore wind generators are nearing their 
upper limits due to social concerns.
Offshore wind turbines have greatly reduced visual impacts and lower noise con-
straints, allowing higher rotor speeds. However, offshore hardware and installation costs 
tend to be expensive, largely on account of water depth and distance from shore. Nev-
ertheless, offshore farms can produce up to fifty percent more electricity than onshore 
equivalent farms. In 2006, offshore wind energy accounted for 1.8% of total installed ca-
pacity, but produced 3.3% of total wind electricity. A significant database has been estab-
lished through worldwide wind atlas records data, with some eight thousand locations 
registering wind speeds at a standard height of eighty meters above sea level. Indications 
are that moving offshore is considered a likely growth area for wind technology, with 
potential for development in near-shore deep water zones in countries and locations in-
cluding the USA, the western coast of South America, Spain, Norway, China, Japan, India, 
Figure 4.2. Typical Wind Speed Power Curve Characteristic: Output Power Versus 
Wind Speed, Indicating Cut-in Speed, Rated Speed, and Cut-out Speed.
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and the eastern coast of Australia. Land-based wind farm capacity is limited to fifty mega-
watts while offshore farms of more than one hundred megawatt capacities are possible. 
Offshore construction is nevertheless challenging, not least in terms of installing deep 
water foundations, achieving connectivity to grid and carrying out maintenance follow-
ing installation of plant.
The cost of fixed mounted offshore wind turbines increases with water depth, ren-
dering them uncompetitive in certain locations. In deep water areas, floating wind tur-
bines may be the most cost-effective and reasonable solution.7 Experience and expertise 
acquired through the offshore oil platform industry means that there is a wealth of 
relevant technology available for adaptation to floating offshore wind turbine platforms 
(FOWT). As a large platform is preferable in order to minimize ocean motion response, 
and the weight of a wind turbine is small compared to that of the floating platform, it is 
possible to install larger wind turbines with capacities of five to ten megawatts. This will 
enable a reduction in power generation cost.8
One major challenge is to design and optimize an appropriate support structure, 
which can contribute almost forty percent of the total cost. Ongoing research and devel-
opment is essential in all areas, including assembly, installation, and decommissioning; 
electrical infrastructure including power transmission and HVDC; power electronic 
converters; monitoring of power quality; enhanced design of turbines; and operations 
and maintenance protocols for offshore systems, in order to reduce COE and minimize 
environmental impact.
FOWT systems may be divided into two groups, single turbine and multi-turbine 
systems.9 Several initial concepts considered floaters supporting multiple turbines, in an 
attempt to reduce floater motion due to smaller thrust height to floater span ratio and to 
improve economy by employing a single mooring system.10 However, such systems are 
subjected to high current and wave loads and their turbines suffer wake effects. The floaters 
Figure 4.3. Wind Turbine Developments: Blade Span and Power Rating.
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supporting a single wind turbine were considered to be more suitable for offshore wind 
energy.11 Single turbine system platforms include spar (S), tension-leg platform (TLP) and 
barge (B) concepts as indicated in Figure 4.4.12 The spar concept uses a long-draft spar 
moored by catenary or taut lines and achieves stability using ballast to lower the center 
of mass below the center of buoyancy. The TLP concept achieves stability through the 
equilibrium of tensioned taut mooring-lines and the excess buoyancy of the platform. The 
barge is generally moored by catenary lines and stabilized by its water-plane area. Hybrid 
models using features of those concepts also have potential for further development.
4.2.5 Environmental Concerns and Social acceptance
Wind farm installation continues to grow annually in most regions, including Europe, 
the United States, China, and India. The EU added ten thousand megawatts of new 
capacity in 2010, approximately ten percent of which was offshore. Germany alone in-
creased power capacity by two thousand megawatts in 2011, setting the mark as the 
leading EU member state in installation of wind energy. The United Kingdom is cur-
rently the largest market for offshore wind, with installed capacity of two thousand 
megawatts, fifty percent of total EU offshore installations.
Although wind turbines emit no carbon emissions and are generally positively re-
ceived by local communities, they are seldom greeted with universal support. Principal 
objections to farm installations tend to be visual or noise related. Wind turbine noise 
can result owing to the passage of wind across the blade surface. Although the blades 
appear to move slowly, the blade tips can move at speeds in excess of one hundred miles 
per hour, which in turn can generate a pulsing noise. In addition, complaints sometimes 
reference the shadows cast by the rotation of the blades; which may be more or less pro-
nounced depending on location and prevailing weather conditions. Objections mostly 
concern farms with large arrays of turbines. On the beneficial side landowners may 
generate income by contractually agreeing land lease for utility installation.
The International Energy Agency Task 28 working group incorporated contributions by 
representatives from USA, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Japan, Norway, Switzer-
land, and the Netherlands to create “an interdisciplinary and cross-cultural exchange plat-
form with goal to support the successful development of wind energy in the participating 
Figure 4.4. Single FOWT Systems: (a) S-FOWT, (b) TLP-FOWT, and (c) B-FOWT.13
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countries.”14 In the context of supporting development of wind projects and understanding 
the opposition that can arise, social acceptance is defined as “societal consensus on the plan-
ning, construction, and operation of wind projects.”15 The group’s recommendations are 
aimed at planners, policymakers, and practitioners of wind power development.
•	 Sites with potentially high conflicts, such as those close to dwellings or in pro-
tected areas, should be avoided.
•	 It is important to anticipate and minimize potential adverse project impacts by 
choosing an appropriate turbine model or by adapting to the behavior of wild-
life such as migrating birds.
•	 Wind farm installations should maximize benefits for local communities by means 
of an equitable distribution of the positive and adverse impacts of a project.
Research in wind energy supported through the EU Framework program includes proj-
ects for the design of very large wind turbines (producing eight to ten megawatts) for 
both onshore and offshore applications.16
Development of wind energy has grown exponentially over recent years and many 
countries have surpassed expectations of the percentage wind capacity that may be safely 
deployed on network grids. Attention to power quality, intermittency, and strength of dis-
tribution and transmission grids have been tackled, enabling connectivity of renewable at 
levels well in excess of what was previously thought possible. The case for wind energy is 
now well established; however it is a maturing rather than a mature science and will have 
an important role to play in reducing carbon emissions to 2020 and beyond.
4.3. hydroelectric Energy
4.3.1. historical Perspective on hydropower and hydroelectricity
Water as a source of energy, or hydropower, has a long history stretching back to, and 
probably beyond, recorded history. In ancient times water wheels were used in milling 
to produce flour from wheat grain. Another use was in agriculture in the form of irri-
gation where some form of waterwheel was deployed to pump and feed water into dis-
tribution channels. In Mesopotamia, the use of irrigation and drainage for agriculture 
dates back to 5000 BC. Cities were built along the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, forming 
the northeastern portion of the Fertile Crescent, which also included the Jordan River 
Valley and the Valley of the Nile.17 Mesopotamian innovations also included construc-
tion of water dams and the use of aqueducts.
Undoubtedly water in the form of rivers was the chief source of power during the 
early stages of the industrial revolution and this largely accounts for the development of 
various types of mills and factories in places that otherwise would be rustic, charming 
and idyllic. Developed in Greece, the earliest evidence of a water-driven wheel is con-
sidered to be the Perachora wheel, dating to the third century BC.18 The Romans and 
Greeks were the first to operate overshot, undershot and breastshot waterwheel mills.19 
The third century AD Hierapolis water-powered stone sawmill is the earliest known 
machine to incorporate a crank and connecting rod mechanism.20
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Early contributors to both the study of hydraulics and the practical realization of water 
wheels included Bernard Forest de Bélidor (1693–1761), who published Architecture Hy-
draulique which described vertical- and horizontal-axis hydraulic machines; Jean Victor 
Poncelet (1788–1867), who improved the design of turbines and waterwheels; Daniel 
Bernoulli (1700–1782) who wrote the theory for the conversion of water power into other 
forms of energy in his book Hydrodynamica; and mathematician and physicist Leonard 
Euler (1707–1783) who wrote his theory of hydraulic machines in 1750.
As the 1800s progressed a number of technological innovations such as the develop-
ment of turbines led to increased efficiencies. And in general a more scientific approach 
was in evidence by which the energy extracted from a headrace could be maximized.
With the development of the electric generator in the latter part of the 19th century, 
through hydraulic coupling, hydroelectric power could be produced.21 The first opera-
tional use of water (hydro) in the generation of electricity in the United States is attributed 
to Wisconsin in 1882. At the beginning of the 20th century, many small hydroelectric 
power plants were being constructed by commercial companies in mountains near metro-
politan areas. India’s first hydropower plant with a capacity of 130 kW was commissioned 
in 1897 at Darjeeling in West Bengal.22 By 1920 forty percent of the power produced in the 
United States was hydroelectric. With the development of extensive electricity networks 
distribution problems in respect of waterwheel power were solved in that the location of 
the power generation did not have to coincide with, say, the site of the end use factory.
For this and other reasons worldwide investment in hydroelectric schemes increased 
dramatically. For small and less technically advanced countries that were energy poor, 
hydroelectric was an attractive option. For example in Ireland the waters of the Shannon 
(the major river in the country) were harnessed at the Ardnacrusha hydroelectric power 
plant and became operational under the control of the Electricity Supply Board (ESB) 
in the late 1920s. The Ardnacrusha hydroelectric power plant was the largest in the 
world until it was overtaken by the Hoover Dam, built in 1936 with power rating 1,345 
MW. The economic and social impact of Ardnacrusha to Ireland was immense. The 
Hoover Dam was eclipsed by the 6,809 MW Grand Coulee Dam in 1942. The Itaipu 
Dam opened in 1984 in South America as the largest, producing 14,000 MW but was 
surpassed in 2008 by the Three Gorges Dam in China at 22,500 MW. Hydroelectric-
ity eventually supplied countries including the Newfoundland-Labrador schemes 
(Churchill Falls) in Canada; Norway, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Paraguay 
and Brazil, catering for more than eighty-five percent of their electricity needs. The 
United States currently has more than two thousand hydroelectric power plants which 
supply forty-nine percent of its renewable electricity.23 Although some countries owing 
to natural topography are considered to have reached their viable potential for hydro 
installations, hydro remains a very important and indeed natural source of electricity 
generation. Examples abound throughout the world.
As the most widely used form of renewable energy, hydroelectricity accounted for 
sixteen percent of global generation (3,400 terawatt-hours) in 2010, and is expected to 
increase about three percent per year over the ensuing twenty-five years. Hydropower 
is produced in 150 countries, with the Asia-Pacific region generating thirty-two percent 
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of global hydropower in 2010. It is noteworthy that China is the largest hydroelectricity 
producer, with 721 terawatt-hours of production in 2010, representing around seventeen 
percent of domestic electricity use. There are now three hydroelectricity plants larger 
than ten gigawatts: the Three Gorges Dam in China, Itaipu Dam across the Brazil/ 
Paraguay border, and Guri Dam in Venezuela.
4.3.2. hydroelectric Power Generation
The parameters governing the amount of electrical energy that may be generated using 
a hydropower source are the height from which the water falls and the quantity of water 
flowing (flow rate).
The power equation may be expressed as:
P = ηphqg
where P refers to the electric power output in KW, η equals a coefficient of efficiency 
(typically around 0.8), q is the flow rate in cubic meters per second, p equals the density 
or specific weight of water (1000 kg/m3), h equals the head in meters, and g refers to the 
gravitational constant, 9.81 m/s2.
In a water turbine, blades are attached to the shaft and when flowing water passes 
against the blades of the turbine, the shaft rotates. After transferring energy to the tur-
bine, water is discharged via a drainage channel called the tailrace of the hydropower 
plant. The shaft is coupled with an electrical generator to produce energy. 
An essential component of hydraulic power generation is the availability of a contin-
uous source of water, providing a large amount of hydraulic energy. While the vertical 
fall (head) of water remains fairly constant once the plant has been designed, the flow rate 
can vary depending upon the intensity, distribution and duration of rainfall. The head of 
water may be available by local terrain or may be created artificially by construction of 
a dam. If available and adequately controlled, ‘water energy’ from rivers, streams, canal 
systems or reservoirs, can provide hydropower plant with efficiency far exceeding that of 
a conventional thermal power plant. As no heat is involved during hydroelectric power 
generation, component parts, if well maintained, can last for up to 40 years.
Water turbines may be classified based on a number of functional and operational 
characteristics. On the basis of head and quantity of water required, turbines can be 
classified as high-head (with heads ranging from several hundred meters to a few thou-
sand meters),  medium-head (with heads ranging from about 60 to 250 meters), and 
low-head (with heads of less than 60 meters). Francis turbines are medium-head, while 
Kaplan and propeller turbines are low-head. Depending on the type of flow, turbines 
are classified as tangential flow,  axial flow, radial flow, and mixed-flow. Turbine shafts 
may be either of horizontal (Pelton turbine) or vertical axis alignment.
4.3.3. Social, Environmental, and Economic Impact of hydroelectricity
There are significant advantages to the use of hydroelectric power. Based on appropriate 
site selection, water is a dependable source of energy which is both non-polluting and 
reliable. It can also be an effective source of power for remote areas. Efficiency of up to 
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eighty percent may be achievable in transferring stored water to electrical energy. When 
storage facilities are effectively used, flood water may be retained and used for agricul-
tural production, river regulation, and wildlife protection.
There can also be adverse effects to the deployment of hydropower. Over the sum-
mer months water reservoirs may have limited natural flow, diminishing the power 
available to the local community. There have been occasions where large numbers of 
people have been evacuated from their homes to enable the construction and instal-
lation of hydro power plants. Landscape clearing may also result in soil erosion and 
in extreme circumstances, landslides. Moreover, in normal circumstances silt may be 
naturally transported downstream by the flow of the river. If it is captured by the reser-
voir this may result in a decrease in fertility of downstream plains.  Aquatic and other 
animal life may be adversely affected owing to reduction in dissolved oxygen levels. If 
not carefully monitored fish may be trapped and killed in passing through the turbine.
4.4. Wave and Tidal Energy
4.4.1. Extracting Energy from the Sea
The use of wave and tidal power has a longer history than many would suspect. The 
Romans built tide mills and much later tide mills were a feature to be found on the 
North Atlantic coast, particularly in France, Great Britain, Canada and the United 
States. Électricité de France (EDF) operates the largest tidal power station in the world 
located on the estuary of the Rance River in Brittany. Its annual output is of the order 
of 0.6 TWh and produces electricity at a cost nearly thirty percent below that of nuclear 
power. The Severn Barrage Tidal Power system in the Bristol Channel has long been 
talked about as a candidate for a large barrage system particularly as the River Severn 
has a tidal range of fourteen meters (one of the highest in the world). But like most such 
schemes environmental issues have prevailed to date. 
This is one of the reasons why open water (especially in noted ecologically sensitive 
estuary environments) exploitation of tidal and wave power is dominating current con-
siderations. It has been estimated globally that 180 TWh of economically accessible tidal 
energy is available. And the corresponding figure for wave energy is of the order of 500 
TWh. In the 1970s Stephen Salter was one of the early advocates and developer of systems 
to extract energy from waves and achieved a 90–90 efficiency in tests of prototypes (i.e., 
ninety percent absorption of the power available in a wave and ninety percent conversion 
of that power into electricity). Interest in these systems waned with falling oil prices. But 
with current high costs of energy and concerns about climate change attention has re-
turned to the quest of extracting energy from waves. Waves of course are a result of wind 
and therefore wave power systems are intermittent sources of power. In contrast the tidal 
system, due to a well-established earth-moon mechanism, provides a regular flow of water 
(stream) largely independent of the wind and thus is an attractive option for energy gen-
eration. Tidal stream generators operating in open sea situations are not without environ-
mental challenges but they are less serious than for estuary based systems.
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4.4.2. Wave Energy
4.4.2.1. Overview
The energy derived from sea waves is one of the most spectacular forms of ocean energy. 
Often, it leads to severe destructive effects. The waves are produced by wind action and 
are therefore in turn indirectly generated from solar energy. The motion of sea surface 
waves is principally determined by wind speed and, in particular, the gradient of the 
wind velocity which induces a force. Thus understanding the temporal and spatial vari-
ations of the wind force regulated through different angles of incidence upon the sea 
surface is a fundamental issue. Another issue is the characteristic spectrum over which 
the wind force is converted into wave motion. Because it is not possible to uniquely sim-
ulate such complex interactions on an entirely deterministic basis through the applica-
tion of computational fluid dynamics over large scales (that is, the wind velocity cannot 
be known precisely as a function of time), stochastic models are required to investigate 
correlations between the energy associated with a sea surface wave stream and the wind 
velocity time series.
Yoshio Masuda is regarded as the father of modern wave energy since his research 
began in Japan in the 1940s. He developed a navigation system powered by wave energy 
and equipped with an air turbine. This device, later called an oscillating water column 
(OWC), was commercialized in Japan in 1965, and subsequently in the United States.
In Europe there has been a research thrust in wave energy since the early 1990s 
stimulated by the European Commission’s inclusion of wave energy as a theme in their 
research and development programs on renewable energies. Since the start in 1992 there 
have been a large number of projects funded by the European Commission. The IEA-
OES 2008 Annual Report provides a survey of the ongoing activities in wave energy 
worldwide.24 In the recent past, there has been growing interest in wave energy in North 
America (USA and Canada), involving the national and regional administrations, re-
search institutions and several companies. This has resulted in frequent meetings and 
conferences on ocean energy.25
4.4.2.2. Nature of Waves
Waves are generated from wind. Hence, as with wind, variability is the main drawback 
for energy generation from waves. The variation can occur over different time scales: 
from wave to wave, with sea state, and from month to month. There are also seasonal 
fluctuations in wave height. Winds generated by the differential heating of the earth 
pass over open bodies of water and push surface water particles along with it (whose ini-
tial conditions are established by the incident radiation) setting up a rolling motion in 
the water and moving the water particles in a vertical and circular path. The energy and 
power densities of a wave are proportional to the square of the wave amplitude and to 
wave period; hence knowledge of the average wave height is therefore important when 
considering where to place a wave farm.
Assessment of wave energy resource at a site is crucial for the purpose of design of 
wave energy converters and also for planning and management, in similar fashion to 
Coyle, Basu, BlaCkledge, and grimson104
that described for wind.26 For the purpose of site classification, the level of available wave 
energy is usually expressed as power per unit length (along the wave crest or along the 
shoreline direction). A good offshore location should offer the availability of an annual 
average ranging between 20 and 70 kW/m. These locations are mostly in areas of moderate 
to high latitude. Seasonal variations are less pronounced in the Southern hemisphere and 
hence southern coasts of South America, Africa and Australia are particularly attractive 
for wave energy exploitation.27 The northern hemisphere (that is, the northern Atlantic 
and Pacific oceans) has large average wave heights. Further, in terms of the proximity of 
these waves to coast lines, there are two principal regions that stand out: the Aleutian Is-
lands and the west coasts of Ireland and Scotland. That latter case is due to the fact that the 
Atlantic Ocean is characterized by prevailing winds from west to east—the Atlantic Trade 
Winds—and these coasts are regions with a higher population density and easier access 
to the infrastructure required to exploit wave energy technology. Indeed, the world’s first 
commercial 0.5 MW wave energy plant, developed by WaveGen, is located in the Isle of 
Islay in Scotland and, on the west coast of Ireland, wave heights can vary from two to 
twelve meters over a week depending on seasonal changes.
The Energy Density E (energy in Joules per unit area) of a continuous sea surface 
wave may be approximated by
 where ρ is the density of (sea) water, g is the acceleration due to gravity and H is the 
wave height. This is the energy associated with the oscillation of a wave on the sea 
surface. For a wave period of T seconds the associated power (in watts per unit area) 
is given by
 Thus for an average wave height of 1 meter and an average period of 1 second the 
wave energy is 1.23 kJ/m2 and the wave power is 1.23 kW/m2. These metrics apply to 
wave energy conversion devices that exploit the energy of the wave at right angles to 
the plane of the sea surface. However, some devices exploit the power associated with 
the propagation of the wave front itself. In this case, the Energy Flux F (also known as 
the Power Density) is given by multiplying the energy density of a wave with the group 
velocity to give
 In all cases the metrics are proportional to the square of the wave amplitude and 
open water waves are generated whenever wind speeds exceed ~0.5 meters per second. 
Large amplitude (~2 m), long period (~7–10 s) waves have power densities commonly 
exceeding 40–50 kW/m.
Conventional wave spectrum models are linear, and assume that the distance 
over which the waves develop and the duration over which the wind blows are suffi-
cient for the waves to achieve their maximum energy for the given wind speed. It is 
assumed that waves can be represented by sinusoidal forms. This relies on the follow-
ing: (i) waves vary in a regular way around an average wave height; (ii) there are no 
E =  – ρgH2 ≈ 1.23H2 kJm-218
P =  — Wm-2ET
F = 0.5 H2T kWm-1
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energy losses due to friction or turbulence, for example; and (iii) the wave height is 
much smaller than the wavelength. These principal assumptions provide the basis for 
predicting wave amplitudes on a statistical basis and it is upon this basis that many 
wave energy converters are designed in which the wave amplitude is taken to conform 
to a Rayleigh distribution. However, this distribution is known to be inaccurate which 
is primarily due to a lack of understanding of how, on a statistical basis, wind energy 
is converted into wave energy.
From a statistical point of view, what is required is a physical model that can accu-
rately predict the distribution of sea surface waves and sea types given knowledge on 
the distribution of the wind velocity. A solution to this problem could then be used to 
estimate the ‘quality of power’ from a wave farm given statistical parameters that reflect 
the environmental conditions in which the wave farm is operating.
A common measure of the Wave Spectral Density S(T) as a function of the wave 
period T is 
where
And,
the wind velocity v being measured at 19.5 m above the still water level.28 However, 
this model does not take into account ‘split spectra’ as can sometimes be observed 
on the west coast of Ireland; that is, spectra consisting of two distinct peaks. Neither 
does the model, which is based on linear wave theory, take into account freak waves, 
which are an essentially nonlinear effect. Furthermore the model provides an esti-
mate of the spectrum of periods of sea waves rather than a model that can be used 
to simulate a time series representing the vertical oscillation of a wave energy device 
at a location on the sea surface. The spectrum of the wave period is a measure of the 
power density and energy flux, but the square of the wave height is arguably a more 
fundamental measure, that is, the wave energy. However, the wave spectral density 
does at least provide a qualitative relationship between the wave properties and the 
wind velocity.
Another important product of the linear wave theory relates to the distribution of 
wave heights which is taken to conform to a Rayleigh distribution  
where H is the wave crest height and σ is the most probable wave height.29 This distribu-
tion is used to define the significant wave height (SWH) which is an average of one third 
of the maximum wave height. High storm conditions can give wave heights of around 
fifteen meters and the probability of waves with twice the SWH is 0.00001. This leads to 
the conclusion that freak waves with heights greater than fifteen meters are effectively 
S(T) = AT3e−bT
a = 8.10 ×
g210−3
2π × 104
b = 0.74 × ( )4g2πv
P(H) = Hσ2— exp (−
H
2σ2)
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impossible. However, this conclusion is wrong, as freak waves are now a well known and 
well documented phenomenon although the reasons for their existence (especially deep 
water freak waves) is still a matter for debate.30 Events of this type can cause serious 
damage to any wave energy conversion device and/or a wave farm that duplicates such 
a device unless it has been engineered to withstand such rare but extreme conditions.
4.4.2.3. Wave Energy Resources and Developments
In 2011, the UK Carbon Trust estimated that the global marine energy sector could 
be worth 760 billion in United States dollars by 2050. Industry estimates put annual 
marine energy revenues at nearly 100 billion dollars by 2025. A detailed assessment of 
Ireland’s wave energy resource undertaken in 2005, for example, looked at the theo-
retical and accessible levels of wave energy in Irish waters.31 The study indicated that a 
theoretical wave energy resource of up to 525 TWh exists within the total limit of Irish 
waters. For comparison, in 2006, the total electricity requirement for the Republic of 
Ireland was only 27.8 TWh of electricity.
The wave energy sector is not as far advanced as other renewable energy sectors 
such as wind or solar, but the concept of harnessing energy from ocean waves is not 
new. The first ideas were patented as far back as 1799.32 Between 1855 and 1973, 340 
patents for wave energy devices were placed. Modern research into wave energy was 
greatly stimulated by the oil crisis of the early 1970s, which led to a dramatic increase in 
oil prices. Figure 4.5 compares oil prices with the number of wave energy patents filed 
from 1960 to 2005.
The increasing oil prices panicked governments into stepping up research into al-
ternative forms of power generation. Several research programs with government and 
private support were started mainly in the UK, Portugal, Ireland, Norway, Sweden, and 
Denmark. In the 1980s, however, the price of oil returned to more affordable levels and 
the interest in wave energy research dwindled. Funding was withdrawn from many 
Figure 4.5. Oil Prices and Wave Energy Patents.
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projects. Since the mid 1990s, the increasing levels of carbon dioxide emissions and cli-
mate change awareness has captured the attention of governments and people the world 
over, and, in turn, the generation of electricity from renewable sources has once again 
become an important area of research. In the last ten years, there has been a resurgent 
interest in the wave energy, particularly in Europe, as seen in the growing the number 
of patents illustrated in Figure 4.5 since that time. Today there are over one thousand 
patents relating to wave energy worldwide and an installed capacity of approximately 
two megawatts.
4.4.2.4. Wave Device Technology
There are a variety of devices and technologies available for the extraction of energy from 
waves, in contrast with the limited choices available for large wind turbines. The differ-
ence in technologies stem from different ways energy can be absorbed from waves and are 
also dependent on water depth and on location (shoreline, near-shore, or offshore). 
There are certain differences in the way hydrodynamics affects floating wave en-
ergy converters and other similar types of bodies such as ships subjected to waves at 
sea. Though results and experiences from previous studies on hydrodynamics of ships 
carried out prior to the mid 1970s can be borrowed for application, the presence of a 
power takeoff mechanism (PTO) and the necessity to optimize power production are 
additional features which need to be considered in depth.
The obvious initial approach for dealing with theoretical developments of wave en-
ergy converters was to address the energy extraction from a regular sinusoidal wave 
by a floating body oscillating with a single degree of freedom with a linear PTO. The 
wave amplitudes were assumed to be small, enabling linearized equations of motion 
which facilitated the use of frequency domain analysis technique. The oscillating water 
columns were the first wave energy converters of their kind and were developed to full 
prototype stage for the purpose of energy extraction from sea waves, even prior to per-
formance modeling and analysis studies.33 This was primarily because the techniques 
from ship hydrodynamics were not applicable or easily transferrable to the study of 
oscillating body converters.
An oscillating water column (OWC) is made up of a chamber with an opening 
to the sea below the waterline. When waves approach the device, water is forced into 
the chamber which applies pressure to the water within the chamber. The wave action 
results in the captured water column within the device moving up and down like a 
piston which alternatively compresses and depressurizes the chamber forcing the air 
through an opening connected to a turbine. A low pressure Wells turbine is often 
used in this device as it rotates in the same direction regardless of the air flow direc-
tion. One of the main advantages of the OWC device is its relative simplicity in design 
and robust construction. An example is the W Limpet Device by WaveGen which is a 
shore mounted OWC.34
An oscillating wave surge converter usually comprises a hinged deflector positioned 
perpendicular to the wave direction that moves back and forth exploiting the horizontal 
velocity of the wave. A well-known example of such a convertor is the Oyster device 
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developed by Aquamarine Power, which is an oscillating device for deployment near 
shore on the seabed in water depth of ten to twelve meters with approximately 2 meters 
of the device exposed above the sea surface. The system uses multiple piston pumps to 
pump high-pressure seawater to the shore through subsea pipelines. The water is then 
used to generate electricity through a hydroelectric turbine. The cost of the pipe line is 
low because the device is deployed near shore. However, this decreases the efficiency of 
the device because a lot of the energy in the waves is depleted due to friction when the 
wave reaches shallow water.35
Point absorber devices have a small horizontal dimension comparative to the lon-
ger wavelength in which they operate. Point absorber devices utilize the rise and fall of 
the wave height at a single point. The devices can be floating structures that heave up 
and down on the sea surface or are submerged below the sea surface using the pres-
sure differential. These devices are generally quite small and as such are not reliant on 
wave direction. For example, the PowerBuoy, developed by Ocean Power Technologies, 
involves a floating structure with one component relatively immobile, and a second 
component with movement driven by the wave motion. In essence it is a floating buoy 
contained within a fixed cylinder. The relative motion is used to drive an electrical gen-
erator through Faraday induction directly.36 Many such units can easily be used in par-
allel to develop a wave farm.
Attenuators are long multi-segment floating structures oriented parallel to the di-
rection of the wave front. The differing heights and force of the oncoming waves along 
the length of the device causes a flexing motion where the segments connect. This flex-
ing is directly connected to hydraulic pumps or other converters. Attenuator devices 
have a relatively small area exposed to the face of the waves, enabling them to reduce 
the hydrodynamic forces of inertia, drag and slamming that have the potential to inflict 
significant damage to offshore devices. The Pelamis, designed by Ocean Power Delivery, 
is made up of four floating cylindrical pontoons connected via three hinged joints. The 
wave induced motion of these joints is resisted by hydraulic rams which pump high 
pressure oil through hydraulic motors via smoothing accumulators. The hydraulic mo-
tors drive electrical generators to produce electricity. Several devices can be connected 
together and linked to shore through a single seabed cable with a typical thirty mega-
watt installation. Such an installation would occupy a square kilometer of ocean and 
provide sufficient electricity for 
20,000 homes (Figure 4.6).37
Overtopping devices have 
reservoirs that are used to cap-
ture sea water by impinging 
waves to levels above and have 
been tested for both onshore 
and floating offshore applica-
tions. The Wave Dragon, for 
example, is an offshore over-
topping device. This device Figure 4.6. The Pelamis by Ocean Power Delivery, Ltd.
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uses a pair of large curved deflectors that concentrate the waves toward a central 
raised reservoir which raises the effective wave height. Kaplan turbines are used to 
convert the low head of the water into mechanical energy. The turbines drive per-
manent magnet generators, thereby generating electricity on the same principal as 
conventional land based hydropower plants.38
4.4.2.5. Arrays, Model Testing, and Control
Generating power to feed the electricity grid from one single device will not be adequate 
and it is therefore preferable to have an array of devices. Hence, the hydrodynamic 
interaction between arrays of devices is crucially important. Studies were first made 
for systems of oscillating bodies.39 Subsequent studies by Evans extended to systems of 
OWCs, however, as the number of devices in an array becomes large, the interaction 
becomes complex and approximate techniques such as multiple-scattering or the plane 
wave method may be applied.
For design and development of wave converters, either numerical modeling ap-
proaches or alternative physical modeling approaches, with wave tank testing, can 
be followed. Since the early pioneering model testing of wave energy converters 
in 1974 at the University of Edinburgh by Stephen Salter, significant progress has 
been made in experimental test studies.40 More recently, experimental studies have 
progressed to the prototype development stage which has facilitated the need for 
larger-scale testing facilities.
As with wind and tidal energy, the extraction of energy using wave energy convert-
ers involves a number of conversion processes. It is essential that each of these processes 
is optimized under certain constraints in order to ensure that overall efficiency is op-
timized. Of particular significance in converter control is the hydrodynamic process 
of power absorption. Several phase-control research strategies have been proposed for 
simple PTO including device analysis when acted upon by irregular waves.41
4.4.2.6. Benefits and Disadvantages of Wave Power
The benefits of wave energy are undeniable but as with any technology at such an early 
stage of development there are a number of technical challenges that need to be over-
come to fully realize the potential of, and most importantly, the commercial competive-
ness of wave power devices. Waves produce a slow (less than one hertz), random, and 
high-density oscillatory motion. Converting these characteristics into a useful motion 
to drive a generator capable of producing a quality output that will be accepted by the 
utility provider presents a considerable challenge. As waves vary in height and period, 
so does their respective energy level. In offshore locations, wave direction is highly vari-
able and so wave devices have to be aligned accordingly. For point absorber devices 
such as the PowerBuoy this is less of an issue and in general becomes less of an issue the 
closer to the shoreline a device is installed. This is because the direction of wave travel 
becomes more uniformly predictable due to the refraction and reflection experienced as 
the water depth shallows and is in essence funneled toward the shoreline.
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One of the principal disadvantages to the effective operation of wave energy convert-
ers is the environment in which they are placed. The irregular and highly unpredictable 
nature of the sea surface has an impact on the design of all devices. To operate efficiently, 
each device must be designed to operate for the most common wave levels. The device also 
has to be capable of withstanding the stresses induced by freak weather conditions and in 
the case of wave energy converters, freak waves. These conditions only occur very rarely 
but when they do, can deliver levels of power greater than 200 kW/m. This design require-
ment throws a very costly barrier in the way of developing wave energy converters as the 
device itself may only be rated to capture the energy from the most commonly occurring 
waves but has to be engineered to withstand the very high and destructive levels of power 
produced, albeit infrequently, by extreme weather events.
The capture of wave energy for electrical power generation is generally considered 
to have negligible environmental impacts. The exact nature and extent of any potential 
impact however remains uncertain as the technology is still in its infancy. The ma-
rine habitat could potentially be impacted depending on the nature of the device be-
ing installed, be they totally submerged structures, above sea level platforms or seabed 
mounted devices. Above sea floating platforms could potentially provide a resting plat-
form for sea mammals as well as a nesting area for birds. The underwater surfaces of 
wave energy devices could provide for substrates or various biological systems. Changes 
made to the seabed for mounting devices and for the provision of submarine cables 
could also impose potentially negative effects on the local marine habitat. Offshore 
wave energy devices may be a source of conflict with commercial shipping and recre-
ational boating. Careful consideration needs to be taken when selecting potential areas 
for the sitting of wave energy devices. Near shore devices have the potential to interfere 
with recreational activities as well as having a negative visual impact on the coastline. 
Any impact that may occur would also be very site specific and it is only with the de-
velopment of large scale wave farms that the devices impact will become better defined.
As with any emerging technology, the goal is to eventually reduce the cost of wave 
energy generation. The barriers listed herein may largely be technical, but every time 
a barrier is overcome, wave energy generation becomes increasing economically viable 
and subsequently moves a step closer to widespread commercialization. Due to its vari-
ability, a ‘wave climate’ is difficult to measure. Wave buoys can give good estimates of 
the sea state but are expensive to maintain for long periods of wave climate estimation.42 
Resource assessment studies are essential when evaluating possible locations for a wave 
energy project, and site specific measurements and surveys are necessary before decid-
ing on the final location for any wave farm.
In addition to the technical advantages/disadvantages, there are a number of legal 
incentives associated with wave energy which include the Public Utility Regulatory Policy 
Act (PURPA), state goals for renewable energy, renewable portfolio standards (RPS), and 
system benefit charges. In this context, research and development efforts are being spon-
sored by government agencies in Europe and Scandinavia. In the US there is little research 
due to lack of funding; although the US Navy, through its Office of Naval Research pro-
gram, does provide some research funds. However, in general, funding levels are not cur-
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rently adequate for commercially realizable projects. Although wave energy conversion 
technologies have significantly advanced during recent years, especially in Europe, most 
devices are still in the prototype-phase and there is need of technology improvements. In 
particular, the survivability and reliability of devices for offshore operation has still to be 
demonstrated. However, the combination of offshore wind, wave, and tidal energy devices 
which can use a common transport infrastructure provides a viable developmental route 
with the lead being taken by the construction of offshore wind farms.
4.4.3. Tidal Energy
4.4.3.1. Overview
Tidal energy is one of the more predictable and reliable renewable energy sources. The 
main objective with tidal energy is obviously to harness energy from the rise and fall of 
recurring tides. This may be achieved through design of tidal barrage systems. In recent 
years, innovative designs by companies such as Open Hydro have resulted in successful 
extraction of kinetic energy in tidal currents following the principles used in wind en-
ergy generation; and despite promise, this method is not yet mature.
Tidal movements are generated from the gravitational and centrifugal forces be-
tween the earth, moon and sun.43 This results in regular rise and fall of the surface of 
the ocean. The causal forces are the gravitational force of the sun and moon on the 
earth and the centrifugal force produced by the rotation of the earth and moon about 
each other.44 Because of the proximity of the moon to the earth, the gravitational force 
of the moon is 2.2 times larger than that of the sun. A heaving motion of water is 
created by the gravitational pull of the moon, which is greater on the side of the earth 
nearest the moon. In addition to this, the rotation of the earth-moon system, produc-
ing a centrifugal force, causes another heaving of water mass on the side of the earth 
furthest away from the moon. When a landmass is aligned with this earth-moon sys-
tem, the water around the landmass is at high tide. Similarly, when the landmass is at 
ninety degrees to the earth-moon system, the water around it is at low tide. Therefore, 
each landmass is exposed to two high tides and two low tides during each period of 
rotation of the earth.45 Since, in addition to earth spinning about its own axis, the 
moon also rotates around the earth; the resultant timing of the tides at a spatial point 
on the earth’s surface varies, occurring approximately fifty minutes later each day.46
Tidal variations not only result in rise and fall of the ocean surface but can also 
lead to tidal currents. As is well known, tidal currents are experienced in coastal ar-
eas and in places where the seabed forces the water to flow through narrow channels. 
These currents flow in two directions; the current moving in the direction of the coast 
is known as the flood current and the current receding from the coast is known as the 
ebb current. These currents can also be used to generate electricity.
Tidal power generation facilities can be classified into two types: tidal barrages and 
tidal current turbines, using the potential and kinetic energy of the tides respectively.47 
Power generated from tidal barrages and tidal currents are also called tidal range power 
and tidal stream power, respectively.
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4.4.3.2. Tidal Range Power
Tidal range power or tidal barrages utilize the potential energy of the tides. A tidal 
barrage is typically a dam, built across a bay or estuary that experiences a tidal range in 
excess of five meters.48 Electricity generation from tidal barrages uses the same princi-
ples applying to hydroelectric generation, with the exception that tidal currents flow in 
both directions. A typical tidal barrage consists of turbines, sluice gates, embankments, 
and ship locks,and can have either a single-basin or double-basin system.
Technologies relating to generation of power using tidal barrages are both well de-
veloped and reliable. Historically, small mechanical devices were powered by tidal en-
ergy in medieval England and China. There are several sites around the world which 
can be considered suitable for tidal range power generation and exploitation. Among 
these, the 240 MWe La Rance system at an estuary in the Gulf of St Malo in Brittany, 
France, has operated reliably since 1967. This project has demonstrated the feasibility 
of tidal range power for large scale operation. Other notable sites include the Severn 
estuary in the UK, the Bay of Fundy on the eastern boundary between Canada and the 
United States; Mezeh Bay and Tugar Bay in Russia; and the Wash, the Mersey, the Solway 
Firth, Morecambe Bay, and the Humber Estuary in the UK. In addition, a number 
of smaller sites with potential include Garlolim Bay in Korea, the Gulf of Kachchh in 
India, Secure Bay in Australia, and Sao Luis in Brazil. It should also be noted, however, 
that environmental restrictions have limited the number of developments of tidal range 
power technology.
The total potential contribution of tidal water to the generation of energy is roughly 
3000 GW. This quantity includes approximately 1000 GW available from shallow water 
depths which are accessible for large civil engineering works, with estimated generation 
potential of 120 GW (about twelve percent of near-shoreline and ten percent of the 
total world hydropower). This should be of significant interest to many countries, in-
cluding the UK where the potential exists to provide twenty-five percent of total power 
requirements through the harnessing of tidal energy. In Canada, the Bay of Fundy (New 
Brunswick to Nova Scotia) is considered capable of producing 30 GW of tidal power. 
Unfortunately, not many tidal power plants have been constructed to this point, pri-
marily owing of high construction cost, relatively short-term financial benefits, and 
the need for engagement by all stakeholders in developing long-term renewable energy 
strategies for tidal energy. The high cost of construction of tidal barrages is a restrictive 
barrier to the development of tidal range power. A high initial investment is required 
owing to the scale of large tidal barrage construction projects and ensuring the dam can 
sustain the tidal water load it will be subjected to. Nevertheless, design of tidal turbines 
has reached mature status and the maintenance costs accruing to existing barrages 
during lifetime operation, is not excessive.
4.4.3.3. Tidal Current Turbines
Like wind, tidal current technology utilizes the kinetic energy in flowing water to gen-
erate electricity; in contrast, there are differences in the operating conditions of the two. 
A striking difference is in the density of air and water; at typical ambient conditions, 
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water is about 832 times denser than air. Water flow speed on the other hand is generally 
much slower to that of air.49
The two most common methods of extraction of tidal energy are based on the type 
of turbine used, whether horizontal or vertical.50
•	 Horizontal axis tidal current turbines: The turbine blades rotate about a hori-
zontal axis which is parallel to the direction of the flow of water.
•	 Vertical axis tidal current turbines: The turbine blades rotate about a vertical 
axis which is perpendicular to the direction of the flow of water.51
Several sites worldwide offer potential for the exploitation of energy from tidal 
current. However, factors such as technology status, water depth, wave exposure and 
seabed exposure require consideration in assessing the practical energy resource 
availability at a particular site location. In general, tidal current sites with water flow 
speed greater than 2.5 m/s are considered to have significant practical energy resource 
and are economically viable.52 The ideal locations for harnessing tidal energy from 
currents are where narrow straits occur between land masses or are adjacent to head-
lands. Locations with major potential include the Arctic Ocean, the English Channel, 
the Irish Sea, Skagerrak-Kattegat, the Hebrides, the Gulf of Mexico, the Gulf of St. 
Lawrence, the Bay of Fundy, the Amazon River, the Rio de la Plata, the Straits of 
Magellan, Gibraltar, Messina, Sicily, and the Bosporus/Istanbul Strait.53 Indeed, a sig-
nificant resource of tidal energy is situated in the Irish Sea, other regions of signifi-
cance being off the west coast of Canada and the African East coast. In each case, a 
large increase in an accessible resource can be expected when slower current veloci-
ties can be exploited.
Tidal turbine technology is still at an early stage of development. The focus of recent 
developments has been on reliability with developments of both scaled-down models and 
full-scale prototypes.54 The first dedicated test center, the European Marine Energy Centre 
(EMEC), based in Orkney, Scotland has been operational since May 2005, with a principal 
focus on the testing of tidal current turbines. Challenges presenting include installation 
issues, maintenance, electricity transmission, loading conditions and environmental im-
pact. Installation and deployment challenges center on installation and foundation design, 
mooring systems design, and 
corrosion prevention strategies. 
These challenges are not unique 
to tidal energy installations and 
experience gained from other 
offshore marine projects will be 
invaluable.
Successful projects in recent 
years include the Open Hydro 
tidal energy turbine. A version of 
the Open Hydro device is illus-
trated in Figure 4.7, in which the 
turbine is mounted on the sea bed. Figure 4.7. The Open Hydro Tidal Device.
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This innovative design incor-
porates a stator and a shaftless rotor 
housed for rotation within the sta-
tor, with the stator defining a chan-
nel in which the rotor is retained.
A further example of a compet-
itive technology is the Kite Device 
illustrated in Figure 4.8 which uses 
a wing to support a turbine that is 
tied to the sea bed. As the tidal cur-
rent flows, the wing generates lift 
allowing the same current to drive 
the turbine. The first sea going pro-
totype of this device was proto-
typed in 2011 and trialed off the coast off Northern Ireland with funding by the UK 
Carbon Trust with the vision of producing a 10 MW array to follow in 2015.
4.4.3.4. Future Potential of Tidal Current Turbines
Extraction of marine energy using tidal current turbines has genuine potential. Sev-
eral companies in the recent past have developed operational demonstration models, 
in both full-scale and down-scale prototype designs. Examples of scale-models include 
Nereus and Solon Tidal Turbines, Evopod Tidal Turbine, Gorlov Helical Turbine, TidEl 
Stream Generator and Stingray Tidal Energy Converter. Most devices installed are cur-
rently under test and it is expected that on continued successful testing and operation, 
full-scale tidal farms will soon become a commercial reality. Some prototypes have 
been built and tested in harsh climatic conditions.
The SeaGen and Seaflow, Open Centre Turbine, Tidal Stream Turbine and Free 
Flow Turbines are examples of full-scale operational tidal current turbines which are 
successfully generating electricity. All demonstration units operate with a horizontal 
axis rotor shaft. With the rapid advancement of technology, promising sites have the 
potential to become economically viable.
4.5. Geothermal Energy
4.5.1 overview
Geothermal energy is the energy contained in the earth’s interior in the form of 
heat. The inner core of the earth reaches a maximum temperature of about 4000°C. 
The origin of this heat is associated with the internal structure of planet Earth and 
the physical processes occurring therein. To extract this large quantity of heat it is 
necessary to have some carrier to transfer the heat to an accessible depth below the 
earth’s surface. Generally, the heat is transferred from depth to sub-surface regions 
mostly through the solid submarine and land surface mainly by conduction (geother-
Figure 4.8. Illustration of the Kite Device.
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mal heat) and occasionally by active convective currents of carrier geothermal fluids 
such as molten magma or heated water. The heated water is essentially rainwater that 
has penetrated into the earth’s crust from the recharge areas. The water gets heated 
through contact with hot rocks, and accumulates in aquifers, occasionally at high 
pressures and temperatures of up to above 300°C. These aquifers (reservoirs) are the 
essential parts of most geothermal fields.55
The average geothermal heat flow at the earth’s surface is just 0.06 W/m2 and hence 
it is not generally noticeable. This is because the temperature of rocks increases with 
depth, with a geothermal temperature gradient of 30°C/km. This continuous heat cur-
rent is trivial when compared to other renewable supplies in the above-surface envi-
ronment, that in total average about 500 W/m2. Also, geothermal energy is unevenly 
distributed, seldom concentrated, and often at depths too great to be exploited indus-
trially. However, at certain specific locations, increased temperature gradients occur, 
indicating significant geothermal resources. These may be commercially exploited if 
available within depths of approximately 5 km at fluxes of 10–20 W/m2. Production is 
expected to be about 100 MW thermal km2 in commercial supplies sustained over a 
period of twenty years of operation.
There are areas in earth’s crust not far from the surface, that is, at a depth from 
the surface on the order of a few kilometers, where magma bodies present in fluid state 
or are undergoing cooling in the process of solidification, resulting in release of heat. 
Also, there may be other areas where magma is not present but due to certain geologic 
conditions the thermal gradient has reached an anomalously high value. In such cases, 
if the areas are accessible by drilling boreholes from the surface it may be commercially 
feasible for extracting energy.
The use of geothermal energy for electric power generation from turbines requires 
heat energy with higher temperature. This is occasionally the case for available geother-
mal energy with temperatures over 150°C. However, in general geothermal heat is of low 
grade and typically possesses temperatures around 50–70°C. Under such circumstances, 
it may better suit to directly heat buildings or it can also be used for preheating of other 
conventional high temperature energy facilities. For example, heat from near-surface 
ground or lakes is frequently used for heat pumps. Several countries have established geo-
thermal electric power projects, including Italy, New Zealand, and the US.
Geothermal energy was first harnessed on a large scale basis in the early years of 
the twentieth century, with applications ranging from space heating to electricity gen-
eration. Examples include electric power generation initiated in Prince Piero Ginori 
Conti in 1904; geothermal steam at Larderello, Tuscany in 1913; and the first large scale 
municipal district heating service in Iceland in 1930. Despite the relative rarity of hy-
drothermal sites, it is estimated that up to six GWe in the US and seventy-two GWe 
worldwide could be produced with current technologies at known hydrothermal sites.56
Hot dry rock (HDR) is another geologic resource which, unlike hydrothermal energy, 
is found in abundance. These geologic structures occur beneath a large proportion of 
the world’s landmass and exist at temperatures of 200°C. Hence, these structures will be 
suitable for electricity generation if energy can be extracted through use of appropriate 
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technologies. Should more advanced extraction technologies be developed, it is esti-
mated that energy available from HDR resources could result in electricity generation 
capacity of 19 GWe in the US and 138 GWe worldwide. Such technology, however, is not 
currently available.
Geothermal mapping has been the key to the development of geothermal energy 
generation worldwide. This information has been obtained through mining, oil explo-
ration and geological surveys. Though deep drill surveys are commonly carried out 
reaching to a depth of six kilometers, technologies to drill boreholes to depths of fifteen 
kilometers or more are currently available, and will likely be exploited going forward. 
Energy production on the scale of hundreds of megawatts has been possible over recent 
decades and the use of geothermal energy for both the heating of buildings and for elec-
tric power production, is rapidly increasing.
4.5.2. Demand and Supply Management
One of the restrictions of energy produced from geothermal sources relates to the fact 
that heat cannot be transported easily from one point to another. In fact, distribution of 
heat over distances greater than about thirty kilometers is difficult. Hence, it is prefera-
ble to consume the energy generated close to the point of generation. Such concentrated 
usage is possible; for example in cold climates, household and business district heating 
schemes generate sufficient loads in regions of high population density. By way of an 
example, for a region with a population density greater than 350 people per square ki-
lometer (equating to more 100 premises per square kilometer), a 100 MWth geothermal 
plant might serve a twenty kilometer square area with energy of approximately two 
kilowatts per premise.57 Such geothermal facilities are operational in Iceland and on a 
smaller scale in New Zealand. Other applications are for glasshouse heating (one exam-
ple is an installation in northern Europe at 60 MWth/km2), fish farming, food drying, 
and factory processes.58
Geothermal electricity generation becomes feasible with source temperatures ap-
proaching 150°C and becomes more attractive still if the temperature from the geo-
thermal source is in excess of 300°C. If it is feasible to generate electricity then it can be 
supplied to the grid, complementing energy supply on a more regional or even global 
scale. Heat rejected from electricity generation could be used in a combined heat and 
power (CHP) mode.
4.5.3. Cost of Geothermal Energy
The primary cost in a geothermal energy project is capital cost, principally for drilling 
of boreholes. Costs of drilling increase exponentially with depth. Since temperature 
increases with depth, and the value of the energy increases with temperature, there ex-
ists an economic optimum borehole depth of approximately 5 km. As a result, the scale 
of the energy supply output is usually greater than 100 MW (supply of electricity and 
heat for high temperatures; heat only for low temperatures). Reinjection of the partially 
cooled water from the heat exchanger can be used as a mechanism to increase the total 
amount of heat extracted from the geothermal source. This has the added benefit of dis-
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posing of water with increased solutes concentration (of about 25 kg/m3) and other pol-
lutants that may be present. However, there is an extra cost associated with this process.
4.5.4. Social and Environmental Impacts
Geothermal energy is safe, reliable and competitive in terms of cost as compared to 
other conventional sources. Security of supply is an added value as power can be sup-
plied continuously at full rating without any intermittency. In addition, Operating and 
Maintenance (O&M) costs are moderate.
The extraction of geothermal energy may have certain drawbacks with respect to 
its environmental impact. First, is the possibility of subsidence affecting local buildings 
due to removal of the hot water from the ground. Some incidents have occurred in as-
sociation with the operation of the 140 MWe Wairakei power station in New Zealand.59 
This problem can be addressed by re-injecting some of the output water flow into the 
area. Other effects relate to the impact the geothermal plant may have on the intensity of 
some of the natural geysers in the vicinity of the plant, though most may not be affected 
significantly. These negative impacts have hindered the growth of geothermal power 
in Japan. Geothermal systems also emit carbon dioxide, however the level is much less 
than that associated with a conventional thermal power plant.
4.6. Impact of Renewable Technologies on Electricity Grid Developments
The large-scale integration of power from newly emerging sources such as wind, ma-
rine and solar on national and cross-national networks presents key technical, financial 
and regulatory challenges. In meeting future energy requirements it is expected there 
will be unprecedented increases on power demand, for instance due to electrification 
of transport and growth in information systems. Consumers will likely have higher 
expectations for both quality and quantity of service.
The European Technology Platform for Electricity Networks of the Future, also 
called SmartGrids ETP, is the key European forum for the crystallization of policy and 
technology research and development pathways for the smart grids sector. In the US, 
the Energy Independence and Security Act established a framework which enabled 
support for matching programs to states, utilities, and consumers to build smart grid 
capabilities, and to create a Grid Modernization Commission to assess the benefits of 
demand response and to recommend required protocol standards.
With the emergence of advanced power systems (smart grids), renewable energy, 
smart meters and novel storage technologies, accelerated modernization of the elec-
tricity infrastructure has commenced. It is difficult to predict what the power infra-
structure of the future will look like. What is acknowledged is that it will likely be not 
a single network, but a network of networks, a network of smart grids. This result will 
present difficult network challenges with requirement to manage uncertainty on both 
the demand and generation side. As with existing power networks, the advanced power 
networks will be required to balance efficiency and reliability and maintain quality of 
power to customers.
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Smart energy may be considered a structure where energy is part of an information 
vector that includes, but is not limited to, energy quantity, unit price, and exogenous 
costs such as emissions, and, a variety of generation and load characteristics. If energy 
denotes the capacity for mechanical work, smart energy may be thought of as the capac-
ity for decision-making regarding energy. Smart energy ‘agents’ may have attributes that 
pertain not only to physical quantities of energy (e.g. kilowatt-hours) but also economic, 
environmental, geographic and temporal characteristics such as price and emissions.60
Smart energy connectivity promises to substantially undergird regional trade and 
development. One such political initiative, “Connecting the Americas 2022,” was an-
nounced in 2012 by leaders of the Western Hemisphere and aims to increase access 
to reliable, clean, and affordable electricity as well as to provide new opportunities for 
regions with electricity surplus to exchange with regions experiencing deficit.61
High voltage direct current (HVDC) transmission will feature prominently in the 
creation of future grids. HVDC results in lower transmission losses to alternating cur-
rent networks. HVDC links are long established and well proven in transmission sys-
tem island grids such as between Norway and Netherlands (NorNed); a 700 MW link 
installed in 2008. Plans for further offshore links in the North Sea are well advanced. 
Under target specific need 4 of the Union of the Mediterranean chapter of cooperation, 
Alternative Energies: Solar Plan, a pathway for facilitation of a new European Supergrid 
was drawn.62 The intent is to facilitate importation of large amounts of concentrating 
power into Europe from North Africa and the Middle East. Organizations such as the 
German based DESERTEC Foundation (formed in 2009) aim to create a global renew-
able energy plan by harnessing energy from locations where renewable energy is plen-
tiful and transferring this energy through HVDV transmission lines, for example solar 
energy from North African and Middle Eastern desert locations.
There is enormous potential for countries of the Middle Eastern region to develop 
such solar network grids which will benefit internal economies through exportation 
of clean energy to Europe and beyond. Saudi Arabia is planning to install 40 GW of 
solar energy capacity by 2030. Masdar City in the UAE is a planned city under devel-
opment which will rely entirely on solar energy and other renewable energy resources. 
Other countries in the region are also exploring possibilities for energy provision by 
solar, wind, and ocean power. In the Sultanate of Oman, the national Power and Water 
Procurement Company is carrying out preliminary research in solar data acquisition 
in preparation for a planned 200 MW concentrated solar plant which is expected to be 
operational by 2018. These initiatives demonstrate the seedlings for emergence of a cul-
tural shift toward green energy projects in the region. A future scenario may result in a 
move from excessive reliance on oil and gas to widespread deployments in solar energy.
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Chapter 5
Solar Power and the Enabling Role of Nanotechnology
ali ShakouRi, bRian noRton, and hElEn mCnally
abstract
Solar power has become the world’s fastest growing renewable energy source in terms 
of new installations in recent years. This chapter provides a brief overview of enabling 
solar power technologies and policies in the context of recent world markets, and 
factors that are likely to influence future trends. We then explore the role of nano-
technology and its significant implications for energy conversion technologies in the 
future. Differences between information and energy devices are highlighted followed 
by a more in-depth focus on solar photovoltaic and thermoelectric devices. A review 
is carried out of advances in nano-engineered thermoelectric materials, module de-
signs, and topping cycle applications that can offer significant cost reductions. The 
chapter concludes with a brief discussion of future opportunities for nanotechnology 
in energy conversion, storage, and conservation such as biofuels, artificial photosyn-
thesis, and electrochemical batteries.
5.1. Introduction
Electricity derived directly from solar and thermal sources is experiencing dramatic 
growth in clean energy markets, while emerging research in nanotechnology is helping 
to underpin broader development efforts. Solar power, including photovoltaic and solar 
thermal technologies, has become the world’s fastest growing renewable energy source in 
terms of new installations in recent years. Thermoelectric conversion is enjoying growth 
as well, particularly in niche applications such as off-grid or mobile electricity generated 
from waste heat or small scale cooling via applied electrical input when run in reverse. 
Nanotechnology enables the manipulation of matter and the fabrication of devices 
with atomic dimensions. New material properties emerge from large surface to volume 
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ratios and the quantum mechanical nature of electrons. On a nanometer length scale, 
physics, chemistry, and biology converge. Precise control of a material’s physical and 
structural properties has huge implications for energy conversion devices. Nanoscale 
morphologies, surface areas, and quantum scale behaviors have led to a new generation 
of photovoltaic devices. Improved understanding of these phenomena is being applied 
to generate electrical potential differences and thereby optimize conversion perfor-
mance. Photovoltaic device durability aspects are discussed and how device life may 
be extended with nanoscale self-assembly. Currently eighty-eight percent of the world’s 
primary energy consumed is wasted in the form of heat. To reduce the consumption 
of fossil fuels, it will be necessary to improve future conversion of heat into electricity. 
5.2. Solar Power overview
Before delving into the atomic scale, let’s go the other direction and consider the sun for 
a moment. It not only represents the largest entity and namesake of our solar system, but 
also the direct or indirect source behind almost all forms of energy we use on earth today. 
It is, one way or another, lighting the words on this page right now. Electricity generated 
from solar photovoltaic (PV) and concentrated solar power (CSP) therefore has the poten-
tial to allay resource constraint and emissions concerns associated with the combustion 
of fossil fuels, and introduce more environmentally sustainable Watts to the global energy 
supply of tomorrow. At the end of 2012, Solar PV reached a significant milestone, exceed-
ing one hundred gigawatts of installed capacity worldwide (Figure 5.1). Moreover, a stag-
gering three-fourths of all new capacity has been added since 2009.1 PV devices convert 
sunlight directly into electricity, whereas CSP collects the thermal energy from focused 
sunlight via a working fluid that subsequently provides heat or electricity.
In recent years, aggressive policy incentives in Europe have translated into a lead-
ership role for the region in PV installations, now home to seventy percent of the global 
Figure 5.1. Cumulative Capacity of Global Solar PV Installations, 2003–2012.2
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share. Asia is next at twenty percent, led by China and Japan with eight and seven per-
cent of global shares respectively; followed by the Americas, where the United States 
has an eight percent global share. This has helped earn Solar PV the distinction of the 
fastest growing renewable energy resource in recent years as measured by new capacity 
additions. In 2013, solar electricity accounted for less than half a percent of the global 
share of electricity, whereas one recent prediction indicates US solar generation capac-
ity could increase by one thousand percent between 2011 and 2040.3 A similar analysis 
estimates solar PV could account for eleven percent of global electricity generation by 
2050.4 While recent trends have helped directly avoid CO2 emissions and pleased many 
advocates of solar energy, there are three disconcerting realities confronting future 
prospects. The three concerns align loosely with categorical themes of our text: policy, 
technology, and economics.
 Global policy, through a combination of clean energy capital grants and Feed-in-
Tariffs, has been effective in jump-starting the nascent solar industry, but political and 
financial stimulus supports have begun to wane.5 Some forecasts suggest the next five 
years could be relatively flat, while optimistic scenarios predict stable growth could 
re-emerge toward the end of the decade. A near term shift from the EU to markets else-
where, likely in Asia and the Americas is expected. National targets, clean energy stan-
dards and emissions policies could obviously heavily influence longer term predictions.
Meanwhile, technology has made great advances in the efficiency of both individual 
cells and solar collection systems. Record setting cells are now exceeding 44.7% in the 
lab, while commensurate strides have been made to increase mass production level ef-
ficiencies which, in real-world solar panel environments, can lag world record levels by 
half or more. Efforts aimed at optimizing of performance specifications in view of cost 
for evolving technologies are helping undergird promising growth potential. Despite 
this, grid and market integration challenges may pose technological barriers to greater 
adoption. Solar and wind are intermittent renewable resources, and electrical infra-
structure has not generally been designed for their seamless integration. A related issue 
is that the capacity factor (or effective capacity) of a solar PV or CSP plant is much lower 
than its nameplate rating, due to varying levels of solar incidence, geographic latitude, 
clouds, and night time. For example, ten gigawatts of installed PV capacity may provide 
only one or two gigawatts of equivalent baseload power to the marketplace;6 whereas ten 
gigawatts of rated nuclear power can deliver about nine gigawatts of baseload electric-
ity.7 Thus, caution is advised when comparing various sources of electrical generation 
on a nameplate capacity basis. That said, break-through technological advances in en-
ergy storage, efficiency, and systems optimization are well within the realm of possibil-
ity to improve the overall value proposition of solar power.
The biggest economic challenge solar PV faces is to achieve grid parity, or competi-
tiveness with retail electricity prices on a per kilowatt-hour basis. Current solar cell tech-
nology and installation costs result in levelized costs for PV generated electricity that are 
generally more costly, but can vary greatly from nearly one to more than three times 
market rates. This is heavily dependent on prevailing market rates, competing sources of 
electrical generation, incentives and subsidies, and state and local policies. Feed-in-Tariffs 
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and subsidies have helped reduce the gap and spawn growth, but absent emissions charges 
or carbon-related taxes on conventional coal or natural gas generated electricity, econom-
ics will largely need to improve autonomously to be compelling. The Sun-Shot program of 
the US DOE’s Solar Energy Technologies Office is aimed at leveraging technologies that 
can bring the cost of solar to grid parity by the end of the decade.8
Other significant solar contributions to clean energy are made by more mature but 
ever-evolving solar thermal technologies, such as the rooftop solar water heaters used 
extensively in Asia. Much of the success of these devices is attributable to the applica-
tion of low-cost technology in amenable urban centers and climates, and their ease of 
integration with existing building infrastructure. In 2012, the equivalent energy saved 
and emissions avoided worldwide from this family of technologies was actually greater 
than that attributable to solar PV and CSP combined.9 While long term predictions 
suggest PV trends will surpass passive solar thermal heating systems in deployment, 
it remains a salient reminder to consider local context and approach technology and 
policy holistically.
It is not the intent of this chapter to provide a comprehensive review of solar tech-
nologies, nor to cover all of the economic and policy considerations influencing their 
greater adoption. Instead, the overview is meant to convey a broader situational aware-
ness and greater appreciation for the need to accelerate technological advances and pol-
icy dialogue. It is especially important to understand the role of nanotechnology in 
helping address some of these critical needs.
5.3. Nanotechnology
5.3.1. What Is Nanotechnology?
By definition, nanotechnology is simply the skill, art, or knowledge of devices or sys-
tems that manipulate phenomena at an approximate 10−9 m scale. In practice nano-
technology can have enormous implications; as nature operates on a nanoscale level,10 
nanotechnology provides unique opportunities for energy conversion,11 medicine,12 
clean water,13 food safety,14 and environmental cleanup.15 It has been argued that the one 
to one hundred nanometer length scale is the most efficient size to fabricate new mate-
rials and new devices because it is comparable to the size of atoms and molecules, the 
building blocks of chemistry and all materials around us. This is also the same length 
scale for biological building blocks such as DNA, RNA, and the various proteins inside 
a cell and at similar energy scales to manipulate quantum mechanics. As early as 1959, 
Richard Feynman described nanotechnology as a field which “might tell us much of 
great interest about the strange phenomena that occur in complex situations.”16 How-
ever the nanotechnology revolution did not begin until the mid 1990s,17 and it was not 
until 2000 that the United States provided funding for the National Nanotechnology 
Initiative.18 While nanoscale electronic and optoelectronic devices are available com-
mercially, nanotechnology remains a relatively new area of research with much current 
work more aptly described as precursory nanoscience.
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Nano is a multidisciplinary science and technology involving biologists, chemists 
and physicists, each of whom have been working at the nanoscale level for hundreds of 
years. At this scale, these disciplines converge with engineers and material scientists 
eager to exploit newly discovered properties. New material properties emerge due to the 
quantum mechanical nature of electrons when we approach atomic scales. High surface 
to volume ratios of micro- and nanoscale devices result in new electromagnetic, me-
chanical, chemical, thermal, and optical material properties. Recent advances in atomic 
and nanoscale modifications of materials and devices have enabled unprecedented con-
trol over these material properties, and are the basis for many new devices and systems 
used in our computing and communication infrastructure. These advances are made 
possible with the emergence of reliable top-down lithography,19 bottom-up self assem-
bly fabrication techniques,20 nanoscale characterization of materials using techniques 
such as scanning probe microscopy21 and electron microscopy.22
Nanoscience will continue to drive profound and broad-ranging changes to the se-
lection of the most suitable materials, underlying functional mechanisms, and processes 
of manufacture for devices used for solar energy conversion applications. New materials 
are being conceived and well-known materials are being arranged, configured, combined, 
and/or coated in order to yield useful properties arising from quantum physics phenom-
ena at a nanoscale level. A general classification of nanomaterials in applications as varied 
as supercapacitors and electrochromic glazings is provided in Figure 5.2.
For very small nanoparticles, all of the energy levels may be separated by finite gaps; 
electronically they behave as artificial molecules. However for “larger” particle sizes, 
the energy levels form the bands seen in a normal solid. In metals and semiconductors, 
the transition from finite gaps to bands occurs usually between two and six nanometers 
with materials such as gold and silver showing this transition at the lower end of the 
range, from two to three nanometers. Semiconductors such as cadmium sulphide are at 
Figure 5.2. A Broad Classification of Dimensionality in Generic Nanomaterials.
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the upper end of the band-gap range having energy-level schema that alter seamlessly 
with particle dimensions up to six nanometers. This variation leads to different wave-
lengths being absorbed, so as the sizes of cadmium sulphide particles change, so does 
their color. These properties have been employed in a range of sensor and biomarker 
applications. Such artificial three-dimensional structures whose properties give rise to 
tunable optoelectronic properties are referred to as quantum dots. They have been used 
to realize wavelength-selective luminescent solar energy concentrators.23 Nanoparti-
cles formed from good bulk electrical conductors are also of particular interest; their 
outermost-occupied energy levels convey charge conduction while being shielded by 
intervening electron change distributions from atomic nuclei. Electrons at these out-
ermost levels thus move much more readily in response to an electrical potential. Such 
nanoparticles are normally less than two nanometers in diameter.
Equally as important as the nanoscale dimensions of particles are the volumes of 
the voids between them. Large voids expose an internal surface area that is several mag-
nitudes larger than the external bulk surface area. Heavily voided assemblies thus obvi-
ously demonstrate enhanced performance with respect to many surface-area dependent 
properties. Highly nanovoided geometries can exhibit high structural strength but have 
little weight. These properties have evolved in nature in, for example, the nanostructures 
of the wings of butterflies and moths24 and have found applications in supercapacitors. 
Longer path lengths and greater collision losses are associated with electrons traveling 
under an electric field through a heavily nanovoided medium. This can be employed to 
create nanoporous metals with metallic properties but high electrical resistance. The 
geometries and topologies possible at the nanoscale include combining metal or semi-
conductor nanoparticles with organic molecules leading to different charge transport 
and photoelectric phenomena.
5.3.2. Microelectronic and Photonic Revolutions
The microelectronic revolution started after World War II, when we first learned to 
make semiconductors. Semiconductors’ electrical transport properties could be changed 
by six to nine orders of magnitude by doping or via the application of an external elec-
trical field. This led to the invention of the transistor, a solid-state amplifier/switch, with 
great performance and scalability. With the invention of monolithic integrated circuits, 
thousands and, ultimately, millions of transistors could be fabricated on the same chip 
and mass produced. Nanotechnology research had a rebirth in the 1990s when mi-
croelectronic fabrication techniques were used to further modify other properties of 
matter (such as light absorption and mechanical strength) by precise control of at least 
one dimension of the material below ten to one hundred nanometeres. The first demon-
strations, more than forty years ago, were quantum wells, achieved by confining elec-
trons in a two dimensional sheet which resulted in electron energy quantization and 
enhanced electron transport and optoelectronic properties. Now quantum well lasers 
are used in every CD and DVD player. In the last twenty to thirty years, Quantum 
wires, dots, and ever more complex nanostructures have emerged. Nanotechnology has 
enabled exponential growth in microelectronics and optoelectronics in the second half 
Solar Power and the enabling role of nanotechnology 131
of the twentieth century. Smaller information processing devices lead to higher integra-
tion (more transistors per chip), lower power consumption per computing operation, 
and faster operations due to smaller distances for charge transport. This is the basis 
for Moore’s law, which states that the number of transistors per chip is doubled every 
eighteen to twenty-four months.25 
In addition to the progress in information processing devices, we have had expo-
nential growth in information transfer, especially in fiber optic applications. These have 
also benefited from miniaturization, which has enabled faster optoelectronic compo-
nents (semiconductor lasers, detectors, wavelength multiplexers, and so on) as well as 
the development of low loss optical fibers. A corollary to Moore’s Law is that the data 
rate for long-haul communications has doubled almost every five years between 1850 
and 1950 and, since fiber optics were introduced in the late 1970s, continued to double 
every one or two years. Recent experiments have demonstrated the capacity to transmit 
one thousand terabits per second over a single twelve-core optical fiber fifty-eight kilo-
meters long.26
Precise control of a material’s electrical, thermal, optical, magnetic, and structural 
properties has huge implications for energy conversion devices such as photovoltaic 
devices which convert light to electricity and thermoelectric devices which convert heat 
to electricity. Nanotechnology is also vital to energy-related applications such as sol-
id-state cooling applications, batteries, supercapacitors, power electronics devices, solar 
fuels, and many more. However, we should also be aware of major differences between 
information devices and energy devices. The former can be as small as possible since a 
bit does not have a minimum size. A property of a single electron or a single photon can 
define a bit. On the other hand, energy applications have a required cumulative length 
scale that matches human consumption (that is, the energy needed to keep the tempera-
ture of a house constant or energy needed to transport one kilogram of material by one 
hundred kilometeres). This distinction is important and is one of the reasons why some 
of the early industrial innovations of the twentieth century no longer exhibit exponen-
tial growth. For example, the speed of airplanes and the energy efficiency for transport 
increased almost exponentially from their advent until the middle part of last century, 
but in the last fifty years the speed of commercial airplanes has stayed constant and fuel 
efficiency has improved at more gradual rates.
A key enabling factor for the microelectronics industry has been the emergence 
of CAD (computer aided design) tools which enable the design of extremely complex 
systems with billions of building blocks. The computing power has now increased to a 
point that we can do first principle calculation of many material properties. This opens 
up the opportunity to design new materials and predict their properties. The new Ma-
terials Genome Initiative for Global Competitiveness in the US could pave the way for 
major applications in the energy field. For example, one could design a photovoltaic de-
vice with appropriate optical absorption and electronic transport properties from first 
principles and thus minimize the trial and error often used to make existing devices.
The remainder of this chapter will introduce the opportunities and challenges of nan-
otechnology as it can be applied to energy. A detailed overview of solar photovoltaics and 
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thermoelectrics for direct conversion of heat into electricity will be presented as well as a 
discussion about opportunities for nanotechnology in energy storage and biofuels.
5.4. Solar Photovoltaics
Nanostructures are employed in many different aspects of solar energy, harness-
ing devices by tailoring properties through nano-morphology to produce novel 
meta-materials. This can lead to new paradigms for device functionality while still 
employing currently-used materials. For example in all-silicon tandem solar cells, 
nanostructures can be introduced that alter band-gaps exhibited by silicon/insulator 
combinations to be closer to those required to achieve optimal solar energy conver-
sion efficiency. Such silicon nanostructures have been made by annealing sputtered 
silicon-rich silicon dioxide layers. The connection of fluorescent dye molecules with 
appropriate nanoparticles has led to new organic photovoltaic devices27 and organic 
light emitting diodes.28
The high initial cost of wafer-based silicon solar cells has led to cost-reduction ef-
forts to reduce required quantities of material or substitute less expensive but still suit-
able material combinations. For example, thin-film silicon solar cells can achieve very 
high open-circuit voltages.29 The few-micron-thick layer of silicon in such cells can be 
realized by either etching or polymer transfer techniques.
The principal advantages of organic photovoltaic devices include wide, though 
presently low-efficiency, solar spectral response and low-cost manufacture via high- 
throughput solution processing. In contrast their disadvantages include low solar en-
ergy conversion efficiency and unproven long-term durability.
Combining a suitable lower band-gap polymer organic material and an electron- 
accepting inorganic material ensures broad adsorption of the solar spectrum while max-
imizing the short circuit current obtained. Forming an organic-inorganic hybrid solar 
cell in solution would lead to low-cost but reasonably efficient photovoltaic devices. Sil-
icon nanocrystal quantum dots are an ideal electron accepting material for inclusion in 
such hybrid solar cells as the engineered band gap arising from electron confinement30 
is almost optimal at ~1.5 eV. Improving the energy-conversion efficiencies exhibited by 
organic solar cells requires a high electron charge carrier yield rate from exciton disso-
ciation in the organic active layer. At the interfaces of materials with different electron 
affinities, excitons are dissociated by electric fields intensified by traps introduced from 
the engineered presence of “impurities.” Blending conjugated polymers with molecules 
that have a high electron affinity, like C60, leads to efficient rapid exciton dissociation in 
low-cost bulk-heterojunction solar cells. Bulk-heterojunction solar cells however, have 
a low solar energy conversion efficiency31 of about seven percent, but achieving a power 
conversion efficiency of ten percent is seen as tenable.32 Currently the most common 
polymer-fullerene system is based on a blend called P3HT:PCBM,33 for which power 
conversion efficiencies are about 4.5%. The nanomorphology of the P3HT:PCBM blend 
is affected by the composition ratio of donor and acceptor materials, solvent materials 
and their concentration, molecular weight, and spin coating parameters.34 Due to the 
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small physical dimensions of the photoactive layer, absorbing a large range of wave-
lengths of the solar spectrum is crucial to enhancing the efficiency of organic photovol-
taic devices. Since a high electromagnetic field strength exists in the vicinity of excited 
surface plasmons, the inclusion of plasmonic metal nanostructures enhances the solar 
energy absorption of organic materials. The resonance wavelength depends strongly 
on the metal nanostructure’s dimensions, geometry, and dielectric properties. Contact 
electrodes represent a high interface barrier and source of contact resistance in organic 
solar cells. An organic cell’s film is formed, usually on an indium-tin-oxide anode, ei-
ther by spin coating or thermal evaporation deposition in a high vacuum. Since the 
optimisation of the metal-electrode Schottky barrier with PCBM and P3HT is likely to 
improve device performance, whichever process is employed needs to provide an anode 
surface that consistently presents a minimal interface barrier to the organic layer. Ther-
mal annealing, solvent annealing, or vapor annealing processes optimize the nano-
morphology of the active layer by sharply increasing hole mobility in the P3HT phase.35
The power efficiency of bulk heterojunction devices has seen continuous increases 
due to the synthesis of innovative low band-gap semiconducting polymer materials and 
morphology enhancement of the photoactive layer. Organic photovoltaic devices now 
achieve power conversion efficiencies up to 9.3%. This efficiency however, is still low 
compared with inorganic counterparts.
The efficiency of monolithic tandem stacks of solar cells has reached 41.6%. An effi-
ciency of 42.7% has been achieved by partitioning the solar spectrum and doing energy 
conversion with five separate cells. Silicon and germanium nanostructures have poten-
tial application in photovoltaic devices including all-silicon tandem solar cells and hot 
carrier solar cells.
Intermediate-band solar cells have been proposed for achieving energy conversion 
efficiencies in monolithic devices comparable to those for tandem solar cell stacks. 
There are multiple designs possible with the performance of the low band gap combi-
nations that improve as concentration increases. Intermediate-band solar cells perform 
differently under various concentrated spectra due to absorption disparities between 
bands. In spectral up-conversion devices infrared solar energy photons are absorbed 
and re-emitted photons are energised at the band gap that can be absorbed by a photo-
voltaic cell.
Concentrating photovoltaics are currently undergoing considerable commercial 
development.36 With high concentration of incident solar energy certain types of so-
lar cells exhibit high efficiency resulting in a much smaller cell area per unit output. 
High solar concentration is achieved usually by optical systems comprised of mirrors or 
lenses or, sometimes, both. At concentration ratios above two, to be effective, all optical 
systems must track the Sun’s azimuthal motion. The latter requires moving parts that 
incur maintenance and replacement costs that could adversely affect economic viability 
or curtail useful system life. Several alternative approaches have therefore been envis-
aged for high concentration without the need for solar tracking.
Quantum dots can be used for luminescent concentration of diffuse solar energy,37 
by choosing quantum dots that absorb in the near infrared to provide a good match 
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to the solar spectrum while avoiding significant reabsorption losses.38 Low quantum 
yields and optical losses have limited the performance of this type of device.
Concentrating most of the solar spectrum from all incident angles without tracking 
may be achievable using a lens fabricated from metamaterials.39 The latter are poly-
mer-based nano/micro structured materials from whose materials and shapes arise; 
negative or extremely large electromagnetic permeability, permittivity, and refractive 
indices.
The use of multiple differently-oriented layers of materials that can switch from 
being transparent to being specularly reflective to form a single solid immobile solar 
tracking system.40 The challenge here is to maintain each switched slate without signif-
icant use of energy.
In many climates, solar energy devices experience wide variations of ambient tem-
perature on both a daily and annual basis. They are also frequently subject to rain, dust, 
snow, high humidity, strong winds, and atmospheric pollutants depending on location. 
Devices fail due to manufacturing defects, random accidents, and environmental expo-
sure. The prevalence of each of these over a cell’s life is shown in Figure 5.3.
For laminated photovoltaic cells, the principle exposure failure mechanism is de-
lamination. Damage is usually caused by moisture penetrating through small cracks in 
an edge seal or, much more slowly, by water diffusing through front surface materials.41 
Figure 5.3. Illustrative Failure Rates Over Time for Photovoltaic Cells. Not to Scale.
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Ethyl Vinyl Acetate (EVA) is the most common encapsulating material. However, ther-
mal expansion and contraction of the EVA with diurnal variations in PV temperature 
causes the encapsulation integrity to fail. Without appropriate treatment, EVA can also 
discolor with a brown opaqueness due to exposure to the UV component of insolation. 
One approach that may prolong device life is to reduce the impact of some of the factors 
driving delamination. Delamination behaviors are complex even under controlled labo-
ratory conditions.42 For example, with innovative multi-layer films developed to obviate 
the problems inherent in the use of EVA, it has been found that delamination between 
the film layers of the same or very similar materials was more likely than delamination 
between dissimilar materials. Thermal management techniques are employed to main-
tain PV closer to ambient temperature to avoid temperature-dependent power output 
reductions. Phase change materials43 have been used for this purpose. As a consequence 
the amplitude of temperature cycling endured by a PV cell is reduced with less con-
comitant thermal expansion and contraction. Ultimately the choices regarding system 
durability are determined by economic factors. Cost premiums may be associated with 
the quality of manufacture, appropriate selection of optimum materials, good design, 
exemplary operation, and scheduled maintenance. Periodic system replacement may be 
a preferred economic decision over selecting a more expensive system with a consider-
ably longer life. The converse, however, may also be valid. Some PV system operations 
are guaranteed some revenue via a feed-in-tariff that pays back the amortised initial 
investment and operating costs over a specified time period. For such installations, after 
that period, any revenue is profit. In such circumstances long-term durability becomes 
very important! There may thus be scenarios where design-for-durability becomes a 
strong driver for innovation in PV technology. This may be seen as, an as yet un-in-
vestigated, opportunity for nanotechnology applications. For example, nanoparticles 
could be used as markers to identify points of local cell failure requiring repair. More 
fundamentally, an interesting and relevant question for future research is; is there the 
potential to employ nanoscale self-assembly to devise self-repairing PV cells?
5.5. Thermoelectrics
5.5.1. overview and Motivation
Currently, photovoltaics and wind energy provide about one percent of total world en-
ergy. Biomass accounts for about eleven percent, used both in liquid fuels and, primar-
ily, in the form of traditional biomass for cooking and heating in rural regions.44 Most 
projections concur that it will take some time before a significant share of our energy is 
derived from renewables. More than ninety percent of primary energy is first converted 
to heat. Currently only twelve percent of the primary energy consumed in the world 
is transformed to end-use applications.45 This is known as exergetic efficiency, a metric 
that takes into account the ability of chemical or nuclear energy sources to do useful 
work. In other words, one could argue we are wasting eighty-eight percent of the en-
ergy in the form of heat. The basic technologies behind our primary energy conversion 
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devices (such as internal combustion engines and power plants) have been around for 
more than a century. The efficiencies are improving, but more can be done. As we try 
to increase energy efficiency and reduce the overall consumption of fossil fuels, we 
should explore opportunities to improve conversion of heat into electricity. That said, 
it is worth noting that the waste heat mentioned above varies greatly in terms of its po-
tential value. It is notable that there are currently no commercially available large-scale 
waste heat recovery systems.
Thermoelectric (TE) power describes a solid-state means of directly converting 
energy in the form of heat to electricity and vice versa. If a temperature difference is 
maintained between the two ends of a conductor, higher thermal energy carriers will 
diffuse to the cold side, creating a potential difference that can be used to power an 
external load. This is a simplification of the Seebeck effect, which is the operative prin-
ciple behind thermocouples. In addition to a large Seebeck coefficient, a high perfor-
mance thermoelectric generator should minimize parasitic losses (low heat conduction 
between hot and cold junctions and low Joule heating as charge carriers move in the 
material). The energy conversion efficiency of thermoelectric devices is directly related 
to the thermoelectric figure of merit for the subject material, ZT = S2σT/κ, where S is the 
Seebeck coefficient, σ is the electrical conductivity, T is the absolute temperature, and 
κ the thermal conductivity.46 Abraham Ioffe introduced the concept of the thermoelec-
tric figure-of-merit in the 1940s and developed some of the first thermoelectric genera-
tors to power radios during World War II. Since the working fluid is electrons or holes, 
thermoelectric devices have many unique advantages over conventional energy conver-
sion systems including: no moving parts or vibration, high reliability and durability, 
compactness, and easy control.47
In the 1950s, silicon germanium and lead telluride alloys with ZT ≈ 0.5–1 at 500–
1000°C were developed. This was used to make radioisotrope thermoelectric generators 
(RTG) with energy conversion efficiency of four to six percent for deep space satellites 
and remote power generation for unmanned systems.48 For satellites that travel far from 
the sun (beyond Saturn), solar radiation is too low for photovoltaic cells to be effective. 
Deep space missions have been using RTGs to power the imaging and communication 
systems. In such applications, efficiency, cost and radiation decay were obviously sub-
ordinate concerns to reliability and longevity. The main commercial success of ther-
moelectric technology has been in Bi2Te3-based Peltier modules to cool electronic and 
optoelectronic devices. For such small and localized applications, mechanical com-
pressors do not scale well whereas these modules, operating under the Peltier effect, 
with modest coefficient-of-performance but fast responses, have been quite effective. 
Thermoelectric coolers are widely used for temperature stabilization of semiconductor 
lasers and for sub-ambient cooling of infrared detectors or CCD cameras.49 Recently, 
thermoelectric car seat climate control systems have been commercialized50 and ap-
plications for picnic beverage cooling is expanding. In the last ten to fifteen years, ad-
ditional applications such as vehicle exhaust waste heat recovery51 have been actively 
studied. In addition to niche applications, there is a huge potential for distributed power 
generation in poor countries. There are many communities who cannot afford the cost 
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of power plants and an electric grid. A small amount of household electricity produced 
by thermoelectric modules in cooking stoves52 or solar thermal systems53 could improve 
the quality of life significantly. Consider the availability of reading lights after dusk in 
and otherwise “off-grid” community, as one of many examples.
If ZT is greater than three to five, the thermoelectric device can be competitive 
with traditional mechanical energy conversion systems. There is no fundamental limit 
on how large the thermoelectric figure-of-merit can be. When ZT goes to infinity, the 
efficiency of the thermoelectric system converges to the Carnot limit (at zero output 
power) or Curzon-Ahlborn limit (efficiency at maximum output power).54 The improve-
ment in the efficiency of thermoelectric energy conversion has been slow because all the 
material properties comprising ZT are coupled, and it is extremely difficult to enhance 
one property without affecting another. Recent advances in nano-engineered material 
properties have enabled breakthroughs for the enhancement of thermoelectric mate-
rials beyond ZT ≈ 1. This has been possible since we have a better microscopic under-
standing of heat and current transport in materials and we have the means to make 
artificial material composites with atomic building blocks. In the following we summa-
rize some of the recent advances in this field.
5.5.2. Nanostructured Thermoelectric Material
A major breakthrough was the theoretical prediction of a large ZT enhancement in 
quantum wells and wires by Hicks and Dresselhaus in 1993.55 This was based on the 
quantum confinement of electrons (or holes) enhancing the Seebeck coefficient and the 
electrical conductivity.56 While this has not been demonstrated to improve the efficiency 
of thermoelectric generators or the cooling of Peltier modules, Hicks and Dresselhaus’ 
paper was an important publication as it introduced researchers to the potential of 
nanostructuring. There are several reasons why it is hard to improve the thermoelectric 
power factor of quantum wells or wire materials.57 We live in a three-dimensional world 
and any quantum confined structure should be imbedded in barriers. These barriers 
are electrically inactive but they add to thermal heat loss between the hot and the cold 
junctions. Sharp features in density-of-states of low dimensional nanostructures also 
disappear quickly as soon as there is size non-uniformity in the material.58 Researchers 
have revisited the large thermoelectric power factor in extremely small quantum wells 
or wires and they point out that the actual improvement in the thermoelectric power 
factor “per conduction channel” is only twelve to forty percent.59 This work also derives 
a minimum packing density for low dimensional thermoelectric material (even with 
ideal infinite barrier confinement) to have any improvement compared to the bulk.
It has also been proposed to use hot electron filtering to enhance the Seebeck coef-
ficient.60 The goal is to have potential barriers that “selectively” scatter cold electrons so 
that the contribution of electrons with energies larger than the Fermi level to electrical 
conductivity is significantly larger than the ones with energy below the Fermi level. This 
creates a metal-like electrical conductor with a large Seebeck coefficient. A similar con-
cept can be applied to holes. The difficulty is in synthesizing metal/semiconductor nano-
composites with appropriate sizes on the order of an electron mean-free-path and with 
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adequate barrier height (on the order of the thermal energy, kBT, where kB is the Boltzmann 
coefficient and T the absolute temperature) for electrons moving in a three-dimensional 
material.61 Based on this concept, microrefrigerators on a chip have been demonstrated 
for localized cooling.62 The estimated enhancement in the thermoelectric power factor 
(~20%) was offset by the increase in the lattice thermal conductivity.63
The rock salt-structured nitrides, including semiconducting ScN and metallic TiN 
and ZrN, have been investigated as a potential system in which energy filtering could be 
achieved at high temperatures for power generation applications. As a class, these ma-
terials also offer exceptionally high thermal and chemical stability, with melting points 
typically above 2500°C and a high degree of oxidation resistance at elevated tempera-
tures. Preliminary study focused on ScN/(Zr,W)N semiconductor/metal superlattices 
grown by reactive sputter deposition.64 The room temperature thermal conductivity is 
as low as 2W/m-K.65 A high Seebeck coefficient of 840 μV/K has been measured combin-
ing the transient I-V measurement and thermal imaging.66 This system has the potential 
to reach ZT values higher than two at temperatures above 1000 K.
Most of the recorded ZT values greater than 1.5 in the last ten years have been 
achieved by reducing the lattice thermal conductivity by increasing interface and bound-
ary scattering of phonons in the nanostructured materials. For example, select semime-
tal/semiconductor nanocomposites showed enhanced ZT~1.3 at 800 K due, mainly, to 
the increased mid and long-wavelength phonon scattering by a few nm-sized nanopar-
ticles.67 Another recent demonstration showed a large power factor enhancement in 
Tl-doped PbTe at high temperatures up to 770 K, and attributed this enhancement to 
the distorted density of states by the resonant level inside the valence band of PbTe.68 
Other studies pointed out the important of convergence of bands in e.g. PbTe1− xSex and 
similar high ZT’s have been achieved.69 At elevated temperatures, near 600 K or higher, 
several PbTe-based nanostructured materials showed ZTs as high as 1.5 or even 2.2.70 
The material system, AgPbmSbTe2+m, also known as LAST-m, becomes spontaneously 
nanostructured when cooled from the melt, which helps reduce the thermal conduc-
tivity.71 The strain field created by nano-inclusions in these material systems is believed 
to effectively scatter phonons to reduce the thermal conductivity. The (PbSnTe)x(PbS)1-x 
system is phase-separated into PbTe-rich and PbS-rich regions, which become coher-
ent nanostructures suppressing the lattice thermal conductivity. A ZT~1.5 at 640 K 
was reported for this material system of n-type with x ~ 0.08.72 The n-type La-doped 
Ag2Te-PbTe system has nano-scale (50–200 nm) Ag2Te precipitates formed in PbTe, and 
showed ZT~1.5 at 775 K.73 Skutterudites and clathrates have complex cage-like crystal 
structures with voids in which rattler atoms are inserted to effectively scatter acous-
tic phonons.74 CoSb3-based filled skutterudites such as p-type LaFe3CoSb12, and n-type 
CeFeCoSb12 showed ZT > 1 at 800 K and higher.75 Recently, Czochralski-grown clath-
rate Ba8Ga16Ge30 showed ZT~1.6 at 1100 K.76 Beyond 1000 K, SiGe has long been known 
to be a good thermoelectric material, and its ZT is typically 0.5 ~0.6 at 1100 K. After 
nanostructuring by hot pressing and ball milling, the ZT of p-type B-doped SiGe was 
improved to 0.7 at 1000 K.77 ZT~1.3 at 1200 K was also reported for nanostructured 
n-type SiGe.78 Two-phase SiGe-SiP nanocomposites had ZT > 1 at 1200 K, and this ZT 
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enhancement was attributed to the modulation doping effect that enhanced mobility 
and thus electrical conductivity.79
Questions have been raised about some of the recently reported experimental re-
sults and theoretical concepts. This is expected for a rapidly growing and dynamic field, 
especially since accurate thermoelectric characterization techniques for small size sam-
ples are being developed concurrently. A major shortcoming for new researchers en-
tering the thermoelectric field is the fact that there are very few papers which clearly 
describe major unsolved controversies.
5.5.3. Material Cost and Efficiency 
Recently, a paper entitled An Inconvenient Truth about Thermoelectrics made the 
claim that “Despite recent advances, thermoelectric energy conversion will never be 
as efficient as steam engines. That means thermoelectrics will remain limited to ap-
plications served poorly or not at all by existing technology.”80 An analysis of the 
potential of thermoelectrics that focuses only on efficiency values is not complete. In 
fact, an analysis that considers optimizing the entire TE power generation system cost 
could lead to the exact opposite conclusion. While it is true that thermoelectrics are 
not likely to replace conventional Rankine cycle steam engines or Stirling engines in 
the near future, they could play a big role by enabling direct conversion of heat into 
electricity, especially for topping cycle or waste heat recovery applications. This is be-
cause the energy cost may be more important than the efficiency of energy conversion 
alone. For example, many groups are working on polymer solar cells even though 
their efficiency is much smaller than the multi-junction crystalline cells. It becomes a 
value judgment and optimization exercise.
A key factor to study with respect to the cost/efficiency trade off in thermoelectric 
power generation, is the optimization of the TE module together with the heat source 
and the heat sink81 estimated the cost of material in a TE power generation system 
($/W) as a function of heat source power density for different material properties, (ZT), 
as well as module design, (fractional area coverage of TE elements). It was shown that 
the module design plays a key factor in determining the cost of waste heat recovery 
thermoelectric systems. It is possible to bring down the material cost from $1–2/W to 
$0.01–0.02/W without improving ZT, if a thin film module with 100s of microns thick 
elements and low fractional area coverage (5–10%) with small parasitics (such as low 
contact resistances) can be developed.82
The thermal disparity between the fuel combustion temperature ~2250 K (adia-
batic) and the high pressure steam temperature up to 800–900 K or high temperature 
combustion gases, results in a large thermodynamic losses in coal or gas turbine power 
plants. While some technologies exist for recuperating a portion of this lost heat, a 
solid-state thermoelectric placed on top of a conventional cycle may prove an effective 
means of directly producing additional electrical power. By selecting the right materials 
for the TE generator for high temperature operation, the overall energy efficiency will 
increase. Recent study shows that, for example, the combined TE/steam turbine topping 
generator system provides a lower energy cost for any period of operational life.83 This 
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study shows that the efficiency of the combined system increases by 10% at an interface 
temperature of about 800 K between the two stages for a TE material with ZT ~ 1.
5.6. Nanotechnology in other Energy applications
5.6.1. Biofuels
Nanotechnology can underpin biofuel development,84 for example by using the unique 
nanoscale properties of biological molecules and surface area to volume ratios to create 
energy from agriculture products and waste. Photosynthesis is nature’s example, using 
the sun’s energy to convert water into hydrogen ions, electrons, and oxygen. Artificial 
photosynthesis is an alternative requiring an antenna (to absorb sunlight) or oxidizing 
center (to produce electrons) and a reducing center (to produce fuels). Nanotechnology 
is used in the antenna section to increase the surface area to volume ratio for increased 
energy absorption and reduce the travel distance of photo-generated minority carri-
ers.85 Graphitic petals86  have recently been produced, providing yet another unique 
nanostructure from which to possibly specifically tune the capture of the energy spec-
trum. In the reducing and oxidizing centers, iron oxide nanoparticles combined with 
water,87 nanotube arrays and various other nanostructured materials have been used to 
reduce water and CO2 to fuels such as methane and other hydrocarbons.88
5.6.2. Energy Storage Devices
Energy storage89 and transport90 are critical research areas required to enable mobile and 
long term integration of many new energy technologies. Batteries are currently the most 
common form of electrical energy storage and nanotechnology has the potential to in-
fluence every aspect of current designs (cathode, anode and electrolyte.) Energy density, 
currently a barrier to wider adoption of batteries, and stability may benefit the most from 
the unique properties of nanotechnology. New electrode materials91 are being developed 
with nanostructures including; nanocarbons, alloys, and oxides to provide greater surface 
area to volume ratios for increased reaction and faster energy transport. Vanadium pent-
oxide (V2O5) is being studied for its unique properties and stable form. While controlled 
and large scale synthesis of nanostructured materials continues to be a challenge, Parida 
et al.92 recently described V2O5 nanoflowers with ferromagnetic and optical properties at 
room temperature. Specifically for lithium-ion technology, transitional metal oxides are 
reviewed providing high theoretical capacities for conversion reaction.93 Within the bat-
tery electrode, nanoparticles are being used to enhance the ionic conductivity and storage 
capacity. Nanomaterials are even being considered for the overall structural integrity of 
batteries due to their enhanced mechanical characteristics.
Today’s advanced lithium-ion battery technologies have made dramatic inroads in 
commercial applications such as portable electronic and rechargeable devices. How-
ever, due to cost, weight and other factors, they are not yet considered practical for 
electric vehicles or intermittent energy sources, i.e., solar, wind, tidal. Alternative forms 
of energy storage are thus in great demand; including biochemical, chemical, or elec-
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trochemical capacitors.94 Nanotechnology is sure to factor in to the development of the 
energy storage systems of the future.
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Chapter 6
Biofuel Prospects in an Uncertain World
Wally tynER and RiChaRd a. SimmonS
abstract
Biofuels have grown from almost nothing in the mid-1970s to over 10 percent of gasoline 
consumption in some countries. Biofuels are essentially a government created industry 
in that when they were introduced, they required government subsidies to compete with 
fossil fuels. Governments saw several benefits for biofuels: 1) reducing dependence on 
foreign oil and reducing supply disruptions such as those of the 1973 and 1979 oil crises; 
2) providing income and employment in rural areas; 3) improving air quality through 
lower tailpipe emissions; and 4) reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions because CO2 
is sequestered during the production of the feedstock. In some measure, biofuels have 
contributed to achieving all these objectives, but questions have been raised regarding the 
effectiveness of biofuels in doing so, as well as on unintended consequences of large-scale 
biofuel production. We will explore all these issues in this chapter, and our scope will 
remain limited to liquid vehicle fuels. First, we provide a brief history of biofuels pro-
duction. Then we explore the implications of the development of first generation biofuels 
with emphasis on corn ethanol in the United States. Most of the chapter is devoted to 
second-generation biofuels; that is, biofuels produced from cellulosic feedstocks including 
crop residues such as corn stover, dedicated energy crops such as miscanthus and switch-
grass, tree plantations such as poplar or willow, and forest residues. The early hope was 
that cellulosic biofuels would be developed fairly quickly, and that first generation biofuels 
(mainly corn and sugarcane ethanol) would plateau with much of the growth coming 
from second-generation biofuels. However, to date there has been almost no commercial 
development of cellulosic biofuels. Much has been invested in research, but most of the 
development has been at the pilot or demonstration plant level. We will explore five areas 
of uncertainty facing potential investors in cellulosic biofuels. Finally, we will summarize 
the major challenges and opportunities for cellulosic biofuels.
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6.1. Biofuels history
Biofuels have been a part of the global energy picture since the mid-1970s. Brazil was the 
first major producer beginning in 1975 with the launch of its PROALCOOL program, 
which provided subsidies for sugarcane ethanol production.1 This policy was mainly 
motivated by the 1973 oil crisis, and Brazil saw sugarcane ethanol as a means of becom-
ing more independent from the rest of the world for liquid fuel. Production began in 
the United States in the early 1980s, stimulated by the National Energy Conservation 
Policy Act of 1978.2 That legislation initially provided a subsidy for ethanol of $0.40 per 
gallon, and the subsidy continued at a level between $0.40 and $0.60 per gallon until it 
finally expired at the end of 2011. Similarly, European Union countries began biofuel 
production supported by government subsidies about the same time.
Over time, as biofuel production grew, governments in all three regions moved 
from reliance on subsidies as the major policy instrument to mandates. In Brazil and 
the EU, targets are established for blending certain percentages of biofuels in the total 
fuel mix. In the US, there is a volumetric mandate known as the Renewable Fuel Stan-
dard (RFS),3 which sets steadily increasing volume requirements for different types of 
biofuels through 2022. By that terminal year, thirty-six billion gallons of ethanol equiv-
alent are prescribed, of which twenty-one billion will need to come from sources other 
than grains or corn starch as indicated in Figure 6.1. The EPA has been forced to waive 
most of the cellulosic biofuel portion of the RFS every year because the biofuels do not 
exist, and will need to continue cellulosic biofuel waivers through 2022, as conversion 
facilities could not be developed at the pace of increase included in the RFS. Thus, main-
taining the mandated trajectory is in serious doubt.
Figure 6.1. EISA 2007 RFS Mandated Volumes Through 2022.4 
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The main difference between a mandate and a subsidy is that the cost of a subsidy is 
directly born by the government budget, whereas the cost of a mandate is born by con-
sumers through higher costs of the blended fuels. That is, presumably the mandated prod-
uct (biofuel in this case) would not be used in the absence of the mandate; otherwise, 
there would be no need for the mandate. Thus, the projected higher cost of the biofuel 
is passed on to consumers through higher cost of the blended fuel. In a sense the cost is 
not visible to consumers, whereas the government budget cost of a subsidy is very visible. 
This visibility became more of an issue as the subsidized volumes grew over time. Today 
the dominant biofuels policies are mandates and not subsidies. The EU targets were set 
in the 2009 directive on mandated use of renewable energy, which requires ten percent of 
transportation fuels to be renewable by 2020.5 Most authorities expect the liquid fuels part 
of that to be around 5.6 percent, with electric vehicles and other options taking the rest.6 
Estimates drawn from a variety of sources indicate that the United States, Brazil and the 
European Union account for nearly ninety percent of global biofuels production, which 
today remains almost exclusively first generation. Small but increasing quantities of bio-
fuels also have been developed in other regions as indicated in Figure 6.2.
6.2. First Generation Biofuels
Ethanol production capacity has grown substantially in both Brazil and the United 
States. For the past decade, most of the automobiles sold in Brazil have been flex-fuel, 
meaning that they can consume any blend of ethanol and gasoline. This provides great 
flexibility both for consumers and government policy. For example, in a recent year, 
there was a poor sugarcane harvest in Brazil, and at the same time world sugar prices 
were abnormally high. The Brazilian Government responded by lowering the mandated 
ethanol average blend level first from twenty-five to twenty percent and then down to 
eighteen percent. The level was subsequently increased again when conditions improved 
for sugar supply. Consumers in Brazil can choose whatever percentage of ethanol they 
want (above the minimum mandated) because many gasoline stations are equipped 
Figure 6.2. Global Share of Biofuels Production, 2010 (Energy Equivalent Basis).
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with what are called blender pumps. Ethanol contains about two-thirds as much energy 
as gasoline, so ethanol must be priced no more than sixty-seven percent of gasoline 
price to induce consumers to use ethanol blends. If the ethanol price is below that frac-
tion, consumers may opt for high ethanol blends or even pure ethanol. Thus, because 
Brazil made a decision to invest in flex-fuel vehicles and flexible fuel dispensing infra-
structure a decade ago, their supply chain today is quite flexible.
The US is not in that situation. In the early 1980s, the US decided on a ten percent 
ethanol blend as the standard, and it became known as gasohol. All vehicles sold were 
required to be able to use the ten percent blend, also known as E10. A second blend of up 
to eighty-five percent ethanol (E85) was also developed, and to consume this fuel requires 
flex-fuel vehicles. To date very few of the vehicles on the road in the US are flex-fuel (about 
11 million out of 250 million). Also, E85 often is not cost competitive with E10 on an 
energy basis, which determines mileage, so most ethanol is consumed as E10. This was 
not a problem until recently. Today the US consumes about 133 billion gallons of gasoline 
type fuel per year. At a ten percent blend, this means the maximum ethanol consumption 
would be 13.3 billion gallons. The RFS mandates consumption of fifteen billion gallons of 
conventional (corn-based) ethanol per year by 2015, and the US has very nearly that much 
ethanol production capacity today. Thus the maximum ethanol consumption given the 
E10 blend level (called the blend wall) is less than the existing production capacity.7 The 
blend wall is the most important issue faced by the US ethanol industry today. The Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 2012 gave final approval for increasing the blend 
limit to fifteen percent, but the approval was only for vehicles built since 2001. About one-
third of the US vehicle fleet is older, and is not approved to use the E15 blend. Despite the 
fact that the newer vehicles account for a greater proportion of the miles driven, fueling 
stations have been reluctant to switch to E15 because they would still lose a significant 
fraction of their customer base. Thus, at present, the blend wall is binding, and is a major 
impediment to growth of the ethanol industry.
The European biofuels market is largely for biodiesel, not ethanol. Biodiesel can 
generally be blended up to twenty percent without adverse effects. With more than 
ninety percent of the energy content of petroleum-derived diesel, biodiesel impinges 
vehicle range substantially less than bioethanol does in comparison with gasoline. In 
this case, the major impediment to biodiesel development is the high cost of the raw 
vegetable oil, commonly from rapeseed, soybeans, or palm.
Clearly one of the objectives of government support for biofuels was increasing 
farm and rural incomes.8 However, an unintended consequence has been that the 
biofuel demand for corn, sugar, and oilseeds has contributed to higher global prices 
for these commodities. Biofuels are not the only driver of higher commodity prices, 
but they are important.9 Agricultural commodity prices have increased because of in-
creased global demand for commodities due partly to dietary transition especially in 
developing countries. As income rises, people demand more animal protein in their 
diets, which increases demand for animal feed ingredients. In the decade prior to 2008, 
global consumption of agricultural commodities grew faster than global production in 
all but one year. That trend meant that global stocks to use ratios were quite low going 
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into 2008, the first large commodity price surge. Also, there were regional production 
shortfalls that accentuated the shortage. Furthermore, the United States dollar fell six-
ty-seven percent between 2002 and 2008, which led to increased prices for commodities 
sold in that currency. Then, on top of these important drivers, there was an increase in 
use particularly of corn for biofuels.
For the biofuels driver, we need to distinguish between biofuels demand driven by 
government mandates or subsidies and demand driven by the higher price of crude oil 
and gasoline. In 2008, we estimated that the surge in crude oil price actually had been 
more important as a driver of increased ethanol demand for corn than had been the 
government subsidy.
In 2011, there was another surge in many agricultural commodity prices. Our 
analysis then indicated that the major drivers were a concurrent increase in Chinese 
demand for soybean imports and a surge in demand for corn for ethanol. Corn and 
soybeans are generally grown in the same areas in the US, and the combination of these 
two drivers led to a 189% increase in the acreage needed in the US to supply these two 
demands between 2005 and 2010. Thus, a big part of the surge in commodity prices in 
2011 was this perfect storm of demand surges.
We began 2012 with low stocks, and then were hit by the drought of 2012. The drought 
caused agricultural commodity prices, especially corn, to surge again in 2012. This surge 
led to calls for reduction or elimination of the US RFS for corn ethanol.10 However, US 
policy is no longer a key driver of the corn ethanol industry. While government subsidies, 
some of which have now expired, and the RFS were critical to the development of the in-
dustry, the economic reality today is that corn ethanol is cheaper per gallon than gasoline, 
and blenders today have an economic incentive to continue blending ethanol even in the 
absence of government mandates. This is true despite the fact that ethanol is more expen-
sive on an energy basis, as most gasoline is sold as E10, and there is no competition on an 
energy basis. Thus, removal or reduction of the RFS in 2012 or 2013 likely would have little 
impact on the demand for corn for ethanol, and thus on the corn price.11
There is no doubt that urban consumers are adversely impacted by higher agricul-
tural commodity prices (due to any cause), particularly in developing countries. How-
ever, there is another dimension to the higher prices that gets little attention. The higher 
commodity prices can help increase rural incomes in developing countries.12 The World 
Bank says seventy percent of the world’s poor live in rural areas and derive their pri-
mary livelihood from agriculture. To the extent that developing country farmers have 
access to the higher commodity prices, their incomes could be increased and poverty 
reduced. There is already evidence that cropland area has increased significantly in the 
past six years mainly in developing countries with the higher commodity prices.13
6.3. Second Generation Biofuels
Second generation biofuels can be produced from a variety of advanced feedstocks includ-
ing cellulosic sources, and perhaps eventually algae. Cellulosic feedstocks can be agricul-
tural residues such as corn stover, wheat straw, or forest residues, or they can be dedicated 
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energy crops such as miscanthus, switchgrass, poplar, and willow. These feedstocks can 
be converted to biofuels via biochemical or thermochemical or hybrid processes. The end 
product of biochemical conversion is typically ethanol. Thermochemical or hybrid conver-
sion processes can produce a wide range of biofuels including green diesel, jet fuel, bio-gas-
oline, and others. Because of the blend wall discussed above and for many other reasons, 
there is today much more interest in the conversion of cellulosic feedstocks to drop-in 
biofuels that are more compatible with existing infrastructure and fuel supply chains.
Though extremely complicated to measure definitively, two indicative measures 
have been used to assess the relative energy and emissions benefits of biofuels as com-
pared with the petroleum fuels they replace. Overall energy ratio represents the ratio of 
energy contained in a given quantity of finished fuel to the energy needed to produce 
that same quantity of fuel. For example, it is estimated that corn ethanol has an approx-
imate energy ratio in the range of about 1.3 or 1.6 to one,14 whereas estimates for sugar-
cane ethanol range from about five to one to greater than nine to one.15 The energy ratio 
for sugarcane ethanol is favorable, but varies greatly depending on harvesting method 
(such as manual vs. mechanized) and how efficiently agricultural residue (bagasse) is 
converted to process steam and surplus electricity. Biodiesel produced from soy or rape-
seed oil is estimated to have an energy ratio above two to one but below five to one.16 
Advanced and cellulosic biofuels produced from a host of new pathways are striving to 
exceed the energy ratio of the most energy efficient first generation biofuels, but this is 
highly case sensitive and remains to be confirmed at commercial scales. It should be 
noted that energy ratios alone do not tell the whole story. The form of energy is critical. 
When solid biological feedstocks are converted into liquid fuels, the form of energy 
becomes much more useful for the transportation system. Also, any transformation of 
energy from one form to another (such as from crude oil to gasoline) involves a loss in 
Renewable Fuel 
Category
Minimum Lifecycle GHG 
Reduction of Subject Biofuel 
Category Relative to a Baseline 
of Gasoline or Diesel
Example
Conventional 
Biofuel 20%
Starch feedstocks including 
corn, sorghum, wheat
Biomass-Based 
Diesel 50%
Biodiesel such as from soy 
or rapeseed and non-ester 
renewable diesel
Cellulosic Biofuel 60%
Any fuel derived from cellu-
lose, hemicellulose or lignin 
non-food feedstocks
Other Advanced 
Biofuel 50%
Any fuel derived from re-
newable feedstocks including 
sugarcane ethanol
Table 6.1. Renewable Fuel Categories and GHG Thresholds as Defined in the Renewable 
Fuels Standard.17
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energy. The point is that it becomes more useful energy. Electricity is more useful for 
lighting than coal. To a real world marketplace then, it is not so much the joules them-
selves as the form of those joules that matters.
Another critical measure of a biofuel’s relative performance is reduction in green-
house gas (GHG) emissions as compared to gasoline or diesel fuels. This too is a com-
plicated metric to pinpoint, however, in the context of the Renewable Fuels Standard, 
the EPA has established key default criteria to help frame objective GHG targets for pri-
mary biofuel categories (Table 6.1). It is of note that the GHG emissions improvements 
for cellulosic and advanced biofuels must exceed those of first generation biofuels to 
qualify toward the US RFS volumetric requirements.
With the billions invested in biofuels research, substantial progress has been made in 
advancing feedstock development and conversion processes for second-generation bio-
fuels. In general, the economic reality is that cellulosic biofuels are not competitive with 
fossil fuels on a market basis. Some form of government support is needed to elicit private 
sector investment in cellulosic biofuels. In addition, there is considerable uncertainty fac-
ing potential investors in cellulosic biofuels.18 In the following section, we will examine 
five major sources of uncertainty: future oil price, feedstock cost and availability, conver-
sion technology yield and cost, environmental impacts, and government policy.
6.3.1. oil Price Uncertainty
Anytime an investment is being considered, one must forecast future input and output 
product prices to do an economic assessment of project viability. For biofuels, the key 
price uncertainty is future oil prices since all the biofuel competing products are de-
rived from crude oil. Furthermore, petroleum represents a major input to agricultural 
crop production in the form of diesel fuel and fertilizer, and this impact is thereby man-
ifested in biofuel feedstock costs. Each year, the US Department of Energy (DOE) fore-
casts future oil prices using a reference case, low oil price case, and high oil price case 
(Figure 6.3).19 The DOE crude oil reference forecast for 2040 is $163/bbl. in 2011 dollars. 
That value is somewhat less than our estimate of the crude oil price needed to render 
cellulosic biofuels economic without government intervention. The low and high price 
forecasts for 2040 are $75 and $237 respectively. DOE does not assign probabilities to 
the three cases, but clearly the reference case is the one they deem most likely. A poten-
tial investor facing this huge range of possible prices and knowing that the breakeven 
price is likely a bit higher than the reference case would be unlikely to make the invest-
ment. Future oil price uncertainty deters investment in cellulosic biofuels.
6.3.2. Feedstocks Cost and availability
There are potential issues with both the quantity and cost of cellulosic feedstocks. 
The good news, however, is that most of the assessments of feedstock availability have 
determined that there is plenty of cellulosic material available in the US to meet and 
exceed the RFS.21 The problem is one of cost. A National Research Council report 
estimated feedstock costs ranging from $75 to $133 per dry ton.22 Generally, residues, 
such as corn stover, wheat straw, and forest residues, had lower costs ($75–$92) than 
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dedicated energy crops, like miscanthus, switchgrass, and short rotation woody crops 
($89–$133). These costs are all much higher than had been expected a few years ago. 
The high cost of feedstock is one of the major factors driving the projected higher cost 
of biofuels. Current market conditions for certain dedicated crops are also not attrac-
tive to farmers, who can realize much greater returns from conventional agricultural 
crops. In the near term, increased use of cover crops and agricultural residues for 
feedstocks may help mitigate this challenge, as they afford farmers supplementary 
profit from currently allocated and revenue-generating land.
Beyond cost, there are also some logistical issues involved in developing the feed-
stock supply system to biorefineries. For the dedicated energy crops, long term contracts 
will be needed, as farmers would not be willing to make the up-front investment re-
quired to establish the crops without some assurance of a market for the product. Biore-
fineries also may want longer term contracts for crop residues as well to assure they have 
a locked-in feedstock supply before investing the hundreds of millions of dollars in a 
facility. To develop these long term contracts, appropriate risk sharing mechanisms will 
have to be designed. In addition, most cellulosic biomass has low bulk density, meaning 
its transportation over distances greater than one hundred miles can render biofuel 
production economics no longer viable.
6.3.3. Conversion Technology yield and Cost
Many of the conversion technologies briefly described below and in the accompany-
ing sidebar on Second Generation Biofuel Conversion Technologies, have been shown to 
Figure 6.3. DOE (Brent) Crude Oil Price Forecasts 2013−2040.20
Biofuel ProsPects in an uncertain World 159
work in that they produce the desired biofuel. The question again is at what cost. Since 
there is very little commercial production, and none without some form of government 
support, we do not really know what cellulosic biofuels will cost. Our best estimate is 
that using the range of feedstock prices above, biofuels are likely to cost at least $4.50/
gallon of gasoline equivalent. Costs could be considerably higher, or they could be lower 
with a major technical breakthrough. This gasoline equivalent level implies crude oil 
breakeven price of around $150/barrel.23 
Some of the technologies being considered have been around for a very long time. 
For example, the Fischer-Tropsch (FT) process of producing synthetic gas, which can 
then be converted into a range of hydrocarbon products, was used by Germany during 
World War II. At that time, German oil supply was restricted or cut off, and coal was 
therefore converted into liquid fuels via the FT process. There are plants today that use 
the process with coal or shale as a raw material, and the process has been proven with 
biomass. Again, the question is one of cost. Biomass is not as energy dense as coal, 
making the economic viability more sensitive to transportation and logistics. What is 
more, experience has shown that the end fuel cost is high even using coal as a feedstock, 
in part due to the large scale and high capital cost structure typical of a typical Fischer- 
Tropsch gasification plant.
Second Generation Biofuel Conversion Technologies
As noted, great interest and expectations, but slow and costly development 
characterize efforts to commercialize advanced biofuel technologies which rely 
on non-food feedstocks and sustainable approaches. Recall that leading sources 
of cellulosic biomass may include agricultural residue, wood waste, tree trim-
mings, switchgrass and miscanthus. An objective of biofuel innovators on this 
frontier is to deliver energy balances, energy ratios and GHG reductions ap-
proaching or exceeding those typical of sugarcane ethanol, which is considered 
an Advanced Biofuel by the EPA. Two leading conversion technologies are being 
pursued via substantial public and private investments, and are summarized 
brief ly below:
Biochemical conversion involves a multi-step process beginning with the pre-
treatment of biomass with some combination of chemical agents and/or catalysts, 
whose function is to begin breaking down the cellular structure of its three primary 
constituents: cellulose, hemi-cellulose and lignin. Conditioning and enzymatic hy-
drolysis typically follow, which balance the pH and help free the sugars of the cel-
lulose and hemi-cellulose. Finally, microorganisms such as yeasts and bacteria are 
introduced to biologically convert these sugars into alcohols via fermentation. It 
should be noted here that other low temperature, non-biological processing routes, 
referred to simply as chemical conversion pathways represent viable technologies as 
well. In these, catalytic and mechanical systems are the principle means of produc-
ing fuel from the sugars and intermediates in biomass. In the United States, several 
demonstration or pre-commercial plants based upon variants of the biochemical 
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conversion pathway are scheduled to come online in the 2013–2015 timeframe, 
and assist in validating process parameters at scale. Major areas of technical uncer-
tainty and continuing research and development include: feedstock variability, cost 
and effectiveness of enzymes, production of enzymes at scale, fermentation pro-
cessing parameters such as rates and yields, and process integration.24 None alone is 
considered insurmountable, but interactions exist which can complicate and delay 
technical and economic optimization.
Thermochemical conversion involves heating biomass in the absence of oxygen 
or air, followed by extraction of hydrocarbons in either liquid (pyrolysis) or gaseous 
(synthesis gas) form. In pyrolysis, the resultant decomposed biomass, or bio-oil can 
be treated with chemical agents to fractionate the liquid molecules and be further 
refined into an array of bioproducts, sugars, and cellulosic fibers. In gasification, 
the resultant syn-gas composed of primarily hydrogen and carbon monoxide, is 
reformed, cleaned, and conditioned to form the building blocks of synthetic hydro-
carbon molecules. This technology is generally less sensitive to variations in quality 
and type of biomass than biochemical pathways. At the same time, thermochemical 
processes are extremely capital-intensive, so efficiency and yield are more depen-
dent upon scale and location. Primary technical challenges focus on making use 
of the full complement of molecules in the biomass, improving catalysts, and in 
upgrading of synthetic hydrocarbons.25 Demonstration and pre-commercial scale 
production facilities are pending in both the US and Europe to deliver advanced 
biofuels via thermochemical pathways. The well-known Fischer-Tropsch process is 
an example of a thermochemical conversion. Not limited to biomass, commercial 
FT processes employ gasification to convert both coal and natural gas to liquids 
such as CTL and GTL.
In a 2013 report, the IEA identified more than one hundred advanced biofuel 
pilot, demonstration or commercial projects being pursued worldwide. Biofu-
els production from second-generation cellulosic sources in 2011 was estimated 
at 137,000 tons, or about 0.15% of all biofuels currently produced. Though the 
global output of second-generation biofuels has tripled since 2010, it remains far 
below expectations due to project delays, closures, and a host of other techni-
cal and non-technical problems. If all known plants either announced or under 
construction come to fruition, cellulosic biofuels would still comprise less than 
one percent of all biofuels by 2018. Of the seventy projects for which data was 
provided, forty-three were biochemical, twenty were thermochemical and seven 
were chemical.26 
6.3.4. Environmental Issues
First generation biofuels have been characterized as having environmental problems 
such as increased soil erosion and chemical runoff due to the higher level of corn pro-
duction necessary for ethanol production.27 Also, when corn is diverted from current 
uses to ethanol production, most current needs, such as feeding animals, must still be 
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met. That means corn or some substitute crop area must be increased somewhere in the 
world. This increased area can result in deforestation or converting pasture to cropland. 
Such land conversion releases greenhouse gases (GHG) rendering corn ethanol (and 
other first generation biofuels) less attractive from the perspective of reducing GHGs. 
Estimating these induced land use changes is very complicated, is uncertain, and is 
controversial.
The environmental picture is somewhat different for second generation biofuels. 
The environmental impacts likely differ depending on whether the feedstock is a resi-
due or perennial crop. For residues, the main concern is the possibility of increased soil 
erosion and loss of soil organic matter. For example, when corn stover is removed, it is 
possible that soil erosion would increase as there would be less residue to hold the soil. 
Similarly for organic matter, to the extent that residue added soil organic carbon (still 
being debated), removing residue could reduce soil carbon. However, there are no land 
use changes associated with residue use for feedstock as the residue is a co-product with 
the crop being grown. For dedicated energy crops, we expect a reduction in soil erosion 
and chemical runoff. Since the crops remain for ten years or more, they will hold soil 
better than an annual crop. Also, little fertilizer is normally applied to the dedicated 
crops, so there would be less runoff. In addition, the perennial crops provide wildlife 
habitat. There is some concern with possible loss of biodiversity if most of the land sur-
rounding a biorefinery were to be planted in one crop. There could be land use change 
if substantial amounts of dedicated crops were used for biofuels, but likely, it would be 
less than first generation crops.
It is likely that second-generation feedstocks would cause less of a food-fuel prob-
lem than first generation. However, at the end of the day, land is the limiting resource, 
so even dedicated crops that are not consumed by humans use land that could be used 
for livestock feed.
6.3.5. Government Policy
The final major uncertainty is government policy. In the US, EU, and Brazil, government 
policies have changed over time. In Brazil, the required minimum blending level has 
changed with evolving economic conditions. In the EU, the biofuel targets and associated 
sustainability criteria change over time. Also, in the EU the renewable energy targets are 
difficult to enforce, and the private sector cannot be assured they will be enforced.
In the US, the RFS for cellulosic biofuels has an out-clause that permits blenders to 
purchase a credit from EPA and another advanced biofuel certificate in lieu of actually 
blending the cellulosic biofuel. For example, in 2013 the EPA credit cost is $0.42, and an 
advance biofuel blending certificate from sugarcane ethanol is about $0.77. So a blender 
could avoid blending a gallon of cellulosic biofuel by paying about $1.19. In May 2013, 
the wholesale price of gasoline was about $2.86 per gallon. If cellulosic gasoline is $4.50, 
the blender would have to choose between buying the cellulosic gasoline and blending it 
at a net cost of $4.50 – 2.86 = $1.64, or paying the $1.19 to avoid blending. Clearly under 
these conditions, the blender would choose not to blend. In this case the RFS is not an 
iron-clad mandate, and, in fact, turns out not to be a mandate at all. This out-clause in 
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the RFS applies to cellulosic biofuels for any year in which EPA waives any part of the 
RFS. In reality, EPA will be forced to waive some part of the cellulosic RFS every year 
because the RFS grows faster than cellulosic capacity could possibly grow. Thus, there is 
no binding cellulosic RFS in the US. With no effective government mandate for cellu-
losic biofuels, and cellulosic biofuels not yet competitive with fossil fuels on the purely 
commercial market, it will be difficult to obtain investment and financing for plants.
Given this reality, what government policy options might get the industry moving? 
In the US, the Department of Defense, most notably the Navy and Air Force, are keenly 
interested in using renewable jet fuel for a significant fraction of their fleet.28 They are 
motivated by both environmental factors and energy security. One policy mechanism 
that could be used to help the military procure biofuels is a reverse auction. In a reverse 
auction, firms bid for long term contracts to supply a fixed quantity of certified biofuel 
to the military. For example, the bid request could specify fifty million gallons per year 
delivered to Air Force Base X for the next fifteen years. Bidders would then estimate 
their costs of supplying the biofuel and submit bids to the Air Force. The lowest priced 
bid wins the contract. This mechanism reduces or eliminates uncertainty in several 
ways. First, oil price uncertainty is eliminated because the firm has a fixed price con-
tract regardless of what happens to the oil price. Second, presumably any firm bidding 
would know their technology at least well enough to place a bid. Third, bidders would 
presumably have provisional contracts with feedstock suppliers before entering a bid, so 
they would know their feedstock cost. Thus, many of the uncertainties described above 
would be reduced via the reverse auction. Suppose that the projected price of equivalent 
fossil fuels over the 15 year period was $4.00 per gallon, and the winning cellulosic fuel 
bid was $4.50. That amounts to an implicit subsidy for the biofuel of $0.50 per gallon, 
but the subsidy is determined by a market mechanism—the reverse auction process. If 
the government wants to get second-generation biofuel plants built, this mechanism 
likely would be cost effective because the level of the subsidy is competitively deter-
mined in the market.
6.4. Conclusions: Major Challenges and opportunities
First generation biofuels are now well established in Brazil, the US, and the EU. Sugar-
cane ethanol is likely to continue growing in Brazil as there are ample land resources 
available to expand production even while ensuring the protection of sensitive areas 
including the Amazon. In the US, the RFS level of fifteen billion gallons of conventional 
corn ethanol is already in place, and the capacity is not expected to grow. This level of 
corn ethanol has been one, but certainly not the only, contributor to higher agricultural 
commodity prices. However, as corn yields increase over time, the fraction of the total 
corn crop going to ethanol will begin to decline, and any price pressure brought on by 
biofuels will begin to diminish.
For second-generation biofuels, the technology has been slow to develop. The US 
RFS mandated level of cellulosic biofuel for 2013 is one billion gallons, but the EPA has 
waived all but fourteen million gallons of that mandate because, by their estimate, only 
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that much will be available in 2013 from all the small commercial and demonstration 
plants in the US. The five uncertainties described above—oil price, feedstock, technol-
ogy, environment, and government policy—have impeded investment in the industry. 
Absent changes in government policy or significant technical breakthroughs, it is un-
likely that we will see large scale development in the near future. There is plenty of bio-
mass feedstock, the technologies are becoming increasingly viable, and environmental 
issues can be managed. However, economics will have to improve to entice substantial 
capital investment into the sector.
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Chapter 7
a Future for Nuclear Energy?
lEftERi h. tSoukalaS, Rong gao, and EugEnE d. CoylE
abstract
Nuclear energy is an ultra-concentrated source of energy; one tonne of natural ura-
nium is capable of producing forty-four million kWh of electricity. By comparison, to 
produce the same amount of electricity would require twenty thousand tonnes of coal 
or 8.5 million cubic meters of natural gas. Nuclear energy is meanwhile controversial in 
the public arena, principally due to its related association to atomic weaponry, its oper-
ational safety records and the radioactive waste materials it produces. These concerns 
have severely undermined the progress of nuclear power over recent decades. It is im-
perative today that we reevaluate these concerns in view of the emerging global energy 
picture. In evaluating today’s energy production options, lifecycle environmental costs 
must be equitably factored in. Such determinations may shift the economic feasibility 
from conventional sources of energy, not least coal and gas, to other sustainable and re-
newable energy sources, including hydro, wind and solar energy. The case for including 
nuclear power as a prominent aspect of the new energy paradigm has become a legiti-
mate question deserving of analysis and exploration.
In this chapter the story of nuclear energy is explored commencing with an introduc-
tion to the essential elements in nuclear power generation followed by a brief historical 
recall of nuclear energy, estimates of current generation status, nuclear energy safety, 
nuclear accidents and their after impact, and challenges in dealing with nuclear waste 
management. The future role for nuclear ‘fission’ energy is discussed with commentary 
on the need for public engagement. This is followed by a brief review of research and 
development in nuclear ‘fusion’ energy and the case for its future deployment.
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7.1. Introduction: Essentials of Nuclear Energy
Nuclear power is based on a fundamental principle discovered about seventy years ago. 
The nucleus of a fissile isotope, such as uranium235 (235U) or plutonium239 (239Pu), be-
comes an unstable compound after capturing an extra neutron and it will promptly 
split into two smaller fragments, releasing enormous amounts of heat in the process. 
The heat is carried away by a coolant, typically water, gas or liquid metal, which subse-
quently converts water into steam that drives a turbine to generate electricity.
As with other material commodities, nuclear fuels experience three phases during 
their life cycle: acquisition, utilization and disposal (Figure 7.1).
The diagram simplistically represents a best-case scenario for nuclear fuels in 
which total recycling is achieved. In the ideal total recycling closed fuel-cycle scenario, 
the generation and disposal of nuclear waste will no longer pose a major problem. In 
practice, significant economic, technical and indeed political barriers remain to be ad-
dressed and overcome.
Uranium is the major fuel used in nuclear power reactors. Even though uranium 
is a rather abundant resource in the earth, the fissile (useful) isotope, 235U, accounts for 
only 0.7% of natural uranium; the majority is mostly 238U, a stable isotope. To achieve 
the required efficiency to sustain nuclear fissions, commercial nuclear power reactors 
use enriched uranium, with a 235U concentration of three percent and above.1 An en-
richment process is therefore required to make natural uranium useable in nuclear 
power reactors. Transforming natural uranium to nuclear fuel involves three typical 
processes: mining, milling, and fabrication.
Uranium is a weakly radioactive element found in the Earth’s crust. It is approx-
imately five hundred times more abundant than gold. Since 2008, the world’s total 
identified uranium resources have grown by 12.5%, of which over 30% is located in 
Australia. Uranium ore extracted from the earth is usually in the form of a compound 
known as triuranium octoxide, U3O8. A leaching process using sulfur acid is needed to 
separate uranium from other waste. The final product, generally referred to as yellow 
cake, consists of at least eighty percent pure uranium, which is transported to a process-
ing facility where nuclear fuel is fabricated.
Enrichment is necessary in nuclear fuel production owing to the fact that the ura-
nium235 concentration in natural uranium ore is too low to be used in commercial nu-
Figure 7.1. A Simplified Nuclear Fuel Cycle.
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clear power plants. Prior to the enrichment process, U3O8 is first converted to a gas form 
of uranium, UF6. The objective of enrichment is to separate 235U from 238U, which can 
be done by virtue of an obvious physical property: that 235U is slightly lighter than 238U. 
In practice, there are two commonly used techniques: gaseous diffusion and gas cen-
trifuge. In the gaseous diffusion process, UF6 gas is pumped through layers of special 
porous membranes. Since 235U is lighter, it tends to diffuse faster and will thus be sepa-
rated from 238U at the end of the pipeline. Because the weight difference between these 
two isotopes is small, hundreds of filtering membranes are required. The gas centrifuge 
approach uses a large number of cylinders rotating at very high speeds. Since gas mod-
ules with uranium238 are heavier, the centrifugal force will drive them to the outer part 
of the cylinders while uranium235 will remain closer to the center. Again, multiple units 
are required to achieve a desirable level of enrichment.
The nuclear fuels used in power generating reactors are arranged in a bundle form 
called a fuel assembly comprising hundreds of fuel rods. To produce a fuel rod, uranium 
dioxide is first baked into cylinder ceramic pellets at temperatures up to 1400°C and 
is then inserted into zirconium metal tubes. The dimensions and arrangements of fuel 
rods are characteristic to specific reactor designs.
The working principle for a power generation nuclear reactor was discovered more 
than seventy years ago and has remained largely unchanged during that time. As in 
a fossil fuel plant, nuclear fuels are burned to produce heat through nuclear fission, 
rather than a chemical combustion process. The fission of the uranium235 nucleus pro-
duces two smaller fragments, called fission products, of two to three free neutrons and 
some gamma rays. The total mass of the fission products is smaller than the mass of the 
original uranium nucleus; the loss in the mass appears as kinetic energy of the fission 
products, typically 200 MeV (or 3.2 × 10−11 J) per fission event.
If all conditions are favorable, the free neutrons released during the initial (first 
generation) fission event may be subsequently captured by other fissile nuclei which in 
turn trigger further fissions. If at least one such event happens on average, a sustainable 
chain reaction is achieved. Regulating the neutron population is crucial in controlling 
the operation of a nuclear reactor. This is achieved primarily through the use of control 
rods. Control rods are comprised of material that can absorb neutrons very efficiently, 
such as graphite.
As the fission process progresses, fissile materials are continuously consumed and 
fission products build up inside the fuels. Some fission products have high neutron ab-
sorption capacity and will reduce the number of free neutrons available to the chain 
reaction process. This eventually leads to a situation where fission cannot be sustained. 
At this point, the reactor has to be shut down and refueled. A burn-up factor is used to 
measure the quantity of fuel that has been consumed. The burn-up factor is usually ex-
pressed as the total thermal energy generated per unit mass, typically in gigawatt days 
per metric ton of enriched uranium (GWd/tU). The average designed burn-up for sec-
ond-generation reactors is about forty GWd/tU. Later technologies in fuel design have 
improved this number upwards to sixty GWd/tU and higher. A higher burn-up allows 
longer operation cycles and greatly improves in both cost and safety.
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Nuclear Fuel Disposal: Once removed from their reactors, nuclear fuels become spent 
fuels. They are sometimes incorrectly labeled as waste; but in fact, more than ninety-seven 
percent of the fissionable material is still contained within. Nuclear fission chain reactions 
cease from the moment of reactor shutdown, however the nuclear fuels remain highly 
radioactive. The main radiation comes from two sources: fission products and actinides.
The fission of the uranium nucleus creates two smaller nuclei, called fission prod-
ucts. The resultant nuclei are normally unstable and will undergo beta decay to more 
stable nuclei, releasing beta or gamma radiation. One possible reaction is the following:
235U + n → 236U → 140Xe + 94Sr + 2n
Most of the fission products have very short half-lives. Xenon140 has a half-life of 
fourteen seconds and Strontium94 a half-life of seventy-five seconds. Other possible fis-
sion products have longer half-lives and are called long-lived fission products (LLFP). For 
example, Iodine131 has a half-life of eight days, while Cesium137 and Strontium90 of have 
half-life of about thirty years. Long lived fission products pose a bigger environmental 
hazard and need to be closely monitored. Nevertheless, most fission products have half-
lives of less than ninety years, making them relatively easy to handle. In fact, after forty 
years, their radioactivity will have reduced to a thousandth of their original level.
Besides the fission products referred to above, nuclear spent fuels also contain ac-
tinides such as Plutonium239, Plutonium240, Americium241, Americium243, Curium245, 
and Curium246, which are mainly produced by neutron capturing of Uranium238. Most 
actinides have very long half-lives, typically thousands or millions of years, presenting 
a gigantic challenge for long term storage of nuclear waste.
The existence of long-lived fission products and actinides demands careful han-
dling of nuclear spent fuels. When they are initially discharged from the reactor, the 
highly radioactive isotopes in the fuels are still decaying, thus generating enormous 
amounts of heat that requires appropriate cooling. Current practice is to submerge the 
spent fuels in pools of water. The water serves as both a coolant and as a layer of radia-
tion shielding. After a minimum of one year of cooling inside the pool, the spent fuels 
may be removed from the water and inserted into a gas-filled steel cylinder container, 
called a cask. Following removal, there are two possible destinies for the spent fuels: 
direct disposal or recycling. In the US, direct disposal is the only legal option. The spent 
fuels would preferably be transferred to a permanent repository for long-term storage 
but such repositories are not currently available.2 Spent fuels are therefore (temporarily) 
stored at plant site locations. The direct disposal approach treats spend fuels as waste 
and immediately creates a huge challenge for nuclear waste management since these 
wastes need to be stored securely for at least one thousand years. Other countries, such 
as the United Kingdom and France, have chosen the recycling approach to alleviate 
the local waste management problem. The recycling of nuclear spent fuels takes place 
in two steps. First, the small amount (three percent) of highly radioactive material is 
separated and concentrated into a special glass which is stored securely. The remainder 
of the spent fuels, consisting of most of the unused uranium and the newly generated 
plutonium, can be reused to fabricate fresh fuel rods.
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7.2. history of Nuclear Engineering
The harnessing of nuclear energy was made possible by the discovery of the nuclear 
fission reaction in 1938. German chemists Otto Hahn and Fritz Strassmann observed 
that when uranium nuclei are bombarded with neutrons they may split into smaller 
fragments. They also estimated that the energy released during the reaction was about 
two hundred MeV, which was later confirmed experimentally by Otto Frisch in 1939. In 
addition, their research also showed that extra neutrons were created during the fission 
process, indicating that a self-sustainable chain reaction might be possible if the newly 
created neutrons could trigger further fission reactions.3
The mechanism of nuclear fission was further investigated by other scientists and 
in a very short period of time some quite significant discoveries were made. First, it 
was found that uranium235 had a better chance for a fission reaction than uranium238. 
Second, slow neutrons (or thermal neurons) had higher probability of being captured 
by the uranium nuclei than fast neutrons. Since the neutrons released from the fission 
process have very high kinetic energy, they need to be slowed down using a moderator 
to increase the potential for a chain reaction. Third, natural uranium contained only 
0.7% of uranium235 and thus an enrichment process was necessary. These findings were 
the base of using nuclear power. At that time, making atomic bombs was the primary 
objective as World War II had just began.
However, peaceful utilization of nuclear power had never been overlooked. In fact a 
group of scientists in Britain suggested in 1941 that besides building atomic bombs, nu-
clear fission could be used in a controlled fashion to produce useful heat. Following the 
war, this option was pursued with intensified efforts. The first reactor used to produce 
electricity was brought online in December 1951 in Idaho in the United States. Other 
countries followed quickly. The Soviet Union put into operation the world’s first nuclear 
power generator in 1954, a five gigawatt unit. These projects convincingly demonstrated 
that peaceful utilization of nuclear power was feasible. The first fully commercial nu-
clear power plant was designed by Westinghouse in the US and commenced operation 
in 1962. The Westinghouse unit was comprised of a pressurized water reactor (PWR) 
with a capacity of 250 MWe. Since then nuclear power generation has significantly in-
creased, with growth pattern illustrated in Figure 7.2.
7.3. Current Status of Nuclear Energy
Recent estimates by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reveal that an-
nual generation of nuclear power is currently on a slight downward trend, decreas-
ing 1.8% in 2011 to 2558 TWh. In 2009, nuclear energy accounted for approximately 
13.5% of world electricity demand. IAEA reported a significant increase in projected 
nuclear generating capacity. In 2009, 130 power reactors with net capacity of 150 GWe 
(gigawatt electric) were planned. China is the largest growth country with an expected 
fifty gigawatt nuclear installation by 2020. India is also planning a large increase, with 
installation of up to twenty reactors by 2020. The contribution of nuclear energy to 
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electricity generation is significant and is likely to grow in terms of percentage contri-
bution to increasing global energy demand. In December 2011, the US Nuclear Regu-
latory Commission granted approval to Toshiba Corporation’s Westinghouse newest 
reactor design (type AP1000), clearing the path for a sale of this reactor in the US and 
a revival of domestic nuclear power construction. US utilities are seeking permission 
to build up to twelve of the new reactors. In Germany, on the other hand, nuclear 
power had accounted for twenty-three percent of national electricity consumption, 
prior to the permanent shutdown of eight plants in March 2011. German nuclear 
power commenced with development of research reactors in the 1950s and 1960s, 
resulting in the first commercial plant going online in 1969. It has been high on the 
political agenda in recent decades, with continuing debate regarding when the tech-
nology should be phased out. The topic received renewed attention due to the political 
impact of the Russia-Belarus energy dispute in 2007 and following the Fukushima 
nuclear accident in 2011.
According to IAEA, as of 2012, there are 435 nuclear power reactors in operation 
with 370,049 MWe installed capacity.
Efficiency in electricity generation is of key importance and nuclear fission is by far 
the most efficient source of energy. Nuclear fusion may result in even higher efficiency 
than nuclear fission, should fusion prove to be controllable. An energy density logarith-
mic scale comparison, summarized in Figure 7.3, shows that uranium fuels are many 
orders of magnitude higher than other fuels in terms of energy density.
Owing to its fuel energy density, a nuclear power reactor can operate without inter-
ruption for up to two years before refueling is required. High energy density also results 
in lower fuel cost in energy production. The US Nuclear Energy Institute estimates that 
for a coal-fired plant, seventy-eight percent of the cost is fuel, for natural gas eighty-
Figure 7.2. Nuclear Power Generation Since 1980.
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nine percent and for nuclear a mere fourteen percent. A study by the World Nuclear 
Association suggested that the cost of nuclear fuel to generate one kilowatt of electricity 
was about $0.0077 USD in 2011. Their analysis indicated that enrichment of uranium 
accounts for about half the cost (Figure 7.4). Lower percentage fuel cost makes nuclear 
power largely resistant to market fluctuation.
One of the most significant advantages of nuclear power is that it is carbon emission 
free. The commitment to low carbon economics makes the nuclear option cost attrac-
tive since other non-carbon free sources, such as coal-fired and gas-fired plants, will 
necessitate development of more advanced (and hence more expensive) technologies 
in order to achieve a reduced carbon emission footprint. An EIA report (Figure 7.5) 
suggests that the nuclear power remains economically competitive among all possible 
alternatives.
With low fuel cost and uninterrupted availability nuclear power can be a reliable 
and predictable source for base-load electricity. Unlike other types of energy, electricity 
Figure 7.3. Energy Densities of Major Fuel Sources.4 Uranium-N and Uranium-R Stand 
for Natural Uranium and Reactor-graded Uranium, Respectively.
Figure 7.4. Cost Components of Getting One Kilogram of UO2 in 2011.
Enrichment,  
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is unique in that it cannot be stored efficiently. Generation and consumption must be 
balanced at all times. Base-load power is the minimum requirement to meet this bal-
ance. Nuclear power meets the necessary requirements that base-load power be safe, 
economically viable and reliable. In some countries nuclear power produces a signifi-
cant portion of electricity (Figure 7.6). France, for example, generated more than seven-
ty-seven percent of its electricity with nuclear power in 2011.
Figure 7.5. Total System Levelized Cost of New Generation Resources, 2016.5 
Figure 7.6. Countries with Nuclear Power Producing More Than 30% of Their Electric-
ity in 2011.6 
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7.4. Nuclear Energy Safety
Safety is of paramount concern in the construction and operation of all nuclear power 
plants. Safety in careful processing and disposal of nuclear waste is also of critical impor-
tance. In this section, we discuss how to achieve these goals in practice. A review of funda-
mental concepts is made with omission of in-depth technical detail. We also examine how 
a masterly engineered system can collapse owing to a series of cascading events.
Nuclear power plants are designed, constructed and operated under very rigorous 
internationally agreed safety standards. Through adoption of defense-in-depth design 
and operation procedures, protocols are put in place with intent to ensure that serious 
malfunction may arise subject only to failure of multiple consecutive and independent 
safety measures. Table 7.1 lists five essential levels of protection in plant design and op-
eration, from accident prevention to disaster mitigation. Required measures to achieve 
these objectives are also listed.
We shall not attempt to discuss these measures in detail. Instead we propose re-
ducing them down to three basic components: the intrinsic safety feature of a chain 
reaction, the control of reactivity, and the residual heat removal mechanism.
7.4.1. Chain Reaction
The chain reaction is central to both nuclear power reactors and atomic energy, in order to 
achieve sustainable fission. This parallel has given rise to the misunderstanding that an out-
of-control nuclear reactor power plant may turn itself into an atomic bomb. This scenario 
will never occur as the design of a nuclear power reactor is vastly different than that of a nu-
clear bomb. Creating a nuclear explosion is physically impossible in a nuclear power reactor.
Level Objectives Measures
1 Failure prevention Adequate site selection, high quality design, con-
struction and operation to reduce or prevent failures
2 Failure detection and 
control
Control and protection system with built-in sur-
veillance features to detect and manage abnormal 
operations before they become significant
3 Design basis accident 
control
Built-in engineering safety feature and accident 
response procedures to prevent core damage and 
manage abnormal operations before they become 
significant
4 Severe accident control Reactor containments to limit the impact of se-
vere accidents that are not anticipated in the de-
sign basis
5 Severe accident 
mitigation
Off-site emergency plan to mitigate the radiolog-
ical consequence of significance release of radio-
active material
Table 7.1. Defense-in-depth Concept of a Nuclear Power Plant.
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Almost all currently operating nuclear power reactors are thermal reactors, which 
use thermal neutrons to sustain chain reactions. Neutrons initially released from nu-
clear fission carry very high kinetic energy (~2 MeV), and are termed fast neutrons. As 
fast neutrons move at very high speed, they have less probability of being captured by 
other fissionable nuclei. By comparison, thermal neutrons have kinetic energy of less 
than 1 eV. From a practical viewpoint, slowing fast neutrons down to thermal neutron 
speed provides a means for lower enriched uranium to be used as fuel. The material 
used to slow down fast neutrons is termed a moderator. The moderator in a thermal 
reactor consists of light material such as water. Using water as the moderator introduces 
an important safety feature: it provides a negative void coefficient. A common feature 
in reactor design is to use water as both moderator and coolant.7 When reactivity levels 
rise the moderator/coolant temperature will rise accordingly. As temperature increases, 
the density of moderator/coolant decreases, reducing its effectiveness as moderator and 
resulting in fewer number of thermal neutrons for fission. This negative feedback mech-
anism is an inherent stabilizing factor in reactor operation. In an extreme accident sce-
nario, the moderator/coolant will vaporize and effectively stop the chain reaction.
7.4.2. Reactivity Control
The primary control of reactor reactivity is through control rods. Control rods are 
made with material that can efficiently absorb neutrons. Reactivity control is achieved 
through mechanically changing the position of control rods inside the reactor core. 
Moving deeper within the core results in more neutrons being absorbed, thus reducing 
reactivity; moving toward core edge has the opposite result. Over ninety-nine percent of 
the neutrons (prompt neutrons) are released within a very short time (half-life of 10−22 
second) during fission, which is much too quick for mechanical systems to respond. 
Therefore, the remaining one percent of the delayed neutrons is crucial for reactor con-
trollability. Reactors are carefully designed to be sub-critical for ninety-nine percent 
of the prompt neutrons, ensuring that these neutrons cannot themselves sustain chain 
reactions, but may achieve criticality with the addition of the remaining one percent of 
delayed neutrons. Control rods are designed to function sufficiently quickly to counter 
any power surge and eliminate the possibility of an unwanted criticality.
7.4.3. Residual heat Removal
The problem of residual heat removal is unique to nuclear power generation. During 
normal operation, heat generated from nuclear fission is continuously carried away by 
the coolant, maintaining steady- state conditions. Following shutdown, scheduled or 
unscheduled, nuclear fission stops but heat generation does not. Fission products gen-
erated through nuclear fissions are radioactive and will keep decaying regardless. The 
amount of heat generated by decay of the fission product is significant, typically five 
percent of the power generated prior to the shutdown. If this heat is not removed effi-
ciently, the reactor core can be heated to thousands of degrees and reach meltdown. In 
a worst case scenario, extreme heat can cause structural damage to the reactor contain-
ment, resulting in the release of radioactive material to the environment. It is therefore 
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vital for a nuclear power plant to maintain residual heat removal capability at all times, 
even under that most severe event condition. A major portion of a reactor’s residual heat 
removal systems are active systems, which means that they rely on electrical pumps to 
produce a constant flow of coolant to circulate the residual heat away from the reactor 
core. Systems are designed such that external power is available during an emergency 
event. On the other hand, in the event of a natural disaster such as in the event of an 
earthquake, local power from the grid infrastructure could be rendered unavailable. 
To militate against such an emergency it is a requirement that nuclear power plants be 
equipped with onsite backup generators and battery power supplies.
7.5. Nuclear accidents and Impacts
In ensuring maximal safety, the design, construction and operation of nuclear power 
plants are required to conform to very rigorous standards and procedures. The US 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) mandates that rector designs must meet a re-
quirement of core damage one in ten thousand years. Most of the current commercial 
reactors in the US are designed for one in one hundred thousand year damage com-
pliancy. The intent for next generation plant is to push this figure to one in ten million 
years. As with other manmade products these theoretical safety parameters cannot to-
tally eliminate the risk of accidents. Human designed engineering systems, however well 
designed, can fail subject to unforeseen circumstantial occurrences. Safety regulations 
in the nuclear power industry are particularly stringent as the potential human, phys-
ical and psychological impacts of system failure are inordinately great. Over the past 
fifty years there have been three major nuclear accidents: Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, 
and Fukushima. Upon close examination of nuclear accidents it is customary to dis-
cover that a chain of events led to the critical event, including: flawed design, human 
error and unexpected events. Learning from previous accidents and making necessary 
adjustments to break the chain of events are integral components of nuclear energy 
safety culture.
7.5.1. Three Mile Island, 1979
The Three Mile Island nuclear facility is located near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, in the 
United States. The accident occurred at four in the morning on March 28, 1979. Ini-
tially there was a minor malfunction in the secondary cooling system. The malfunction 
caused a rise of temperature in the primary reactor coolant and later triggered auto-
matic reactor shutdown sequences. During the shutdown, a pilot operated relief valve 
opened to avoid potential over pressure, as per design. However, it failed to close prop-
erly as programmed after ten seconds, resulting in lost coolant. Unfortunately there was 
no instrumentation in situ to detect the position of the relief valve, thus operators were 
not aware of this situation. The built-in safety mechanism detected the loss of coolant 
and responded to it by injecting replacement water into the reactor, resulting in a rise of 
water level in the pressurizer, a tank designed to maintain proper pressure level in the 
reactor. Operators noticed the anomaly in the pressurizer but were unable to properly 
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diagnose its root cause: the relief valve. Instead, they were under the impression that the 
pressurizer was over-filled. To correct this artificial problem, operators reduced the flow 
of replacement water according to operating manual instructions. Without sufficient 
coolant, steam formed and caused excessive vibration of the cooling pumps. To avoid 
damage resulting from the vibration, operators shut down the pump station, with effect 
of worsening the situation. Without coolant, the reactor core overheated and started to 
melt. This continued for over two hours before operators finally closed the relief valve 
and started to restore the cooling system. It took almost one month for the damaged 
reactor to fully shut down (cold shutdown) on April 27.
The Three Mile Island accident was one of the worst case scenarios in terms of re-
actor core damage. Later inspection revealed forty-five percent of the core had melted. 
Fortunately, its consequence was limited since the damaged core was well confined in-
side the reactor vessel. During the event, the amount of radioactive material released to 
the environment was negligible. In a study carried out by the State Health Agency over 
a period of eighteen years, no abnormal health issues were reported for the population 
of thirty thousand residing in the surrounding locality. The Three Mile Island accident 
was thoroughly studied by scientists, engineers and regulatory agency authorities. Ad-
ditional rigorous safety measures were enforced following the accident.
7.5.2. Chernobyl, 1986
The Chernobyl accident was the most devastatingly destructive in the history of nuclear 
power. The chain of events, ironically, starts with an electrical engineering experiment 
designed to test a safety feature. In a nuclear power plant, uninterrupted electricity sup-
ply is required to drive coolant pumps. In case of total loss of station power, on-site 
backup generators are on hand to immediately come on line. At Chernobyl, however, 
there was a sixty to seventy-five second gap before the diesel generators were able to 
reach full power. To bridge this gap, engineers hypothesized that following the loss of 
power the slowing down steam turbine might be able to spin long enough and continue 
providing sufficient electricity for the coolant pumps before the backup generators took 
over. They needed to verify this idea experimentally and decided to take advantage of 
a routine shutdown to perform the test. For some reason, safety officers were not con-
sulted concerning the test, and the required approval was not secured. This lack of com-
munication was of critical import and proved a deadly mistake. In carrying out the test 
some major flaws in reactor design were unwittingly unearthed. The Chernobyl reactor 
was of graphite-moderated water cooled design. Unlike many other reactor designs, 
this one has an important characteristic: a positive void coefficient of reactivity. This 
means reactivity increases as coolant temperature increases, the opposite effect to a re-
actor with negative void coefficient. In normal circumstances a positive void coefficient 
(PVC) does not indicate that a reactor is unstable as there are other mechanisms inher-
ently available to stabilize the overall reactivity. However, under certain circumstances, 
especially at low power level and with certain fuel configurations, PVC will dominate 
and may result in very unstable conditions. The test crew at Chernobyl were not aware 
of this potential threat. However, even with this flaw, the test could have been safely 
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completed if everything had gone to plan, and the same test had been carried out mul-
tiple times previously without incident. 
The test was scheduled to finish during the day shift of April 25. However, an un-
expected outage at a local power station forced the power grid operator to order that 
the Chernobyl reactor remain in service for the duration of the power shortage. This 
unexpected development resulted in delaying the test to midnight of April 25, as the test 
procedure would require reducing the power output of the reactor. The delay was criti-
cal; the night shift crew were less prepared for the test. A number of changes were made, 
putting the reactor into a dangerous positive feedback mode. This positive feedback 
was successfully compensated for by the automatic control system throughout the test 
duration. The disaster started when an emergency shutdown procedure, called SCRAM 
(Safety Control Rod Axe Man), was initiated. This standard procedure inserted control 
rods into the core to quickly stop the reaction. There was a major flaw in Chernobyl’s 
control rod design, with the result that for the first few seconds after the control rods 
were inserted, reactivity increased rather than decreased. The combination of positive 
void coefficient and a flawed control rod design led to a rapid power surge which de-
stroyed the reactor within seconds. Violent fires and explosions expelled tons of highly 
radioactive material into the environment. Two operators were killed in the explosions 
and another twenty-eight emergency workers died within three months owing to acute 
radiation poisoning. About four thousand cases of radiation-exposure-related thyroid 
cancers were diagnosed in the affected population. A much larger number of people 
were psychologically affected. The Chernobyl disaster was unique in the sense that its 
flawed design was not adopted anywhere in the West. However, the demonstration of a 
lax safety culture and poor crisis management during the event resulted in severe dam-
age to the reputation of nuclear power, leading to decades of stagnation in the nuclear 
power industry.
7.5.3. Fukushima, 2011
At 2:46 p.m. on March 11, 2011, a major earthquake of magnitude 9.0 hit the east coast 
of Japan. The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant was located about 180 kilometers 
south of the epicenter. The nuclear plant had six reactor units. Units 1, 2, and 3 were 
operating when the earthquake hit, however all were successfully shut down. Units 4, 5, 
and 6 were not in service at the time of the quake. These reactors received no physical 
damage from the earthquake, even though its intensity exceeded the plant design limit. 
Since the earthquake also disabled the external electricity supply to the power plant, 
back up on-site generators, located in the basement of the reactor buildings, started 
automatically to operate the residual heat removal system. About fifty minutes after the 
earthquake, a major tsunami of up to fifteen meters in height arrived. 
All nuclear power plants located along the coastline are required to implement 
tsunami countermeasures. However, the one in Daiichi was only able to handle tsu-
namis of up to 5.7 meters in height. This standard was established in the 1960s based 
on limited scientific data regarding the likelihood of super tsunamis and earthquakes. 
The tsunami submerged the basements of the plant and caused many critical safety 
Tsoukalas, Gao, and Coyle180
components to malfunction, including sea water pumps, diesel power generators, and 
batteries. Without heat sinks, the core temperature rose and water vaporized. Emer-
gency workers tried to restore cooling capability but without sufficient power supply 
and lacking essential equipment, their efforts were not effective. A few hours later, the 
cladding of the fuel elements was damaged due to high heat and the nuclear fuel was 
exposed, releasing radioactive substances to the atmosphere. Hot steam interacted with 
zirconium cladding and produced hydrogen, igniting hydrogen explosions inside the 
containment buildings. 
The recovery was a lengthy process: it took months to achieve cool shutdown con-
ditions. No casualties were reported relating to the nuclear accident but radioactive ma-
terial released to the air and water posed great environmental and health concerns. The 
exact impact, however, will not be available until more data has been accumulated. The 
Fukushima accident has forced a reconsideration of the required safety standards for 
nuclear power plants. Rare events do occur in nature and safety measures and protocol 
must be continually updated.
7.6. Challenges in Nuclear Waste Management
Handling the spent fuel (waste) discharged from a nuclear reactor is a rather compli-
cated issue. Highly radioactive material generated from nuclear fissions poses serious 
health and environmental threats if not managed properly. A typical 1 GMWe (1,000 
MWe) nuclear reactor produces about twenty-seven tonnes of spent fuel annually. From 
a technical viewpoint this translates to a relatively small volume of waste material, how-
ever political and environmental considerations have had great impact on the problem.
There are two possible options for handling these spent fuels: either through direct 
disposal or via recycling. The United States, Canada and a number of other countries 
Figure 7.7. Spent Fuel Inventory as of the End of 2007.8 
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have chosen the direct disposal approach. Nuclear spent fuels are treated as waste im-
mediately after they are removed from the reactor. Eventually the waste is buried, as 
is, deep underground. Other countries, including the UK and France have chosen to 
recycle. This is a preferable solution both from an economic and environmental concern 
viewpoint. About ninety-seven percent of the material could potentially be recovered 
from the spent fuel and reused in the production of fresh fuels. The remaining three 
percent of high level waste must be vitrified and permanently buried.
The inventory of nuclear spent fuels will vary depending on the generation capacity 
and waste management approach of a particular country. An indication of the global 
nuclear spent fuel inventory by country at the end of 2007 is shown in Figure 7.7. The 
USA and Canada are the two largest holders of spent fuel.
Multiple layers of protection are designed to safely dispose high level nuclear 
waste material. The waste is first solidified in an insoluble matrix such as boro-
silicate glass and then sealed inside stainless canisters. The canisters are further 
surrounded by clay to prevent ground water penetration before they are put into a 
deep underground repository site. Although these protective measures should be 
adequate in reliably isolating nuclear waste from the environment for a long pe-
riod of time (typically one hundred thousand to one million years), lack of absolute 
confidence in the technology still prevails in the general public persona, resulting 
in strong resistance to siting waste repositories in community localities. Proposed 
projects are often delayed or abandoned. Thus far, no geological repository has been 
licensed for retaining of civilian nuclear wastes. Dry cask storage has often been 
implemented as a temporary storage solution, in the hope of a more permanent 
solution being agreed upon going forward. Currently, spent fuels are stored in can-
isters and surrounded by heavy reinforced concrete walls. Dry-cask storage is a rel-
atively inexpensive solution but as the volume of the stockpile increases the security 
threat is also augmented accordingly.
The Nuclear Waste Policy Act passed by the United States Congress in 19829  
required the Department of Energy to identify and construct an underground facil-
ity for permanent storage of high level nuclear waste. Initially Yucca Mountain was 
selected as one of three candidate sites and the US congress commissioned a thor-
ough evaluation study of the site in 1987. The proposed site is located in Nevada, 
120 kilometers northwest of Las Vegas. The Yucca repository is a deep underground 
facility, about 350 meters below surface level, with capacity to accommodate more 
than 63,000 tonnes of spent fuel. It was scheduled to receive spent fuels by 1998. 
In spite of the fact that the Yucca Mountain project was thoroughly studied dating 
back to 1978, debates and counter-debates on project efficacy were never success-
fully resolved or agreed upon. One of the central issues is whether the facility is 
environmentally safe and would remain so for up to 1 million years. Following 
many delays, the project was officially terminated in 2011. The failure of the Yucca 
Mountain project has not just been excessively costly but has also left the US in a 
very difficult situation, lacking long term storage for the country’s nuclear waste 
into the foreseeable future.
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7.7. Future Role for Nuclear Power
Awareness and understanding of both the historical and contemporary contexts of nu-
clear power are essential inputs to any attempt to answer questions regarding the future 
of nuclear power: will it rebound as an important source of energy or will nuclear en-
ergy be gradually phased out? In endeavoring to answer this question a number of vari-
ables need to be considered. These include the global future energy outlook, innovation 
in nuclear technological developments, and public acceptance or non-acceptance of nu-
clear energy. These variables are somewhat interdependent and resolution and decision 
making is a subjective process. In this section we consider the variables independently. 
We also encourage the reader to independently consider the issues and to participate in 
a much required public debate on this important topic.
Global Energy Outlook is largely shaped by two parameters: energy security and 
climate change. Energy security addresses the availability of resources. Currently fossil 
fuels such as oil, gas, and coal comprise about eighty percent of world total energy use, 
servicing transportation, electricity generation, industry, and the residential and com-
mercial built environment. As noted in Chapter 1, abundant and easy access to these 
resources has supported unprecedented growth rates of human civilization for more 
than a century. The presumption that these resources remain abundant has changed 
since 2005 when global petroleum production became inelastic with respect to prices, 
indicating that conventional oil production had plateaued and will begin to decline. In 
“oil’s tipping point has passed” Murray and King argue that the oil market has “tipped 
into a new state; production is now inelastic, unable to respond to rising demand, and 
leading to wild price swings.”10 The study reveals that while production of crude oil 
increased to meet demand between 1988 and 2005, since that time production has been 
roughly constant, despite an increase in price of around fifteen percent per year. The 
harnessing of available oil reserves is also proving more costly and difficult, contrib-
uting to the tail-off in levels of production. Furthermore, nearly seventy percent of the 
world’s remaining conventional oil reserves are located in five Persian Gulf countries.
Recent studies also suggest that coal supplies are less abundant than previously be-
lieved. Over reliance on fossil fuels, high concentration of resources and declining sup-
ply create great concerns in respect of security and availability of energy supply. Energy 
Watch indicate that US coal production peaked in 2002 and that world coal production 
is projected to peak by 2030.11 Supplies of natural gas are abundant and offer the best 
production potential of the fossil-fuels coal, oil and gas. Recent discoveries include sig-
nificant finds in Israel and Mozambique. Twenty-five percent of electricity generation in 
the United States is supplied by natural gas power plants. Although production of conven-
tional natural gas in North America peaked in 2001,12 recent years have seen the rise in 
hydraulic fracturing of shale rock as a new means of further exploitation of natural gas, 
with significant potential finds both in the US and in many other countries. While frack-
ing offers significant promise in non-conventional natural gas exploration, it also carries 
environmental concerns, in particular relating to stress on surface-water and ground- 
water supplies. Air pollution owing to volatile organic compounds and other hazardous 
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compounds are also of environmental concern.13 There is also controversy surrounding 
the quantity and abundance of supply required to meet demand going forward.14
Climate change will increasingly factor into the determination of the future role 
for nuclear energy in national grids. Accepting that greenhouse gases are a major con-
tributing factor to global warming, in endeavoring to avoid catastrophic consequences 
to the ecosystem resulting from warmer climate, it is imperative that enhanced efforts 
be made toward limiting the rate and pace of average global temperature increase. As 
discussed earlier in this book, the Kyoto Protocol has set goals to limit temperature rise 
to not greater than two degrees Celsius above preindustrial levels. To achieve this objec-
tive an aggressive shift from the use of carbon-emitting resources to generate energy is 
required. Whether such a shift is possible through introduction of renewable, non-car-
bon emitting fuel sources alone, is highly questionable. It is therefore essential that a 
wider role for nuclear energy be discussed between nuclear energy scientists, policy 
makers and within the broader public domain. Security of energy supply is an equally 
challenging and deterministic input to this debate. Energy security arguments suggest 
that reductions in  fossil-based energy resources, which can require transportation over 
several thousand kilometers across land and sea boundaries, could help address over-
dependence and inefficiency, factors that would have significant economic and social 
implications.
Technological innovations in reactor design will be key to the future role for nu-
clear power. Evolutionary new reactor designs have made nuclear power safer and more 
cost-effective to currently operating plants. The adoption of advanced fuel cycle tech-
nologies will greatly relieve the pressure of waste disposal and make nuclear power a 
virtually sustainable resource.
7.7.1. advanced Reactors to Improve Safety and Efficiency
Since the introduction of nuclear reactors in the 1950s there have been four generations 
of innovation in reactor design. The first generation (I) was the early prototype reactor, 
developed during the 1950s and 1960s as a proof of concept design. The majority of 
commercial nuclear power reactors that are currently in operation belong to the sec-
ond-generation (II), designed to be economical and reliable for large scale generation. 
Many of these reactors are nearing the end of their operational lives and will be re-
placed by generation III/III+ reactors, now mature following decades of research and 
innovation. By using state-of-the-art technologies through incorporation of over fifty 
years of experience, the new generation of reactors offers a major upgrade in terms 
of energy efficiency and operational safety. The new reactor plants are certified to op-
erate for sixty years. Older power reactors were designed to operate for forty years.15 
The new generation reactors will possess higher thermal efficiency as they operate at 
higher temperatures. The new reactors also feature standardized and modular designs, 
a major improvement which will be beneficial in expediting licensing procedures and 
reducing construction costs. Advanced reactors are more robust and less complicated in 
structure, with fewer components facilitating operation and maintenance. Most appeal-
ingly, a feature of some new reactors is the adoption of passive safety systems and other 
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inherent safety features, representing a major leap over the old reactors that rely on 
active residual heat removal systems. New designs use passive safety features such as 
gravity, providing natural circulation which helps to stabilize reactors and to keep them 
intact in the event of an emergency for an extended period of time (up to seventy-two 
hours), during which external resources can be arranged and put into operation. With 
such passive safety systems in place, a catastrophic event such as the Fukushima acci-
dent could be avoided.
These emerging generation reactors may also be used to produce hydrogen eco-
nomically. This will be of particular benefit as a transportation fuel, an industry which 
currently consumes more than forty percent of global petroleum supplies. If hydrogen 
can replace petroleum in transportation, reliance on petroleum will be greatly reduced. 
This will in turn enable significant reductions in greenhouse gases emissions. A further 
attractive feature of some generation IV reactors is that they operate a closed fuel cycle: 
they can burn nuclear waste. Nuclear waste produced from generation II/III reactors 
can be fed as fuel to generation IV reactors, reducing the burden on waste management.
7.7.2. Closed Fuel Cycle to Increase Uranium Utilization and  
Reduce Uranium Proliferation Risk
The simple once-through fuel cycle utilizes less than one percent of available uranium; 
proposed advanced once-through systems will utilize less than two percent uranium. 
This severe underutilization of uranium gives rise to two major problems: cost efficiency 
and waste management. Sources of uranium, like petroleum, are limited on earth. If 
uranium continues to be used with such poor efficiency, the current known sources will 
be depleted within one hundred years. Although further exploration may result in the 
discovery of new resources, a more reliable and desirable solution would be to improve 
utilization efficiency. Underutilization also leads to higher volumes of nuclear waste 
which requires treatment and safe storage. Some radioactive actinides have very long 
half-lives and need to be safely stored for over ten thousand years. Finding a place for 
this purpose is extremely difficult, as we have learned from the Yucca Mountain Project.
Scientists and engineers are working on a more promising and preferable solution, 
that of nuclear waste recycling. Recycling could solve two problems at once, through 
achieving much higher utilization efficiency and producing significantly less quantities 
of radioactive waste to be disposed. The most mature recycling technique currently 
available is through using fast reactors. Fast reactors use fast neutrons rather than ther-
mal neutrons to sustain chain reactions. Using fast neutrons presents a great technical 
challenge in reactor design since fast neutrons are difficult to capture by fissionable 
nuclei. Construction costs are also high making them an unattractive economic prop-
osition at the current time. However, should scientists and engineers succeed in mas-
tering the technological challenges while reducing implementation costs, fast reactors 
will be very attractive, possessing a number of unique features. Fast neutrons have the 
ability to split the problematic long-lived actinides and transmute them to isotopes with 
manageable half-lives of typically hundreds, rather than millions of years. A further 
advantageous feature of fast reactors is that they can become breeder reactors; they can 
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be used to produce fuel while generating power. Through incorporation of these fea-
tures, closed fuel cycle reactors would be achievable, with many generation IV reactors 
operating as fast reactors.
7.8. Social Engagement
Public acceptance is vitally important for successful deployment of new technologies in 
the energy and industrial processing sectors. In respect of nuclear power acceptance is 
of even greater import. For technologies such as coal, wind and solar, risks and benefits 
have been well aired and are quite well understood, with mixed reaction and public ac-
ceptance. A consensus does not exist regarding the risks associated with nuclear power, 
there is widespread public anxiety relating to radiation risk and to the management of 
nuclear waste. Building on this chapter’s earlier discussion about nuclear accidents, it 
is understandable that concerns can have an overriding bearing on acceptance of nu-
clear energy, adding to the complexity in development and implementation of required 
solutions.
7.8.1. Radiation Risk
Fear of radiation in the public mindset is well founded, not least as a result of the dra-
matic effects of nuclear radiation which resulted from the bombing of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki at the end of World War II. Radiation can kill cells and can incur inadvertent 
changes to DNA structure. The degree of damage to the human body relates on the dose 
the body has been subjected to. The effective dose received by a human being is mea-
sured using the Sievert (Sv) unit. Exposure to high a dose of radiation (more than three 
Sievert) over a short period of time can result in acute radiation sickness and can indeed 
be fatal. In the 1986 Chernobyl accident, 134 emergency workers were subjected to an 
extremely high radiation dose (between 800 and 16,000 milliSievert). Twenty-eight of 
these workers died from radiation sickness within months of the accident. These losses 
could have been significantly reduced had the radiation measurement equipment been 
operational. False readings from the faulty equipment had misled the emergency work-
ers into believing the reactor was intact and the plant safe.
Potential long-term health problems resulting from low-level radiation include can-
cers and other heritable diseases. The International Commission on Radiation Protec-
tion suggests that the chance of developing a cancer increases by 5.5% for every Sievert 
(Sv) exposure and by 0.2% for heritable effects. These figures have been extrapolated 
from high-level dose observations and their validity to low-level dose equivalence may 
not have direct correlation. It is believed that less than 100 mSv over a long period of 
several years poses no measurable health effects. For a period of twenty years (1986–
2005) following the Chernobyl accident, more than five million people lived in the con-
taminated area, and were subject to doses of ten to fifty mSv. Citizen health status was 
closely monitored by international agency organizations during this time. The Cher-
nobyl Forum, organized by agencies including IAEA, WHO, and the UN, and with in-
put from three countries directly affected by the Chernobyl disaster, Belarus, Ukraine, 
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and Russia, published their most recent findings in 2005. They concluded that no mea-
surable increase was found in incidence of radiation-induced leukemia or solid can-
cers, other than thyroid cancer. The thyroid gland accumulates radioactive ioline-131 
from the food stream, making it vulnerable to radiation exposure. Fortunately, thyroid 
cancer is a treatable disease. Following the recent Fukushima accident, a preliminary 
report published by WHO in 2012 estimated that people residing in the contaminated 
zone received radiation doses of between ten to fifty mSv. The long term health effects 
resulting from this exposure may or may not be observable but will necessitate a long 
time frame to carry out observations, analyses, and publication of consequential re-
sults. Health effects resulting from low-level dose radiation exposure can be difficult 
to measure owing to many interrelated concurring factors. For example, about forty 
percent of the general population will eventually develop cancers regardless of exposure 
to radiation during their lifetime. Small percentages of radiation-related superimposed 
cancers, if any, can therefore be difficult to measure and quantify. It is also important 
to note that the human body has its own defense system that may repair some minor 
damage caused by low level radiation, thus minimizing and masking its effect. More 
scientific data is needed in order to establish a guideline for low level radiation risk. 
Such studies are imperative to building public confidence and to establishing proper 
evacuation zones should accidents happen.
It is also important to point out that the above figures typify worst case scenarios. 
On average, if one happens to reside in the near vicinity of a nuclear power plant, re-
sulting radiation doses of typically less than 0.1 mSv per annum will add to the 2.4 mSv 
dose accruing as a result of natural sources, and is not considered a sizable increase.
7.8.2. Change of Nuclear Energy Culture
The nuclear power community also bears responsibility for lack of public acceptance of 
nuclear energy. Failure to engage with the public in providing relevant information can 
result in failure, no matter how technically sound and safe a new innovation may be. 
The Yucca Mountain Project is a typical example where technical decisions were over-
ruled by political expediency, due to lack of sufficient public support. A thorough study 
of the Yucca Mountain project was carried out and the project was highly commended 
from a technical viewpoint. However, a lack of strong support from local residents and 
state government, combined with political and financial uncertainties, made project 
survival very difficult. In contrast, the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in the state 
of New Mexico, a geologic repository for military radioactive waste, was successfully 
received by the local community. This was achieved through committed public engage-
ment, resulting in strong support from all sectors. This example indicates that through 
appropriate engagement and information viewpoint exchange, public opinion can sway 
in favor of high priority energy installations.
Unfortunately transparency and openness has not always been the hallmark, and 
this invariably has damaged the reputation and credibility of nuclear power. The gen-
eral public in the Soviet Union was not informed of the Chernobyl accident until two 
days post the initial plant disaster. Evacuation of the nearby city of Pripyat did not 
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commence until thirty-six hours after the accident. Evacuees were informed that the 
clean-up would last only a few days. Poor management of the crisis and the release of 
false information resulted in severe damage to public confidence in nuclear power, both 
regionally and throughout the world.
Initiating change in nuclear culture toward a more open forum of engagement and 
discussion is complex owing to the necessity of striking a balance to the need for secur-
ing sensitive and confidential information. Information which may be shared and that 
which may not can form sensitive boundaries, with decisions which can have signifi-
cant consequence. At Fukushima, initially some vital plant information was not avail-
able to the emergency work force, because the utility deemed it sensitive. The lack of 
information delayed the rescue efforts and was one of factors which contributed to the 
escalation of the tragic event.
An important question remains: what is the financial outlay for a nuclear reactor? 
Costing nuclear power comprises four major components: construction, operation, waste 
disposal, and plant decommission. Waste disposal and decommission costs are normally 
calculated into the generation cost, comprising only a small fraction of the total when 
compared to construction cost. The real cost of constructing a new nuclear plant is a hot 
topic of debate. Various estimates in overall cost invariably arise and have a tendency 
to change rapidly over time. The estimated overall per unit construction cost in the US 
in 2003 was approximately $2,000/kWe. This increased to $4,000/kWe by 2009. Based 
on these numbers, the overall cost of nuclear power today has increased to $84/MWh, 
exceeding that of coal ($62/MWh) and gas ($65/MWh). At first glance, in terms of cost 
analysis the future looks pessimistic for nuclear power. However, a closer examination 
will reveal that the majority of the cost surge is the result of regulation changes, on ac-
count of public resistance and political intervention. For example, the next generation 
French reactor, Flamanville 3, experienced repeated delays with resulting cost increase 
of more than two billion euro. Much of the additional costs incurred are a result of de-
sign modifications requested to comply with stricter safety regulations which have been 
stipulated post the Fukushima accident. The Shoreham nuclear power plant located in 
Long Island, New York, is another example of how nuclear power can become expensive. 
Construction commenced in 1973 and was projected for completion in 1979. The initial 
cost was estimated at $217 million. During construction however additional regulation 
requirements were established, necessitating significant design changes which resulted 
in ensuing project delay. The plant construction was finally completed in 1984. Unfortu-
nately the most costly delays were just about to begin. The Three Mile Island accident in 
1979 and the Chernobyl accident in 1986 altered public opinion to nuclear power, making 
it very difficult for the newly built plant to obtain an operating license. As a result the 
Shoreham plant never came into operation and the project was finally abandoned in 1989. 
The final cost exceeded six billion US dollars. This constituted excessive and unnecessary 
cost inflation, and ultimate waste of public and private funding. Such waste may be miti-
gated going forward by movement to modular plant design and construction.
In evaluating the future potential for nuclear power it is also necessary to consider 
the competing technologies. In order to replace conventional coal, oil and natural gas, 
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the principal competitors to nuclear energy are hydro, wind and solar. Hydro is capa-
ble of providing clean, reliable base-load energy; however its availability is confined 
by location. Solar is currently expensive and may not be feasible for widespread uti-
lization in the near future. Wind power is relatively cheap, estimated at between $70/
KWh and $120/KWh, which is on par with nuclear power. Cost will continue to drop 
as technology improves and the industry matures. However, important as wind, solar 
and other alternative renewable energy sources are, owing to intermittency and scale 
it is unlikely they will succeed as base-load providers. In maintaining balance between 
generation and consumption, power grids rely on certainty of supply. A small amount 
of uncertainty can be offset by other reliable resources, such as through use of coal and 
natural gas. Should the share of wind power increase to significant levels, some major 
innovations must be introduced to the power grid in order to handle the associated 
uncertainty of supply.
Risk is an intrinsic parameter in characterizing a particular option. Using nuclear 
power presents a risk. Risk also presents if opting to abandon deployment of nuclear 
energy. We may consider recent developments in Germany by way of example. Shortly 
after the Fukushima disaster, Germany announced the abandonment of its nuclear pro-
grams, with immediate shutdown of eight reactors and the phased shutdown of the 
remaining nine reactors by 2022. The share of nuclear generated electricity dropped 
from twenty-three to seventeen percent while renewables increased from twenty to 
twenty-five percent. A consequence of this motion is that consumers will be required to 
pay €250 per household to sponsor cleaner energy. Over thirty billion euros of invest-
ment is also needed over the next two decades to build more power lines to transmit 
and deliver the electricity generated from renewables, such as offshore wind turbines. 
However, wind is an intermittent resource, and thus the construction of a new supple-
mentary power plant will be required to meet the power deficit requirement. This will 
present challenges to the country in its ability to cut carbon emissions by forty percent 
of 1990 levels by 2020, however Germany has shown innovation and has been an exem-
plar country in renewable technology development and grid connection. Neighboring 
countries to Germany, in particular France and the Czech Republic generate a major 
portion of their electricity from nuclear power, hence buying and selling between coun-
tries may require import of nuclear sourced energy. This fact introduces some complex 
dynamics into energy and climate policy with respect to national vs. economic trading 
bloc priorities. 
7.9. Future for Nuclear Fusion
The atomic reaction in nuclear fusion is different from nuclear fission; in fusion two light 
atomic nuclei fuse to form a heavier nucleus and in so doing a large amount of energy 
is released. Research in fusion is the domain of plasma physics and is sometimes con-
sidered a holy grail in the search for future energy provision. From early twentieth cen-
tury scientific experimentations to the present day, research has continued to endeavor 
to perfect the capture of energy transfer via nuclear fusion. A Tokamak, devised by 
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Russian physicists Igor Tamm and Andrei Sakharov in the 1950s, is a magnetic device 
that contains a plasma in the shape of a torus, and which remains central to research 
in nuclear plasma physics to this day. Today, the International Thermonuclear Exper-
imental Reactor (ITER) project is comprised of an international research consortium 
with objective to build the world’s largest experimental tokamak nuclear fusion reactor. 
In the process fusion between deuterium and tritium (D-T) will produce one helium 
nucleus, one neutron and excess energy. The aim is to complete the transition from 
experimental studies in plasma physics to electricity generating fusion power plants.
The timeline toward achieving these goals however remains relatively long term; 
the first demonstration of electricity production is not expected for thirty years. In ad-
dition, as with current day fission power generation, safety and waste management will 
be of paramount importance to nuclear fusion power generation. It is important that 
support is maintained for ITER and related research projects in the expectation that 
experimental physics, material science and engineering practice will combine to enable 
development of a mature and reliable fusion energy future.16
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Chapter 8
Taking Emerging Renewable Technologies to Market
mEliSSa daRk, jEnny daughERty,  
PEtER CamPbEll, and William gRimSon
abstract
This chapter sets out to demonstrate that introducing renewable energy sources into an 
existing market is a complex socio-techno-economic challenge. The important role that 
competition plays is reviewed in the context of demand and the number of suppliers: 
too few can result in the market being difficult to penetrate. The cost of switching tech-
nologies is very relevant to taking advantage of renewable energy sources; for example 
the electrical supply networks would need considerable augmentation. The role of reg-
ulatory frameworks, the distinction between inducements and mandates are discussed 
and consideration is given to the type of political systems in place where renewable 
technologies are being adopted. The nature of the social dimension is stressed where it 
is noted that different countries react in different ways to the promotion of new tech-
nologies. A key concept, levelized cost, is used to compare the economics of a range of 
energy sources. Levelized costs take into account the cost of a kilowatt-hour (kWhr) in 
terms of both initial construction of the system and the recurring operating costs over 
its financial life. The question of reliability and maintainability is stressed, in particular 
with respect to offshore wind energy systems where costs are currently relatively high. 
However the technical learning that comes with exploiting offshore wave energy is, over 
time, expected to moderate the levelized costs. In turn, this is seen as a driver to vari-
ous initiatives by which governments seek to promote such technologies and encourage 
much needed venture capital.
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8.1. Introduction
This chapter provides a brief overview of various economic, political, social, and main-
tainability factors that influence bringing technologies to market. In order to illustrate 
the interactions among social, technical, and economic systems, a few salient aspects of 
these systems are elaborated as a way of laying a foundation for a more detailed account 
focused on wave energy. Furthermore, all factors are endogenous, meaning that 1) these 
factors are all a part of the environment or system in which a technology is brought to 
market, and 2) the value of these factors is determined by the states of other variables in 
the system. The multiple interactions and impacts of these factors on bringing a tech-
nology to market are beyond the scope of this chapter. Instead of an exhaustive treat-
ment, we offer a few critical ideas with illustrations in hopes that we provide sufficient 
grounding for readers to extend their thinking with regard to the topic.
8.2. Economic Factors
All technologies encounter prevailing market conditions, which influence whether or 
not the technology comes to market, how, when, by whom, and where. Prevailing mar-
ket conditions are factors such as the number of competitors, the nature and intensity of 
competitiveness, the market’s growth rate, and so on. The competitors within a market 
are the persons or firms that offer a similar product or service. Competition in a market 
is generally viewed as socially desirable because it requires companies to make efficient 
use of their resources in order to reduce costs.
All markets can be said to have a competitive structure that affects bringing a new 
technology to market. The competitive structure of a market refers to the current state 
of the market with regard to several interrelated factors: 1) the number of competitors 
in the market; 2) the relative strength of these competitors; 3) the level of demand for 
the technology and the existing supply; and 4) the ease of entry into the market. There 
are several known obstacles that can make it difficult to enter a market with a new 
technology, and the more barriers to entry there are, the stronger the position for the 
incumbents. For example, a market that is occupied by a couple of dominant firms that 
have economy of scale advantages can be difficult to penetrate. Incumbent firms usually 
have favorable access to resources, existing supply and distribution chains, and “know 
how” that positions them strongly for holding onto and growing market share. Another 
barrier to entry is capital (equipment, buildings, or raw materials) investment. Gener-
ally speaking, as the needed investment in capital increases, it becomes more difficult 
to take a new technology to market. A third barrier to entry is strong brand recogni-
tion and customer loyalty among the existing competitors. A product or service that is 
established in the market and known to provide a given value for the price paid has a 
distinct advantage over a new product whose price-value proposition is uncertain. 
A fourth possible barrier to entering a market with a new technology is switching 
costs. Switching costs are the costs incurred with switching from one product to the 
next. For instance, the potential costs to switch from gasoline powered to electric ve-
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hicles (EVs) would include producing an infrastructure of charging stations to support 
the fleet of EVs. As with many new technologies, there is the familiar chicken-or-the-
egg phenomenon. The market needs to produce more charging stations in order to en-
courage more drivers to drive EVs. At the same time, the market needs to see more EVs 
on the road in order to build more charging stations. Switching costs can go beyond 
installation and startup costs to include search costs, that is, the costs associated with 
searching for and learning about the new technology, as well as fees to exit a market, for 
instance, the costs to disassemble the infrastructure built to sell gasoline for cars. A fifth 
potential barrier to entering a market is network effects. Network effects arise in cases 
where the value of a product increases as the number of users increase. This is often 
the case with information technology products and services where the value an indi-
vidual derives from a product arises both from their own personal use as well as from 
the usage of others. In cases of network effects, consumers are reluctant to switch one 
product because of the consequent effects on the other products/services in the network 
that they enjoy and rely on. Finally, tariffs and government regulations can prevent or 
delay entry into a market by protecting the existing technology or failing to incentivize 
the development and/or adoption of the new technology, which we discuss again in the 
section on social factors.
The competitive intensity of a market has been characterized by Porter as including 
five factors.1 While many of these factors are similar to the barriers to entry already men-
tioned, Porter offers elaboration that is useful and worth repeating. These are: 1) the threat 
of substitute products or services; 2) the threat of established rivals; 3) the threat for new 
entrants; 4) the bargaining power of suppliers; and 5) the bargaining power of consumers. 
The threats to substitute products that prohibit or constrain bringing a new technology 
to market arise from buyers’ propensity to substitute products, the relative price of the 
substitute to the incumbent product/service, the number of substitute products, the ease 
of substitution, associated switching costs, and perceived differentiation. The threat of 
established rivals refers to the competitive struggle for market share among firms in an in-
dustry where increased rivalry among established firms leads to stronger threats to prof-
itability. The strength of rivalry among established firms within an industry stems from 
the extent of exit barriers, the amount of fixed costs, the presence of global customers, the 
growth rate of the industry, the demand for the new product, and the possible absence of 
switching costs. The threat for new entries comprises the risk to the entrant to get into 
a market and includes patents (which essentially block new entries for a time period), 
brand equity and customer loyalty, switching costs, sunk costs and capital requirements, 
access to distribution, and absolute cost. The bargaining power of consumers is the ability 
of consumers to exert pressure, often through price, on the firm(s) attempting to enter 
with new technology. Several factors influence consumer bargaining power including the 
ratio of buyer concentration to firm concentration, buyer switching costs relative to firm 
switching costs, buyer information availability, price sensitivity among buyers, and the 
availability of substitute products with differential advantage. The fifth and final threat 
category in the Porter model is the bargaining power of the suppliers. Suppliers can in-
crease the cost of inputs to the product/service; the presence of substitute inputs will affect 
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the bargaining power of suppliers, as will the differentiation of the inputs. If the inputs 
from a given supplier are more costly, but result in a differential product that consumers 
will buy, such that switching costs are also justified, entry of the technology into the mar-
ket is more likely.
8.3. Political Factors
Intersecting the myriad of economic factors, political factors also influence bringing 
a new technology to market and the deployment of technology in the market. We can 
think about these political factors as having direct and/or enabling (or disabling as the 
case may be) effects. A full treatment of how political factors affect bringing a technol-
ogy to market is beyond the scope of this chapter and book; we will focus on describing 
two factors with examples that illustrate how the factor affects marketization. The two 
political factors we address are 1) issues that deal with the structure or affairs of govern-
ment, and 2) particular policies, laws, or regulations. Both political structure and the 
policies and laws enacted by a government can lead to either an enabling or constrain-
ing environment. And political structures have implications for the types of policies 
and laws that may be enacted.
What do we mean by a political structure? Political structure refers to groups, such 
as political parties, lobbying groups, and institutions; it includes the presence or absence 
of, and nature of: the judicial, legislative, and executive systems. Political structure also 
refers to the relation of these groups to each other, and their patterns of interaction 
within the political system. These factors will vary across different political structures, 
their relation to each other, and their patterns of interaction over time influence the 
laws, regulations, and norms present in the political system. These variations matter in 
bringing technologies to market and in enacting policies and laws that enable or con-
strain bringing technologies to market.
One very clear example of different groups and their relation to each other is 
non-federalist versus federalist governments. The two primary types of non-federalist 
political structures are unitary political systems and confederate political systems. A 
unitary system is a system of political organization in which most or all of the govern-
ing power resides in a centralized government, which delegates authority to subnational 
units and channels policy decisions down to them for implementation. There are many 
examples of unitary political systems, including Bolivia, Chile, Egypt, Ireland, France, 
the People’s Republic of China, and Vietnam. And while there are several nation states 
that have unitary political systems, they vary greatly.
A confederate government is the type of government where the power rests with 
the local entities, which dictates directives to the national government; the confed-
erate government can only do what the confederation allows it to do. In this system, 
there is little central political control and power is very diffuse. Confederate govern-
ment powers are often in the areas of defense and foreign commerce. Two current 
day examples of confederate political systems are Canada and the European Union. 
Energy policy in Canada’s confederation is interesting and illustrative. Jurisdiction 
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over energy resources is divided between the federal, provincial, and territorial gov-
ernments. Canada’s national government has authority regarding the regulation of 
inter-provincial and international trade and commerce, which has implications for 
energy, as well as the management of non-renewable resources on federal lands. The 
provinces control the exploration, development, conservation, and management of 
non-renewable resources, as well as the generation and production of electricity. As a 
result, Canada’s national government must coordinate its energy policies with those 
of the provincial governments without any guarantee of success and little power to 
issue mandates. A case in point is Canada’s participation in the Kyoto Protocol. While 
the national government of Canada had the authority to sign the Kyoto Protocol, the 
brunt of implementing the legislation fell to the provinces given their control over 
energy resources and consumption. The greenhouse gas reduction targets for Canada 
in the treaty remained an unrealized dream due in large part to Canada’s confederate 
political structure. The national government in Canada reduced funding for Canada’s 
climate change plan and cut most of Canada’s climate change programs, including 
successful programs like the Wind Power Production Incentive, which subsidizes 
the installation of wind power, and Energuide for Houses, which gives incentives for 
Canadians to make their homes more energy efficient.
In a federalist political structure, the powers of government are divided between 
the national (federal) government and state and local governments. Certain powers are 
delegated to the national government, and all other powers are reserved by the states or 
the people. A case in point is the US system, which is federalist; a fact that has signifi-
cant implications on our views toward and use of energy both regionally and nationally. 
In the US, the states rather than the federal government hold important authority for 
planning energy system expansions, siting energy facilities and regulating energy fa-
cilities and transmission. States control important policy decisions that affect bringing 
energy technologies to markets. A supplier looking to bring a new technology to market 
may have to deal with fifty different state positions. The complexity of this for a supplier 
should be fairly obvious. Furthermore, it should be noted that such a company is facing 
several other possible barriers to entry described in the previous section. The states’ 
role in energy policy in the United States is particularly important for wind power. Ac-
cording to Wilson and Stephens, state-level authority has had huge implications when 
it comes to bringing wind technology to market. Sixty-five percent of all turbines in-
stalled in 2008 were in just six states (TX, CA, IA, MN, WA, and OR), yet the Great 
Plains states (ND, SD, and NE) have both some of the nation’s greatest wind resource 
potential and installed wind power capacity of only four percent of the national total.2 
In a unitary system, the policies would be enacted at the national level and passed down 
to the local level for implementation.
Within similar political systems, policy development, implementation and out-
comes can vary greatly for numerous reasons. Some of the factors that shape the policy 
agenda, which in turn affects bringing technologies to market include: the nature of 
relationships and the patterns of interaction among the institutions (federal, state, lo-
cal), government stability, public trust in government, consumerism, and the political 
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agenda toward the market economy. What is important to keep in mind is that while 
societies are complex and dynamic systems, and no two are identical, the structure of 
the government will impact policy, which in turn will impact if and how energy tech-
nologies are brought to market. In a recent analysis, Shobe and Burtraw found that 
“the design and implementation of climate policy in a federal union will diverge in 
important ways from policy design in a unitary government. National climate policies 
built on the assumption of a unitary model of governance are unlikely to achieve the 
expected outcome because of interactions with policy choices made at the sub-national 
level.”3 These interactions could be many. For example, whereas a unitary government 
is better positioned to enact international agreements, a federalist system is argued to 
be closer to people, the locus of their needs, and therefore more responsive and unique 
in solutions for attacking social, economic, and political problems.
All political structures, regardless of type, create policy instruments (laws and reg-
ulations) to tackle social problems. The political structure impacts the types of policy 
instruments that are realized, which in turn impacts if and how new technologies are 
brought to market. Successful policies are successful in a context, that is, a political 
structure. Policies that lead to increased energy security, growth of domestic economic 
activity, and environmental benefits in one context, may lead to high energy prices, 
perverse incentives, and public dissatisfaction with renewable energy technologies in 
another context. This satisfaction and dissatisfaction impacts bringing the technology 
to market. While there are several types of policy instruments, we are only addressing 
the two most common policy instruments: inducements and mandates.
Inducements are some sort of incentive that helps bring about an action or a de-
sired result, such as tax breaks, subsidies, and rebates. Inducements are conditional 
grants of money and are often accompanied by rules to ensure that the money is used 
consistently with policymakers’ intent. Any inducement, regardless of its nature or 
intended objective, is comprised of three main parts: (1) the inducement giver, or the 
person or party offering the incentive; (2) the inducement receiver, who is the target, 
or the individual or entity being offered the inducement; and (3) the inducement or 
incentive itself. Inducements rely on the power of persuasion as opposed to force. And 
while inducements are frequently used policy instruments, their complexity must be 
acknowledged. As policy instruments, the efficacy of inducements is dependent on 
the following factors: 1) the extent that the inducer is willing and able to make good 
on its promise; 2) the degree to which the inducement that is actually provided re-
flects what was offered; and 3) the extent to which the inducement receiver complies 
with responsibilities and obligations present in the agreement made with the inducer. 
Inducements are not really suited to modify behavior in a single episode. Instead, the 
goal of most inducements is to secure ongoing compliance with overarching, long-
range policy goals, and this assumes that the inducement giver is willing and able 
to monitor the inducement receiver over time. Inducements to develop innovations 
often come in the form of a research grant to create the new technology and supply 
the needed resources to do so. Other forms of inducements aimed at stimulating sup-
ply are loans, loan guarantees, tax breaks, free land, etc. Because innovations rarely 
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find ready-made markets, it is often necessary to stimulate or create a market, that 
is, stimulate demand. For example, in the United States, HUD (Housing and Urban 
Development) has several multi-faceted programs that offer incentives to citizens to 
utilize energy-savings techniques. Using a tax break as the inducement, a citizen may 
get a tax break for implementing an energy saving technique, thereby aiming to create 
demand in the market for the technology.
Inducements can be negative as well as positive. Sanctions or fines can be used to 
deter undesired behavior. When the inducement receiver fails to modify the undesired 
behavior, the inducement giver must be willing and able to impose the sanction or pun-
ishment, else the inducement will be ineffective. The cost to enforce the inducement has 
to be carefully considered; it is not socially advantageous when it costs more to enforce 
a sanction than is gained by the diffusion of the technology. However, it is often very 
difficult to quantify these costs and trade-offs.
Mandates are official rules that specify actions to be taken in specific situations or 
contexts, as opposed to incentives (or disincentives) that attempt to stimulate behavior. 
Mandates state that one will do something, whereas incentives ask whether one would 
like to. Regulatory mandates and incentives can produce similar results, but mandates 
generally require no loss of revenue by the government. Generally speaking, mandates 
can be efficient in terms of expenditures; the primary costs of mandates are enforce-
ment costs. Mandates can operate on individual people, organizations, collectives, or 
governments. A few examples of mandates that affect bringing energy technologies to 
market in the United States include: 1) state renewable portfolio standards (RPS) for 
renewable electricity, which require the increased production of energy from renewable 
energy sources, such as wind, solar, biomass, and geothermal; 2) the federal Renewable 
Fuel Standard (RFS), which is a program that requires transportation fuel sold in the US 
to contain a minimum volume of renewable fuels; and 3) California’s Low Carbon Fuel 
Standard regulation that mandates use of an increasing amount of fuels with lowered 
GHG emissions each year in the state. In much the same way as incentives, mandates 
aim to affect supply and demand in bringing a new technology to market.
8.4. Social Factors
Technology can be seen as being influenced and shaped by the societal context within 
which it resides.4 A given technology being adopted by society is not necessarily a pre-
dictable occurrence; the result of a linear process that moves from research and devel-
opment to a commercialized product. The best or most inventive technology does not 
necessarily translate into a technology that is adopted and used by society. A technolo-
gy’s success in the market is not based solely on the technology’s merits or capabilities, 
but is contingent on several factors including the preferences and choices of individuals, 
as well as societal values and norms. Often there is a right time and right place for a 
technology to be picked up by the majority of people within a society. For example, in 
2004, David Cohen’s idea for a social network using mobile phones seemed innovative 
and viable enough for investors so that he could found his company iContact. However, 
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after eighteen months of trying, he was unable to convince phone carriers that his soft-
ware was the next best thing that consumers would be clamoring for; not until Apple’s 
iPhone’s app store hit the market in 2008 would this trend be manifested.5
The social context (the time and place) in which a technology emerges is important 
to its adoption and diffusion. Adoption and diffusion are two concepts that are often 
used to examine the social factors involved in emerging technologies moving from con-
cept to market. The adoption and diffusion of technology is an explanation of how, why, 
and at what time a technology spreads. These terms stem from Rogers’ book entitled 
The Diffusion of Innovations, in which he described diffusion as the process by which 
an innovation develops over time and spreads through a social system.6 Adoption is the 
process an individual undergoes from first hearing about a technology to the point of 
deciding to accept it. The diffusion process, on the other hand, explains group behavior, 
in how an innovation spreads among consumers; how a technology ends up in factories, 
homes, schools, offices, and so on. Essentially, the diffusion process encompasses the 
adoption process of several individuals over time.
The factors that affect adoption and diffusion often reside within a society’s cul-
ture. A way to understand a society’s culture is through its social institutions. A society 
structures and reproduces itself overtime through institutions such as its government, 
family, language, and legal systems. These are developed by people and fulfil certain 
roles over generations. For example, the family as a social institution has become the 
primary site of reproduction and initial socialization; it is where individuals first learn 
about the norms and values of their larger social group. Because of this socialization 
process, it is often difficult to see social institutions as being constructed by people as 
they have typically existed for generations and generations. They are taken for granted 
by the individuals within a society and become essentially invisible to them. Technol-
ogy’s development is subject to these social institutions and, in particular, the political 
and economic arrangements of the society. The power dynamics within these institu-
tions impact the priorities that are established, the investments that are made, and the 
projects that are funded that lead to technological innovations.
The importance of social institutions on emerging technologies is evident when 
comparing nations.7 Differences exist in how technologies are adopted even among 
countries with similar technological and economic infrastructures. For example, the 
United States and Great Britain could be said to be similar in many regards, but the 
adoption and diffusion of certain technologies has varied greatly. Take, for example, the 
adoption of genetically modified food; Great Britain and other European countries have 
instituted stricter regulations than the United States thus slowing the diffusion of these 
types of foods in the market. This has been attributed to differences in their cultures in 
regulating risk; the United States has become less restrictive in this regard.8 The soci-
etal institutions and individuals acting within those societies affect how a technology 
emerges. In other words, technological adoption results from the choices of individuals 
who operate within social institutions. Social institutions, including governmental pol-
icies and societal values, in a sense, define the rules of the game or define the right time 
and right place for a specific technology within a specific society.
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Diffusion, or how individuals learn about a new technology, is a function of the 
social system and the interconnected nature of its institutions. Rogers provided a 
framework for understanding the role of individuals within a society in spreading the 
knowledge and behaviors associated with an innovation. Generally, change agents bring 
the innovations to a society, typically through the gatekeepers and opinion leaders of 
that society. The gatekeepers and opinion leaders are those individuals who have the 
expertise and power to impact societal behaviors and values. In terms of their influence, 
individuals within that society can be categorized across five different rates of adoption. 
These categories are innovators, early adopters, early majority, late majority, and lag-
gards. Innovators are the risk-takers who are willing to be first to adopt an innovation. 
Early adopters are more discreet in their adoption choices but are typically quick to try 
new innovations. Their opinions carry the most weight among the other adopter cat-
egories. The early majority tends to adopt after some time and once the success of the 
innovation is more predictable. The late majority adopts after the average member of the 
society does and are typically skeptical about innovation. Laggards are last to adopt, if 
they ever do.
Beyond diffusion, however, the acceptance or resistance of a new technology can be 
impacted by how individuals make decisions and calculate their own costs and benefits. 
Do the benefits outweigh the costs (not only financial costs but also other potential costs 
such as to their health, time, and so on) for the individual? This cost-benefit analysis 
changes depending on its impact over time, such as long-term environmental impacts 
and impacts on others. Some argue that individuals are willing to assume more risk or 
costs for others than for themselves. The acronym NIMBY, which stands for the phrase 
“not in my back yard,” is used to describe this resistance to a particular technology. 
If the individual incurs disproportionate costs or experiences adverse impacts, then 
resistance can be higher than otherwise. For example, even though proponents note 
the environmental and economic benefits of wind energy, an often-cited opposition to 
wind turbines is from individuals in communities where projects have been proposed 
because their large structures negatively impact the landscape. This occurred on the 
east coast of the United States where several residents opposed the construction of Cape 
Wind, an offshore wind farm in Nantucket Sound, on the grounds that the wind tur-
bines would obstruct their oceanfront views. Wind farms are a good idea in theory, but 
perhaps less so when they are in one’s own back yard.
Another complaint about wind turbines is the noise they produce. Some have ar-
gued that the sounds produced by the turbines can cause insomnia, dizziness, and 
headaches. For example, Jim Cummings of the Acoustic Ecology Institute, an online 
clearinghouse for sound-related environmental issues, has said that about a dozen or so 
of the 250 new wind farms have generated significant noise complaints.9 This issue has 
been researched by several groups and the findings indicate that there is no evidence 
that wind turbine noise poses any health risks. While there is no evidence to support 
such claims, this issue is dependent on context. For example, a previously quiet setting 
“is more likely to produce irritated neighbors than, say, a mixed-use suburban setting 
where ambient noise is already the norm.”10 Again, right time, right place.
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8.5. Maintainability Factors
The final set of factors is more narrowly focused on the technology itself and its design. 
Maintainability factors are considered during the design and installation of techno-
logical products and systems. Maintainability is defined as the probability that when 
maintenance is necessary, a failed technology will be restored to its operational effec-
tiveness within a specified time.11 Operational effectiveness is the ability of a technology 
to perform as expected when operated. Maintainability is related to the reliability-fail-
ure propensity of a given technology. Reliability is a measure of the ability of a tech-
nology to avoid failure. Failure includes lost performance, compromised safety, and 
the need for restorative actions such as diagnosis, repair, spare part replenishment, or 
maintenance. The ease and economy of restorative actions that are necessary to restore 
a failed product is a function of its maintainability. Restoration involves isolating the 
source of failure, correcting the problem, and testing. For a technology to be maintain-
able, the design should not be too complex; equipment should be easy to access, remove, 
and replace; component parts should be uniform or standardized; and there should be 
minimal specialized parts or tools.
Maintainability is an important factor when considering offshore wind turbines as 
a solution to wind energy technology. Offshore wind farms are increasing due to the 
demand for renewable and environmentally friendly energy and the social and political 
concerns over onshore wind farms as already discussed. However, offshore wind energy 
production faces other issues including the design, installation, and maintenance of the 
turbines. Research has been undertaken to inform the design of wind turbines in a ma-
rine environment and the related logistical and accessibility issues. One of the primary 
challenges is the operation and maintenance of the offshore turbines including their 
accessibility, corrosion, and related costs. For example, the type of vessels needed to in-
stall and maintain the turbines is but one factor that must be determined. One approach 
is to develop ways to ensure the reliability of the wind farm as a whole by implement-
ing a more standardized reliability system within the industry.12 Many industries have 
implemented similar standardized reliability and maintenance approaches to improve 
cost-effectiveness, control, and safety. If offshore wind turbines are to emerge as a pri-
mary energy sources, the reliability and maintainability factors will have to be resolved.
8.6. Economics of Energy
When you consider the worst or near-worst climate change scenarios there seems to be 
little point in arguing about the relative costs of alternative sources of energy versus fos-
sil fuel based energy, such as oil, gas, and coal. In a variation of Pascal’s wager, the best 
bet appears to be to assume that climate change is real and that without appropriate ac-
tion highly undesirable and very costly outcomes will occur. One such action is to dras-
tically reduce our dependence on fossil fuels and in turn control or even reduce carbon 
dioxide levels in the atmosphere, and in such a course of action the high cost would be 
more than offset by the avoidance of a highly changed climate. If the assumption turns 
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out to be invalid the consequence is that money will have been wasted on the search 
for alternative energy sources. It is, really, in a rational world, a choice of how two very 
different consequences should guide or even dictate our actions with respect to energy. 
But we live in a world of competing rationalities and undoubtedly one ground on which 
there are multiple views concerns the economics of energy. The following section of this 
chapter deals with some of these economic data.
The economics of alternative energy, just like any other energy source, are difficult 
to establish to the point that all interested parties accept the conclusions. Furthermore, 
when it comes to comparing, say, the cost of wind with nuclear power generation var-
ious conclusions can be generated depending on the assumptions made. For example, 
is the cost of an additional standby plant factored in to the wind side of the equation to 
account for downtime when there is no wind? Is there a figure allocated to environmen-
tal costs associated with uranium ore extraction and nuclear waste disposal, or the costs 
of related security aspects? How might the sequestering of CO2 on very large scale be 
factored into estimates of the cost of energy in the event that such a course of action is 
required? In spite of such problems, some overview of the relative costs associated with 
diverse energy sources is at the least informative.
For tidal and wave energy the first piece of data that needs to be gathered is how 
much energy is there and how much of it is available at an affordable cost. A State of 
the Industry Report for the UK reports that “globally, it is estimated that there are 180 
TWh of economically accessible tidal energy and over 500 TWh of economically ac-
cessible wave energy available annually.”13 Now, both tidal and wave energies depend 
on local physical characteristics of the surrounding sea and seabed, and it turns out 
the UK, despite its small size, has a disproportionate share of this globally accessible 
energy. “It has been estimated that UK waters contain around 15 per cent of the world’s 
economically accessible tidal resource and over 10 per cent of the world’s economically 
accessible wave resource. This tidal resource is estimated at 29 TWh, and wave is 50 
TWh.”14 To put these figures in context, in 2011 the total UK overall primary energy 
consumption in primary energy terms was approximately two hundred million tonnes 
of oil equivalent. In units of watt-hour this amounts to 2.36 TWh. In terms of electricity 
consumption the wave energy could contribute up to about fifteen percent of the UK’s 
needs. Clearly then there is an case on the basis of availability, especially in the UK, that 
marine energy should be exploited.
The second piece of economic data that needs to be considered is the cost of pro-
ducing energy and making measured comparisons across a sweep of technologies. Two 
sets of estimates are presented, with the first set comparing levelized costs for a range of 
both dispatchable and non-dispatchable sources in the United States. The second set of 
estimates deal with tidal and wave generation based on data assembled in the UK with 
specific reference to Scotland. A close reading of both reports is required if conclusions 
are to be drawn as between the United States and the UK; but that is not the intention 
here, rather conclusions are only reached with respect to each jurisdiction but which 
are nevertheless possibly valid globally with respect to the various technologies. A final 
point—the actual amount of costs estimated are of less importance than the relative 
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costs across technology domains, so the year on which costs are estimated is of no great 
significance with respect to the conclusions drawn later.
The US Energy Information Administration (EIA) in a recent report presents the 
average levelized costs for a diverse range of generating technologies.15 The report de-
fines levelized cost as the per-kilowatthour cost of both building and operating a gen-
erating plant over an assumed financial life and duty cycle. Factors in calculating the 
estimated levelized costs include “fuel costs, fixed and variable operations and main-
tenance (O&M) costs, financing costs, and an assumed utilization rate for each plant 
type.”16 It is worth noting that financial incentives are not factored into the estimated 
levelised costs. A few points can be made in reference to Table 8.1 in the EIA report, 
presented here for convenience.
Some of the points that emerge are:
•	 The network investment for non-dispatchable technologies is approximately 
three hundred percent above that of dispatchable technologies.17
•	 The capital cost of offshore wind is 275% above that of on-land wind.
•	 The levelized capital cost of Natural Gas-fired Conventional Combined Cycle 
is 17.4 (near the lowest among dispatchable technologies), compared to 83.4 for 
Advanced Nuclear and 193.4 for Offshore Wind.
What is immediately clear is that the economic data favor, in terms of cost, the 
use of dispatchable technologies over the non-dispatchable ones. The issue that the 
electricity network or grid is unsuitable currently, say, for the large scale introduction 
of alternative energy systems is simply a reflection that high capacity transmission 
does not exist to and from much of the coastal regions where wave, tidal and wind 
generation could be sited. But addressing this problem would not represent a recur-
ring cost, so in that sense the investment cost is not overly serious. The acceptance of 
large transmission systems in areas often of outstanding beauty would certainly be 
considered problematic. However the issue of the emissions downside to the use of 
fossil fuel remains.
Focusing now on the relative costs of wave and tidal where the data in the following 
table is taken from a report prepared for the Scottish Government.18
The report asserts that the diminishing costs in time are due to global deployment 
of the technologies and, as a consequence, the expected impact on learning and knowl-
edge accumulation in the marine business; , the advantage that would come with an 
expected increased level of deployment (scale); and a declining rate of increase in the 
underlying costs. Overall, Tidal Stream appears to have the initial advantage but Wave 
technology is predicted to have, in the longer term, the lowest levelized cost.
8.7. Some Challenges for Emerging Wave Energy Technologies
This section provides an illustration of how economic, political, social, and maintain-
ability factors influence wave energy technologies’ route to market in the UK. It opens 
with an exploration of an oil embargo in the Middle East, an area not renowned for its 
abundance of water or waves.
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The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was formed in 1960 
in order to create a system that stabilized the price of oil and in turn, the world’s en-
ergy markets. This aim was achieved successfully for many years by coordinating the 
US average levelized costs (2011 $/megawatthour) for plants entering service in 2018
Plant type
Capacity 
factor (%)
Levelized 
capital cost
Fixed 
O&M
Variable 
O&M 
(w/ fuel)
Transmission 
investment
Total system 
levelized cost
Dispatchable Technologies
Conventional 
Coal
85 65.7 4.1 29.2 1.2 100.1
Advanced 
Coal
85 84.4 6.8 30.7 1.2 123.0
Advanced Coal 
with CCS
85 88.4 8.8 37.2 1.2 135.5
Natural Gas-Fired
Conventional 
Combined 
Cycle
87 15.8 1.7 48.4 1.2 67.1
Advanced 
Combined 
Cycle
87 17.4 2.0 45.0 1.2 65.6
Advanced CC 
with CCS
87 34.0 4.1 54.1 1.2 93.4
Conventional 
Combustion 
Turbine
30 44.2 2.7 80.0 3.4 130.3
Advanced 
Combustion 
Turbine
30 30.4 2.6 68.2 3.4 104.6
Advanced 
Nuclear
90 83.4 11.6 12.3 1.1 108.4
Geothermal 92 76.2 12.0 0.0 1.4 89.6
Biomass 83 53.2 14.3 42.3 1.2 111.0
Non-Dispatchable Technologies
Wind 34 70.3 13.1 0.0 3.2 86.6
Wind-Offshore 37 193.4 22.4 0.0 5.7 221.5
Solar PV1 25 130.4 9.9 0.0 4.0 144.3
Solar Thermal 20 214.2 41.4 0.0 5.9 261.5
Hydro2 52 78.1 4.1 6.1 2.0 90.3
Table 8.1. Estimated Levelized Cost of New Generation Resources, 2018.
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policies of the member states, thereby protecting their mutual economic interest. In its 
early days OPEC was not a political organization. In 1973, however, some OPEC mem-
bers sent a strong political signal to the West by using a tool of economic warfare, the 
embargo.19
In 1972 the price for a barrel of crude oil was around three dollars. This price had 
quadrupled to over twelve dollars by the end of 1974. Western economies were given 
the rare chance of a ride in a time machine and saw what the world would be like when 
there was no longer an endless supply of cheap oil.20 The UK government began to assess 
a wide range of possible energy options to ensure security of energy supplies.
One possible energy option was to develop the indigenous oil reserves held under 
the UK’s North Sea. With extreme waves of up to thirty meters high, not to mention 
long term effects of erosion and corrosion, it was clear that any development in this 
harsh environment would not be without its technological and economic challenges.
It was estimated that overall, the development and production investment required 
for an oilfield in the North Sea was in the region of £1200–£1500 per barrel per day.21 
This significant capital investment posed a potential barrier. However, following the 
events of the oil embargo, the oil was becoming so expensive that the North Sea was 
viewed as being economically viable to exploit on a large scale, and consequently a high 
level of investment took place. Investment in oil and gas extraction accounted for six 
to eight percent of all UK fixed investment from 1975 to 1983.22 What made these pros-
pects even more attractive was the fact that the North Sea was surrounded by politically 
stable states, and possession of an indigenous source of oil and gas increased energy 
security of supply.
In 1975, the required infrastructure of connecting pipelines and terminal facilities 
were completed and the first oil from the Argyle field was brought ashore. This was fol-
lowed soon after by oil from BP’s massive Forties field. Discoveries and production from 
Table 8.2. Summary of Levelized Costs (in January 2010 Terms). Case (£/MWhr).
Technology Cost scenario 2020 2035 2050
Wave High 253 142 105
Medium 214 118 86
Low 177 97 71
Tidal Range High 349 323 286
Medium 279 258 229
Low 205 190 168
Tidal Stream 
(shallow)
High 211 199 166
Medium 173 166 138
Low 141 134 111
Tidal Stream 
(deep)
High 250 159 129
Medium 203 126 102
Low 166 102 82
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the region grew as the UK sold leases on sectors in the North Sea to British, European, 
and American companies.
Throughout this period of early oil industry development, the UK was still assessing 
a wide range of energy options. Aware of the available resource lapping on the shores of 
the UK and perhaps buoyed by offshore development possibilities being demonstrated 
in the North Sea, government advisers advocated an urgent research program into the 
potential of harnessing the UK’s wave resource. As a result, the Department of Energy 
provided inducements to support innovation, funding wave energy research from 1974 
to 1983 under its Wave Energy Programme. The program objectives were twofold: first 
to establish the feasibility of extracting energy from ocean waves and second, to esti-
mate the cost of energy if used on a large scale to supply UK requirements.
A large number of devices were considered during the program but were found 
to be uneconomic. With hindsight, industry experts felt that the program’s objectives 
were over ambitious resulting in massive devices, with corresponding high capital and 
generating costs.23
By the early 1980s the UK was a net exporter of oil and as the energy crisis sub-
sided, so did the interest in wave energy. A period of consolidated research followed 
before a resurgence of interest during the mid 1990s, concurrent with a widespread 
public recognition of both climate change issues and the finite nature of fossil and 
nuclear energy sources.
As part of its commitment to tackle climate change, the UK is legally committed to 
delivering fifteen percent of its energy demand from renewable sources by 2020, con-
tributing to its energy security and decarbonization objectives.24 A policy framework 
has been put in place to ensure that the wave energy industry can grow and help to meet 
this clear mandate and encourage wave energy technology development.
When considering the progress of the wind energy industry since the 1970s, it has 
been shown that the turbine industries have established themselves in countries such 
as Denmark, where there have been suitable framework conditions in place providing 
a stable domestic market.25 The innovators and early adopters now hold a significant 
market share of the multi-billion-pound wind turbine market; in 2008 the combined 
global market share of Denmark’s two largest wind turbine manufacturers was just 
over twenty-seven percent.26 To date the UK’s policy framework is working to promote 
a stable domestic market for the wave industry. As a result a large proportion of the 
world’s marine energy device developers are either based in the UK or conducting tests 
in UK waters.27
An important element of the UK’s framework is funding. To support the deploy-
ment of early wave energy technologies, short term capital funding is required. In the 
recent economic downturn, a realization of technology risk and the long time to market 
of early-stage wave energy technologies has led to a shift away from reliance on venture 
capital money to fund the early stage of the industry. In order to fill the gap, public 
funding has increased via initiatives such as the Marine Energy Array Demonstrator 
(MEAD) fund, and some major industrial companies and utilities have taken equity 
stakes in technology companies.
Dark, Daugherty, Campbell, anD grimson208
Longer term funding streams are also essential. These provide certainty to investors 
and an enhanced revenue stream for the first commercial projects. They are also vital 
to encourage long-term investments by supply chain companies and offshore opera-
tions and maintenance contractors, key when considering maintainability. At present 
this funding is provided through the Renewables Obligation (RO), the main market 
support mechanism for renewable electricity projects in the UK. It places an obligation 
on licensed electricity suppliers in the UK to source a proportion of their supply to cus-
tomers from eligible renewable sources. It is monitored through Renewables Obligation 
Certificates (ROCs); with suppliers required to acquire a certain number of ROCs per 
MWh of electricity supplied to customers.28 Through a system banding within the RO, 
there are incentives in place to create demand in the market for nascent technologies. 
Under current banding, a wave energy installation receives five ROCs for each MWh 
produced while an onshore wind installation receives one.29
While the funding streams available provide confidence, social factors require a 
decrease in reliance on such policy instruments, paid for through levies on consumers. 
The industry needs to demonstrate that considerable wave resource can be accessed, 
converted to a useful form and delivered at a cost effectively in comparison with other 
methods of energy generation (shown in Table 8.1).
Future reductions in wave energy’s levelized costs of energy (LCoE) lie through 
programmes of Research and Development (R&D) combined with learning through 
knowledge accumulation with deployment of technologies. As stated earlier, induce-
ments to develop innovations often come in the form of research grants. In 2011, 
around forty universities were identified globally which were focused on research 
into marine renewable devices, with over a quarter of these based in the UK.30 This 
research base is supported by high capital infrastructure required for testing. The 
National Renewable Energy Centre (NaREC) and the European Marine Energy Centre 
(EMEC) currently provide facilities in the UK to test components and deploy full 
scale devices respectively.
When considering significant offshore operations, such as the deployment of a full 
scale wave device, the nascent wave industry in the UK is able to leverage the learning 
and knowledge that has been accumulated in the oil industry over the previous four 
decades. The rapid development of the North Sea’s oil industry was aided by the strong 
competition and investment, which lead to the development of new technology that was 
at the forefront of the industry’s major achievements. Technologies such as dynamically 
positioned vessels and geophysical survey tools used to develop oil reserves are now 
being effectively used in the development of offshore renewables.
As stated in the Economics of Energy section, decreased levelized costs are ex-
pected to come as a result of an increased scale of deployment of technology. To date, 
forty-one wave and tidal sites have been leased from the Crown Estate, which owns or 
has vested interests in almost the entirety of the seabed to twelve nautical miles around 
the UK. With a total potential installed capacity of approximately two GW, this is the 
largest development pipeline of wave and tidal projects in the world, effectively creating 
demand by providing a route to market for developing technologies.31
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The majority of these leased areas are in an early development phase, seeking reg-
ulatory permissions from the consenting authorities before the implementation of the 
project. As part of any consent application, and depending on the scale of the proposed 
project, an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) may be required under legislation. 
The International Association for Impact Assessment (IAIA) defines an EIA as “the 
process of identifying, predicting, evaluating and mitigating the biophysical, social, and 
other relevant effects of development proposals prior to major decisions being taken 
and commitments made.”32 The process ensures that all likely impacts, both positive 
and negative, are fully appraised before the project is allowed to proceed. For any pro-
posed wave development this appraisal would include consideration of the effects of 
proposed project infrastructure upon the landscape and seascape.
The process ensures that all likely impacts, both positive and negative, are fully ap-
praised before the project is allowed to proceed. For any proposed wave development, this 
appraisal would include consideration of the visual impact on the landscape and seascape, 
as well as a range of other environmental factors. Grid infrastructure upgrades required 
to meet any increased generation capacity would also be appraised through this process.
As with most forms of renewable resources, wave energy is unevenly distributed. 
With exposure to the prevailing westerly wind direction and the long Atlantic fetch, the 
far north and west (and least populous) areas of the UK, tend to have the most energetic 
wind and wave climates. In order to help to meet renewable energy targets, the UK has 
an opportunity to generate energy from its far-flung periphery.
The grid network was designed to transmit and distribute electricity from big, cen-
tral power stations to our cities, towns and onwards, through ever thinner wires, to 
remote regions of the UK. Akin to the infrastructure of connecting pipelines and ter-
minal facilities required for the successful development of the North Sea oil industry, 
appropriate grid infrastructure is essential for wave technologies to succeed in the UK.
8.8. Conclusion
Introducing renewable energy sources into an existing market is a complex socio-techno- 
economic challenge, which requires many agencies to align their objectives if a suc-
cessful outcome is to be achieved. Because of the economics of delivering energy to the 
consumer, which favors traditional sources, the commitment to embark on a heavy 
cycle of investment in renewable energy systems is contingent on governments accept-
ing the need to manage environmental impacts and address climate change (for ex-
ample by controlling CO2 and other gases in the atmosphere). Governments are the 
agents of society; thus individuals as part of the community have a clear role to play. 
To date a balanced debate between all stakeholders has been marked by its absence 
and special interest groups with their particular agenda have dominated the debate. As 
ever with such complex situations a well-informed understanding of what is involved 
is critical if sound decisions on the future of energy are to be made. And that process 
of being informed and informing should not be confined to technologists, economists, 
and engineers. Society in general has a role especially bearing in mind that the choices 
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involved are difficult ones to make. And perhaps we do not have the tools available to 
make such choices. The introduction of additional power transmission networks (grids) 
and devices in areas of often great beauty has to be balanced against the advantages of 
curtailing climate change. How are citizens to make such choices with such diverse and 
competing factors at play?
The debate is not simply terrestrial. Andre Bryans has noted that “the installation 
of Tidal Energy Devices will result in the earth moon distance increasing at a rate 
of approximately 1 cm per year per 1 TW year extracted.”33 The point here is not so 
much the increase in orbit of the moon but rather the complexity of systems by which 
the unexpected, to some, can result. We are undoubtedly at the beginning of a long 
learning curve.
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Chapter 9
Transportation and Energy
RiChaRd a. SimmonS, Shaun mCfaddEn,  
david kEnnEdy, and maRy johnSon
abstract
The role of transportation in society and commerce today is undoubtedly more far-reach-
ing than at any prior time in history. This chapter explores both the literal and figurative 
prime movers that have defined more than a century of innovation in transportation. In 
section one we commence with an overview of transportation energy and its links with the 
environment, consumers and related policies. Particular attention to the implications of 
the sector’s reliance on petroleum is given. Gasoline and diesel fuel have proven extremely 
well suited in providing ample energy, in a dense, portable and low cost manner. We re-
view  basic thermochemistry behind the combustion of liquid petroleum fuels in setting 
the stage to compare strategies aimed at reducing environmental impacts sector-wide.
Sections two and three explore recent developments and case studies focused on 
electric and hybrid vehicles, and aviation respectively. Historical trends, key policies 
and global interactions are also discussed along with noteworthy actions taken by lead 
nations. For both ground transport and aviation, priority is being given to efficiency, as 
economic paybacks are attractive and environmental benefits can be felt immediately. 
Next and equally critical, are focused efforts to develop and commercialize alternative 
fuels, advanced vehicles and technologies over the mid to longer term. A brief overview 
of fuel cells is also provided. Environmental impacts and sector emissions are discussed 
as increasingly imperative, but not exclusive, inputs to energy transitions in transport.
A more coordinated overall approach is suggested to help achieve secure and sus-
tainable economic, environmental and social objectives in the coming decades. Prompt 
execution of definitive actions, largely known today, can be critical in stimulating what 
many experts believe are necessary reduction trends. Through the overviews, case stud-
ies, and policy analysis, the authors suggest that near term steps will heavily influence 
the composition of automotive and aviation fleets and their fuel supplies by 2030.
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9.1. Transportation Energy overview
9.1.1. Introduction
As we shift gears to consider energy for transportation, it quickly becomes apparent 
that the sector’s Achilles heel is its disproportionate reliance on oil. From one’s daily 
commute, to the family vacation, and even the laptop shipped from overseas—chances 
are that transportation, fueled by petroleum, has made it possible. This has significant 
geopolitical, economic, and environmental consequences, none of which are easily nav-
igated in the near term. While the oil dependency of major consuming countries varies, 
the United States is not unique with a transportation sector that accounts for nearly 
thirty percent of total domestic energy consumption and a similar percentage of green-
house gas (GHG) emissions.1 Strides have been made in the United States and elsewhere 
to ensure that electricity needs for stationary power can be met by a diverse suite of 
domestically sourced coal, natural gas, nuclear, hydro and a host of emerging renewable 
resources. By contrast, the US remains reliant on petroleum for about ninety percent of 
transportation needs.2 And the US is not alone. 
For many countries, including the US and many European states, oil is often the 
single most significant imported item, accounting for ever-increasing shares of GDP 
and driving trade deficits. Even oil rich nations face concerns including inefficient 
domestic use, wasteful national subsidies, air quality, and capacity management in 
the face of volatile global markets. It is estimated that there are nearly one billion ve-
hicles on the road today, with expectations that the global fleet will exceed 1.3 billion 
by 2020.3 In China alone, the vehicle fleet grew ten-fold from about two million in 
1980 to twenty million by 2005.4 In 2012, more than eighteen million new light duty 
vehicles entered the Chinese market, a tally that led the world in units produced and 
surpassed sales in the US (fourteen million) and Europe (sixteen million).5 Any dis-
cussion seeking to advance an understanding of the global energy crisis must include 
an analysis of the transportation sector and the central role played by oil. It must also 
consider some of the challenges, opportunities, technologies, and policies associated 
with replacing petroleum and developing more sustainable forms of energy for the 
transit of people and goods.
Experts agree that substantial reductions in oil consumption and emissions can 
be achieved through a combination of measures over near, intermediate, and long 
term horizons. With regard to ground transportation, improvements to vehicle ef-
ficiency, diversification of alternative fuel supplies, and realistic scale up of hybrid, 
electric, and advanced vehicles over the long term constitute key strategic develop-
ments. An eventual transition to hydrogen as an alternative fuel may also become 
technically and economically viable in the long term, though many significant chal-
lenges loom. In addition to passenger cars, transportation segments such as aviation, 
rail and maritime represent areas of considerable opportunity for reducing reliance 
on traditional petroleum fuels and reducing the sector’s carbon footprint. Technology 
deployment will be the driving force behind this strategy, but this will take time and 
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impose significant costs. Successful implementation would help mitigate national se-
curity, environmental and trade concerns, but expectations should remain realistic. 
Resource diversification can pay double dividends by not only curbing demand, but 
also by redirecting significant quantities of oil to higher value purposes with fewer al-
ternatives such as aviation, fertilizer, plastic, and chemical production. And yet even 
successful conservation and optimization initiatives in developed regions like the US 
and Europe, may do little to change global oil consumption as the developing world 
grows and competes for scarce supplies.
9.1.2. Efficiency and Vehicle Technology
Efficiency enabled by vehicle technology is the single most effective tool for reducing oil 
use in the near term. Higher oil prices combined with aggressive new rules by the US 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for increasing Corporate Average Fuel Econ-
omy (CAFE) standards are expected to result in higher efficiency internal combustion 
engines and reductions in vehicle weight. In 1973 during the oil embargo, cars in the US 
averaged fourteen miles per gallon (mpg). Five years later, CAFE standards were intro-
duced for passenger vehicles at a level of eighteen mpg. This was increased gradually to 
27.5 mpg by 1990, where it remained unchanged until 2011. The recent EPA rulemaking 
sets a goal of 35.5 mpg to be met by 2016, followed by a five percent annual increase for 
nine years to an equivalent fuel economy of 54.5 mpg by 2025. Many experts indicate 
that fuel economies in the 40 mpg range are achievable within ten years from technol-
ogies under development today. To achieve interim CAFE targets within this decade, 
recent estimates predict that technology upgrades will result in cost premiums in the 
range of $1500–$4500 per vehicle at production scales.6 Many believe that these invest-
ments are justified, given that they will be offset or exceeded by fuel savings; though 
given the variability of gasoline and diesel prices, it proves difficult to predict benefit/
cost ratios with certainty. Despite this, there is reason to have confidence in selected 
near-term estimates, as the technology under development is largely identified. Though 
not exhaustive, key technological innovations include the following:
•	 Weight Savings (while maintaining safety and crash worthiness)
 Ȏ Advanced materials (composites and alloys)
 Ȏ Removal of excess payload
 Ȏ Downsizing within classification footprints
•	 Improvements to Internal Combustion Engine (ICE)
 Ȏ Higher thermal efficiencies
 Ȏ Increased use and optimization of turbochargers, reduction in displace-
ment at constant performance
 Ȏ Improved combustion (higher compression, variable valve actuation, ad-
vanced sensors, optimized control)
 Ȏ Selective cylinder de-activation
•	 Improvements to Vehicle
 Ȏ Regenerative braking and idle-off (stop-start) modes
 Ȏ Improved transmissions (increased number of discrete gears)
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 Ȏ Higher voltage systems (reduced resistive losses)
 Ȏ Reduced aerodynamic drag, rolling resistance, and friction
 Ȏ Improved air conditioning systems, including lower impact refrigerants
Looking further down the road, a marked point of diminishing economic re-
turns on increased fuel economy at affordable premiums may potentially occur in 
the 2020–2030 timeframe and above fifty mpg. Actual viability of ultra-efficient ve-
hicles clearly depends on the future price of oil, a very difficult commodity to predict 
even one year ahead, let alone ten to fifteen. Reaching 54.5 mpg for the fleet target av-
erage, meaning essentially half of new vehicles sold (including light duty vehicles and 
light trucks) should exceed this value, will only be possible by significantly growing 
the market share of hybrid/electric, fuel-cell, and advanced alternative vehicle tech-
nologies. However, this technology remains extremely expensive and may require 
additional infrastructure. These technologies, and their associated cost estimates, 
are less evolutionary by nature, and risk factors are therefore higher. In addition, for 
grid-recharged electric vehicles, the impact on GHG emissions is highly dependent 
on the source of electricity used. Studies indicate that the lifecycle environmental 
impact and emissions of an electric vehicle recharged with coal-derived electricity 
may not, in fact, be better than an equivalent vehicle with a gasoline powered in-
ternal combustion engine. If natural gas, renewables, or nuclear power is used for 
recharging, then the net lifecycle emissions impact is superior. To quantify this, one 
study projects that by 2015, a fully electrified Nissan Leaf would emit twenty grams 
of CO2 per kilometer in France, where much of the electricity comes from nuclear 
power, but 114 g/km in the UK, where there is a greater reliance on coal. In heavily 
coal-dependent countries such as Poland or Luxembourg, estimated emissions are 
135 g/km.7 Thus, while one overarching objective is to reduce oil consumption, a 
parallel objective is to reduce the environmental footprint by increasing the use of 
lower carbon sources. Experts urge caution against unrealistic expectations for the 
growth rate of purely electric vehicles, noting that market share in a decade could 
remain in the single digits.
Challenges notwithstanding, consumer demand for vehicles with a reduced im-
pact on energy resources and the environment has increased, and products showcas-
ing many of the aforementioned technologies are beginning to satisfy that market 
trend. Vehicle efficiency standards (such as CAFE) which encourage the introduction 
of such advanced technologies, taken along with advanced alternative fuels could to-
gether help reduce oil consumption on the order of thirteen to forty percent by 2035.8 
These levels of reduction can only be realized if efficiency gains are cashed in di-
rectly to reduce oil consumption, rather than being traded for increased performance, 
weight, or additional use (known as the rebound effect). This trade-out phenomenon 
characterized the Sport Utility Vehicles (SUVs) and sports cars of the 1990s and early 
2000s, as engine power, vehicle capacity, and weight increased dramatically, while 
fuel economy remained relatively flat. Looking forward, oil reductions in transpor-
tation that are not displaced by coal-electricity should reduce the associated GHG 
emissions proportionately.
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9.1.3. alternative Fuels and Diversity at the Pump: Biofuels, Natural Gas, and hydrogen
Alongside aggressive efficiency improvements, alternative fuels have the potential to offer 
considerable near-term promise in campaigns to reduce oil and emissions. It should be 
noted that alternative fuel availability and adoption are highly regionally dependent. Con-
ventional biofuels currently account for an impressive ten percent of US gasoline supply 
(or about seven percent of US liquid transport fuels at nearly thirteen billion gallons per 
year or 600,000 boe/d), primarily in the form of corn-based ethanol blended gasoline. 
By 2022, US policy calls for twenty-one of the predicted thirty-six billion gallons of re-
newable fuels to come from advanced non-food sources such as cellulosic biomass and 
algae, more than doubling current biofuels penetration. There is increasing concern that 
renewable fuel targets will be missed, as significant technical and economic challenges 
have delayed the commercialization of advanced fuels. Other infrastructure, storage and 
delivery aspects of higher alternative fuel blend percentages will also require attention. 
Despite this, research indicates that ethanol can reduce GHG emissions as compared to 
gasoline. Reductions vary depending upon the process and feedstock, for example: corn 
ethanol reduces emissions by twenty percent; sugarcane ethanol by sixty percent; and 
cellulosic ethanol by sixty to ninety percent. Several US companies are bringing pilot fa-
cilities online in 2013 and 2014, with projected full-scale production of cellulosic ethanol 
within five years. On January 1, 2012, Congress allowed fiscal support and import tariffs 
for conventional ethanol to expire. Legislation and support policies that would re-direct 
future tax incentives or loan guarantees toward advanced biofuels and infrastructure up-
grades have been introduced, but have not been adopted as law.
The United States and Brazil (with bioethanol from corn and sugarcane) and Europe 
(with biodiesel from rapeseed and waste cooking oil) account for more than ninety per-
cent of the world’s biofuel production. The commercial availability of flex-fuel vehicles, 
beginning in the early 2000s, has enabled higher blends of biofuels with conventional 
petroleum fuels. So-called first generation biofuels dominate the biofuels market, owing 
to their simple conversions from established crops, such as corn, sugarcane, rapeseed, 
and soybeans. Increasing attention to land-use and environmental impacts has resulted 
in constructive national and international dialogues over ways to ensure the sustainable 
production of biofuels. Scale-up of advanced biofuels will require the utilization of low 
cost, non-food feedstocks, such as agricultural residue, municipal solid waste, woody 
and cellulosic biomass, and potentially algae. 
Natural gas currently comprises less than one percent of transport fuel, but demon-
strates remarkable potential for growth—particularly with urban fleets of buses, deliv-
ery vehicles, taxis, and other mass transit vehicles. Heavy duty and long haul transport 
offer additional segments where natural gas could serve as a key transport fuel. Abun-
dant supplies of low cost natural gas and developed infrastructure in both centralized 
urban and residential locations could make this fuel a competitive alternative in the 
medium term. Gaseous fuels include Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG), Compressed Nat-
ural Gas (CNG), Dimethyl Ether (DME), Bio-Gas, and Hydrogen; all have the potential 
to emit cleaner air than liquid petroleum transport fuels. Atomised gas fueled (AG-
F)-powered vehicles for instance perform significantly better than their conventional 
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counterparts in terms of NOx and PM emissions. They have reduced CO2 emissions over 
gasoline and diesel, and uptake of AGF could constitute a step in the transition toward 
a hydrogen-based road transport system. Propane (LPG) has a higher energy density 
than gasoline, burns cleaner, and results in less fouling of plugs and contamination of 
oil.9 As a result, it is broadly used in industry for factory applications, as a fuel for fork-
lifts and maintenance vehicles.
Natural gas engine technology and infrastructure upgrades are currently expensive, 
and few consumers are willing to pay an estimated $2000–$4500, or more, to switch a 
light duty vehicle over from gasoline. However, a sustained fuel price spread with oil due 
to the shale gas revolution improves the prospects, reducing payback periods and result-
ing in a more compelling overall value proposition for natural gas. While US natural gas 
prices have recently decoupled from global crude oil, they are predicted to rise modestly 
in the coming years, particularly if the United States embarks on an export strategy or 
substantially accelerates the transition from coal powered electricity. Studies suggest that 
CNG has the potential to displace 180 million barrels of crude oil per day between 2025 
and 2040, particularly if it can be phased in for fleet applications that rely heavily on diesel. 
A gradual conversion and replacement of transit, delivery and heavy-duty vehicles could 
result in a five to ten percent reduction in diesel demand, and yield significant benefits 
by improving energy security and fuel price stability while reducing carbon emissions.10
Public and private research in alternative fuels continues at an aggressive pace. 
Many vehicles can be converted to run on hydrogen as a green alternative to gasoline, 
however research is addressing concerns related to storage, safety, infrastructure and 
sourcing. These, and other economic constraints, will have to be resolved before hy-
drogen and hydrogen fuel cells can achieve appreciable market share. Meanwhile, the 
Vehicle Technologies Program of the Department of Energy funds and coordinates a 
portfolio of vehicle research into such areas as hybrids, energy storage, advanced com-
bustion engines, and advanced materials. Similarly, the European Union has launched 
the European Green Cars Initiative, involving “research on a broad range of technol-
ogies and smart energy infrastructures essential to achieve a breakthrough in the use 
of renewable and non-polluting energy sources.”11 Both US and European initiatives 
focus on mid to long-term R&D and emphasize the importance of aligned approaches 
between industry and policy makers.
9.1.4. Combustion overview and Primary Transport Emissions
When fossil fuels burn, hydrocarbons combine with oxygen (or air) to produce carbon 
dioxide, water and heat. The amount of heat produced is a function of the chemical energy 
potential of the fuel and the efficiency of the process. The energy content, or so-called high-
er-heating value or calorific value of a fuel is the quantity of heat produced by its combus-
tion under standard conditions (that is, at a temperature of 0°C and a constant pressure of 
1,013 mbar). On a mass basis, the calorific values of diesel and gasoline (petrol) are com-
parable at 45.5 MJ/kg and 45.8 MJ/kg, respectively. Diesel fuel is, however, more dense 
than gasoline and contains approximately ten percent more energy by volume (roughly 
36.9 MJ/liter compared to 33.7 MJ/liter). Diesel engines operate at a higher thermody-
TransporTaTion and EnErgy 221
namic efficiency than gasoline counterparts. These facts help explain why diesel pow-
ered vehicles can generally achieve better efficiencies than gasoline powered vehicles.
Just as energy content determines heat output, the amount of carbon produced by a 
combustion reaction depends largely on the carbon intensity of the fuel. A rough rule of 
thumb suggests that for equivalent units of energy produced, natural gas emits about half 
and petroleum fuels about three-quarters of the carbon dioxide produced by coal. The emis-
sions from a four-stroke Internal Combustion Engine (ICE) depend on the ratio of air to fuel 
as they enter the cylinder during the intake stroke. The combustion of octane, a key com-
ponent of gasoline, with the theoretical or “stoichiometric” amount of air is shown below.12
C8H18 + 12.5(O2 + 3.76 N2) → 8CO2 + 9H2O + 47N2 
With less air than the theoretical amount, the mixture is rich, forming some Carbon 
monoxide (CO) and unburned hydrocarbons (HC). This may inhibit the production of 
nitrous oxides (NOx) due to lower combustion temperatures. With a higher proportion 
of air, fuel becomes the limiting reactant, and this lean mixture generally results in the 
formation of fewer unwanted products of combustion. If, however, the mixture becomes 
excessively lean, misfire can occur, resulting in emissions of unburned hydrocarbons 
(HC). Diesel engines operate with a lean mixture and emissions of HCs and COs are 
low, but NOx emissions are high due to high operating temperatures. Diesel engines also 
emit soot particles (or black carbon), and as a result have been known to pose health and 
respiratory risks. Led by a core group of national governments, the multi-phase/multi-
year implementation of stringent environmental regulations on gaseous and particulate 
matter (PM) from diesel engines has helped mitigate such risks considerably.
Catalytic converters serve the purpose of reducing emissions of the main pollutants 
(CO, HC, and NOx) that result from the incomplete combustion of transport fuels. Op-
erating at elevated temperatures with specialized materials, the converters oxidize HCs 
and COs to CO2; as well as reducing NOx to N2, nitrogen gas, a benign agent comprising 
seventy-eight percent of the earth’s atmosphere.
As noted, fuels differ in the amount of carbon and energy they contain and this 
has implications for fuel economy and greenhouse emissions. To quantify one potential 
comparison, a car fueled by gasoline emitting 148 g CO2/km would emit 130 g CO2/km 
if fueled on LPG. Despite its lower energy density by volume, a twelve percent net reduc-
tion in emissions on a per kilometer basis would result. It should be noted that the pro-
portion of tailpipe versus upstream GHG emmissions comprising the total CO2eq/km 
for gasoline, LPG, and other fuels can vary substantially. Table 9.1 shows typical 
amounts of CO2 emitted from the combustion of three primary transport fuels.
Fuel Type CO2 Emissions  Kg/Liter of Fuel
CO2 Emissions  
Lbs/Gallon of Fuel
Gasoline/Petrol 2.3 kg/L 19.4 lbs/gal
Liquid Petroleum Gas (LPG) 1.6 kg/L 12.7 lbs/gal
Diesel 2.7 kg/L 22.2 lbs/gal
Table 9.1 Typical CO2 Tailpipe Emissions Per Volume of Fuel Consumed.13
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In the production process of a vehicle it is estimated that 720 kg of CO2e is produced 
for every €1,000 of purchase price (about 1220 lbs CO2e per $1000). The production of 
a medium car therefore can generate up to 17 tonnes of CO2e and a typical gasoline fu-
eled car produces approximately 1.8 metric tonnes of CO2 for every 10,000 km driven. 
Figure 9.1 charts the combined CO2 emissions profile for an average vehicle including 
production and use, projected for a vehicle’s operating life.14
9.1.5. Regulating Emissions from the Transportation Sector
As noted earlier, the Kyoto Protocol is generally seen as an important first step toward 
a global emission reduction regime aimed at stabilizing GHG emissions, and providing 
essential architecture for future international agreement on climate change. This has 
significant implications for transport emissions, which account for about twenty-five 
percent of the total from fossil fuel combustion worldwide, and grew forty-five percent 
between 1990 and 2007.15 Regulation on vehicle fuel economy (as in the United States) 
or fuel consumption (such as in Europe) for new vehicles has been the primary policy 
mechanism aimed at curbing emissions in the sector. As noted above, aggressive fuel 
economy targets have been established via CAFE standards through 2025, with similar 
initiatives in place for Europe. The prevalence of gasoline and diesel in transport means 
that there is, at present, a tight correlation between fuel consumption (or fuel economy) 
and vehicle emissions. For example, 54.5 mpg is roughly equivalent to about seventy to 
eighty grams of CO2 equivalent per kilometer driven. The existing CAFE policies com-
bine fuel economy and emission regulations into one standard. More precisely, while 
the Department of Transportation’s National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 
(NHTSA) sets fuel economy specifications directly, EPA regulations specify emission 
Figure 9.1. Example of CO2 Emissions (Tonnes) from Production and Use Over Vehicle 
Lifespan.
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targets which can be correlated to effective fuel economy targets based upon vehicle size 
(or footprint) classification.
The European Commission imposes standards on GHG emissions for new vehicles 
explicitly. In 2010, the approximate level of CO2 equivalent emitted per km from new 
cars sold in Europe was 143 grams, having fallen from 167 grams in 2002. Currently, 
the EU has in place a target of 130 grams by 2015, and a proposed target of 95 grams 
for 2020. By 2030, a range of 50 grams CO2/km and 70 grams CO2/km (depending on 
vehicle technology) is targeted for cars, and a range between 75 grams CO2/km and 105 
grams CO2/km applies to vans. These targets are seen as credible but challenging by 
industry, and they are consistent with the EU goal of ensuring that average emissions of 
new car and vans are near-zero at the tailpipe by 2040.
9.1.6. Consumer Behavior and Intelligent Transit
Clearly, consumers play a critical role in long term strategies to reduce oil use. In the ab-
sence of a price on carbon, persuading consumers to reduce their energy footprint will 
remain challenging. However, higher gasoline prices have already initiated a market-in-
duced behavioral shift. Increasing availability of affordable lower carbon fuels and effi-
cient vehicle options will continue this trend. Reduction in vehicle miles traveled (VMT) 
via carpooling, teleworking, real-time route optimizations, and expanded use of mass 
transit will further reduce oil consumption. At the vehicle and system level, it will be 
increasingly possible to leverage powerful data acquisition and network resources to 
inform driving behavior and enhance overall efficiency. As transportation represents 
the second highest expense in most American household budgets, consumers stand to 
directly benefit from reduced dependence on and volatility of oil. Complemented by 
coordinated policies at the state and municipal levels, consumer behavioral change has 
the potential to contribute to double digit reductions in oil used for transport.
An important aspect of consumer behavior is clearly product selection. An individual’s 
decision to purchase a given vehicle is a complex matter of personal need and preference, 
value judgment, budget, and a critical assessment of major attributes. Yet, it is certainly a 
topic to which a wide audience can relate, and potentially, an opportunity to examine a host 
of theories and research findings. Much has been written on this by a range of experts in 
business, academia, and government; and a thorough discussion of this topic is beyond the 
scope of this book. However, energy transitions in the context of transportation technology 
and policy can be illuminated by a brief glance at fundamental operating costs of existing 
and emerging vehicles. Consider a hypothetical comparison of 6 selected vehicles, using a 
variety of fuel sources and technologies, all subjected to the same real world conditions. Ta-
ble 9.2 summarizes first order results from one such thought experiment. It is by no means 
exhaustive, and while many assumptions must be made, such an exercise can begin to help 
quantify relative operating costs and impact on emissions for various vehicle architectures.16
The purpose of such a thought experiment is not to “advocate” for any particular 
option, nor to suggest that any specific vehicle, technology or company is best. Instead, 
it is meant to introduce the notion that numerous factors can be significant in a vehicle 
decision, and economic and environmental implications must be balanced against other 
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Vehicle  
Energy 
Source
Vehicle Make/
Model and 
Driving Mode
2013 
MSRP
Operating 
Cost  
Scenario 1  
($/mile)
Operating 
Cost  
Scenario 2  
($/mile)
Total Est. 
Emissions  
(t CO2)
Fuel  
Economy 
(mpg or 
mpge) 
Gasoline Ford Focus  (All Gasoline) $16,200 $0.365 $0.462 30.0 31
Diesel VW Jetta TDI (All Diesel) $22,990 $0.462 $0.538 31.8 34
Hybrid 
Gasoline
Toyota Prius 
(Hybrid  
Gasoline)
$24,200 $0.427 $0.487 18.6 50
Electric 
Vehicle 
(EV)
Nissan Leaf 
(Electricity 
Mix A)
$28,800 $0.445 $0.455 16.8 115
Nissan Leaf 
(Electricity 
Mix B)
$28,800 $0.445 $0.455 6.7 115
Nissan Leaf 
(With Subsidy) $21,300 $0.339 $0.349 6.7–19.3 115
Plug-in 
Hybrid EV 
(PHEV)
Chevy Volt  
(All Electric,  
Mix A)
$39,145 $0.600 $0.611 18.9 98
Chevy Volt (All 
Gasoline) $39,145 $0.668 $0.749 23.5 37
Chevy Volt 
(80/20 EV Gas, 
Mix A)
$39,145 $0.612 $0.639 19.2 74
Chevy Volt 
(80/20 EV Gas, 
Mix B)
$39,145 $0.613 $0.639 9.7 74
Chevy Volt  
(All Electric, 
with Subsidy)
$31,645 $0.494 $0.504 9.7–20.4 98
Chevy Volt  
(All Gasoline, 
with Subsidy)
$31,645 $0.561 $0.634 23.5 37
Com-
pressed 
Natural 
Gas (CNG)
Honda Civic 
NG $27,255 $0.488 $0.569 29.1 31
Table 9.2 Comparison of Vehicle Operating Cost and Emissions for Various Vehicle 
Architectures.16
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criteria and preferences, including safety and styling. That said, a more analytical assess-
ment of comparative options may help inform the interdependent development of tech-
nology and policy, while meeting long term consumer and social objectives. The reader is 
thus encouraged to consider how the rubber literally meets the road as personal values and 
preferences are put increasingly into a greater social and global energy/climate context.
9.1.7. Policy overview
The enactment of robust policies is essential to ensuring successful outcomes, as policies 
experience rapid iteration to varying degrees of success. Transport policy in particular is 
essential to achieve successful reduction of CO2 emissions. Some policies are aimed at tax-
ing fuel or creating market-based mechanisms for trading emissions and/or carbon credits. 
Others are encouraging, by subsidy, regulation or mandate, greater adoption of cleaner 
fuels, energy efficiency, and alternative energy sources. Economic uncertainty and broad 
differences of opinion among voters and their elected officials have made consensus on en-
ergy and climate policy difficult to achieve. State and local authorities often have more flex-
ibility to execute energy policy measures than large national governments. In the United 
States as of 2013, for example, a clean energy standard (CES) has been controversial at the 
Federal level, yet at least half of the fifty states have passed legislation such as a renewable 
portfolio standard (RPS) specifying certain amounts of renewable energy.17 In addition, 
many US states mandate the use of ethanol blended fuel (E10), and some impose additional 
requirements on renewable fuels, as in the case of the California Low Carbon Fuel Stan-
dard. The implementation of local, state, or regional policies may benefit from coordination 
with neighboring efforts, as policy effectiveness can be sensitive to scale. In addition, auto-
makers generally prefer a consistent policy and regulatory context to facilitate standardiza-
tion in design and manufacturing. Flexible and comprehensive policies that accommodate 
technological, economic, and social considerations can help relieve geopolitical and global 
economic stress and reduce emissions while helping to normalize trade balances. Thus, 
rectifying an overdependence on crude oil becomes a tremendous opportunity, with tri-
ple-bottom-line benefits. As the industry adapts and pursues a more sustainable future, the 
visionary spirit of Henry Ford, Thomas Edison, and the Wright brothers is alive and well 
today. This is welcome indeed, because a new journey of a thousand miles has begun.
9.2. Electric and hybrid Vehicles
9.2.1. Introduction
Today’s ground vehicles represent over a century of sustained technological progress 
and provide mobility and access that quite literally open doors to new worlds. They are 
seemingly ubiquitous; some eighty-one million were produced in 2011 alone. Figure 9.2 
shows global vehicle production between 1997 and 2011.18
It is well-known that the Internal Combustion Engine (ICE) Vehicle has dominated 
the industry over the last century, and effectively powers the vast majority of the world’s 
estimated one billion vehicles. As noted in the previous section, ensuring a sustainable 
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future for ground transportation will require solutions that help wean the world from 
petroleum-derived fuels and reduce emissions. In 2011, seventy-one percent of the pe-
troleum supplied to all sectors in the United States found its way to the fuel tanks of 
the nation’s boats, planes, trains, and predominantly, ground vehicles.19 The market is 
not yet diverse, as Hybrid Electric Vehicles (HEVs) accounted for 3% of total vehicles 
sales in the US in 2012, Electric Vehicles (EVs) just 0.3%, and Compressed Natural Gas, 
0.008%.20 The remainder of new car sales in the US (96.7%) are safely assumed to be 
conventional ICE vehicles operating with gasoline or diesel fuel. Recent annual growth 
trends for HEVs are noteworthy, and the US has more HEVs than any other county hav-
ing recently surpassed the one million mark, but change progresses slowly. While the 
market share of many alternatives is growing, diversification is still a relatively recent 
development. Despite that newer vehicles account for a greater share of the miles driven, 
the estimated fleet turnover ratio in the US is about fifteen to twenty years, implying 
the overall US fleet remains comprised of nearly ninety-nine percent gasoline or diesel 
powered vehicles.21 The composition of national fleets in other countries is not substan-
tially different, though the ratio of gasoline to diesel engines can vary considerably.
9.2.2. Challenges Faced by Transportation
The challenges to the transportation sector are as clear as they are significant, and while 
they may not be unique to this sector, they are certainly felt more acutely. The most im-
portant challenges are the threat of oil depletion, greenhouse gas emissions, and other 
tailpipe pollutants.
Figure 9.2: Global Vehicle Production Figures for Recent Years.
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Predictions about peak oil abound, but since 1983, global production of oil has ex-
ceeded global oil discoveries. Unconventional and deep offshore resources are coming 
online, but shortfalls and gaps between production and reserves have been known to re-
sult in higher prices. In turn, this may justify the use of new and unproven technologies 
and greater risks to extract oil that has previously been deemed uneconomic. Even with 
potentially expensive and unconventional supplies, crude oil is clearly a finite resource 
and its depletion is a legitimate concern.
The products of combustion of a petroleum derived fuel burned in oxygen in-
clude water (H2O) and carbon dioxide (CO2). Both emissions were once thought of as 
benign, non-polluting substances that could be safely released into the atmosphere. 
However, it has become clear that increasing levels of greenhouse gases, notably CO2, 
contribute to global warming and climate change. In 2009, transportation accounted 
for twenty-three percent of global CO2 emissions, ranking second among all sectors 
behind electricity.22
In the past, vehicles burned lower quality fuels in less efficient engines, resulting in 
high levels of air pollution concentrated in urban centers. Modern vehicles have signifi-
cantly reduced air pollutants such as NOx and SOx (gases comprising either nitrogen 
and oxygen or sulfur and oxygen). However, tailpipe emissions such as particulate mat-
ter from diesel exhaust can still cause health and respiratory conditions. With increas-
ing urbanization and vehicle use, localized air pollution poses a significant problem. 
This is particularly true for developing nations where vehicle fleets may be older or 
non-compliant with modern emissions standards.
9.2.3. The Role of Technology
From a global and social perspective we may consider a quantity of interest to be depen-
dent on multiple related factors namely: population size (P), affluence (A), technology 
(T), and end-user usage (U). A dimensional analysis illustrates how the resultant quan-
tity of interest can be expressed as the product of the disaggregated factors: 
For example, consider global CO2 emissions from transport in terms of appropriate 
factors.
The CO2 emissions per year (on a mass basis) depends on population size, the ratio 
of vehicles to people (affluence factor), the average mass of CO2 produced per kilometer 
of travel (technology factor), and the average number of kilometers traveled per year per 
vehicle (usage factor).
It may be difficult to calculate the factors individually but the effects of a change in 
any given factor are evident. The global population is about seven billion, and growing 
steadily. Similarly, vehicle ownership per capita is on an increasing trajectory worldwide. 
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Therefore, in order to reduce the level of CO2 emissions, we must look at reducing the 
remaining disaggregated factors: improvements in the technology to reduce the average 
mass of CO2 emitted per km, or reductions in vehicle usage in a given year.
Direct comparisons of CO2 emissions for ICE and EVs are complicated. CO2 esti-
mates for ICE vehicles are based on combustion chemistry of standardized and well-un-
derstood fuels. As noted in the previous section, the ideal combustion of one liter of 
octane produces approximately 2.3 kg of CO2 (Please see Table 9.1). The technology fac-
tor is estimated by multiplying the carbon intensity by the fuel economy: 2.3 × (L/km). 
Slight variances may apply for different fuel types or blends, but the approach and order 
of magnitude remain valid. This methodology is called a tank-to-wheel (T2W) analysis. 
On the other hand, EVs have no direct tailpipe emissions and we may assume that the 
corresponding technology factor is zero CO2/Km. However, if we extend the analysis to 
include the primary electricity source we find that the CO2 emissions and CO2 intensity 
per kWh vary greatly and are dependent upon the source of electricity. For EVs this 
approach for calculating CO2 emissions is called a well-to-wheel (W2W) analysis.
Similar thought exercises, as just described, may be performed on petroleum con-
sumption or tailpipe emissions in transportation by changing the technology factor. 
For petroleum consumption the technology factor is changed to fuel economy (L/km). 
For tailpipe emissions (such as NOx) the technology factor is changed to units of mass 
of unwanted emissions per km (for example, NOx/km). The role of technology is clear—
improvements in technology can reduce petroleum consumption, CO2 emissions, and 
other tailpipe emissions.
Recently, much discussion has revolved around the electrification of vehicle drive-
lines and the benefits conferred by these new technologies. Two distinct modes of elec-
tric vehicles have come to the fore, namely, the Electric Vehicle (EV) and the Hybrid 
Electric Vehicle (HEV). New electric mobility technologies are emerging as both viable 
competitors and complementary systems to the internal combustion engine.
9.2.4. a Brief automotive Journey Through Time
It is a mistake to consider vehicle electrification as a new technology, and the historical 
record is instructive as we look forward to a new era in transportation. The electric vehi-
cle has its own long-established history, enjoying a significant share of the vehicle mar-
ket during the industry’s early years (1895–1905). In the year 1900, for example, 4200 
vehicles were sold in the United States, of which forty percent were steam driven, thir-
ty-eight percent were EV, and twenty-two percent were ICE vehicles.23 Following early 
steam-powered vehicles by Cugnot (1769) and Trevithick (1801), Thomas Davenport 
developed one of the first DC electric motors and demonstrated its use on a small model 
vehicle in the 1830s. Shortly afterward, Robert Anderson developed a non-rechargeable 
Battery Electric Vehicle (BEV) which was followed by the invention of a rechargeable 
battery by Gaston Planté in the 1860s. Camille Faure (1881) improved this technology 
for use in BEVs.
Most of the initial EV designs were little more than a battery box and motor on 
a 4-wheel frame, using simple chain drive transmission systems. On a full charge, 
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the range from the lead acid battery cell was typically fifty miles with a top speed of 
thirty mph. The battery was charged in between uses by a stationary generator. In 
the early days of distributed electricity, slow and frequent recharging plagued the 
growth of the EV. However, 1897 would bring some milestone developments: in the 
US, Oldsmobile was formed to manufacture electric vehicles; in the UK, the London 
Electric Cab Company was launched; and in France, M. A. Darracq demonstrated 
regenerative braking technology.24 Regenerative braking converts a vehicle’s inertia 
back into stored electrical potential by using the electric motor as a generator. Despite 
this, the expense, short life, slow speed and limited range coupled with the large mass 
of chemical required to store electrical energy made early electric vehicles obsolete.
Conversely, gasoline/petrol/diesel vehicles overcame most of these shortcomings 
very early and grew quickly in appeal. Karl Benz is credited with developing the first 
ICE vehicle in 1885. By the early 20th century ICE vehicles were beginning to replace 
BEVs. Three major factors were responsible for the domination of the ICE vehicle over 
the BEV in the early years of the automobile:
1. BEV’s limited driving range compared to the ICE vehicle;
2. Advent of the Ford Model T production assembly line; and
3. Invention of the starter motor for the ICE.25
The BEV’s limited range was largely due to the low energy density of the battery tech-
nology of the day, which failed to mature sufficiently to compete with the energy stored in 
liquid fuels. While only gasoline, diesel, and some alcohols were available as liquid fuels 
in the early years, early batteries were far inferior to today’s NiMH and LiIon variants.
Henry Ford introduced the ICE-based Model T Ford in 1909, successfully pioneer-
ing the principles of mass production to place motor vehicles within financial reach of 
many in society. Unable to capitalize on economies of scale for reasons of both supply 
and demand, BEVs remained relatively expensive.
The early ICE vehicles (including the Model T) had one major drawback: the need 
for a crank start. This meant that the vehicle operator had to step out of the vehicle and 
manually turn the engine crank shaft via an external handle until the engine started. This 
operation required great effort and could be dangerous. In 1911, Charles Kettering solved 
this problem by connecting an electric starter motor to the engine’s crank shaft enabling 
the operator to easily start the ICE without exiting the vehicle. It seems ironic that batter-
ies and electric motors played a major role in the early conquest of the ICE over the BEV!
The first hybrid electric vehicles (HEV) came about in the early years too. Begin-
ning in 1897, hybrid electric vehicles operating with natural gas or gasoline were intro-
duced by Entz, Porsche, Jenatzy, the Electric Vehicle Company, Baker, and Owen, the 
latest of which was in production from 1915 to 1922.
It was not until the 1970s and the Arab oil embargo that concerns about oil supply 
resurfaced, renewing interest in electric vehicles. In the US, the Electric Vehicle Act of 
1976 was introduced while Victor Wouk, the so-called “godfather of the hybrid,” de-
veloped the concept of the HEV based on a Buick Skylark from General Motors. After 
testing by the EPA, Wouk’s prototype was verified to consume half the fuel and emit 
just nine percent of the emissions of the stock version.26
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Meanwhile, significant improvements in ICEs and reformulated gasoline took 
place as well, constantly raising the bar for competitive technologies. Many had a 
positive and lasting impact, such as the introduction of the catalytic converter, the 
phase-out of lead, the commercialization of biofuels, fuel injection, and sophisticated 
combustion controls.
More recently, modern EV and HEV have enjoyed a surge in attention through 
invigorated research and development. A pivotal moment came when General Motors 
launched the EV1 and, between 1996 and 1999, became the first to mass produce 
electric vehicles in the modern era. Ford quickly followed in 1998 with an all-electric 
pickup truck, the Ranger Electric, marketed primarily as a limited-use service vehicle 
to parks, couriers and utilities. The HEV entered the modern era to stay when Toy-
ota released the Prius to the Japanese market in 1997 and later worldwide, making it 
the first mass-produced HEV. Since these pivotal launches, HEVs have enjoyed greater 
market share than their EV counterparts. In 2012, the Society of Automotive Engineers 
listed twelve major original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) with production hybrid 
vehicles on the market. A few OEMs have brought EVs to market, such as Nissan with 
its Leaf. The Chevy Volt is classified as an extended range EV, and if driven less than 
forty miles per day and recharged every night, could theoretically never require gas-
oline. By combining power plants and energy sources, the Volt functions as a plug-in 
hybrid electric vehicle (PHEV). Though difficult to generalize and sensitive to electricity 
sources, one study suggests that an electric car can actually have a higher W2W carbon 
footprint than a gasoline vehicle until it has exceeded 130,000 km.27 This is partly due 
to the carbon emissions generated in the mining of materials such as lithium, copper 
and rare earth metals, and in the production of batteries for electric cars. Though not 
yet mainstream, fuel cell vehicles are also entering the mix, suggesting that our roads 
could be characterized by a great deal more technical diversity in the future, as noted in 
a market simulation performed by IEA shown in  Figure 9.3.
Figure 9.3. IEA Scenarios of Light Duty Vehicle (LDV) Market Share Through 2050.28
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9.2.5. Modern Vehicle Configurations
A vehicle may be classified by the technology used in its propulsion system. From an 
energy perspective, we consider how the energy is stored within the vehicle and how it 
is converted to kinetic energy. Hence, there are two distinct subsystems to consider: the 
Energy Storage (ES) system and the Driveline (DL) configuration.
From a thermodynamic viewpoint, we consider the system boundary around the en-
ergy system (dashed lines in Figure 9.4). We categorize vehicle energy systems as open or 
closed. In an open system, matter flows into and out of the system boundaries, such as air, 
fuel and exhaust. In closed systems, no matter crosses the thermodynamic system bound-
ary. Figure 9.4 shows the thermodynamic principles of open and closed systems applied 
to the automotive context.
In both open and closed systems, energy may pass the system boundary in the form 
of electrical energy, mechanical work, chemical potential, or heat. The law of conserva-
tion of energy applies to both systems. Note that in some systems (such as b) regener-
ative energy from the braking system may pass from the DL to ES device. In the open 
system, the law of conservation of matter applies; the matter that crosses into the system 
boundary must either be stored within or passed through the system boundary. The 
overall efficiency of the propulsion system is evaluated by dividing the useful kinetic 
energy by the total stored energy in the system. The effectiveness of a vehicle propulsion 
system can be assessed in view of three competencies:
1. The energy stored and made available at the wheel (total capacity to do work).
2. The power available at the wheel through the propulsion system (work per-
formed in a given time).
3. The rate and capacity to replenish the energy stored (ease of refueling or recharging).
Competency 1, the energy at the 
wheels, determines the potential range 
of the vehicle. It is a function of the ca-
pacity of the ES system and the overall 
efficiency of the propulsion system.
Competency 2, the power avail-
able at the wheels, is effectively the 
rate of conversion of energy from the 
ES to the drive train. It is a function 
of the overall efficiency of the propul-
sion system, and the capacity of the 
ES to deliver power to the DL system 
over time. Competency 2 differs from 
Competency 1 in that it represents 
the ability to extract stored energy at 
a sufficient rate to meet driving de-
mands. Hence, the power available at 
the wheels determines vehicle driving 
performance.
Figure 9.4. Open and Closed Thermodynamic 
Systems.
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Figure 9.5. Series Drivelines: (a) ICE Driveline, (b) BEV Driveline with Transaxle (c) 
BEV with In-Hub Motors; Hybrid Electric Drivelines: (d) Series Hybrid, (e) Parallel 
Hybrid, (f) Series-Parallel Hybrid; Complex Hybrid Drivelines (g) Two Wheel Drive, 
(h) Four Wheel Drive. FT: Fuel Tank; B: Battery; M: Motor; G: Generator.
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Competency 3, the capacity to replenish the ES, is a measure of how readily en-
ergy removed from the vehicle can be replaced, for example by refueling or recharg-
ing. It is purely a matter of end-user convenience and includes considerations of time 
and availability of energy infrastructure, such as fueling or charging stations, to re-
plenish the ES device.
The following sections highlight key points of ICE, EV, and HEV technology, but 
are not meant to be exhaustive.29
9.2.5.1. Internal Combustion Engine Vehicles
In an ICE vehicle, the ES system is a fuel tank where liquid fuel is stored in chemical 
form. The fuel is pumped to the engine on demand where it is mixed with air from the 
atmosphere and combusted within the engine. As noted in the preceding section, this 
process converts chemical potential to thermal energy which, in turn, imparts kinetic 
energy through the engine mechanism to a rotating shaft. The mechanical DL transmits 
this rotational kinetic energy via a system of gears, couplings, and driveshafts and deliv-
ers energy to the wheels, thus imparting kinetic energy to the vehicle. All of the energy 
conversion processes in this propulsion system occur in series. Diagram a in Figure 9.5 
shows a schematic of this driveline with the direction of energy flow.
The ICE vehicle is an open thermodynamic system. Fuel and air are the system in-
puts that enter the system boundary at the fuel tank throat and air intakes respectively; 
and the products of combustion, such as exhaust gases, exit the system boundary at the 
tailpipe. From this, it follows that a vehicle’s overall system efficiency can be defined as 
the useful work performed divided by the total value of the energy input.
Consider gasoline, which has a specific higher calorific value of approximately 46 
MJ/kg or in volumetric terms 34 MJ/L. For a full 50 liter (13.2 gal) tank of gasoline, the 
chemical potential (ES) is 1700 MJ (475 kWh). Since the energy available at the wheels 
is dependent on the overall efficiency, then stored energy available at the wheels, given 
a typical overall efficiency of twenty percent, is 340 MJ (or 95 kWh).
The distance a vehicle can travel on 50 L of fuel (or 340 MJ of energy at the wheel) 
depends on vehicle performance, driver inputs, and driving conditions. Using average 
fuel economy values, a typical modern gasoline ICE vehicle with an engine size of 1.6 
L is 6.6 L/100 km and a fifty-liter fuel tank would, on average, permit 757 kilometers 
of driving. This exercise demonstrates that an ICE vehicle, even with its low overall 
efficiency, converts a modest amount of fuel into ample energy at the wheels, and by 
extension, range to the vehicle.
Next, consider the rate of conversion of energy, or power, for such a vehicle. Imag-
ine that a particular driving condition requires 20 kW of power at the wheels. Again 
assuming a twenty percent overall efficiency, 100 kW of energy are required through the 
propulsion system from the tank; this is referred to as fuel power. Knowing the energy 
content is 46 MJ/kg, a fuel power of 100 kW would require 2.17 g/s of fuel to be pumped 
into the engine and injected into the cylinders for combustion. Again, we note that even 
in this low efficiency system, small amounts of fuel (on the order to grams per second) 
are required to deliver the specified instantaneous power.
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A refill of a fifty-liter fuel tank typically takes less than five minutes to complete. 
Hence, with respect to all three competencies, we see that gasoline is a dense, pow-
erful, and convenient source of energy. Its overall suitability as a source of energy to 
an open thermodynamic system helps to explain the dominance of the ICE vehicle in 
everyday use.
That said, ICE vehicles are actually quite inefficient in their use of energy. Because 
of the open thermodynamic system, undesirable exhaust gases are steadily emitted. 
The required range of engine performance must match a wide range of driving con-
ditions: take off from a standstill, repeated stop-and-go, high-speed cruising, accel-
erating at high speed, and hill climbing. To achieve this, the DL must have different 
gear ratios to help match the engine’s torque-speed characteristic to those required 
where the wheels meet the road. Hence, the DL, with its gearboxes and drive shafts, 
is bulky and adds considerable weight to the vehicle. A great deal of the energy input 
for many vehicles is consumed in simply conveying the vehicle itself. In addition, the 
engine cannot provide a stall torque, or a torque without rotation, which means the 
engine has to be running as the vehicle takes off from a standing start. Historically, 
this has meant that in urban driving when the vehicle is waiting in traffic, the engine 
is consuming fuel to keep it idling, but produces no useful kinetic energy. Under 
this condition, the overall efficiency is effectively zero percent. Even though OEMs 
have begun addressing such inefficiencies (for example by applying selective cylinder 
shut-off or idle-off control schemes), the incredible convenience and suitability of 
petroleum fuels in the ICE has created inherent shortcomings that leave much room 
for improvement.
9.2.5.2. Electric Vehicles
The Electric Vehicle (EV), or Full Electric Vehicle (FEV), is one where the only energy 
source on the vehicle is an electrical one. The Battery Electric Vehicle (BEV) is an exam-
ple of a Full Electric Vehicle. Since the battery must be charged by an external source, 
the term Plug-In Electric Vehicle (PEV) is sometimes used.
Figures 9.5(b) and 9.5(c) show two possible architectures for a BEV. Both versions of 
EV drivelines shown are examples of series architecture. Figure 9.5(b) shows a version 
with a single motor, which means that a transaxle with a differential gear system is re-
quired to divide and direct the drive torque to the wheels, not unlike a conventional ICE 
drivetrain. Figure 9.5(c) demonstrates the flexibility of the EV architecture, where two 
motors may be used: one to drive each wheel. The electric motor can act as a generator 
in reverse, thus regenerative braking is readily achievable with little additional cost. For 
this reason the power flow from the wheels to the motor to the battery is shown as being 
bi-directional.
EV performance under Competency 1 is determined by the capacity of the ES and 
the overall efficiency of the propulsion system. Typically, EV drivelines exhibit very 
high overall efficiencies, on the order of ninety percent. However, the energy densities of 
modern batteries are a significant constraint on the ES capacity and hence vehicle range. 
State-of-the-art battery technologies are based on Nickel-Metal Hydride (Ni-MH) and 
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Lithium Ion (Li-ion) chemistry. Practical values for the specific energies of these tech-
nologies are 270 kJ/kg for Ni-MH and 648 kJ/kg for Li-ion.30 Lithium-ion technology, 
popularized in cell phones and laptop applications, is becoming the preferred choice 
for EV architectures. However, the specific energy values should be compared to the 
calorific value of petroleum fuels, 46 MJ/kg, up to two orders of magnitude greater. At 
the system level, we can compare the ICE vehicle’s 95 kWh of energy content from its 
50L fuel tank with the EV and PHEV shown in Table 9.2, which have battery capacities 
of 24 kWh and 16.5 kWh respectively.
EV performance under Competency 2 is also limited by the ES and the battery tech-
nology. Typical specific power values for modern batteries vary widely and range from 
5 to 400 W/kg,31 or about 25 kWh per charge for the EV and PHEV vehicles shown in 
Table 9.2. Furthermore, a technology tradeoff exists in modern batteries between spe-
cific power and specific energy. In other words, most batteries are optimized to either 
deliver low levels of continuous power over extended periods (like a laptop), or surges 
of peak power for brief periods (like a cordless drill). Today’s vehicles frequently require 
both in sufficient quantity on any given trip. Studies of various battery technologies 
demonstrate that maximum specific power is achieved with a significant reduction in 
specific energy and vice versa.32
Also under Competency 2, acceleration performance can be excellent for vehicles 
propelled with an electric motor, as full torque is available throughout the speed range. 
This provides for a quicker response from start and smoother transitions between 
speeds at greatly enhanced efficiencies, as compared to ICE vehicles that require dis-
crete gears and sub-optimal engine power matching.
EV performance under Competency 3 has three major considerations: the time to 
fully recharge at one sitting, the availability of charging points in a recharging infra-
structure, and the number of recharges permitted during the lifetime of the battery. 
Typically recharging a battery takes much longer than filling a fuel tank (even in so-
called “quick charge” high voltage modes). Vehicle charging stations are increasing in 
number in many urban centers, but are not inexpensive and lag significantly behind 
the number of conventional refueling stations. A related consideration is that in many 
urban centers where EV uptake is targeted, many consumers lack a garage or a reserved 
parking space to reliably recharge overnight. Batteries have lifecycles in the range of 
150–1500 recharge cycles.33 Li-ion batteries in particular have issues with electrolyte 
decomposition and the formation of oxide films on the battery terminals that affect the 
life of the battery.
9.2.5.3. Hybrid Electric Vehicles
The Hybrid Electric Vehicle, or HEV, is used to describe a vehicle that has at least two 
onboard Energy Storage systems, where the energy from each storage systems is used 
to propel the vehicle either directly or indirectly. The purpose of the HEV architecture 
is to exploit the benefits of two energy storage technologies. Possible combinations in-
clude, but are not limited to ICE with an electric motor powered by a battery, capacitor 
or flywheel, or an electric motor powered by a fuel cell and a battery or a capacitor. Our 
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focus will be on the most common hybrid combination on the market, namely, ICE 
paired with a battery-powered electric motor.
Figure 9.5(d) shows the simplest hybrid driveline, called a series hybrid. As with the 
previous series architectures the energy conversion processes may be logically consid-
ered to occur one after another. This architecture can enjoy the benefits of regenerative 
braking. Two particular advantages of this architecture include reduced demand for 
the ICE and optimization of operating speed for the ICE as its sole purpose is to run 
the generator. Figure 9.5(e) shows an alternative architecture called the parallel hybrid. 
Here, two power streams interface at a suitable point in the driveline, delivering their 
combined effort through a customized mechanism. Figure 9.5(f) shows a series-parallel 
hybrid driveline. This driveline leverages two control methodologies- one that exploits 
the presence of the generator to improve engine efficiency and a second that provides 
for operation in a more conventional direct gasoline mode. The drive from the ICE may 
be used to directly drive the axle or generate electricity to recharge the battery. The 
trade-off for this type of architecture is that it requires a sophisticated Engine Control 
Unit (ECU).
Even more sophisticated complex hybrid drivelines have reached the market. Figure 
9.5(g) shows a two-wheel drive version of a complex hybrid driveline which is found 
on the latest Toyota Prius. In this architecture the generator may be used in motoring 
mode to add additional drive to the axle. Figure 9.5(h) shows a four-wheel drive version 
of a complex hybrid driveline, which is found on the Lexus RX450h. Parallel-series 
drive is provided to one axle via the combined efforts of the ICE and motor. A second 
motor supplies drive to the second axle in isolation. Coordinated control for such ar-
chitectures is critical.
Each HEV has specific advantages and disadvantages. However, in general HEV 
performance under Competency 1 is an improvement over EV and ICE vehicles. Over-
all efficiencies are on the order of thirty-five percent, which is not as good as EVs that 
can reach sixty percent, but considerably better than the twenty to twenty-five percent 
range typical of ICE vehicles. Caution is advised here when comparing vehicle system 
efficiencies that are purely tank-to-wheels (T2W). A well-to-wheels measurement would 
capture electricity efficiency, oil mining, and refining, which could narrow significantly 
the margin in overall efficiency between EV and gasoline vehicles. Because petroleum 
fuel is used as the primary on-board energy source, the ES storage capacity is high. 
Ni-Mh storage capacity is typically sufficient for HEV. HEV vehicles currently have the 
greatest stored energy available to the wheels and hence the longest driving ranges.
HEV performance under Competency 2 is generally comparable to other vehicle 
technologies. The combination of stored energy in the fuel tank and the battery can be 
made available to the wheels at the required power level by using either by the motor, 
the engine, or both. One drawback impacting performance is the additional mass (due 
the larger battery pack and sophisticated DL) as compared to the ICE vehicle’s conven-
tional DL.
HEV performance under Competency 3 is directly comparable to the ICE Vehicle. 
This is because petroleum-based fuel is the primary energy source to be replenished. 
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Some HEV architectures, such as plug-in HEV or PHEV, have been designed to tap into 
cheaper electrical energy available from the grid. As mentioned, the Chevy Volt is an 
example of PHEV architecture.
As discussed, the power density of electric batteries is much lower than that of 
gasoline, meaning electric cars require more space to store that power in batteries, 
adding energy-sapping weight. The engines of electric cars are generally smaller than 
gasoline or diesel engines, but the size and mass of the batteries offsets any net ad-
vantage. In addition, the user is effectively paying for multiple drivetrains which in-
deed improve efficiency, but at a cost premium. The main performance advantage of 
the electric car is its low energy consumption when accelerating from start and at 
lower speeds, enabled by precision control. Hybrid cars take advantage of the electric 
drivetrain in acceleration at low speeds and then switch automatically to gasoline for 
higher speeds requiring sustained power. This enables HEVs to get the best of both 
worlds. When the engine runs on gasoline, it automatically charges the battery of the 
electric engine.
9.2.6. Government Policies and Initiatives for Change in the automobile Market
It is clear that ICE is the dominant and mature technology in the automotive sector. 
Because of evolving longer term sustainability concerns with ICE (high CO2, unwanted 
gaseous and particulate emissions, low efficiency, and oil dependence) competing tech-
nologies will increasingly replace the ICE over time. In the short and medium terms, 
improvements in ICE technologies are expected to further improve the performance of 
the ICE, as noted in the previous section.
Presently, the technology closest to matching the performance of the ICE is the elec-
tric motor. However, just as the Achilles heel of ICE is oil dependence, the Achilles heel of 
the EV sector is low energy density and the high cost of battery technology. The EV revo-
lution will not happen overnight, nor will it happen in the short term. It could also incur 
large system costs, beyond the traditional purchase price of the vehicle itself. Some cost 
premiums may be justified, but more data will be required in the coming years.
Currently, there is a major political drive to deploy a diverse array of new vehicle 
technologies including hybrid, electric, and future alternatives that substitute batteries, 
fuel cells, or even hydrogen for traditional fuels.
Though not exhaustive, Table 9.3 provides a few examples of areas where specific 
policies are being enacted across themes and regions.
Governments could use a feebate system (McKinsey Report), where revenue from 
high taxes and penalties on poor performers could be used to provide the fiscal incen-
tives to support a growing market share for electric vehicles.34
A real objective of policymakers is to reduce oil consumption and emissions, but 
achieving market share for EV and HEV technologies has become a proxy for these goals. 
Economists warn that solutions be market-based and realistic. Table 9.4 provides a snap-
shot of targets worldwide. This list is not exhaustive and is subject to change in policy.
At the municipal level, many cities and large urban centers have introduced local 
initiatives and policies for promoting the use of EV technologies. Short commuting 
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distances within urban centers will suit the current performance characteristics of EV. 
The OECD and IEA have jointly published the EV City Casebook, providing a review of 
the global electric vehicle movement in sixteen urban centers across the United States, 
Europe, China and Japan.36 IEA has also launched an international effort, the Elec-
tric Vehicle Initiative (EVI), in which more than a dozen countries are collaborating to 
remove hurdles and speed adoption via policies, standards, infrastructure, and infor-
mation sharing. EVI has recently published the “Global EV Outlook,” with a detailed 
summary of the EV landscape through 2020.37
Policy Theme Embodiment Example  Country or Region
Fuel Economy Numeric standards and targets in the form of mpg or L/100 km
United States, Japan, 
Canada, Australia, 
Taiwan, South Korea
Emission Standards Emission targets for new vehicles to market
European Union, 
United States (Califor-
nia & Federal level)
Fuel Taxes Tax fuel sales to reduce fuel consumption.
European Union, 
Japan
Fiscal Incentives
Give tax relief based on engine 
size, efficiency, CO2 emissions. 
Provide subsidies for new 
cleaner technologies
European Union, 
Japan
Fiscal Penalties
Penalise poor performers: low 
efficiency vehicles operators and 
high polluters
Paris (Ban on SUVs)
Research and  
Development
Promote private and public sec-
tor research for cleaner energy 
technology and alternative fuels
European Union, 
Japan, United States, 
others
Traffic Control  
Measures
Allow lane privileges to EV and 
HEV vehicles United States, Norway
Change Consumer 
Behavior
Educational programs on EV 
technology
Government Fleet 
Procurement
EV technology in public service 
fleets via public and public-pri-
vate procurement
Market Share Targets Set mandates to introduce new technology targets See Table 9.4.
Table 9.3. Policy Themes Being Enacted Worldwide.
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Policymakers will play an important role in the gradual adoption of EV tech-
nology to the market. A joint approach with a full range of stakeholder views should 
inform policy decisions. Stakeholders include auto manufacturers and suppliers, fuel 
and energy providers, government agency and public sector authorities, and con-
sumers. Policymakers must balance the need for quick action on climate change and 
energy security with the pitfalls of economic hardship arising from bad policy deci-
sions. It is important that policy works at the pace of technology maturation. Sound 
policy will in turn expedite and encourage technology development and maturation 
in key areas, thus, providing consumer confidence and an increased market share for 
clean technologies.
9.3. aviation Fuels and Regulation
A predominant reliance on petroleum may be a significant issue for cars, trucks, and 
ground transportation, but it is felt even more acutely in aviation; as yet, little compares 
in delivering the necessary energy density, availability, and cost. A century-old indus-
try, air transport has been built around fossil fuels- arguably been made possible by 
them; and the technological and financial barriers to entry are among the greatest of 
any industry. Debates ensue about whether such demanding specifications justify the 
complex conversion of limited biomass to jet fuel. And yet, an interesting journey has 
Country/Region Target Target Date
United States 1,000,000 2015
China 5,000,000 2020
Japan 20% “Next-generation” autos 100% “Next-generation” autos
2020 
2050
Canada 500,000 2018
Europe 15,000,000 2025
Denmark 200,000 2020
France 2,000,000 2020
Germany 1,000,000 2020
Ireland 350,000 40% market share
2020 
2030
The Netherlands 10,000 in Amsterdam 200,000 in Amsterdam
2015 
2040
Spain 1,000,000 2014
Sweden 600,000 2020
United Kingdom 1,200,000 BEV; 350,000 PHEV 3,300,000 BEV; 7,900,000 PHEV
2020 
2030
India 100,000 2020
Table 9.4 Electric or Advanced Vehicle Targets by Region.35 
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Fuel Cells
Much basic research has been allocated to the development of hydrogen fuel cells. 
While this technology is by no means commercially viable as yet, it may eventu-
ally help resolve some of the range, power, and emission concerns prevalent today. 
In addition to potential cost barriers, hydrogen sourcing and infrastructure loom 
large as key challenges. That said, it is important that a robust vehicle diversification 
strategy include a range of options. Fuel cell energy storage for future generation 
vehicles may equal or indeed surpass advanced battery systems. If so, they will cer-
tainly help satisfy some of the longer term objectives in the drive toward sustainable 
transportation.
A basic fuel cell operates by conversion rather than combustion and is based on 
an electrochemical cell. Fuel cells contain an anode and cathode, separated by an 
electrolyte. The anode receives hydrogen (H2) from a supply at low pressure while the 
cathode receives oxygen or filtered air. At the anode, hydrogen molecules split into 
protons and electrons. If the anode and cathode are then connected via an electrical 
conductor, the protons from the anode move through the electrolyte toward the cath-
ode. The electrons move through the conductor to the cathode and can supply electric 
curent to a moter or other appliance load. At the cathode, protons and electrons react 
to form water with the supplied oxygen. In the long term, hydrogen fuel cells may 
become suitable green car technology with the potential to offer the power and range 
of a conventional gasoline engine with water as the only byproduct. 
Fuel cells have relatively few moving parts, so recurring maintenance costs are 
lower, helping reduce overall lifetime cost. They are comparatively efficient—some 
technologies can convert more than fifty per cent of the energy content of the hydro-
gen to electrical power. Notwithstanding the tank-to-wheel (T2W) uncertainty of the 
fuel supply, however, fuel cells are more efficient than diesel generators. Due to their 
modular design, additional cells can be added to the system, increasing the amount 
of power produced without replacing the whole system. Fuel cells are generally dis-
tinguished by their electrolyte and brief description of major technologies follows.
Alkaline fuel cells were among the first to be developed, and use an alkaline 
electrolyte such as potassium hydroxide. Catalysts include a variety of non-precious 
metals, but their main drawback is poisoning of the cell by carbon dioxide. 
Direct methanol fuel cells use a polymer membrane as the electrolyte but are 
differentiated in their fuel type, which is pure methanol. 
Proton exchange membrane or polymer electrolyte membrane (PEM) fuel cells 
use a polymeric membrane as the electrolyte, with carbon electrodes and a plati-
num catalyst. Their high power density and fast start-up time make them the most 
suitable fuel cell for transport applications.
Phosphoric acid fuel cells use liquid phosphoric acid as an electrolyte and po-
rous carbon electrodes containing a platinum catalyst. This is one of the most ma-
ture fuel cell technologies and is mainly deployed in stationary power applications.
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begun as leading aviation stakeholders are engaged in the pursuit of sustainable eco-
nomic and environmental solutions.
9.3.1. The Global aviation Industry
The goal of the aviation industry is to provide quick, safe, and affordable transporta-
tion of passengers and cargo to destinations all over the globe. Air transportation is 
the only viable means of transport between many areas of the world, as other means of 
travel such as by ship, automobile or train are impractical or are unavailable. Aviation 
provides social benefits as well, for example by providing access to distant or remote 
locales and relief during in times of disaster. The Air Transport Action Group projects 
that aviation accounts for 56.6 million jobs worldwide and $2.2 trillion in GDP.38 Yet 
the economic engine that is aviation does not run without burning fuel and producing 
emissions. Therefore, efforts to reduce energy consumption and emissions in aviation 
are vital to the long-term sustainability of the industry. As noted in Chapter 2, a pivotal 
US policy developed to improve energy independence while reducing emissions is the 
Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA) of 2007. This law identifies specific goals 
for improved efficiency standards for fuel economy, appliances, lighting and buildings; 
as well as increased production of biofuels.39 
The transportation sector accounts for about 28.1% of US energy consumption.40 In 
2012, US jet fuel consumption was 22 billion gallons (512 million barrels), or about eight 
percent of total US petroleum use. Commercial air carrier operations accounted for the 
majority of this total, with domestic flights out-consuming US-originated international 
flights by nearly two to one.41 Aviation gasoline accounts for about one percent of US 
aviation fuels, with a consumption of about 221 million gallons (5 million barrels). In 
comparison, 192 billion gallons (4.6 billion barrels) of gasoline and diesel were used in 
ground transportation, a sector that accounts for more than seventy percent of total US 
petroleum consumption.42 Annual worldwide jet fuel consumption for the aviation in-
dustry is around 63 billion gallons (1500 million barrels) as estimated by the Air Trans-
port Action Group.43
In 2012, 2.9 billion passengers flew over 5.3 trillion kilometers. The International 
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) is projecting an annual growth rate of 4.9% through 
Molten carbonate fuel cells (MCFCs) are high temperature fuel cells in which a 
molten salt mixture is suspended in a ceramic matrix. They can reach much higher 
efficiencies and are currently being developed for electrical applications in natural 
gas and coal power plants. Durability is a primary disadvantage due to corrosion 
resulting from high temperature operation.
Solid oxide fuel cells (SOFCs) operate at extremely high temperatures and as 
a result are projected to have extremely high efficiencies. SOFCs can utilize less 
expensive catalyst materials and a greater variety of fuel sources. Slow start up and 
durability may limit their use in mobile applications, yet development is underway 
to optimize performance at lower temperatures.
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2030, meaning that passenger traffic and total flight kilometers would more than double 
in the next twenty years. Such growth will put extraordinary demands on fuel supply 
with significant environmental implications. Of particular importance is the impact of 
air transportation on CO2 emissions, which are expected to increase at an annual rate 
of two to three percent, up to three percent of the global total from all sources by 2050.44 
Numerous initiatives are aimed at reducing the carbon footprint of aviation on both 
national and international levels. As we delve further into this, it becomes apparent how 
the future of the aviation industry is inextricably linked to its energy source.
9.3.2. aviation Fuels overview
In addition to creating propulsive power, fuel serves several other important functions 
in aircraft. In jet aircraft, heat is generated by the combustion of fuel and by friction 
between aircraft surfaces and surrounding air at operating speeds. Aircraft designers 
use the heat absorbing capacity of fuel to dissipate heat and help cool the aircraft. The 
lubricity of fuel is a critical property in the engine and fuel system of the aircraft. Fuel 
can also be used as the working fluid in hydraulic systems and for load balancing.
Most commercial and private aircraft use one of three fuels: aviation gasoline (av-
gas), jet fuel of various types (such as Jet A, Jet A-1, Jet B, or JP-8), and diesel. Diesel is 
used in small quantities for ground operations and in a limited number of flight appli-
cations; hence the principal focus here will be on the other two primary aviation fuels. 
Avgas represents the last leaded transportation fuel permitted in the US, and current 
efforts are focused on replacing lead in this fuel by 2018. For jet fuel, the current focus 
is on petroleum alternatives and managing the emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) and 
other GHGs. Particulate matter emissions are gaining in importance as well, particu-
larly because some alternative jet fuels emit smaller particulate matter and health im-
pacts are believed to increase with decreasing particle size.
In 2012, fuel costs comprised thirty-three percent of airline operating expenses, 
and represented the largest portion of airline costs. This is in dramatic contrast to their 
fourteen percent share in 2003. Due to a strong correlation between fuel and operating 
expenses, the industry is eager to reduce fuel consumption on economic grounds. En-
during technical focus on efficiency, weight reductions, and flight optimization tech-
niques have resulted in significant fuel savings in recent decades. Figure 9.6 documents 
these trends in aircraft energy intensity during the past fifty years.
Air carriers have significantly increased overal net efficiency (the number of aircraft 
miles flown per gallon of fuel). This metric incorporates both operational and techno-
logical efficiency gains. Table 9.5 uses data from the US Department of Transportation 
to calculate percent improvement, indicating that aircraft miles flown per gallon for 
domestic air operations has increased sixty-seven percent from 0.32 in 1990 to 0.54 in 
2011. A forty-one percent increase has been estimated for international operations. It 
should be noted that “aircraft miles per gallon” are lower for international flights owing 
to the use of larger aircraft with increased weight. However, such flights typically carry 
more passengers than domestic flights, meaning the energy efficiency per passenger 
mile is actually comparable to shorter flights.
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Despite these promising trends linking sustained innovation to reduced energy use, 
the recent volatility of fuel prices has made it difficult for airlines to forecast key op-
erating costs and has impacted profitability. During the past decade, many global air 
carriers have been required to restructure their businesses, and many have faced bank-
ruptcy. While a variety of factors may have contributed to this situation, financial stress 
in aviation has been exacerbated by vulnerability and risk associated with fuel costs. 
Continuing to reduce fuel usage is therefore crucial in order to help the sector achieve 
economic, environmental and social sustainability. Accordingly, the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) has set a goal to “improve the National Airspace System (NAS) 
energy efficiency by at least two percent per year, and develop and deploy alternative jet 
fuels for commercial aviation.”47
Today’s aviation fuels are almost exclusively petroleum derived. To an even greater 
extent than ground transport, the capital-intensive aviation sector developed around pe-
troleum fuels due to their unique combination of operating characteristics, energy density, 
availability, and reasonable cost. Engines and aircraft systems are extremely expensive 
Figure 9.6. Energy Intensity in Aviation.45 Note: Energy Intensity (vertical-axis) is De-
fined as Megajoules Per Passenger Kilometer Traveled (MJ/p-km); 1.4 MJ/p-km Equals 
Approximately 49 Passenger-miles Per US Gallon; 1.0 MJ/p-km ~ = 70mpg.
Year Domestic  
Operation
Improvement 
from 1990
International 
Operations
Improvement 
from 1990
1990 0.32 0.19
1995 0.36 11% 0.22 15%
2000 0.38 17% 0.23 21%
2005 0.48 48% 0.26 33%
2010 0.53 64% 0.28 45%
2011 0.54 67% 0.27 41%
Table 9.5. Aircraft Miles Flown Per Gallon.46
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and therefore designed for long life through a rigorous product development schedule 
where ten years is not atypical. Fleet turnovers are commensurately slow, on the order of 
twenty-five years. This is easily understood when one considers that a Boeing B737–800 
can cost $89 million; a B787–8, $206 million; and an Airbus A380 reportedly costs $375 
million.48 Taken along with entrenched support infrastructure, it is important to note that 
major changes of any kind can be costly, long term propositions in the aviation business.
9.3.3. alternative aviation Fuels and Emissions
Despite the complexity of introducing alternatives to petroleum jet fuel, the potential 
benefits of improved price stability, supply diversity, and reduced environmental im-
pacts are broadly supported. Renewable fuels are alone among viable petroleum fuel 
replacements in aviation, as neither batteries, fuel cells, nor any other low carbon 
technologies can yet deliver on the overall requirements. An important constraint on 
potential new fuels is the requirement they be “drop-in,” meaning operationally indis-
tinguishable from petroleum-based fuels. If fuels are not drop-in, then the required 
modifications to aircraft, engines, and aviation infrastructure for the transportation, 
storage and delivery of aviation fuels would make alternative fuels cost-prohibitive and 
operationally difficult. Should an alternative fuel necessitate changes to the aircraft sys-
tem, the aircraft would be required to undergo extensive testing and evaluation and be 
certified (or type-certificated) to use that fuel.
Under the drop-in caveat, significant strides have been made including the certifi-
cation of two alternative fuel specifications which have been tested on a myriad of mil-
itary and commercial test flights. Blends of petroleum-based Jet A/A-1 with up to fifty 
percent alternative fuels are accepted for aviation turbine engine use if compliant with 
jet fuel specifications ASTM D1655 and ASTM D7566. Because neat (one hundred per-
cent) biofuels have certain characteristics that fall outside of jet fuel requirements such 
as low aromatic content or higher freezing points, the fifty percent blending allowance 
permits mixtures to comply with specifications. There is no currently approved alterna-
tive fuel for aviation gasoline, but research efforts are underway to produce an unleaded 
aviation gasoline that performs as well as 100-octane leaded avgas (100LL) and meets 
the same specifications (ASTM D910 and ASTM D6227).
Liquid drop-in alternative jet fuels can be produced by the conversion of feedstocks 
(such as coal, natural gas, or biomass) through a variety of technical pathways. The 
two ASTM-approved methods are the Fischer-Tropsch method, which converts solids 
to synthesis gases and then liquid fuels, and the Hydrotreated Esters and Fatty Acids 
(HEFA) method, which converts oil-based biomass into hydrocarbon molecules similar 
to kerosene. Pathways that utilize non-food feedstocks are preferable, as they do not 
compete for conventional agricultural land. Certified fuels must satisfy alternative jet 
fuel production methods and jet fuel specifications. A summary of primary conversion 
pathways is provided in Table 9.6.
In addition to alternative fuel technologies, research in aircraft propulsion is also a 
growing area of development. While the energy density of electric power is a barrier for 
transport category electric aircraft, significant advances in unmanned and personal-use 
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aircraft have been achieved. Comparative Aircraft Flight Efficiency’s CAFE Foundation 
conducts annual electric aircraft symposia to usher in the “age of electric flight.” The 
CAFE Foundation hosts a Green Flight Challenge Program incentivizing the develop-
ment of sustainable, ultra-quiet and emission-free flight.50 Solar powered aircraft and 
hybrid aircraft are being developed for selected applications as well. In addition to re-
ducing fuel consumption, the aviation industry is endeavoring to reduce greenhouse 
gas and particulate emissions; yet without successfully introducing some quantity of 
renewable alternatives, the aviation sector has few options to meaningfully reduce its 
carbon footprint. The primary emissions of jet fuel combustion are carbon dioxide, wa-
ter vapor, nitrogen oxides, and particulate matter. Petroleum-based fuels contain sulfur 
and emit trace quantities of sulfur oxides, whereas bio-derived jet fuels have little or no 
sulfur. An important difference between aviation and other industries is that emissions 
are delivered to the atmosphere not only locally, but also in the atmosphere at altitude.
Comparison of alternative to petroleum-based fuels are made on a life cycle basis 
from well-to-wake, or from the origin of the inputs through point of use in the aircraft. 
The well-to-wake method offers a more complete environmental and cost impact anal-
ysis than that of a wheel-to-wake approach. A new fuel may appear environmentally 
attractive based on the wheel-to-wake process, but may be characterized by greater en-
vironmental impacts during its conversion than petroleum-based fuels. Improper land 
use change or inefficient collection/conversion methods might explain why total  life 
cycle analysis (LCA) could become less favorable for a biofuel. Agreement on metrics 
ASTM Specification Status Description Typical Feedstocks
D1655–99 Approved, June 1999 Petroleum Jet Fuel Crude Oil
D7566-Annex A1 Approved, Sept. 2009 Fischer Tropsch (FT)
Coal, Natural Gas, 
Biomass
D7566-Annex A2 Approved, July 2011
Hydroprocessed 
Esters & Fatty Acids 
(HEFA)
Plant oils, animal 
fats, algae
D7566-Future  
Annexes
Under Review
Alcohol-to-Jet  
(ATJ) Fuel
Ethanol, Butanol, 
Methanol
D7566-Future  
Annexes
Under Review
Direct Sugar to Hy-
drocarbons (DSHC)
Sugar cane, Cellosic 
Biomass
D7566-Future  
Annexes
Under Review
Hydrotreated Depo-
lymerized Cellulosic 
Jet (HDCJ)
Cellulosic Biomass, 
Ag. Residue
D7566-Future  
Annexes
Under Review
Catalytic Hydro-
thermolysis (CH) or 
Pyrolysis
Plant oils, other 
renewable oils
D7566-Future  
Annexes
Under Review
Catalytic Conversion 
of Sugar
Sugar cane, Corn 
Stover, Biomass
Table 9.6 Summary of Alternative Jet Fuel Conversion Pathways, 2013.49
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and methods for LCA are inherently complicated, yet are being discussed within gov-
ernments, organizations, and ICAO. Thankfully, the aviation community can draw 
from a wide body of existing literature and research regarding environmental impacts 
of biofuels in general.
9.3.4. Policy Frameworks and Initiatives for Greening the aviation Industry
The simultaneous challenges of expanding aviation while reducing its environmen-
tal impact clearly requires the implementation of practical and coordinated policies 
on both national and international levels. International aviation is excluded from the 
Kyoto Protocol, and instead the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) is 
charged with the development of policies and standards that will reduce GHG emis-
sions in aviation.51
ICAO is a United Nations specialized agency that provides a forum for UN nations 
to collaborate on standards and regulations, and is charged with promoting global avia-
tion safety, security, environmental protection, and sustainable development of air trans-
portation. ICAO supports policies for market-based emission reduction and sustainable 
alternative fuel.52 Due to the expected climatic impact of aviation, ICAO alternative fuels 
efforts fall under its environmental protection mission. ICAO created the Global Frame-
work for Alternative Aviation Fuels (GFAAF) to highlight and communicate goals and 
progress in the development and use of alternative aviation fuels. GFAAF facilitates fora 
to harmonize definitions, standards, methodologies, and financial incentives. 
The ICAO Committee on Aviation and Environmental Protection (CAEP) seeks to 
develop an international carbon dioxide emissions standard that will include life cycle 
and emissions impacts of alternative fuels and technologies. The ICAO Aircraft Engine 
Emissions Databank contains information on exhaust emissions for production aircraft 
engines with rated output exceeding 26.7kN (6000 lbs). Emissions data is provided by 
engine manufacturers using ICAO approved procedures and is currently available for 
Jet A/A-1 petroleum-based fuels. The standards limit the emissions of smoke, unburned 
hydrocarbons, carbon monoxide, and oxides of nitrogen from turbojet and turbofan 
aircraft engines.53 Studies by NASA, including the Alternative Aviation Fuel Experi-
ment (AAFEX II) and the Alternative Fuel Effects on Contrails and Cruise Emissions 
(ACCESS), are being conducted on the ground and at altitude to quantify the effects of 
alternative fuels on aircraft and exhaust emissions.54 
To promote awareness and aid passengers and airlines in carbon offset efforts, 
ICAO has developed a Carbon Calculator which is accessible on their website.55 The 
Carbon Calculator estimates the carbon dioxide and fuel consumed per passenger 
between destinations worldwide using route specific data. The calculator takes in to 
account cargo carried, number of passengers on board, aircraft type and other route 
data. For example, an economy class passenger traveling the 11,822 km roundtrip from 
Dublin to Dubai is estimated to have a carbon footprint of approximately 846 kg of 
CO2; an economy class passenger traveling the 3,186 km roundtrip from Birmingham, 
England to Budapest is estimated to have a carbon footprint of approximately 323 kg 
of CO2.56
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The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the European Aviation Safety 
Agency (EASA) are the US and EU government agencies charged with regulatory 
oversight for alternative fuels and emissions reduction in aviation. The FAA’s strate-
gic planning document, Destination 2025, sets several energy and environment-related 
performance metrics to be achieved by 2018, including:
•	 one billion gallons of alternative jet fuel consumed by 2018,
•	 a replacement for leaded aviation gasoline,
•	 a two percent annual improvement in energy efficiency (fuel consumed per 
miles flown),
•	 a fifty percent reduction in health impacts from emissions, and
•	 the establishment of a trajectory for carbon neutral commercial aviation growth 
based on a 2005 baseline.57
Other FAA initiatives have set similarly ambitious goals by 2018 such as reductions 
in overall aviation fuel consumption by thirty-three percent, noise by thirty-two deci-
bels, and NOx emissions by sixty percent, as described in the Continuous Lower Energy, 
Emissions and Noise (CLEEN) program.58
In order to provide demand assurance for industry and FAA aspirational goals, 
the service branches of the US Department of Defense  have announced a range of 
goals to increase the utilization of renewable energy over the next decade. According 
to the US Department of Defense, “any alternative fuels for DOD operational use must: 
be ‘drop-in’; that is, requiring no modification to existing engines; be cost-competitive 
with conventional petroleum fuels; be derived from a non-food crop feedstock; and 
have lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions less than or equal to conventional petroleum 
fuels.”59 The Air Force has more specific goals “to test and certify all aircraft and sys-
tems on a 50:50 alternative fuel blend by 2012, and to be prepared to acquire 50% of the 
Air Force’s domestic aviation fuel as an alternative fuel blend by 2016.”60 While the Air 
Force has met the 2012 goal, it may be worth noting that “being prepared to acquire” 
and “actually acquiring commercially competitive quantities” by 2016 are quite differ-
ent matters. Cost remains a major challenge.
The European Aviation Safety Agency’s Flightpath 2050 also seeks carbon neutral 
aviation growth using a 2005 baseline, and a fifty percent reduction in emissions by 
2050.61 Sustainable Way for Alternative Fuels and Energy for Aviation (SWAFEA) is a 
study commissioned by the European Commission’s Directorate General for Trans-
port and Energy. Covering multiple disciplines and interests in the well-to-wake 
lifecycle, the SWAFEA team includes representation from twenty European and in-
ternational organizations that are studying the feasibility and impact of the use of 
alternative fuels in aviation.62 International collaborators within the International 
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) have set goals aimed at improving global fuel 
efficiency by two percent annually and seeking funding for the broader development 
of sustainable aviation fuels.63
While the aviation industry and regulatory agencies agree on the need to reduce emis-
sions, there is disagreement over the best approaches to accomplish such far-reaching 
goals. Market-based incentives, fuel taxes, and voluntary offsets are just a few of the 
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ways that use of alternative fuels may be promoted. Using a market-based mechanism 
known as cap-and-trade, the European Commission via its Emissions Trading System 
(ETS) sets a limit on CO2 emissions for certain emission-intensive industries. In January 
2012, the Commission included the aviation industry in the ETS and initially set an 
emissions cap for flights taking off or landing at European Union airports. For the pur-
poses of fiscal and environmental accounting, the EU ETS estimates the CO2 based on 
the amount of fuel consumed during flights to or from an EU city. The ETS is intended 
to incentivize and accelerate the reduction of CO2 through reduced fuel consumption 
and improvements in aircraft operation. Non-EU countries have protested the imple-
mentation of the EU ETS as a unilateral tax. The EU does not view the ETS as a fuel 
tax or charge that violates any international agreement. However, it does have some 
unintended consequences. For instance, some cargo carriers responded by re-routing 
long haul cargo flights around the EU. The cargo still found its way to the EU desti-
nation or departed from EU airports, but the cargo airlines added stops to previously 
non-stop long haul flights to significantly reduce the impact of the flight on their ETS 
assessments. Adding a stop actually adds to the net emissions, but saves on the ETS 
assessments. As a result of controversy over the ETS policy and its implementation for 
aviation, the ETS was postponed in 2013 for international flights in anticipation of a 
pending multi-lateral agreement through ICAO.64
The Commercial Alternative Aviation Fuels Initiative (CAAFI) is a multi-stake-
holder endeavor which aims to promote the development of alternative jet fuel in the 
context of the industry’s energy and sustainability challenges. CAAFI includes mem-
bers from the aviation and aerospace industries, academia, and government.65
IATA’s policy is to reduce the environmental impact of aviation, and is supporting 
sustainable biofuels as a means of achieving carbon dioxide reductions throughout the 
well-to-wake lifecycle. While IATA obviously does not control the price of fuel, IATA 
policies are aimed at indirect measures of managing fuel costs, for example by increas-
ing the availability and diversity of supply, and the reliability of certified fuels.66
9.3.5. Conclusion
While aggressive national and international policies and performance goals can be 
useful in developing the assurances that industry stakeholders require, it should be 
reiterated that major transformations in technology and infrastructure are costly, 
time-consuming, and complex. While fuel efficiency in air transit has increased dra-
matically, the implementation of market-based carbon emissions regulatory programs 
at both national and international levels appears non-trivial. History has often demon-
strated that policy and technology must progress in a coordinated manner in order to 
deliver optimal results. Given its involved regulatory framework, expensive and techni-
cally advanced capital equipment, and international reach, this may be even more rele-
vant with respect to the aviation sector. At the same time, it is clear that alternative fuels 
and reduced emissions are enabling priorities for the future of aviation. A robust policy 
discourse and international cooperation can be essential in facilitating the deployment 
and commercialization of emerging technologies.
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Chapter 10
Policy Challenges for the Built Environment:  
The Dilemma of the Existing Building Stock
maRk ShauREttE
abstract
The built environment accounts for approximately forty percent of the total energy con-
sumption in developed countries. Because buildings have a long life, the greatest oppor-
tunity for energy reduction in the built environment will come from energy conservation 
in the existing building stock. An overview of the policy challenges presented by the built 
environment, with an emphasis on existing facilities, is accompanied by a discussion of 
specific technologies that may have the potential to reduce energy use. To illustrate the 
degree of complexity associated with shifts to new technologies, lighting, a major con-
sumer of electric energy in the built environment, is described in an expanded narrative 
by Kevin Kelly. The chapter concludes with a discussion of recent policy schemes that 
have been employed in the United States and the European Union to promote energy 
conservation in the built environment. Both voluntary and public policy programs are 
included, along with an examination of resultant successes and failures. Based on this 
discussion, a series of recommendations and opportunities for future solutions is pro-
vided for each of the challenge areas presented earlier in the chapter.
10.1. Introduction
Energy use in the built environment comprises approximately forty percent of the en-
ergy consumed in developed countries. In 2004, the emissions resulting from direct 
energy use in the built environment were about 8.6 Gt of CO2 per year. Through the use 
of mature technologies, building energy use can be reduced substantially. Due to the 
long life of buildings, energy policy aimed at promoting building energy conservation 
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in existing buildings is confronted by significant technical challenges. New construc-
tion produces substantially more efficient structures, but there are obvious limits to the 
rapid replacement of inefficient buildings. In addition, the complexity of design and 
construction required for the multitude of unique structures makes a one-size-fits-all 
solution impossible.1 These and other barriers make public policy and the integration of 
energy conservation measures in the built environment an interesting and challenging 
area of study. The intersection of technology and public policy in reducing energy use 
and environmental impact of buildings necessitates integrated thinking by technolo-
gists, designers, managers, the business community as well as those who control and 
influence public policy.
The Urban Land Institute (ULI), a nonprofit research and education organization 
in the United States, examined some of the complex issues surrounding climate change, 
energy use, and the way leaders working in real estate and the built environment are 
challenged in this complex area. The authors emphasize the fact that “Even at the peak 
of recent building cycles, only 2 percent of the total existing floor space annually is 
added by new commercial building construction. In the years ahead, this portion is 
likely to remain below 1 percent. . . . It is the balance of buildings—the overwhelming 
majority of the existing building stock—that remains the dominant untapped market 
opportunity to invest in energy efficiency.”2
The sheer size of this challenge can be appreciated by examining an identifiable 
segment of the built environment. In 2003, a total of nearly 4.9 million commercial 
buildings in the United States, comprising more than 71.6 billion square feet of floor 
space, consumed more than 6,500 trillion Btu of energy.3 The critical portion of existing 
commercial buildings is the considerable inventory of structures constructed during 
the years between World War II and the late 1970s (about forty percent of the total com-
mercial space). These structures were built prior to the energy use reduction efforts that 
became more common through changes in design, materials, and construction practice 
brought about by increasing energy costs in the mid to late 1970s. Most of the buildings 
from this era are reaching the end of their designed economic life (forty to sixty years in 
the US) and are prime candidates for retrofit or reconstruction.
Residential buildings also contribute significantly to the energy crisis. In addition 
to the challenge of replacement over an extended time period, homes also present 
complications due to the variety of owners and occupants. The type and degree of 
challenges can also vary by climate, age of the structures, and ownership patterns. 
This is a global challenge. For example, in 2006 more than fifty percent of Ireland’s 
existing domestic buildings were built before the first thermal energy insulation stan-
dards were put in place. As a result Irish homes consume thirty-one percent more 
energy per dwelling than the EU-15 average and thirty-six percent above the EU-
27 average. Since residential structures represent twenty-three percent of total final 
energy consumption in Ireland, improvements in residential energy efficiency holds 
significant potential for reducing overall energy use.4 This is a major concern because 
Ireland has relied on imported energy for approximately ninety percent of its total 
energy needs between 2001 and 2011.5
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While the pursuit of technological solutions to the energy crisis through renewable 
energy production has long-term merit, a more immediate step is to minimize building 
operational energy consumption. The US National Academy of Sciences concluded that 
well-designed policies by nations and states can result in substantial energy savings.6 
What remains is for nations and states to reach agreement on the best combination of 
standards, design, research, financing, incentives, and education as well as the optimal 
combination of technologies needed to maximize energy conservation efforts in the 
built environment.
10.2. Energy Conserving Building Retrofit Technologies
A thorough discussion of the technological options available for energy conserving ret-
rofit of existing buildings is beyond the scope of this book. Nevertheless, some basic 
understanding of the options available is necessary as an introduction to policy discus-
sion. This section is devoted to basic details about several categories of technology for 
building energy conservation. The complicating factors of human behavioral impact on 
technology performance are excluded to simplify the discussion. Readers should review 
this material with the understanding that consumer decisions to adopt or not adopt en-
ergy conserving technologies are not always rational and may be influenced by factors 
other than cost and benefit evaluations.7
10.2.1. Temperature, Ventilation, and humidity
10.2.1.1. Insulation
One of the most universal categories of energy conserving technologies is the use of 
insulating products to reduce the thermal losses through the exterior structure of a 
building. Insulation can range from very simple to install to very complex. Material 
and labor costs also vary widely. This variability is intensified by the diversity of build-
ing types and the inaccessibility of the space within the walls and ceilings of existing 
buildings where insulation is typically installed. In addition, a significant lack of un-
derstanding of the building science behind the performance of insulating products by 
building trades often leads to inefficiency or even damage due to condensation resulting 
from improper installation.
Insulation of existing structures may require damage repair or replacement of in-
terior or exterior finish surfaces. In addition, there is a very wide range of choice and 
performance of insulating products that can be confusing for contractors and consumers. 
Fortunately, insulation products have a long life. Any existing building insulation project 
should strive to maximize the insulation level achieved. This will avoid the need for fu-
ture disruptions and a repeat of surface finish damage caused by attempts to increase the 
insulating value at a later date. Under the appropriate conditions, a properly implemented 
addition of insulation is an important component of any energy conserving building ret-
rofit. In addition to the reduced energy loss and elimination of thermal bridges that can 
result, occupants can expect increased comfort when insulation is properly installed.
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10.2.1.2. Air Sealing
An often overlooked but critical component of any attempt to reduce building energy con-
sumption is air sealing the structure. Although there are many reasons that buildings need 
to be ventilated, the ventilation process is more effective and efficient if outside air is in-
troduced in a controlled manner. The penalty for uncontrolled building ventilation in cold 
climates can be as high as, or higher than, the energy lost from heat conducted through the 
building structure. As buildings become more highly insulated, the energy cost penalty for 
air leakage becomes an even higher percentage of the building operating energy load. Ven-
tilation as part of the heating and cooling strategy for the structure is preferable to letting 
the building breathe through uncontrolled air infiltration and exfiltration.
Techniques for air sealing are typically low-technology caulks, tapes, and air barri-
ers. A critical component of air sealing is assuring that the tradesmen completing the air 
sealing understand how to apply the appropriate technology, as well as quality control of 
the final installation. An understanding of building science principles can help mitigate 
the potential for moisture problems that may be created by extensive air sealing. Unsealed 
forced-air heating and cooling ductwork located outside of the heated and cooled portion 
of the structure is a common source of air leakage. Inaccessible ductwork can be a chal-
lenge to seal. Recent advances in the use of adhesive coated particles sprayed into leaky 
ductwork to seal leaking joints shows promise for commercial application.
10.2.1.3. Heating and Cooling Systems
Systems for heating and cooling a structure use different technologies based on climate, 
location, available energy sources, building type, cultural norms, regulatory standards, 
contractor experience, or even regional availability of system components. Systems can 
be serviced by centralized heating and cooling plants that supply a district of build-
ings or all occupancies of a single large building. Alternatively systems are available to 
serve a single occupancy independent of others in a building or district. District sys-
tems offer efficiencies of scale but may suffer from distribution losses. District systems 
typically utilize steam or water to distribute heating or cooling to buildings being sup-
plied. Increasing boiler or chiller efficiency, distribution efficiency or advanced control 
systems are key retrofit opportunities in these distributed systems. Advanced technical 
solutions for district systems include efforts to maximize the output from fossil fuel 
consumption, for example by simultaneously extracting both heat and energy. The con-
sistent temperature deep in the ground can also be used as a heat energy source or heat 
sink for cooling to increase system efficiency.
Heating and cooling systems for single occupancies typically use forced air circula-
tion or water circulation to heat or cool the occupied space. Many of these systems burn 
fossil fuels in a central furnace or boiler. Burning biomass is an alternative. The thermal 
efficiency of new equipment can exceed ninety-five percent. The fact that older equip-
ment operates at sixty percent efficiency or less can be justification for the replacement 
of currently operational equipment. Increasing the efficiency of forced air or hydronic 
(water) distribution systems is often limited by restricted access to the distribution sys-
tem. Nevertheless, fan motor upgrades, variable fan speed control, pump replacements, 
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insulation of distribution ducts or pipes, and sealing duct leakage all offer energy effi-
cient retrofit opportunities.
Heating by electricity is also used in single occupancy systems. The simplest sys-
tems are inexpensive, easy to control, and capable of supplying heat directly to any 
space through electrically heated elements. Unfortunately these basic systems suffer 
from distribution losses inherent with electricity. As a result they have high operating 
costs and impose significant loads on electric grids. Heat pumps, which use compressed 
gas as a means to transfer energy from the outside air to the inside air (or the reverse for 
air conditioning), are an alternative employed to reduce energy use in electric systems. 
Heat pump systems are capable of utilizing energy from outside air until the outside 
air temperature drops well below the freezing point of water. The efficiency of energy 
capture for a heat pump will fall as the outside temperature decreases, making them im-
practical in extremely cold climates. Heat pumps can also be installed as ground source 
heat pumps that use the warmer and more consistent deep ground temperature rather 
than the outside air as the energy source. Heat pump systems are desirable where fossil 
fuels are hard to supply to the building. As a retrofit option, heat pumps have limitations 
because they require the installation of a distribution system, usually using forced air, 
for occupancies that contain multiple rooms.
10.2.1.4. Control Systems
Control of temperature, ventilation, and humidity are typical features of modern heat-
ing and cooling systems. Opportunities for control retrofits are presented as a separate 
category to emphasize their unique importance. Temperature control in older build-
ings is usually limited to maintaining a set temperature. Because many spaces are only 
occupied for a portion of the day, retrofit opportunities exist in control systems with 
automatic temperature set-point adjustments that maintain the most comfortable con-
ditions only when needed. Ventilation, a requirement for human habitation and health, 
is best controlled through automatic mechanical systems that capture the heat available 
in the exhaust air and use it to warm the incoming ventilation air. Heat recovery ven-
tilation systems can capture as much as eighty percent of the exhaust heat. Adequate 
humidity control is important for occupant comfort. Humans prefer relative humidity 
in the forty to sixty percent range. When humidity is maintained in this comfort range, 
energy savings can be obtained because occupants are usually satisfied with cooler air 
temperatures in the winter and warmer air temperatures in the summer. In addition, 
adequate humidity control can help prevent building damage from excess moisture that 
can accumulate in well insulated and sealed structures.
10.2.2. Windows
The thermal performance of windows has improved substantially through the use of 
multiple layers of glass, inert gases sealed between the glass layers, low emissivity glass 
coatings, thermal break spacers between the glass layers, thermal break window frames, 
and improved gasketing on operable window sashes. Window replacement is often part 
of building retrofit strategies, but high cost can limit the viability of window replacement. 
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Window replacement may also be limited by architectural requirements in historic build-
ings. When cost or the desire to maintain the original appearance of a window is a concern, 
window repair using double glazing or the use of a separate storm sash can be considered. 
Because some older windows do not have adequate thickness to accept double glazing, the 
addition of a storm sash may be needed. An internally mounted storm sash can provide 
substantial energy loss reduction and improved occupant comfort by raising the interior 
surface temperature of the glass. The benefits of a storm sash can be maximized when the 
storm sash glazing has a hard coat low emissivity (Low E) coating.
Windows are also impacted by radiant energy that passes through the glass. Radi-
ant energy passes through the window glass, striking interior surfaces where it is con-
verted to heat energy. This may be beneficial in winter months but detrimental during 
summer time. Shading strategies can be employed to maximize the passive solar heat 
gain in the winter but shade the windows in the summer when the heat gain would be 
undesirable. Existing buildings may be limited in the ability to effectively capture pas-
sive solar heating because window locations are fixed and horizontal shading may be 
difficult to add architecturally. Window coverings and tinted or reflective glass coatings 
are an option in these cases. Advanced technologies which darken the window glazing 
based on an applied electric current, change in temperature or light intensity are avail-
able but have limited commercial availability.
10.2.3. Domestic hot Water
Hot water production for domestic use is a significant component of energy use in 
residential buildings as well as in commercial buildings that require hot water for 
washing or industrial processes. The most beneficial hot water retrofits reduce both 
energy and water quantity demand through improved washing machines, dishwash-
ers, and process equipment. Additional savings can come from more efficient pro-
duction and storage of hot water. Hot water use tends to be intermittent. To meet the 
fluctuating demand, water heaters typically use a storage tank to maintain a ready 
supply of hot water. Heavily insulating the storage tank is often a simple and inex-
pensive retrofit option. Efficient natural gas water heaters are available for replace-
ment of older electric water heaters. Other alternatives are tank-less water heaters 
which avoid the standby tank losses but may have limitations in hot water capacity 
under heavy demand. When an electric water heater is the only option, a heat pump 
water heater can be used. Heat pump water heaters can utilize the heat obtained 
from the central heating heat pump or from a stand-alone heat pump which extracts 
energy from its surroundings to heat the water. Stand-alone heat pump water heaters 
which operate within the building enclosure provide some limited air conditioning 
for the occupants.
10.2.4. Lighting 
Lighting is often the largest consumer of electricity in a commercial building and 
can also be a significant energy draw for a residential dwelling. Long reliance on in-
candescent lighting in residences allows easy retrofit to more efficient compact fluo-
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rescent lighting (CFL) systems. In commercial buildings ,more efficient fluorescent 
fixtures have been used for years. Unfortunately the T-12 fluorescent fixtures with 
magnetic ballasts that were installed in the past are no longer a reasonable choice. 
Easily obtained T-8 or T-5 high efficiency fixtures with electronic ballasts can be used 
to reduce energy consumption by as much as fifty percent. Use of natural lighting 
for illumination (day-lighting) in combination with task lighting, proper levels of 
background illumination, and sensor controlled supplemental lighting can be useful 
in reducing energy consumption when windows are available. Exterior lighting and 
areas not used continuously can benefit from timer controls or occupancy sensors 
to turn off lighting when not needed. Retrofit using high efficiency light emitting 
diode (LED) lighting has recently become available (see sidebar on the next page for 
expanded lighting discussion).
10.2.5. additional options
Improvemetns in energy efficiency can be obtained via additional means such as re-
placement or retrofit of commercial refrigeration systems, home appliances, passive de-
sign principles, passive cooling techniques, the introduction of thermal mass, impacts 
of building orientation or vegetation, as well as building operations and maintenance 
improvements.
It is appropriate to emphasize the importance of retro-commissioning. Commis-
sioning is the terminology used to describe the process of quality assurance for new 
systems to ensure they are operating at design parameters and in turn at their highest 
efficiency level. Older systems frequently become misadjusted over time and therefore 
require retro-commissioning. Retro-commissioning can be applied to most if not all of 
the non-passive energy related technologies in a building. Occupant training should be 
a part of this process. Occupant behavior has a major impact on energy consumption. 
Even if the original occupant understood the most efficient operation of the building 
systems, it is very likely that over time retraining will become necessary as occupants 
change. Retro-comission of heating and cooling systems, for example, should always be 
completed as part of any building retrofit
10.3. Complexity of Energy Efficiency Retrofit Strategies
A host of issues influence and complicate decisions regarding how, when and where to im-
plement energy efficiency retrofits, including a wide array of non-technical factors. These 
factors relate to building characteristics as well as to the impact on owners, occupants, 
and stakeholders involved in the retrofit process. Even a well-planned community-wide 
retrofit scheme may entail extensive examination or nearly every building as an individu-
alized custom project. This requires understanding, environmental focus, and monetary 
incentives linking yearly energy savigns to investment in green and efficient technologies.
The choice of which technologies to utilize is highly dependent on climate and the 
physical characteristics of the structure. Even residential structures built using stan-
dardized materials and designs are prone to modification through their lifetime. The 
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Energy Saving Developments in Lighting
Kevin Kelly
Recent developments in artificial lighting design, lamp technology and control op-
tions provide potential for significant energy savings going forward. Historically, 
equal illuminance across the whole working plane was the goal of lighting design-
ers, however this is now considered wasteful of energy. For example, in an office 
setting the working plane was interpreted as the whole plan area of the room at desk 
height; 300 to 500 lux was specified, depending on whether work was mainly PC 
based or paper based. This resulted in arrays of lights that provided high levels of 
lighting throughout the space, whether needed or not, and often for periods extend-
ing beyond the working day, as evidenced in large cities where empty office blocks 
had lights switched on well into night hours. This criterion of near equal illumi-
nance across a working plane also tended to lead to rather boring and monotonous 
interiors. Today such energy inefficiency is unacceptable. LED lamp development 
also provides potential for energy savings as these lamps replace less efficient lamps. 
New recommendations, such as those specified in the SLL Code for Lighting 
2012,8  offer pragmatic design advice  to ensure adequate and efficient lighting while 
maintaining balance in financial outlay (purchase, energy cost, and end-of-life dis-
posal) and environmental impact (electricity load, chemical pollution, and light 
pollution at night). The code is based on quantitative recommendations that meet 
minimum lighting requirements but also acknowledges that there is a need to target 
lighting more carefully and address quality issues. For example, modelling of peo-
ple in offices to ensure good visual interaction becomes important and good quality 
lighting and energy efficiency are now as important as quantitative specifications 
about light levels.
Good quality and efficient lighting in buildings starts with the need to max-
imize daylight penetration. Maximizing daylight offers opportunities to lift the 
spirit with natural light and so daylight must be carefully designed into a building 
in tandem with the artificial electric lighting and controls to create good quality 
efficient lighting in the space. Human beings have a preference for natural light 
over artificial light and side lit interiors often automatically offer good modelling by 
providing a strong cross vector of light. This means that people can see other people 
more easily as light falls on their faces from the side windows. More recently, the 
need to maximize daylight is also driven by the necessity to reduce energy used 
by electric lighting. Maximizing daylight and minimizing energy used by electric 
lighting must take place in a way which minimizes overall energy consumption in 
the building.  It is counterproductive to maximize daylight in order to reduce light 
energy consumption if thermal energy requirements increase due to the need for 
extra heating or cooling. It should be noted that extra glazing will increase heating 
load in winter and cooling load in summer, whilst electric lighting can also con-
tribute significantly to building cooling load requirements. A balance needs to be 
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sought with building type, method of construction, orientation, and occupation, 
usage and location.
Daylight availability charts can be used to conclude that there is an exter-
nal illuminance of in excess of 10,000 lux for seventy percent of the office work-
ing day in London.9 This suggests that a room with a five percent daylight factor 
would have an average illuminance of 500 lux minimum for seventy percent of 
the working day. The artificial lighting in a space with this level of daylight might 
be turned off or at least dimmed without any significant disadvantage to work 
efficiency in such an area. A room with this level of daylight factor (above five 
percent) would merit consideration of daylight detection. This should be incorpo-
rated into an automatic control system. Experience to date indicates that without 
such an automatic control system, the potential energy saving benefit of daylight 
is unlikely to be fully realized. Ensuring user satisfaction throughout the working 
day would require integration of the lighting control system in an acceptable way 
to ensure lights are on when needed and off or dimmed at appropriate times. It 
is important that clients and facilities managers are adequately briefed about the 
operation of the automatic control system, in order to ensure optimal operation 
while realizing effective energy savings. 
While standards, demands, and design methodologies change, major change is 
also underway in lamp technology. It is notable that the development of solid state 
lamp technology is revolutionizing the lighting industry. As with many revolution-
ary step changes in development and use of new technologies, there has been col-
lateral damage to early adaptors of poor-quality light emitting diode (LED) lamps. 
However, the pace of growth of this technology is exponential and it is still at an 
early stage in development. In a study by Philips Lighting it is estimated that while 
only six percent of lighting was solid state in 2010, seventy-five percent of lighting 
is expected to be LED lighting by 2020.10 At present the biggest applications of LED 
lighting are for stage, external lighting, architectural lighting, retail, cold rooms, 
transport, and hospitality. Going forward, LED lamp technology is expected to im-
pact office and general interior lighting, but what is the current status? Exaggerated 
performance of LEDs by some newly emerging companies has resulted in disap-
pointment among clients who have expressed growing skepticism. Lighting design-
ers complain that there are not sufficient and reliable specifications underpinning 
LEDs, which places risk on the designers who specify them and the contractors who 
install them. Lighting manufacturers respond that the technology is evolving at 
such a fast rate that it is pointless to create specifications that are out of date as soon 
as they are printed. They also point out that it is impossible to reliably guarantee 
and measure lamp life-cycle; LED lamps should typically last in excess of eleven 
years (up to 100,000 hours) of constant use. At present, measurements are recorded 
over a time period of 9000 hours and life expectancy results are based not on lamp 
failure but on an accepted minimum level of lux depreciation, with data extrapo-
lated for longer periods of time.  
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Present development of LED technology suggests that the efficacy of these 
lamps is soon to surpass even the most efficient fluorescent lamps; in the near 
future it is also likely to surpass the monochromatic Low Pressure Sodium (SOX) 
lamp used on motorways and in similar applications. McKinsey estimates that 
global revenue for LED lighting will be €65 billion by 2020 and LED usage will be 
over sixty percent of the entire market.11 This is consistent with similar forecasts 
by Philips above. It is proposed there will be a focus shift from lamp replacement 
to fixture replacement. With fluorescent lamps, the luminaire is likely to last for a 
couple of decades and lamps will be replaced very cheaply every couple of years. 
LEDS on the other hand come hand in hand with the luminaire and if one needs 
replacing, usually the other does also. This raises questions about life cycle and 
replacement cost considerations. When replacing the whole luminaire, it is un-
likely the same unit will still be manufactured due to the rapid developments in 
this area. This will mean that all luminaires in a space must be replaced once 
lamps begin to fail or their output drops markedly. The question must also be 
raised as to why one would replace a highly efficient fluorescent luminaire, whose 
lamps are providing in excess of 100 lumens per watt, with a much more expen-
sive LED luminaire with lamps of a similar efficacy, especially when they are so 
expensive to buy at present. Interior lighting relies on inter reflected lighting to 
create an acceptable visual ambiance. Considerable light falls on walls and ceil-
ings through reflection. However, some direct application of light onto an object 
or surface can create a more visually appealing and stimulating environment. At 
present it is this directional light characteristic of LEDs, providing color variation 
and visual stimuli, which provides great potential for indoor use. However, as 
previously mentioned, poor quality, relatively cheap LED lamps have fallen short 
of expectations to date. Poor heat dissipation has also been a limitation. Low-cost, 
modern T5 fluorescent lamps provide 100 lumens per watt, with very good color 
rendering and a variety of color temperatures. The long history and successful 
application of these fluorescent luminaire lamps enables them to retain the pole 
position for the general interior lighting market at present.
The cooler color temperature of many LED lamps is deemed unacceptable by 
many home owners and other users. The generally more appealing warmer color 
LEDs are available but are usually much more expensive. The present high cost 
of good quality LED lamps and luminaires along with the above may delay their 
widespread use for interior lighting. LEDs may be the future for interior light-
ing but they are not yet the optimal choice. However, owing to their directional 
accuracy, LEDs may be more suitable for many applications including outdoor 
use. There is a lack of reliable research in this area at present, and this needs to be 
addressed going forward. LEDs may also form a useful alternative to traditional 
lighting in future indoor applications particularly as the tendency to flood light 
onto a general working plane is replaced by more individual targeting of light on 
a specific set of task areas.
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resulting variation from structure to structure limits one-size-fits-all solutions. In ad-
dition, the selection of one technology can impact the performance or specification 
of a completely separate part of a whole-building retrofit strategy. An example of this 
phenomenon is the influence of the level of insulation on the design and performance 
of mechanical heating and cooling systems. Increasing the insulation level reduces the 
required capacity of a building’s heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) 
system. Installing an oversized HVAC system can negatively impact the system’s effi-
ciency, equipment life and occupant comfort. The timing or staging of installation can 
introduce additional complexities and potentially lead to inefficient choices. Failing to 
increase insulation levels at the same time the HVAC equipment is replaced results in 
equipment that does not match the actual heating and cooling needs of the building. 
The best retrofit technology upgrade strategies seek to implement all possible technolo-
gies on a whole-building basis.
Goals and expectations of owners, occupants, policy makers and taxpayers, who 
may subsidize or incentivize retrofit activity, can vary. What level of occupant comfort 
is expected? To what degree are energy use, CO2 emissions, and property value im-
portant? Are project costs justified by cash flow, payback period, investment return or 
carbon reduction goals? How are the interests of those who own a rented building, and 
presumably pay for the retrofit, cost balanced with the interests of occupants who will 
benefit from the reduced cost of energy used? The answer to each of these questions is 
probably different depending on which stakeholder group is questioned. Some useful 
guidance for policy makers in examining the cost vs. benefit impacts on various stake-
holders in building energy efficiency programs is provided by the US Environmental 
Protection Agency, which offers five principal approaches to guide public utility com-
missions, city councils, and utilities. They are careful to state that “there is no single 
best test for evaluating the cost-effectiveness of energy efficiency.” If a single cost-effec-
tiveness measure is used it may not balance the costs and benefits of all stakeholders.12
In addition to payback or cost vs. benefit considerations, the source of funds 
can influence retrofit decisions. Grants to promote energy conservation typically 
require some form of decision oversight by the funding agency in order to maintain 
This is an exciting and challenging time for the lighting industry with good 
potential for LED lighting and improved lighting controls generally. The chal-
lenge is to provide robust solutions that will maximize the benefits of new tech-
nologies whilst protecting clients from poor quality products and installations.  
A further goal will be to maximize light quality and minimize energy use by 
integrating daylight with appropriate artificial light in a way that lifts the spirit 
of those using the space with easy facilitation to operate and override automatic 
lighting controls when required. Product reliability and integrated standards will 
be required in order to leverage the benefits of new technologies and in so doing 
help reduce energy use, improve upon energy efficiency, and contribute to reduc-
tion of greenhouse gas emissions. 
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adequate control over the appropriate use of the funds. Funding agencies often lack 
sufficient understanding of the complex technologies involved in energy related ret-
rofits to adequately provide oversight. This can lead to rigid guidance which may not 
meet the specific conditions of every structure. The use of partial funding through 
tax incentives, rebates or bank loans can permit greater flexibility for more build-
ing-specific solutions.
Regardless of the source of funds, the fragmented nature of construction contract-
ing for residential and small commercial buildings provides challenges to successful 
energy conserving retrofits. Building contractors typically do not have a thorough un-
derstanding of all available technology solutions or the underlying science. Even when 
trained designers, such as architects or engineers are involved, retrofits intended to re-
duce air leakage often result in problems with elevated moisture levels in the structure. 
The challenge is complicated by the fact that building contractors typically hire an as-
sortment of subcontractors to work with the specialized crafts involved. Each of these 
crafts lack an understanding of how their use of technology interacts with the work 
performed by other subcontractors. An outside party to supervise technical specifica-
tion and quality control may be needed.
The strategies described to this point have concentrated on the reduction of energy 
use during the occupancy of the building, or the use phase. Although a significantly 
smaller component of the lifetime environmental impact of the building, many experts 
advocate that the energy associated with the building’s construction phase be included 
in energy efficiency decision making. This embodied energy represents the sum of all 
the energy required to construct the building, including energy consumed to mine raw 
materials, create the building materials, construct the building, and to demolish and 
dispose of the building itself at the end of its life. By including embodied energy, the 
cost vs. benefit considerations can encompass the full life cycle cost of the building. 
Currently the availability of data required to accurately calculate embodied energy for 
complex buildings is limited, but the body of knowledge for life cycle cost analysis is 
developing rapidly.
10.4. Policy Challenges to Energy Efficiency Retrofit Success
The multi-dimensional and complex influences on energy retrofit decisions create many 
barriers to the creation and implementation of policies designed to promote and facili-
tate building energy efficiency. In 2010 the US Department of Energy (DOE) published 
a report from the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) titled Summary of 
Gaps and Barriers for Implementing Residential Building Energy Efficiency Strategies. 
The report’s authors outline barriers and opportunities for market transformation for 
future reduction in building energy use.13 Some of the significant challenges for residen-
tial energy conservation include:
•	 Limited training and certification for contractors,
•	 Difficulty in evaluating the quality or quantity of benefits other than simply 
by cost,
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•	 Complexity created by regulations and incentives intended to promote con-
servation,
•	 Lack of reliable energy savings information to build stakeholder confidence,
•	 The disconnect between cost and building value created by energy conserving 
interventions,
•	 The need to verify performance based on sound building science principles,
•	 Incomplete understanding of homeowner motivation for energy conservation 
investments,
•	 Limited energy conservation knowledge of those who influence residential in-
vestment, and
•	 Lack of standardization in technologies and building standards.
A follow-up report published by DOE in 2011 provides additional detail, especially 
on the relationship between technical and non-technical barriers. The report points 
out that the building science behind whole-building energy performance is complex, 
requiring extensive education for homeowners, contractors, regulators, appraisers, real 
estate agents, material suppliers, architects, engineers, program managers, lawmakers 
and those involved with financing.14
Commercial buildings have many of the same barriers to energy retrofit as resi-
dential buildings with the addition of greater scale and complexity. Not only are the 
buildings more variable in design and material use, but additional non-technical factors 
must be considered. The US Zero Energy Commercial Buildings Consortium (CBC), a 
voluntary group of professionals from the commercial real estate industry formed at 
the request of the DOE, compiled a report in 2011 that outlines many of the challenges 
they face in working toward significant energy use reduction in commercial buildings.15 
In addition to the impediments identified by NREL for residential buildings, the CBC 
report highlights the following:
•	 Conflicting retrofit costs and benefits for building owners and occupants,
•	 Lack of individual tenant utility metering,
•	 Significant impact of occupant plug loads,
•	 Disincentive created by energy upgrades that trigger added upgrades to meet 
minimum codes,
•	 Frequent failure to maintain equipment at originally installed efficiency,
•	 Traditional design and construction practice does not promote whole-building 
efficiency,
•	 No facility for accurate low-cost performance comparison between similar 
buildings,
•	 Lack of accountability for energy performance and consistency of performance,
•	 Utility profits and pricing linked to energy sales, limiting utility incentives for 
energy reduction,
•	 Competition for owner’s capital to be made available for energy conservation 
investment, and
•	 Energy cost savings often have limited impact on the financial position of the 
building asset.
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These reports make it clear that the process involved with planning, implementing 
and assuring performance of energy related building improvement requires significant 
management. To begin the process, a thorough understanding of the science involved 
with building energy performance must become commonplace to architects, engineers, 
contractors, subcontractors, equipment and material suppliers as well as building facil-
ities managers, purchasing agents and maintenance personnel.
By examining the simple example of adding insulation to an existing structure, the 
potential for unintended consequences becomes clear. In Figures 10.1 and 10.2, sim-
plified brick masonry wall diagrams before and after insulation is added, are shown. 
The previously uninsulated brick wall normally absorbs moisture from the exterior. 
In Figure 10.1 moisture in vapor form is free to pass in and out of the wall either from 
the interior or the exterior surface because all of the building materials used allow the 
passage of moisture by diffusion. This unrestricted moisture flow allows the wall to 
dry to the interior in the winter. In Figure 10.2 a thin layer of insulation was added to 
the interior. A thin layer was chosen to avoid losing valuable useable floor space while 
reducing the heat flow through the wall. The insulation layer reduces heating energy 
consumption and increases occupant comfort by raising the surface temperature of the 
interior wall during cold winter days. A common insulation choice for this purpose is a 
product with a high resistance to heat flow per unit thickness that maximizes the ther-
mal performance. These insulating products are frequently made from foam materials 
that do not allow the passage of moisture to the interior through diffusion.
With the addition of internal 
wall insulation, the internal wall 
temperature is cold because it is no 
longer heated from within the build-
ing. Figure 10.2 shows the resulting 
condensation of water on the inside 
of the masonry when exterior tem-
peratures are low enough to reach 
the dew point or when warm moist 
air (typically above thirty percent 
relative humidity) leaks into the wall. 
The dew point is the temperature at 
which moisture will condense for a 
given level of moisture in the air. The 
two conditions previously described 
have a dew point of 3°C (37°F) or 
below, a common winter condition 
in much of the world. The moisture 
absorbed in the masonry by the up-
graded wall now does not dry to the 
interior as necessary to avoid deteri-
oration as it once did.
Figure 10.1. Uninsulated Masonry Wall Dries to 
Both Interior and Exterior.
Policy challenges for the Built environment 269
In addition to possible liquid 
moisture flowing into the struc-
ture, Figure 10.3 shows the result 
of the brick masonry wall reaching 
sub-freezing temperatures. The 
now consistently moist masonry 
suffers from wintertime formation 
of ice crystals within the brick, 
causing the expanding frost to de-
teriorate the exterior surface of the 
brick.
Over and above the univer-
sal education needed to promote 
the desired performance in design, 
there is a significant need for edu-
cation and enforcement in imple-
mentation of energy retrofit. The 
fragmentation of the construction 
contracting and procurement pro-
cess compounds the problems that 
result from poor understanding by 
those responsible for retrofit design. 
Figure 10.2. Potential for Condensation Resulting 
from Addition of Interior Wall Insulation.
Figure 10.3. Surface Deterioration from Sub-freezing Consistently Moist Brick.
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Unfortunately, program management of policy schemes put in place to promote and incen-
tivize energy improvement can also add to the disconnect between science based decisions 
and achievement of successful retrofit in practice. The best executed design will fail if the 
procurement and construction process is not properly managed. Choice of retrofit mea-
sures or materials which are inappropriate for the building’s characteristics, poor availabil-
ity of a trained workforce and/or construction management by unqualified energy services 
providers will all add to the uncertainty of energy saving outcomes. It is easy to understand 
the limited willingness of building owners to invest in energy improvements.
Even when technical and implementation challenges of energy services contracting 
are solved, there are still barriers to funding the retrofit work. Curtin and Maguire in 
a report for the Institute of International and European Affairs note that in Ireland 
there is a lack of attractive loan offerings for homeowners to finance residential retrofits. 
Homeowners are also hesitant to invest in energy improvements because of the risk of 
inadequate performance to justify the investment.16 This observation is not unique to 
Ireland. Low participation rates and performance uncertainty have stymied financial 
innovation. For commercial building owners there is a divergence in strategic planning 
between the capital costs needed to implement retrofits and the resulting operating cost 
reduction. Owners frequently take a short-term view of return on investment while 
energy upgrades are a long-term investment. Long-term investments typically require 
financing. Lenders have not been able to agree on the method needed to value the effect 
that improvements in energy performance have on a building’s marketability.17 Without 
an increase in value, lenders are hesitant to provide vehicles for energy services lending. 
Utility company participation is often suggested, but utilities need encouragement to 
make changes in the revenue/profit structure of their business to justify investments 
that effectively result in reduced sales of their service.
There also appears to be an incomplete understanding of the most effective meth-
ods to market energy conserving retrofits. There is little agreement on the approach or 
message that is likely to cause differing groups to take action. Foremost in this discus-
sion is the manner in which costs and benefits are considered. Payback (the time thresh-
old for energy savings to repay retrofit costs), Return on Investment (the investment 
analysis common to business investment), Net Present Value (analysis using time value 
of money to compare projected energy savings to retrofit costs in current dollars) and 
Internal Rate of Return (discount rate that makes the net present value of all retrofit cash 
flows equal to zero) can be logically applied to investments in energy conserving retrofit 
projects, but may lead to different conclusions for different project characteristics. Pay-
back is commonly used because of its simplicity, but is it the most appropriate? Benefits 
to society are also appropriate in marketing messages to stakeholders. What should 
the priorities be? Carbon reduction, economic development outcomes, job growth, new 
business development, advancement of redevelopment/regeneration can all result from 
energy related retrofit activities. In the final analysis, difficulty in determining the best 
approach to take stems from a lack of agreement on how to value the benefits.
The discussion which has been presented to this point revolves around use of ex-
isting technologies to improve the energy performance of buildings. There is some ad-
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vocacy for advancement of new technologies to provide simple solutions that either 
dramatically reduce energy consumption or provide low-cost renewable sources of en-
ergy for building operations. While there are promising developments in many new 
products, barriers to their widespread use exist. To an even greater extent than the au-
tomotive sector, the built environment has a great deal of inertia. Thus the status quo 
represents one of the industry’s greatest barriers to rapidly adopting new technology. 
Substantial investment is required on many levels to change the way things are done. 
The complexity of interactions and the many players involved with the manufacture, 
distribution, adoption and implementation of new technologies leads to challenges for 
any new building technology. Often what is lacking is cooperation between researchers, 
energy laboratories, manufacturers and end-users to help promote technology transfer 
through planning, assessment and trial implementations that provide the needed out-
reach to building owners and contractors.
Despite the potential for both direct cost savings and long-term societal benefits, 
the end-user is frequently a barrier to wide acceptance of energy related upgrades. 
Personal values can play a strong role in homeowner reluctance to upgrades. Conflict-
ing values can range from resistance to potential changes that impact the appearance 
of the residence to concerns about the quality of workmanship and the perceived 
value of improvements. In some cases the inconvenience of workers being present 
in an occupied home or the need to clear out an attic space used as storage to make 
room for increased insulation can become a deterrent. As a result, there is a clear need 
to understand the priorities, values and long-term goals of homeowners when policy 
toward energy retrofit is considered. In the commercial building sector, additional 
end-user challenges exist because of the split incentives between building owners 
and tenants. Some experts have suggested that because of the many barriers, market 
forces alone are not adequate to motivate a significant increase in energy efficiency 
even with escalating energy prices. Based on the results of a multi-year simulation 
study focusing on the six markets of Brazil, China, Europe, India, Japan and the US 
sponsored by the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD), 
the WBCSD advocates for a broad set of interventions by industry, governments, and 
building owners to make meaningful market transformation a reality. The WBCSD 
conclusions are noteworthy because their study area represents nearly two-thirds of 
the world’s energy consumption.18
To achieve the market transformation needed to move beyond these barriers, 
programs with government support may be needed. The development of government 
programs must avoid creating barriers that further prevent wide acceptance of energy 
related retrofit as a result of program design or management. Program and regulatory 
barriers can come from both unexpected and anticipated program consequences. In-
centive program design problems can arise from incentives that are too small to change 
behavior or too complicated to manage either by program managers or potential recipi-
ents. Regulatory restrictions based on conflicting social concerns such as building con-
servation or historic preservation planning constraints must be carefully considered to 
avoid significantly diminishing the program outcomes.
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10.5. Building Energy Reduction Programs  
Recently Employed in the US and EU
Attempts have been made to devise programs which reduce the operating energy con-
sumption of the built environment. As was noted in the previous section, participation 
in building energy reduction programs has often been lower than expected, even when 
they involved limited financial investment by the building owner. This fact reflects rec-
ognition of the many non-monetary costs of building energy retrofits that complicate 
technical and non-technical barriers. Policy commentary has exposed the substantial 
conflict between programs that base energy reduction investments solely on the mon-
etary energy cost saving for the existing building owner and the longer-term societal 
imperative imposed by the global energy crisis.
For the European Union, the societal obligations created by the global energy crisis 
were recognized in the Energy Performance of Buildings Directive (EPBD), first im-
plemented in 2002. The EPBD was updated in 2010 with more ambitious provisions 
creating obligations for EU countries to implement programs that achieve the require-
ments for building certification, inspections, and training with the ultimate goal to 
improved energy performance. While these directives are creating future obligations 
for EU countries, solutions will come only from transformation of markets which in 
many ways are localized. A large body of public policy commentary and research has 
been devoted to program design. Brenda Boardman, in a policy framework for the UK 
titled Achieving Zero: Delivering future-friendly buildings, makes many suggestions for 
the future based on successes and failures of programs implemented in the UK.19 Many 
of the policy schemes presented by Boardman are useful for stimulating creative public 
policy discussion, but cannot be applied without careful consideration for the condi-
tions specific to the market where the policy will be put to work. The following sections 
provide a small sample of past attempts to reduce energy consumption in buildings.
10.5.1. Voluntary Schemes to Promote Reduced Energy Consumption
Numerous voluntary schemes to promote energy reduction in the built environment 
have been offered on a local level. These voluntary programs have for the most part been 
targeted to owners of domestic buildings. While having the advantage of easy contact 
with local conditions and end-users, these programs have limitations in their ability to 
influence wide market transformation. Program incentives of many types are used with 
the ‘reward’ for participation as variable as the program sponsors.
Some programs simply provide ratings or labels in an attempt to enhance the rec-
ognition of value for the building owner created by the energy conserving investment. 
Enhanced ratings can be based on established standards such as construction specifi-
cations that are beyond code or when buildings achieve certified levels for recognized 
sustainability programs. Schemes based on sustainable building ratings such as Lead-
ership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED), the BRE Environmental Assess-
ment Method (BREEAM) and Green Globes provide a framework for best practice in 
energy conservation as well as additional areas of environmental sustainability. Rating 
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programs specific to building energy use such as Energy Star developed and promoted 
by the US government, Passivhaus which is a rigorous standard for low energy building 
first developed in Germany and the Home Energy Rating System (HERS) developed by 
Residential Energy Services Network (RESNET), a group of US energy professionals, 
offer a more energy conservation targeted evaluation.
Utility companies have developed programs to promote energy use reduction 
through rebates that reward owners who upgrade to appliances, water heaters or heating 
and cooling systems that operate at a high efficiency. Tax reduction is also a common 
form of reward for voluntary programs. The tax reward may be a credit against income 
tax due or an abatement of real estate property tax increases that might otherwise result 
from energy related building improvements. A type of reward for voluntary participa-
tion that often targets low income owners takes the form of a grant. Subsidized loans 
to complete the work have been suggested for higher income owners, but as described 
in a later section, lack of certainty that the energy savings will be adequate to repay the 
loan limits their use.
Overall, participation in voluntary programs has not been overwhelming. Demon-
stration programs that bring the potential for energy use reduction to the attention of 
building owners have been one approach to increase participation. The US Department of 
Energy has launced a program called the Better Buildings Challenge which works in co-
ordination with communities, community based organizations, education providers and 
corporate partners to demonstrate residential, commercial and industrial projects that are 
successful in dramatically reducing energy use. Prior programs sought to achieve a simi-
lar outcome and future programs will be needed to provide adequate market penetration. 
Education is also an area where governments both local and national play a role. In the US 
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and Department of Energy (DOE) provide 
building energy related educational materials through the Energy Star program and the 
Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) program. These educational programs 
are supported by the research efforts of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), the 
National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL), Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory 
(LBNL) and the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL). The laboratories are lo-
cated in diverse regions of the US which allows them to concentrate on energy research 
specific to differing climates.
10.5.2. Public Policy Schemes Recently Employed and Proposed
A review of some national or regional schemes to promote building energy use reduction 
through public policy intervention is informative. An example of a regulatory mandate 
is the EU requirement for member nations to institute a national building energy perfor-
mance assessment scheme. The impetus for universal building energy rating is to develop 
a publicly available uniform measure of the energy performance for every building. These 
ratings, typically referred to as asset ratings, are based on the theoretical performance of 
the building under a specified set of environmental conditions. Although asset ratings 
do not reflect the actual energy consumed by a building, they are preferable to collecting 
past utility use data because asset ratings eliminate the influence of occupant behavior. 
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Through the uniform collection of building ratings, consumers can compare buildings 
based on energy performance. Ratings can also provide a basis for building values assess-
ments that reflect investments in energy performance. Some compare building energy 
performance ratings to miles-per-gallon ratings for automobiles.
In 1997 the first national building energy rating program was put into effect in 
Denmark. In 2002 the EU enacted the Energy Performance of Buildings Directive 
(EPBD). As part of the EPBD, member states were required to implement a national 
building energy rating and disclosure program beginning in 2009. In recent years Brazil, 
China and Australia have instituted national building rating schemes, although China’s 
program is only mandatory for government owned or funded buildings. The US has not 
yet developed mandatory state or national level building rating programs, but several 
major cities have mandatory rating and disclosure programs underway.
Building rating and disclosure is not without its challenges. Some argue that the 
simulated energy use developed for the asset ratings is not an adequate reflection of 
the building energy consumption and is subject to lack of uniformity based on the ac-
curacy of the building data which is used to generate the rating. Enactment of univer-
sal building ratings in the US has been hampered by disagreement on a standardized 
methodology for collecting building data. In an article published by the Bureau of 
National Affairs in 2011, the authors describe a consensus standard being developed 
by the American Society for Testing and Materials International (ASTM) which may 
provide the uniformity needed in the US for collecting and analyzing building perfor-
mance information for regulatory compliance.20 In addition to quality control in the 
data collection and analysis, many issues remain to be resolved. Rating programs must 
make performance data easy to understand yet meaningful, translate the performance 
data into building valuation information for lending and investment decision makers, 
preserve the privacy of sensitive building data while permitting adequate public dis-
closure of building energy performance as well as maintaining and updating the large 
database required to assure that ratings remain consistent over time.
A recently introduced program called the Green Deal is a more market or investment 
driven concept. The Green Deal, authorized by the UK Energy Act 2011, is an attempt 
to seamlessly combine energy company obligations to support building energy use im-
provements along with a financing mechanism. Upgrades for buildings under the Green 
Deal must meet the Golden Rule. The basic concept of the Golden Rule is that all energy 
improvement investments must produce savings that equal or exceed the cost of the im-
provements. In addition, the time period required for repayment of the improvement cost 
must not exceed the expected life of the improvement. Repayment is to be administered 
through the energy utility billing process. The regulatory complexity of the Green Deal 
is beyond the scope of this chapter, but several of the program management issues are 
noteworthy. For instance if this market driven program is to be successful, Green Deal 
Providers must be able to negotiate the complexity of program guidelines, obtain suffi-
cient financial backing for up-front costs, work with energy companies to facility loan 
payback and implement energy conserving retrofits that apply appropriate building sci-
ence and energy cost saving analysis to assure a quality retrofit that meets the Golden Rule 
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payback requirements. A tall order based on the barriers previously introduced. Who will 
bear the cost if Green Deal Providers fail to adequately plan or implement their retrofits? 
What risks do Green Deal Providers accept by making the upfront investments needed to 
become a viable Provider if several years into the program the Green Deal is determined 
to be too costly for the UK government to maintain?
10.5.3. Program Successes and Failures
Descriptions of successful building energy programs are common in the mass media, but 
how success is defined can radically change the assessment of a program. Many programs 
describe their success by providing details of work accomplished or percentage reduction in 
energy consumption for a group of buildings. While these accomplishments are noteworthy 
in demonstrating the potential for reduction in energy use and carbon production, the mag-
nitude of the problem truly requires many millions of structures to be retrofit every year. 
The UK has committed that zero carbon emissions will be associated with all buildings in 
the entire country by the year 2050. While zero carbon emission does not mean zero en-
ergy use, it does mean that most if not all of the twenty-six million homes and two million 
business structures must undergo some form of energy retrofit by 2050. Simple math tell us 
that for success in the UK alone several hundred thousand retrofits per year will be required 
immediately, growing to a million or more per year over time.
Failures are easier to identify because they are characterized by lack of participation. A 
notable example is in the area of financing building energy improvements. Energy upgrades 
require funds to complete the work, so financing is critical. Energy efficiency financing pro-
grams have failed to attract participation from both lenders and borrowers. Neither is willing 
to take the risk that the energy performance will justify the debt. Some have suggested that 
energy improvement loans should be tied to the real estate through on-bill financing that is 
paid for by current owners as well as future owners if the expected life of the improvement 
exceeds average years of ownership. While this may solve some owner concerns, lenders and 
investors continue to worry about the loan risk because the increase in building value result-
ing from the energy improvement may not adequately reflect the improvement cost. Energy 
Services Companies (ESCO) have been successful in reducing risk for entities with large port-
folios of buildings by providing up-front capital in return for a share in the energy savings. 
This process can reduce building owner risk. A US government program issuing Energy Sav-
ings Performance Contracts (ESPCs) to ESCOs aims to achieve extensive recuctions in en-
ergy use, emissions, and cost in large installations where economies of scale can be leveraged. 
However, in its current form the ESCO process is not well suited to small projects. Nearly all 
of the ESCO projects to date have been for public projects or very large scale private projects.
Another notable failure is that the incremental learning that takes place with every 
new program is seldom passed on to future stakeholders. This lack of continuity of 
knowledge as programs expire is just one example of challenges to policy making. Lim-
its on the life of a program also limit the possibility of sustained success. Energy retrofits 
are complex and require training for many levels of stakeholder. Many of the stakehold-
ers who participate in the process are small business entities that depend on a finan-
cial return for continued existence. Will the large number of small and medium size 
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businesses needed to carry out the energy improvements invest the time and resources 
needed for a program with an uncertain future? Will the lessons learned from previ-
ous short-lived programs be available to them as preparation? How do energy retrofit 
services become a trusted process implemented by proven entities without continuity? 
Will an efficient low-cost material and equipment supply chain capable of meeting high 
volume demands develop without continuity?
10.6. Recommendations and opportunities for Future Solutions
While no single solution or ideal combination of recommendations will provide an an-
swer to the challenge of excess energy consumption by the built environment, a number 
of opportunities for improvement exist. The following is an amalgamation of sugges-
tions from current literature on the subject grouped by related topic.
10.6.1. Education, Motivation, and Marketing
•	 Use demonstration projects open to the public to make building owners aware 
of energy conserving retrofit potential. Include government owned buildings in 
the demonstration.
•	 To increase confidence in the potential energy savings, make simplified kitchen- 
table discussion information about energy conserving retrofit available to 
building owners.
•	 Work toward branding of energy retrofit solutions based on sound building science.
•	 Create education programs for builders, developers, architects, engineers, lend-
ers and appraisers.
•	 Education programs should include building science in addition to standard 
practice so that designers and builders fully understand the technical ramifica-
tions of their retrofit decisions.
•	 Home improvement contractors drive adoption of technologies. Use educated 
service providers to promote energy retrofit to improve participation rates.
•	 Experiment with new measures and messengers to inform and engage people 
toward an energy-aware culture.
•	 Develop mechanisms that make energy performance improvement visible to 
guests, friends, and neighbors.
•	 Help building owners distinguish between dubious and real energy savings claims.
•	 Develop marketing to promote energy retrofit whenever any renovation activ-
ity is considered to take advantage of the economies available at the time.
•	 Market all benefits of energy conserving retrofit including improved occupant 
comfort, safety, indoor air quality, and overall environmental quality.
•	 Target populations need to be exposed to energy conserving retrofit communica-
tion and marketing three or more times before showing recognition of the message.
•	 Promote the value of energy audits.
•	 Educate the building construction industry about the pending growth oppor-
tunities in energy services contracting.
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•	 Utilize workforce re-education funding to support education of needed energy 
services workers and managers.
•	 Develop building science elementary and secondary school curriculum to aid 
in understanding of building energy performance for future building owners 
and occupants.
10.6.2. Technology, Building Codes, and Implementation
•	 Support government funded research to develop and commercialize energy 
conserving technologies.
•	 Expand and strengthen support for energy improvement contractors that pro-
mote integrated design through whole-building retrofit options.
•	 Include technologies with longer payback periods such as energy recovery ven-
tilation and triple glazed windows to achieve ambitious building energy use 
reduction goals.
•	 National building codes and enforcement need to be strengthened to improve 
building energy performance.
•	 Eliminate disincentives to energy conserving retrofits created by code triggers 
that require other code compliance upgrades when energy retrofits are completed.
•	 Combine building energy performance codes and renewable energy regula-
tions to help promote whole-building performance analysis.
•	 Develop standardized practices when possible to streamline decision making 
and completion of energy services work.
•	 Encourage integrated design approaches and innovations.
•	 Develop standardized green lease agreements that help sort the split incentives 
between building owners who pay for energy conserving retrofits and renters.
•	 Develop simple to use energy retrofit quality criteria and checklists.
•	 Develop standardized energy audit procedures, tools and reports.
•	 Increase indoor air quality research to develop mechanical ventilation require-
ments for buildings retrofits that dramatically reduce building air leakage.
•	 Encourage the development of very low-capacity high-efficiency heating and 
cooling equipment that will be needed for high performance homes.
•	 Simplify the complexity of programmable thermostats.
•	 Promote community or district wide volume purchases of materials for energy 
related retrofits.
•	 Promote one-stop-shop business models that combine design, financing and 
contracting for energy conserving retrofit.
10.6.3. Building Performance Rating and Labeling
•	 Based on a national asset rating assessment standard, implement building rat-
ings and labels that are uniform, simple to understand, normalized to eliminate 
inconsistencies and adequately reflect value related to building marketability.
•	 Rating and labeling programs should adopt mechanisms to assure that label 
information remains current and accessible to the public.
Shaurette278
•	 Research is needed to ascertain the market value impact of building energy 
performance labels.
•	 Develop simplified energy performance simulation tools that don’t require ex-
tensive knowledge or training for use by building owners and managers inter-
ested in building energy upgrades.
•	 Life Cycle Energy Consumption is beyond the scope of near-term comparisons, 
but work should continue to perfect the analysis for future building energy per-
formance comparisons.
•	 Create simple benchmarking and goal setting tools to assist commercial build-
ing owners in making energy performance decisions thru comparison to simi-
lar high performance buildings.
10.6.4. Financing
•	 Concentrate efforts on those most in need of financing.
•	 Align monthly repayment cost to energy savings to avoid net increase in 
monthly cost.
•	 Allow the financing of non-energy upgrades to promote energy conserving ret-
rofit at the same time as other improvements.
•	 Loan terms in excess of five to seven years will be needed to promote compre-
hensive whole-building retrofits.
•	 Enable lending tied to the asset such as on-bill financing repaid through utility 
billing systems or municipal financing funded through bond sales that are re-
paid through real estate taxes.
•	 Develop and mandate standardized building appraisal procedures that reflect 
building energy performance for use in risk analysis for energy improvement 
mortgages.
•	 Create protocols for reporting of building energy use that can be used during 
commercial real estate due diligence and underwriting for building loans.
•	 Investigate turn-key practices which combine financing and performance 
guarantees or shared savings through contracts with ESCOs.
10.6.5. Program Design
•	 Programs and policies should strive for integrated market transformation tar-
geting barriers and contextual challenges specific to a target population in a 
community or region.
•	 Programs should employ rigorous assessment including measurement and ver-
ification of the installed energy savings measures to validate program goals.
•	 Program assessment and validation data collection should begin immediately 
so that mid-program corrections can be made.
•	 Consider action research that collects and builds on programs so that lessons 
learned from past programs are not lost as new programs are developed.
•	 Subsidies may be required for demonstration and roll-out support to imple-
ment residential programs.
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•	 Design incentive programs where the cost of access does not exceed the value 
of the benefit.
•	 Incentive programs should provide increasing benefit levels for more aggressive 
whole-building retrofits.
•	 Consider tax incentives such as reduced real estate taxes for owners completing 
energy retrofit.
•	 To increase the scale and scope of utility sponsored programs, decouple the 
connection between reduced sales resulting from energy conservation and util-
ity revenue.
•	 Develop certification programs to help assure the efficacy of installed energy 
savings measures.
•	 Design residential retrofit programs that align with and take into account per-
sonal values and decisions of homeowners. Design programs around people not 
buildings.
•	 Design programs around specific communities, contexts and populations.
•	 Partner with and showcase renovation and regeneration contractors with ade-
quate training and proven performance that will include energy retrofit at the 
same time as other building improvements.
•	 Provide low-risk entry points for building contractors interested in business 
development for energy services contracting.
•	 Utilize trusted third parties such as non-profits, charities, religious institutions, 
schools, or community organizations as referral agents for retrofit programs.
•	 Programs should be kept in place for a decade or more to avoid the reluctance of 
business participants fearful of developing new practices for short-lived programs.
Obviously, not all of these suggestions can be adopted in every situation. Some 
are even in conflict with others. Policy must adapt to the community and context in 
which it is implemented. For new construction and developing countries policy should 
concentrate on new construction codes and code enforcement. In the developed world 
more complex solutions will be necessary.
Discussion Problem
In Happy Hills, a planned community of approximately 250,000 that serves a bed-
room community to a nearby major city, the residents live in predominantly multi-
family housing which is comprised of buildings with twenty to forty living units in 
buildings three to four stories in height. Residents enjoy a good standard of living 
and can commute by rail to jobs in the nearby major city.
The multifamily residential buildings are privately owned and most residents 
rent their apartments paying monthly rent to a wide diversity of landlords. The 
buildings were constructed in the 1960s and most of the residents have been living 
in their homes for many years. Because of a lack of new construction in the area 
and the excellent physical condition of the existing buildings, the majority of the 
residents would like to remain in their current apartments.
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Happy Hills operates a local utility that supplies both electricity and natural gas to 
the community. Community leaders are well aware of the challenges of the global en-
ergy crisis and the local impacts of the crisis because of their position as a public utility. 
Utility operators have noted that on a per capita basis Happy Hill residents use sub-
stantially more energy than the average based on national statistics. Because the local 
buildings were metered for energy consumption by the building or grouping of build-
ings when they were constructed, the utility managers have no easy method to track 
individual apartment energy use. The local government would like to establish policies 
and programs that promote improved residential energy conservation in Happy Hills. 
What public policy or program recommendations would you recommend?
As you make your recommendations be sure to consider energy conserving tech-
nology selection and integration, program standards and implementation, financing 
for incentives or grants, building owner acceptance, building occupant reaction, and 
how to monitor program success and metrics. After you have your initial recommen-
dations, consider the following questions: What would be different if the apartments 
were owned individually by the occupants? What would be different if the residences 
were detached from each other rather than in a multiple occupancy building?
This problem is likely to have a multitude of solutions, none of which would be 
ideal due to the complex interaction involved. The case example should stimulate 
thought and discussion about the range of issues encountered at the nexus of tech-
nology and a common set of circumstances with both private and public implica-
tions. The best solution will integrate the concerns of the stakeholders resulting in 
measurable reductions in building operating energy as an outcome.
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“Energy and persistence conquer all things”
Benjamin Franklin
Epilogue: Reflections on our Path Forward
What do the trajectories of energy supply and demand, population growth, and cli-
mate change suggest about the future? Can sustainable, practical, affordable solutions 
be brought to bear upon these challenges? As we deepen our understanding of the ques-
tions, we come to realize that the solutions will not be easy ones at all. These are wicked 
problems that will require trade-offs and tough decisions. They will lead to new ques-
tions, some more complicated yet. As we noted in Part I, it is unlikely a single technol-
ogy or a single country will swing the needle entirely by itself. Nor will any single policy, 
however robust and timely. Lasting solutions will rely on creative interdisciplinary col-
laboration, and not just within academia but from the furthest reaches of the public and 
private sectors as well. They will involve more active participation from consumers and 
civil society, be accompanied by a growing social consciousness, and demand further 
technological innovation and coordinated policy dialogue.
When considering tomorrow’s energy supply and demand trends, it is important 
to recognize that compelling market factors will continue to heavily influence these. 
In the near term, if one expects that consensus opinion will overwhelmingly embrace 
large price premiums in return for low carbon energy, then one has not fully consid-
ered the adaptability and market efficiency of today’s current energy matrix. That said, 
with increasing concern over resource scarcity and environmental impacts, it is now 
more widely appreciated that existing energy resources, natural gas and nuclear power 
as examples, can represent a viable bridge to a more diverse, sustainable, and lower 
carbon energy future. This will not happen by accident, nor will the bridge have any 
value if it does not have an opposite shore on which to land. Thus, technology, policy 
and consumer response must become more synchronized and flexible to spawn robust 
energy and climate strategies in the face of changing variables, evolving economies and 
electorates, and new scientific data and discoveries.
With world population having reached seven billion in late 2011, “medium band” 
projections indicate a world population of approximately nine billion by 2050, increas-
ing relatively modestly to ten billion by 2100. Thus, by 2050 the planet will be home to 
thirty percent more people than it is today. Asia is the most populated continent today 
with 4.3 billion inhabitants (sixty percent of world population), largely comprised of the 
combined populations of China and India. Africa hosts one billion inhabitants. These 
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statistics confirm the growing life force of the planet and global energy requirements 
will continue to increase accordingly. And while expansion of developing regions often 
welcomes a rising middle class, nations must thoughtfully grapple with the resource 
implications of broader economic prosperity. Challenges in meeting the social, eco-
nomic, and technological requirements for a larger emerging world force are therefore 
considerable, not least owing to the fact that the world is struggling today with oil prices 
in excess of $100 per barrel, coupled with an awareness of the historic dependence of 
global economic growth on oil production.
On climate, it is widely considered that a global temperature increase in excess of 
2°C will result in considerable variation to habitats, which in turn will affect food pro-
duction and livelihood for populations in many regions of the world. Impact predic-
tions are well beyond the scope of this book, however experts note that a number of 
geographical locations including the United States, Australia, and Africa may be in-
creasingly susceptible to drought. Other regions are expected to experience increasing 
levels of rainfall, including Asia, parts of Europe and the US. Some regions will suffer 
on account of crop failure while others may benefit through warmer weather pattern 
shift from southern to northern regions.
Part II of our book has laid a strong foundation from which we can draw some sa-
lient observations about prospects for energy production and conversion technologies. 
Carbonaceous fossil fuels—principally coal, oil, and gas—remain the major constitu-
ents fueling our growing energy demands as the search for new and unconventional re-
sources, once considered beyond reach, gains pace via new and unprecedented mining 
and extraction technologies. The debates relating to developments in carbon capture 
and storage (CCS) and extraction of natural gas from shale continue to gather pace, 
while coal is expected to continue providing significant baseload power in many coun-
tries. A serious conundrum remains that national climate objectives cannot be achieved 
without the effective demonstration and implementation of CCS, which is not expected 
to be achievable at sufficient scale prior to 2030.
Natural gas can be viewed as a microcosm of the types of issues that may increas-
ingly accompany the world’s energy future. Consider that the tremendous quantities 
of low cost natural gas from shale formations via new hydrofracking techniques have 
been made possible by innovative technologies pioneered over the past several decades, 
with both government and private support. From 2005 to 2013, the share of US natural 
gas from shale formations has increased from about four percent to more than thirty 
percent and will continue to climb. Estimates of gas quantities that may be recover-
able through hydrofracking vary; some analysts suggest that up to forty trillion cubic 
meters is attainable in the US alone. This, if achievable, could satisfy a large portion of 
energy demand for upwards to one hundred years at about half the emissions of coal. 
The increase in emissions to Earth’s atmosphere through greater deployment of gas will 
nevertheless be substantial; there is no room for complacency in assuming natural gas 
will be a solution to a warming atmosphere and climate change.
And yet while some see unconventional natural gas as the solution to national if 
not global energy problems, public opinion is divided on the subject. Critics fear en-
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vironmental damage may result through widespread exploitation of gas by hydraulic 
fracturing and are concerned about the effectiveness and standardization of regulatory 
frameworks. There is credible concern of a significant increase in carbon footprint ow-
ing to venting and leakage of both carbon dioxide and methane during mining, and 
through the combustion of natural gas to produce energy following extraction and pro-
cessing. A further point of controversy relating to fracking comes from concerns about 
increased pressure that underground fluid injection can exert on seismic faults, thus 
making them more likely to slip. Reports by seismologists in the US note a number of 
small quakes which have been triggered by far off larger earthquakes; it is apparent that 
wastewater injection critically loads local faults, placing them on the verge of rupture. 
Amid these challenges stand great opportunities for technologists, policy makers, and 
informed consumers to collectively balance the trade-offs and adopt lasting strategies 
with regard to natural gas.
Additional challenges and opportunities surround the deployment of renewable 
energy resources as well. The European Wind Energy Association is intent on achieving 
a target of twenty percent total EU electricity consumption powered by wind, while the 
United States claimed the number one spot in wind connectivity from China for 2012. 
Combining with a very strong year in Europe, the annual world market grew by ten 
percent, equivalent to forty-five gigawatts, and with total combined global wind instal-
lation of 282.5 GW. Other regions of the world are seriously engaged in wind energy 
development and installation as well, including Latin America, Africa and Asia. Policy 
at the national level is a critical factor in driving both domestic and regional markets. 
Having greatly incentivized record US installations in 2012, the US Federal Renewable 
Electricity Production Tax Credit (PTC) was extended for one year on 1 January 2013. 
The message is clear that wind energy is growing and that renewable energy technol-
ogies can indeed be deployed into existing markets at scale. However intermittency, 
grid integration and paybacks without subsidy support remain key hurdles to overcome 
going forward.
Throughout the first decade of the twenty-first century solar photovoltaic energy 
(PV) has been the fastest growing renewable energy technology globally. The cumula-
tive total reached 100 GW by the end of 2012, of which seventy-five percent was installed 
since 2009. Concentrated solar power (CSP) which generates heat and electricity, is also 
gaining in popularity, particularly in the United States and in Spain. IEA estimates that 
solar energy could provide up to one-third of the world’s energy demand after 2060. 
Though optimistic, it signals the potential for growth in what is perhaps the most nat-
ural energy available to planet Earth. Costs have fallen and in sunny countries, solar 
thermal energy (STE) and solar photovoltaic electricity (PV) are competitive against 
oil-fueled electricity generation, and are very effective in helping meet demand peaks. 
Rooftop solar water heating has soared in China, and IEA believes that rooftop PV in 
sunny countries could be a way forward in meeting local generation requirements. The 
tough reality is that further support by way of feed-in tariffs, including market-based 
reverse auction mechanisms, will be required for some time before the industry can 
stand on its own and eventually sustain itself. It is worth noting that solar power has 
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been accompanied by certain unintended consequences over the past decade, for 
example by guaranteeing artificially high electricity rates. The hope is that these grow-
ing pains and lessons learned help make utilities, investors and policy makers more 
effective at commercializing renewable energy.
Hydro remains the world’s largest source of renewable electricity. It was second 
to wind power in new installations between 2005 and 2010. Although more suited to 
some countries than others based on geography and natural resources, there is room 
for significant growth in the decades ahead. In pumped storage hydroelectricity, Japan 
has successfully pioneered a seawater energy storage facility at Kunigama, Okinawa, 
a non-trivial challenge due to corrosion considerations. A consortium in Ireland has 
proposed development of a large-scale pumped storage scheme which, coupled with 
wind turbines whose energy pumps seawater to upper storage lakes, could provide the 
majority of the country’s electricity needs. Energy storage remains a strategic need that 
can enable renewable energy generated from intermittent sources, and one where inno-
vation, investment and multi-stakeholder dialogues are in great demand.
While Ocean Energy developments, including tidal power, tidal marine currents, 
wave power, gradients of temperature and salinity, are at an early stage, there is promise 
that breakthroughs will enable deployment, particularly in island and remote locations. 
An array of proposed, planned and operational wave and tidal energy projects and ma-
rine test sites in Europe, span the continent from Norway to the northern coasts of 
Africa. Technological advances will be critical in demonstrating the viability of this 
resource. Similarly, there is also potential for a scaled increase in the global production 
of geothermal heat and electricity outwards to 2050. IEA estimates that geothermal 
energy can comprise 3.5% of global electricity and 4% of heat energy by 2050, perhaps 
optimistic, but again indicative of what technology appropriately deployed may be ca-
pable of achieving.
Biofuels are similar to shale gas, in that they represent another intriguing microcosm 
of the interplay between technologies and policies with regard to economic and environ-
mentally sustainable energy solutions. As we graduate from first generation to second, 
agricultural land area, second-generation conversion technologies, environmental prom-
ises, and practical policies are all central to the evolving debate. Sustainable deployment 
of high-impact, second-generation biofuels will undoubtedly require balanced policy 
measures and an improvement in the economics of advanced biofuel production. With 
experience as our guide, active participation and compromise from engineers, scientists, 
economists, law makers, and consumers can also be expected to figure in.
With regard to the future of nuclear energy, we again see that a delicate balance 
is imperative to address the social and political complexities associated with sensitive 
technology. Societal concerns and the consequential realities of nuclear accidents con-
tinue to reappear at Fukushima, following the March 2011 nuclear accident. Among 
these were concerns relating to recorded radiation levels in sea water near the power 
plant. Strategies to address these issues remain ongoing, and represent another area 
in which the technological and policy communities must cooperate and counsel each 
other to facilitate best possible outcomes. Another takeaway from this ongoing dilemma 
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is the reality that although accidents at nuclear power plant are rare, the resulting con-
sequences can be far reaching. This adds to public disquiet and mistrust of nuclear 
energy and factors into societal acceptance of regional nuclear plant construction. Yet 
for many countries, strategic national targets call for meaningful contributions from 
nuclear power to help meet key CO2 reduction goals by mid-century.
As with energy production where the easy oil has been consumed, and decisions 
have become much more complex and interconnected, future energy use will present 
some equally difficult challenges. The world has grown accustomed to a cheap and 
readily available supply, creating a behavior on the consumption side that is as pre-
dictable as it is unsustainable. Perspectives drawn from Part III speak to the future of 
energy consumption.
We have seen that the introduction of renewable energy sources into existing 
markets is a complex socio-techno-economic challenge that depends upon alignment 
of stakeholder objectives in order to truly succeed. Thus far, complete alignment has 
generally proven elusive. While the economics of energy distribution and use cur-
rently favors traditional sources, growing government and private sector investment 
in renewable energy systems is reflecting broader awareness and acceptance of the 
need to address fossil fuel dependence and climate change. A key takeaway is that 
civil society, and more specifically the individuals that comprise it, have important 
roles to play. The best renewable technology under the most appropriate policy must 
still be met by a market where individuals advocate and engage in its adoption and 
use. Timing and communication among the stakeholders are tantamount to the tech-
nology and policy themselves.
The broad categories of transportation and buildings collectively account for about 
seventy percent of global energy consumption. While each is unique, some common 
trends apply including near-term efforts aimed at improving energy efficiency. Admit-
tedly, this may not sound as exciting or cutting edge as other emerging technologies, but 
energy efficiency may in fact be among the most critical near-term means of reducing 
energy demand and emissions in relatively immediate and affordable ways. The tech-
nologies largely exist, there is substantial policy and regulatory precedent, and consum-
ers can see the direct economic benefits from their investments. More efficient vehicles, 
including optimization of internal combustion engines and aggressive national fuel 
economy standards have combined to accelerate efficiency efforts in transportation. Im-
plemented effectively, this will have the effect of dramatically reduced oil demand and 
emissions from the sector. New technologies including hybrid and electric vehicles, and 
advanced fuels will increase in market share, but their commercial viability will depend 
on development, validation and production costs. Fleet turnover will be gradual, but 
new technologies in automotive and aviation show great promise and have done well to 
ensure alignment within industry and government entities, to streamline the eventual 
policy rollout.
In the built environment, insulation, lighting, controls, heating/cooling, and other 
conservation and efficiency improvements from off-the shelf technologies are contrib-
uting to dramatic gains in energy savings and reduced environmental impact. This is 
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a success story in real time whose value should not be understated. For new buildings, 
the outlook is promising and will increase compliance to stringent standards. That said, 
older buildings comprise a dominant share of the stock, exceeding ninety  percent in 
many regions. This dilemma means assessing the benefits and costs associated with 
upgrades becomes more difficult. Longer term solutions are case dependent, and will 
likely involve innovation related to more intelligent design and use of HVAC, lighting, 
water, and advanced building materials, among others. An exciting aspect of built en-
vironment energy analysis is the more clearly defined interaction of the consumer with 
energy decisions. Though more data-informed and rational responses are desirable in 
consumer decisions, lessons learned from this sector may have far reaching application 
to others, and provide avenues for more proactive energy involvement by lay society.
We hear you saying, “I want to make a difference.” Consider three closing themes as 
we conclude our reflections on the path forward.
For the future of energy supply, diversity in the energy matrix is imperative. By 
all means, there is room to scale-up renewable technologies, but it will happen alongside 
efforts to optimize conventional and fossil resources. This means that wind, biofuels, 
solar, and other clean alternatives will become truly competitive; and it also means the 
momentum in natural gas and nuclear must be leveraged in order to reduce the envi-
ronmental impact. It means managing the tough realities of coal and oil. For now, all 
cost effective kilowatt-hours (and BTUs) will find a market; and in the very near future, 
there will be an ever-increasing demand for the clean ones.
For the future of energy consumption, efficiency and conservation must not be 
overlooked. In the next decade, these areas will potentially do more to reduce energy 
costs, use, and emissions than even the cleanest new energy sources. While the inno-
vation may look different from R&D on new conversion technology, it will be no less 
impactful. This is about a relentless focus to extract the most value from every watt. 
Intelligent controls, advanced materials, cutting edge optimization technologies for 
mature industries, and more informed and proactive consumers—these will become 
the agents of change.
For the next generation of energy leaders, social awareness and technological 
innovation must go hand in hand. Grand global challenges like energy and climate 
demand that problem solvers interact across boundaries, and outside of comfort zones. 
Tomorrow’s policy makers, for instance, must more deeply appreciate the complexity 
of engineering and economic challenges. Tomorrow’s scientists and engineers must not 
only be aware of social implications, but conversant enough to speak candidly and af-
fect them favorably. The world is in need of better data to be sure. But equally critical are 
educated experts willing to interpret data and communicate complex issues throughout 
the world.
We have not found a perfect source of energy. Nor have we resolved the difficult 
issues of consumption. For the foreseeable future, we thus have some compromises to 
make. Since the first man-made fire, draft animals, steam engines, jet airplanes, per-
sonal computers, and smart phones we have opted to leverage our natural resources to 
reduce our physical burden, improve our quality of life, and accelerate our journey in 
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this world. A world that is an organism, of which we are a critical and wonderful part. 
We have pioneered great achievements and witnessed many natural and man-made di-
sasters. Yet we adapt, learn, innovate, and try to improve. Taking on board all this new 
data affects everyone differently—some retreat, many carry on as usual, others take up 
action. In crisis, action is often needed; the engine does not run itself, so to speak. And 
yet, even action alone may not guarantee positive change. The action must be informed, 
coordinated, flexible; it must be backed by a critical mass; and it must leverage the best 
of technology and policy, of science and the human heart. The physical laws and data 
that describe our world to us are impersonal and without conscience. Not so for us. And 
therein lies perhaps our greatest challenge and our greatest opportunity.
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